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Abstract
The thesis critically examines the challenges of implementing cybersecurity in Nigeria. It focuses
in particular on identity-related cybercrimes in e-payment systems. The thesis follows two broad
lines of investigation. First, it examines how the convergence of telecommunications and banking
services create a multi-stakeholders’ e-payment service provider system and the implications of
this convergence for security and regulation of e-payment systems. Second, the thesis examines
the societal, institutional and political considerations that affect the legal and regulatory responses
to identity-related cybercrimes or that explain the lack of such responses.
The research reveals that social perceptions of cybercrimes and political interference in law
making process, as well as lack of proper identity management systems are crucial factors which
affect the development and effectiveness of cybersecurity laws in Nigeria. The research also
reveals that policy proposals for cybersecurity have focused extensively on criminal legislation
and that this approach has marginalised the roles of data protection and identity management laws
in preventing identity-related cybercrimes.
The thesis argues that current self-regulatory initiatives in the Nigerian e-payment industry are
inadequate due to the multi-stakeholders’ nature of electronic transactions. Using Lessig’s theory
of modalities of regulation as a theoretical framework, the thesis highlights the primacy of laws in
defining privacy and security standards as well as technical standards for the protection of users
of e-payment services. The thesis however concludes that although laws are crucial, and
cybercrimes are global, the development of cybersecurity laws must be moderated by an
understanding of the legal and regulatory challenges as well as the socio-cultural and political
factors in Nigeria. The thesis makes specific recommendations for developing laws and policies
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The emergence of the digital economy has generated much debate about cybersecurity.
This is more so in Nigeria with the increasing adoption of electronic means of payment.
E-payment systems are expected to facilitate the development of e-commerce through a
range of technology driven payment instruments and services. They are also expected to
improve banking and payment services and ultimately facilitate Nigeria’s integration into
the digital market place. Therefore, the migration of consumers to e-payment systems is
backed by active government policies. However, developments in cybersecurity laws
have not corresponded with government’s policies to promote the digital economy and in
spite of its relative nascence, e-payments are already being exploited by criminals.
Increased criminal activities are particularly significant because Nigeria already has one
of the highest records of internet crimes in the world.1 The high record of criminality has
been attributed to a number of factors including lack of legislation on cybercrimes and
lack of regulation in the general area of cybersecurity. As a basis for understanding the
challenges of developing and implementing cybersecurity laws in Nigeria, this research
examines the legal and regulatory responses to identity-related cybercrimes in e-payment
systems. Where there have been no responses, the analyses in the thesis examines the
reasons which account for lack of responses.
The thesis starts with a general overview of law and regulation of the e-payment industry
in Nigeria. It follows with the analysis of the cybercrime threats to e-payment systems. It
then examines the legal and regulatory structures put in place to control cybercrime in
Nigeria. The thesis follows with the analysis of the theories of regulation of cyberspace
and how these aid the understanding of the relevance and primacy of legal regulation. It
concludes with recommendations for achieving cybersecurity consistent with the legal,
enforcement and regulatory environment in Nigeria.
This chapter sets out the broad framework for the thesis. It describes the central thesis of
the research and its originality and contribution to knowledge. It also sets out the
1 See eg Federal Bureau of Intelligence Internet Crime Complaint Centre, ‘2013 Internet
Crime Report’ <https://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2013_IC3Report.pdf> accessed
01/06/2015.
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principal research questions sought to be answered and a synopsis of the chapters in the
thesis. The chapter concludes with a description of the methodology employed to answer
the questions, the data analysis technique, how ethical issues were addressed, and the
limitations of this research.
1.1 Central Thesis and Contribution to Knowledge
It is argued in this thesis that innovations in payment systems have positive and negative
implications for the development of the digital economy. Lack of legal regulation will
promote the negative effects of cybercrime and encroach on user trust and confidence.
Conversely, legal regulation of security and privacy standards in e-payment systems will
control the negative effects of cybercrimes and increase user confidence and trust in
electronic transactions. However, criminal laws which have been the main focus of policy in
Nigeria provide scant protection against the threats of cybercrimes. It is argued that rather
than the criminal law, law and policy makers should focus on an amalgam of laws
particularly those that boost data protection and engender trust in electronic transactions. As
preventive measures, these laws offer better protection than the reactive criminal law.
Apart from the literature which implicates Nigeria in pervasiveness of cybercrimes, there is
a relative paucity of literature on cybercrimes and cybersecurity in Nigeria. In addition, the
existing literature is devoted to advocating an update of the criminal law to accommodate
new forms of online offending. Little is thus understood on why criminal laws have not
been passed or their limitations in dealing with cybercrimes. Different to other research, this
thesis goes beyond the rhetoric of criminal legislation. Using e-payment systems as a case
study and following the notion that law cannot be examined in a vacuum, the thesis
investigates the legal, social and cultural constraints to implementing cybersecurity in
Nigeria. It proposes that by understanding these issues, we may better develop a proposal
that meets the exigencies and idiosyncrasies of the social and legal environment. The
research is therefore original in two distinct ways. One, it advances the literature by
providing explanations based on empirical study, on the reasons underpinning the current
responses (or lack of it) to cybercrimes in Nigeria. Two, based on the understanding of the
socio-legal environment, it proposes a regulatory model for cybersecurity in Nigeria. The
findings made by the research will enhance the development of the digital economy in
Nigeria by negotiating an appropriate approach to controlling theft and fraud online. It will
also have far-reaching implications for controlling other cyber-related crimes such as
money-laundering and terrorist financing.
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1.2 Principal Research Questions
The objective of the research is summed up in a research question as follows; to what extent
has the Nigerian law evolved to meet the challenges of cybersecurity in electronic
transactions? In order to place the investigation within the context of e-payment systems,
this thesis will also answer the following specific questions; what are e-payment systems
and what role do they play in development and governance in Nigeria? How do cybercrimes
threaten e-payment systems and how has industry and policy responded to the threats? To
what extent has the criminal law responded to the threats of cybercrimes and what reasons
account for the response(s) or lack of it? How does the understanding of data protection
regimes aid the prevention of identity related cybercrimes and to what extent has the
Nigerian law integrated data protection standards? How do theories of cyberspace regulation
aid the understanding of the limits of private ordering systems and self-regulation in the
context of controlling identity-related crimes in e-payment systems? To aid the development
of the electronic economy and considering the context of the Nigerian society and nature of
cybercrimes, how should the law best address the challenges of identity related cybercrimes
in e-payment systems?
1.3 Chapter Structure and Synopsis
To address the research questions, the thesis is divided into seven further chapters as follows:
Chapter Two – Legal and Institutional Frameworks for E-payment Systems in Nigeria
Chapter two provides an important background context for the thesis in three ways. First, it
provides relevant background information on the Nigerian legal system including the
constitutional framework and law making process. Second, it highlights the development of
e-payment systems in Nigeria and demonstrates how new payment instruments, channels
and institutions pose new challenges for traditional banking and financial regulation. Third,
the chapter examines the significance of e-payments to economic growth, development and
governance in Nigeria.
Chapter Three – Cybercrime Threats to E-payment Systems
Chapter three also sets an important analytical background for the examination of law and
policy on the control of identity-related cybercrimes in Nigeria. Against the background of
data collected during the fieldwork, the chapter examines different forms of cybercrimes
that threaten e-payment systems, services, institutions and users. The chapter begins by
charting the development of cybercrimes in Nigeria. It then evaluates the re-emergence of
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cyber-fraud as a problem in the face of new e-payment systems. The chapter considers in
particular the threats posed by criminal activities such as hacking, phishing and spamming,
and identity theft and fraud. It also explicates the position of service provider organisations,
particularly telecommunications and financial and non-financial organisations, as threat
vectors. In establishing the links between data breaches and identity theft and fraud, the
chapter examines the notion of identity, its digital dimensions and the criminal use of
identity information in e-payment systems in Nigeria. The chapter concludes with the
consideration of the solutions offered to resolve threats to identity information. It examines
in particular technologically based solutions such as authentication protocols and encryption,
the Payment card Industry Data Security Standards (PCIDSS) and the various regulations
and guidelines provided by the Central Bank of Nigeria to ensure consumer protection and
deter identity theft and fraud.
Chapter Four –Criminal Law Responses to Identity Related Cybercrimes
Chapter four evaluates the responses of the criminal law to cybercrimes generally and
identity related crimes in particular. The chapter examines the extent to which the threats
identified in chapter three have been criminalised. It evaluates the position of extant
criminal legislation on hacking, phishing, identity theft and fraud relative to traditional
crimes such as burglary, criminal trespass, impersonation and fraud. Based on the
examination of the relevant provisions of the proposed law on cybercrime in Nigeria, the
Cybercrime Bill 2014, and its juxtaposition with those of the UK Computer Misuse Act
1990, the analysis identifies gaps in the Nigerian criminal law. Finally, using the empirical
data and the literature, the chapter provides some understandings of the challenges and
limits of criminal legislation to combat cybercrime. It examines in particular how
perceptions of the crime by the society, law enforcement agents and even lawmakers may
affect the effectiveness of a cybercrime law.
Chapter five- Regulation of Data Processing in Nigeria
Chapter five examines alternative regulatory approaches implicating service provider
organisations in the protection of consumer information which are susceptible to criminal
exploitation. The chapter begins by identifying the links between privacy and e-payment
systems. It then referenced the literature in distinguishing between the concepts of privacy
and data protection. The analysis in the chapter proceeds with the examination of the state
of the Nigerian law on regulation of data processing. In particular, the chapter evaluates
different regulatory guidelines developed by the telecommunication and financial sectors on
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data protection. Using the UK/EU Data Protection law as the main comparative reference,
the chapter concludes with the examination of the provisions of a draft Nigerian data
protection law which is modelled closely to the Canadian Personal Information Protection
and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) 2000. It examines the scope of the proposed law
and interpretational and conceptual challenges which it may pose considering the nature of
the internet and in the context of mandating organisations to protect personal information.
Chapter Six – Theories of Regulation in Cyberspace
In order to underscore the limits of technology and industry private ordering systems in the
control of identity-related cybercrimes, chapter six examines the theories of regulation in
cyberspace. The chapter sets out the respective theories of cyberspace regulation and
evaluates the cyber-libertarian and cyber-paternalists concepts of regulation. Having
critiqued the different regulatory approaches advanced by the two schools of thought, the
chapter argues that Lessig’s alternative theoretical framework of modalities of regulation is
useful for addressing the problems of identity theft and fraud in e-payment systems. The
chapter tests the validity of this position by demonstrating how technology, industry and
norms fail to regulate effectively unless they are backed by the force of law.
Chapter Seven – A Proposal for Cybersecurity in E-payment Systems in Nigeria
Chapter seven follows up on chapter six and argues that an approach promoting law as the
primary source of regulatory rules should apply in the particular context of the Nigerian
system. In order to provide further support for this position, the chapter summarises and
reviews the main findings and arguments from the empirical data and the literature. It argues
in particular that for cybersecurity laws to be effective, there must also be an understanding
of how different laws function in different socio-cultural and legal and regulatory contexts.
In this respect, the chapter identifies the systemic problems of implementing and enforcing
the cybercrime law in Nigeria. It also highlights the general ineffectiveness of the criminal
law in controlling cybercrime at national and international levels. The chapter therefore
recommends that policy should focus on preventive non-criminal legislation rather than
cybercrime laws which are essentially reactive. Based on the findings from the empirical
data, the chapter concludes with specific recommendations which should be implemented to
achieve cybersecurity in Nigeria.
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Chapter Eight –Conclusion of Central Thesis
Chapter Eight concludes the thesis. It re-examines the research questions and identifies the
broader applicability of the research findings.
1.4 Research Methodology
The research takes an exploratory approach to developing an understanding of the control of
identity related cybercrimes in e-payment systems in Nigeria. A qualitative methodology is
found to be more appropriate in addressing the research questions and the thesis employs
both documentary and empirical methods of research.
1.4.1 Documentary Research
Documentary research involves a review of existing literature to provide the background for
a theoretical analysis of the questions posed by the research. In this regard, primary sources
such as statutes and case laws are examined. Carefully selected secondary sources of
information including texts, journal articles, records of legislative proceedings and relevant
grey literature are also examined. Notably, documentary analysis provide important insights
into the subject or phenomenon being studied and aid the understanding of existing theories
and development of new ones. As Webley noted, the importance of documentary analysis in
legal research is underscored by the fact that documents provide evidence of directions.
They also provide evidence of legislative intent and provide understandings of perceived
shortcomings or best practices in the legal system as well proposing an agenda for change.
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More crucially, where the research involves empirical work, textual data may be used to
support observational or interview findings.3
While this research is not essentially comparative, the thesis involves some comparative
analysis. The documentary research draws on the literature pertaining to cybercrimes and
cybersecurity in other jurisdictions particularly the UK. Generally, comparative materials
can serve as an illustration or constitute persuasive authorities, they can be supportive of an
argument and they help to elucidate existing rules of law to test its soundness or otherwise.4
Therefore, the comparative perspectives in this research stems from its usefulness in
enabling the thesis to examine what is right or wrong with the legal process or system in
Nigeria based on available materials and experiences in the UK. The UK is particularly
2 Lisa Webley, ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research’ in Peter Cane and
Herbert ‘M. Kritzer, The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (OUP 2010) 11.
3 Kathy Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory (2nd edn, SAGE 2014) 48.
4 Charles Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspects of Money (6th edn, OUP 2006).
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relevant because Nigeria shares a common law origin with the UK and still references
English laws, cases and practices in her legislative and judicial systems. Hence, cases from
the UK are said to have ‘persuasive’ authorities on the Nigerian courts.
It is however important to state that the thesis did contain an isolated review of the literature
in the sense of summarising the findings in the literature in a single chapter. The approach
taken here is to integrate the review into the body of the thesis and to summarise the
literature throughout the whole project. This approach is followed because it provides an
avenue not only to summarise the existing literature but also to synthesise the literature with
the analysis and context of the research.
1.4.2 Empirical Study
The purpose of the empirical work is to provide explanations and insights into the
challenges of achieving cybersecurity from practical perspectives of practitioners and
experts in the area. It is particularly useful to this research because cybersecurity is a new
and emerging area in Nigeria and the literature is typically and expectedly scant. The
empirical data therefore fills the gap by providing additional and alternative means of
identifying and understanding the problems. The empirical work is also useful for theorising
and therefore generalising the research findings. According to Creswell, an appropriate
methodology must capture the philosophical assumptions of the researcher including the
ontological and epistemological perspectives underpinning the research. 5 Qualitative
research methodologies are therefore inductive, emerging, and shaped by the researcher’s
experience in collecting the data.6 Consequently, good qualitative data are more likely to
lead to unanticipated findings which help researchers to get beyond initial conceptions and
to generate or revise conceptual frameworks.7
1.4.2.1 Choice of Participants
With respect to the identification and choice of participants, a purposive sampling method
was adopted. In a purposive sampling, the researcher’s priority is the relevance of the
selected sample group and the contributions of their account of reality to the task of
answering the research questions.8 The use of this form of sampling to generate qualitative
data is therefore founded on the need to examine from practical perspectives the challenges
5 John W Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design Choosing Among Five
Approaches (Sage 2013) 22-41.
6 ibid.
7 Matthew Miles and Michael Hubberman, Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded
Sourcebook (Sage 1994) 1.
8 S Sarantakos, Social Research (2nd edn, Palgrave 2005) 152.
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posed by cybercrimes. This approach to qualitative inquiry is important to the objective
analysis of the subject of the research and the validity of the conclusions reached by the
thesis.
Following the above, participants in the fieldwork were selected from law enforcement
agencies engaged in cybercrime investigations and prosecution (hereinafter law
enforcement), officials of banks and non-bank organisations providing e-payment services
(hereinafter payment service providers), and regulators of the payment and financial
industry (hereinafter regulators). Other participants include lawmakers in the Nigerian
National Assembly (hereinafter lawmakers), government agencies engaged in policy
formulations and legal drafting (hereinafter policy makers) and information security experts
(hereinafter IT security experts). A total of 21 interviews were conducted. These include 9
payment service providers, 3 policymakers, 4 lawmakers, 2 representatives of regulatory
bodies and 3 IT security experts. 19 interviews were eventually analysed as two participants
withdrew their participation.
It is important to mention that while the validity of a qualitative inquiry is not necessarily
linked to a large number of participants, 9 the relatively small number of interview
participants in this research reflects the dearth of expertise in the area of cybercrimes and
cybersecurity in Nigeria. On the part of payment service providers, the newness of the
services, and the inclination of payment service providers to engage third party information
security organisations, perhaps explains the relative lack of expertise. However, expertise is
equally lacking among law enforcement agencies, policy makers and lawmakers. For
example, some central policy making authorities have virtually no staff and law
enforcement is made up of very small circle of cybercrime investigators or “experts”. Also,
because of the high rate of turn-over in the legislative houses, most lawmakers have had no
opportunity and/or experience of participating in any debates on cybercrime/cybersecurity
laws. Therefore, selection had to be made among the principal officials of the legislative
houses based on availability and willingness to participate in the interviews, but most
importantly, based on their access to archived documents and legislative records. These
participants were identified through referrals within the legislative house itself.
1.4.2.2 Form of Interviews
The empirical work was conducted through qualitative interviews and all interviews took
place from April to July 2013. The choice of qualitative interviews is based on the role it
9 see Charmaz (n 3) 105-108; see also notes on generalizability of Findings below.
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plays in “interpretive inquiry”.10 For example, qualitative interviews allow the researcher
access to otherwise inaccessible areas such as people’s subjective experiences and
attitudes.11 The interviews can also be used to understand the meanings which people attach
to both their own actions and those of other people. 12 They can therefore expand the
horizons of a studied phenomenon and encompass both the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ of the
inquiry. As noted by Rubin and Rubin, ‘If what you want to find out cannot be answered
simply or briefly, if you anticipate that you may need to ask people to explain their answers
or give examples or describe their experiences, then you rely on in-depth interviews’.
13
Based on these elements, qualitative interviews was found to be a more appropriate method
of eliciting comprehensive responses on issues such as the scope of fraudulent electronic
payment activities, the nature of the responses to the activities, and the limits and
effectiveness of such responses as well as reasons for legal responses or lack of it.
Furthermore, semi-structured interviews are used in preference to loosely structured
interviews because when viewed from the perspective that qualitative interviews are guided
conversations, they tend to be more useful in generating data.14 Semi-structured interviews
enable the researcher to have some set questions while the majority of the questions will
then be open-ended rather than closed.15 This approach is useful in a number of ways. It
enables the questions which are of interest to the researcher to be covered while also
allowing room for the views of the interviewee to be freely expressed and incorporated. It
also enables the researcher to achieve a balance in the interviewer/interviewee relationship
because semi-structured interviews minimise status differences between interviewer and
respondent and can avoid the hierarchical pitfall. 16 Finally, semi-structured interviews
enable greater openness and insight, which can facilitate a wide range of responses, leading
to fuller and richer data. 17 In the context of this research therefore, semi-structured
interviews assisted the researcher to strike a balance between eliciting relevant information
10 Kathy Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide through Qualitative
Analysis (SAGE 2006) 25.
11 Anssi Rerakyla and Johanna Ruusuvuori, ‘Analysing Talk and Text’ in Norman K Denzin
and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds) The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research (4th edn, SAGE
2011) 529.
12 Webley (n 2) 4-9.
13 Herbert J. Rubin and Irene S. Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data
(2nd edn, SAGE 2005) 2-3.
14 ibid 3.
15 Webley (n 2) 9.
16 Uwe Flick, An Introduction to Qualitative Research (3rd edn, SAGE 2006).
17 Punch K F, Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches
(2nd edn, SAGE 2005).
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from law enforcement agents and industry regulators who were more receptive to fairly long
interviews or more open questions and from representatives of payment service providers
who were more reticent because of the constraints of time and the confidential nature of
financial services.
1.4.2.3 Conduct of Interviews
Whether identified prior to commencement of fieldwork or subsequently through referrals,
all participants were contacted by letters inviting them to participate in the interviews. A
Participant’s information sheet setting out the expectations and procedures to be followed
during the interviews was annexed to the interview letters. Most participants communicated
their willingness to participate in the interviews by contacting the researcher through the
telephone or e-mails. All the interviews were carried out in Nigeria and were conducted in
the workplace or offices of the participants. The participants were professionals and experts
in their respective fields and the interviews were conducted in an atmosphere of mutual
respect between the researcher and the participants.
The general format of the interview questions contained the main questions sought to be
covered during the interviews. Following the need to elicit as much information as possible,
the questions were framed in open-ended language. Also, to avoid pre-empting answers
from the participants, the format contained no leading questions. However, the profession
and area of expertise of the participants, as well as responses to the initial questions often
require that subsequent questions be modified or additional questions asked to elicit
meaningful and comprehensive information. In such cases, the researcher asks follow up
questions intended to generate specific responses. This approach is consistent with the form
of qualitative interviews which embed flexibility and openness.
To re-establish participants’ voluntary participation, they were requested to sign a ‘consent
form’ before the commencement of the interview. 18 All responses to interview questions
were handwritten and no audio or visual recordings were made. However, note-taking posed
some challenges particularly in cases where the participants speak very fast and in fairly
long interviews. Although longer interviews invariably generate a wide range of useful data,
it also often means it is difficult to maintain a steady and unbroken speed of note-taking.
Since the researcher was aware that the target participants may be opposed to the recording
of the interviews in the first place, requests were only made for participants to either repeat
their responses or to speak slowly rather than a request to switch to recording the responses.
18 See notes on research ethics below.
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Although, ultimately, the note-taking means the interview text sometimes trails off and
when repeated, the impact or meaning of certain statements is lost or reduced, the note-
taking process also aided the richness of the information. For example, because they were
not being recorded, participants appear more confident to give “sensitive” or “off the record”
information.19 Notably, most participants still gave permission for comments made “off the
record” to be written down and used by the researcher provided the participants could not be
identified.20 Taking handwritten notes therefore presumably put the participants more at
ease and willing to disclose relevant and important information.
1.5 Research Ethics- Informed Consent and Data Protection
Consistent with the University’s code of ethical conduct, ethical approval was sought and
obtained before the commencement of the fieldwork.21 In giving the ethical approval, the
ethics committee evaluated the research questions, the letters proposed to be sent to the
participants, and the participant’s information sheet as well as the participants consent form.
Before and during the interviews, all participants were informed about the process of the
interviews including the fact that participation was completely voluntary. Participants were
above the age of 18 and did not belong to any group of vulnerable individuals. They were
all therefore able to and did give their consent to the interviews by signing the declaration
on the participants’ consent form.
The research did not identify any risk of mental or psychological distress to any of the
participants. There were no anticipated or actual conflicts of personal, financial or
professional interests. The participants were professionals and offered information
voluntarily without any financial or other inducements. They were informed that they could
request for and will be sent transcripts of their respective interviews.
All personal and identifying information collected during the interviews were kept in
accordance with the Data protection law and the University Of Leeds Code Of Conduct on
Data Protection. Interview transcripts in the form of typed and handwritten notes were kept
19 One example of “off the record” information is one participant’s observation that
Nigerian lawmakers needed to be ‘lobbied’ in the form of monetary and other incentives to
pass a bill into law. When asked to clarify this notion of lobbying, a lawmaker also
answered, ‘what do you mean we are being lobbied? …. ‘That’s not true… it’s extremely
damaging… people shouldn’t talk like that…’
20 These assurances were given verbally although they were already stated in the
accompanying explanatory note.
21 Application for ethical review was made using the University of Leeds Research Ethics
Committee Application Form Version 11.
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safe in a locked cabinet. All data was anonymised and linking information was removed. All
data will be destroyed after the completion of this research.
1.6 Data Analysis
The analysis employed systematic coding of the data and used the grounded theory to
develop theoretical constructs. Coding in data analysis aids the linking of different segments
or instances in the data. It brings fragments of data together to create categories of data
having some common property or elements, and allows the differentiation and combination
of data and the reflections made about the information.22 As a tool, coding is meant to be
flexible and driven by the researcher’s insights.23 It is therefore a heuristic device used to
link the data to ideas and concepts rather than an end in itself. It is generally intended to
exploit the directional, critical, and analytical dimensions of the data. 24 The important
analytic work, as Coffey and Atkinson correctly argue, lies in the identification of relevant
concepts.25 Accordingly, Seidel and Kelle assert that, ‘codes represent the decisive link
between the original ‘raw data’, that is the textual material such as interview transcripts or
field notes, on the one hand and the researcher’s theoretical concepts on the other.’26
Following the directions above, coding of the interview data in this research was used to
assign meanings to words, statements or paragraphs as well as to generate ideas and
concepts related to the data. The handwritten interview transcripts were typed and data was
manually coded and manipulated to obtain their meanings. Three broad steps were followed
to analyse the data. In the first stage, labels or keywords were assigned to characterise the
interview data. In the second stage, codes and categories were further analysed for varieties
and commonalities. The objective of the second stage was to generate denser set of codes or
core categories to which themes could be assigned. 27 A Theme is described as an
integrating, rational statement derived from the data that identifies both content and
meaning. 28 It is the outcome of coding, categorisation and analytic reflection which
22 Amanda Coffey and Paul Atkinson, Making Sense of Qualitative Data Complementary
Research Strategies (SAGE 1996) 31.
23 Corbin J ‘Taking an Analytic Journey’ in J M Morse (ed), Developing Grounded Theory
(Walnut Creek Press 2009) 35, 40-41.
24 Coffey and Atkinson (n 22).
25 ibid.
26 Seidel J and Kelle U, ‘Different Functions of Coding in the Analysis of Textual Data’ in
U Kelle (ed), Computer-aided Qualitative Data Analysis: Theory, Methods and Practice
(Sage 1995) 52 cited in Coffey and Atkinson (n 22) 31.
27 Pat Bazeley, Qualitative Data Analysis Practical Strategies (SAGE 2013) 101-222.
28 Coffey and Atkinson (n 22) 190.
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elucidates the relationship between the coded categories and relevant theoretical
conceptions.29 (Sample codes annexed as appendix to thesis)
The third stage of the analysis involved the extrapolation of concepts and ideas from the
common themes. This is theoretical coding, which is the interpretative stage of the analysis
involving the linking of codes or core categories to the literature in order to understand the
theoretical implications of the data. As Coffey and Atkinson argue, although theories are
intrinsic in the research process itself, and often inform the coding process, however, since
generalisation of ideas is not dependent on the data alone, careful examination of codes can
also help to generate formal substantive theoretical ideas. 30 Notably, when theoretical
constructs develop later in the research, and after data collection and analysis, as in the case
of this research, they are said to be grounded in the data. Grounded theory is defined as the
discovery of theory from data systematically obtained and analysed in social research. 31
It is important to note here that because qualitative research involves personal engagement
with data collection, interpretation and reporting, it is often perceived as subjective. It is
therefore the responsibility of the researcher when coding the data, as with when selecting
the participants,32 to eliminate researcher opinions or prior concepts which may bias or
prejudice the analysis. In this research, data was treated uniformly and consistently either by
ruling out alternative explanations for the interpretation given by the researcher or by
finding sources independent of the data, which support the interpretation. Also, in order not
to stereotype the data, the researcher searched for variability and data which did not fit prior
expectations. For example, throughout the thesis, policy documents, reports and statistics as
well as comparative analysis from other jurisdictions were used to underline the correctness
of certain extrapolations made from the data or to rule out alternative explanations for the
conclusions drawn.33
Furthermore, since eliminating researcher bias also involves the use of appropriate data
analysis method, the grounded theory approach used in this research aided the researcher to
deal with and overcome conceptions made prior to data collection and analysis. As already
29 Saldana J, The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers (SAGE 2009) 13 cited in
Bazeley (n 27) 190-191.
30 Coffey and Atkinson (n 22) 141-153.
31 Barney G Glaser and Anslem L Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory (Weidenfield
and Nicolson 1967) 1, see also Cathy Urquhart, Grounded Theory for Qualitative Research
(SAGE 2013) 4.
32 See notes on generalizability of findings below.
33 See e.g. notes in 4.2.3.1 Access without Authority (Basic Hacking Offence) 97
particularly at 98-103.
14
implied above, grounded theory refers to both the process of coding itself and to the theory
generated from the data. As a process of coding, the role of the theory is to highlight the fact
that irrespective of the researcher’s preconceived notions, the data is bound to reveal
accounts of the phenomenon which cannot be formulated or conceived independently of the
data. Therefore, while grounded theory does not presuppose that the researcher has no
preconceived notions of theories or the literature, it overrides such preconceptions because it
ensures that the researcher keeps an open mind on the findings which may emerge from the
data, and ensures the researcher’s formulation of theories is based on the findings.34
As a final point in this section, it is important to state that similar to the literature review,
findings from the empirical research are integrated into the entire body of the thesis rather
than being presented as a separate chapter. This approach provides cohesion and better
contextual understanding of the data than would a dedicated chapter which may produce
fragmented and disjointed data sets.
1.7 Generalisability of Findings
Generalisation in qualitative research is often contested because of the context specific
nature of the research and the involvement of the subjective experience of the researcher.35
However, in the preponderance of the literature, it is also agreed that the notion of
generalisability in qualitative research is to be understood in terms of extrapolations and
interpretations which may form the basis for understanding situations and cases other than
those directly studied.36 In this respect, qualitative researchers may lay claim to external or
internal generalisation of their findings. Internal generalizability refers to generalising from
cases and settings directly or actually studied to those not studied but which are within the
same setting.37 The validity of internal generalizability depends on whether the sample
directly studied is representative of the population within that setting. 38 External
generalisation involves generalising to contexts or cases beyond the setting studied.
34 See Urquarth (n 31).
35 See e.g. Martyn Hammersley, Questioning Qualitative Inquiry: Critical Essays (Sage
2008); see also David Wainwright, ‘Can Qulaitative Research be Qualitative, Critical and
Valid’ (1997) 3(2) The Qualitatve Report.
36 See e.g. Joseph A Maxwell and Margaret Chmiel, ‘Generalisation in and From
Qualitative Analysis’ in Uwe Flick, (ed) The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis
(Sage 2014), 540; see also Mike Metcalfe, Generalisation Learning Across Epitemologies’
(2005) 6(1) Forum: Qualitative Social Research available <http://www.qualitative-
research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/525/1136?ref=driverlayer.com/image> accessed
05/11/2015.
37 Joseph A Maxwell, ‘Understanding and Validity in Qualitative Research’ (1992) 62(3)
Havard Educational Review 279, 293.
38 ibid 284.
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Although, internal generalizability is often regarded as a more legitimate claim by
qualitative researchers, this is not to say that claims to external generalisation cannot be
made. As Becker argues, generalisation in qualitative research usually takes place through
the development of theories which make sense not only of the particular case or
phenomenon studied but also shows how the same process can lead to different results in
different situations.39 As Johnson and Christensen also correctly observe, a well-developed
theory explains how something operates in general and enables one to move beyond the
findings of any single research.40
In this thesis, an important claim made to generalizability is the formulation of a theory
which underlines the impacts of socio-cultural and political and institutional factors to the
development of cybersecurity laws. This theory suggests that if law and policy take into
account socio-cultural and political and institutional contexts of a society, legal and
regulatory responses to cybercrimes can become more effective. Therefore, even in the
globalised contexts of cybercrime and cybersecurity, the development and effectiveness of
laws will be determined by the socio-political ethos of respective jurisdictions. In effect,
while the research avoids exaggerated claims to external generalizability in terms of the fact
that its findings are immediately transposable to a different jurisdiction, the theory it has
generated make the findings relevant for understanding the relevance of socio-cultural and
political contexts in cybersecurity discourse and solutions. These contexts might be similar
or diverse but they are present and should be taken into account.
As noted above, internal generalisation is far more important in qualitative research because
it underpins the validity of inferences drawn from the sample or case directly studied.
Therefore, as this research investigates the legal and regulatory responses to identity–related
cybercrimes, the purposive sampling approach already described above was used to identify
participants whose accounts are crucial to the case study. 41 This sampling method takes into
account the knowledge, experience and expertise of the sample population to the
investigation. To illustrate, participants were chosen from service provider organisations
because they are adequately positioned to give more accurate information about the nature
of cybercrimes that threaten e-payment systems and to understand the responses which have
been developed and how law and policy may otherwise respond to counter the threats. Also,
39 Howard Becker, ‘Generalising from Case Studies’ in Elliot W Eisner and Alan Peshkin
(eds), Qualitative Inquiry in Education: The Continuing Debate (New York Teachers
College Press) 240.
40 Johnson B and Christensen L, Educational Research: Quantitative, Qualitative, and
Mixed Approaches, Research Edition (2nd edn Pearson), 19.
41 See notes in 1.4.2.1 Choice of Participants above.
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lawmakers, law-enforcement agents and security experts as well as regulatory agencies were
chosen for their relevance in giving diverse and varied accounts of cybercrime and the
reasons underlying legal responses or lack of responses. In terms of its internal
generalizability therefore, the sample used in this research is sufficiently representative of
the population of available service providers and experts in the area of cybercrime and
cybersecurity in Nigeria.42 As Miles and Hubberman aptly point out, although the validity
of results depends on their internal generalizability to the particular case or setting being
studied, it is impossible to study ‘everyone everywhere doing everything, even within a
single case’.43 However, even if this was possible, it is arguable that not all possible
accounts of individuals, phenomena or institutions are equally useful, credible, or
legitimate.44 In view of this position, the extrapolations made from the account of the
participants in this research are as applicable to the narrow area of identity-related
cybercrimes in e-payments as they are to the broader area of cybercrime and cybersecurity.
1.8 Limitations of the Research
This research represents one of the most comprehensive attempts to understand the
problems of cybersecurity in Nigeria. It sets the tone for further inquiry, questions and
debates on the approach to regulating and controlling the growing problem of cybercrimes.
However, it suffers from two limitations. The first is that because the area of the law is
relatively new, literature and statistics are sparse. This means reliance had to placed almost
exclusively on foreign literature and the views and opinions of few experts in the field of
cybersecurity in Nigeria. The second, closely associated with the first is the dearth of
expertise in the area of cybercrimes and cybersecurity. Given that only few people are
knowledgeable in the area, the number of participants in the interviews is further limited to
the accessible individuals who could give expert and authoritative information and opinions
on the subject. This may have limited the perspectives from which the problems could be
understood. However, this deficit also provides the background for further research
particularly quantitative research into areas of privacy behaviour and societal perceptions of
cybercrimes.
42 ibid.
43 Mathew B Miles and A Micheal Hubberman, Qualitative, Qualitative Data Analysis:
Sourcebook of New Methods (Sage 1984) 36.
44 see Maxwell (n 37) 282-283.
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Chapter Two
Legal and Institutional Frameworks for E-payment
Systems in Nigeria
Introduction
E-payments are important for development and are essential to leverage the advantages of e-
commerce. Since the late 1990s, government policy in Nigeria has focused on reforming the
payment systems and the promotion of e-payment systems became a top policy agenda for
the government. However, the ensuing migration to e-payment systems has implications for
the financial industry, and the users of payment services as well as for law and policy. E-
payments implicated banks, other financial institutions, telecommunication providers and
other organisations in service provision, and payment facilitation and transmission. Also,
while the system enhanced interoperability, convergence and competition in the payment
industry, they aggravate the risks of cyber-intrusions, and other computer-related crimes
which raise the threats of identity crimes in fund transfer systems.
This chapter provides an overview of e-payment systems in Nigeria. The chapter is divided
into two parts. As a useful reference for later discussion in the thesis, the first part gives
some background information on the Nigerian legal system. It discusses the sources of
Nigerian laws and shows its links with English law. It also highlights the constitutional
arrangement and the legislative and judicial processes in Nigeria. The second part examines
the development of e-payment systems in Nigeria. It analyses the impacts of respective
payment instruments and the institutional arrangements for payment systems on users and
consumers. It also examines the legal status of e-payments relative to cash. The chapter
concludes with an examination of the major justifications for e-payments in Nigeria and its
advantages for e-commerce as well its implications for new forms of crimes.
2.1 PART I - An Introduction to the Nigerian Legal System
2.1.1 Sources of Law
Historically, Nigerian law developed from English law. British colonisation of Nigeria
effectively started with the annexation of Lagos in 1861. In 1900, Northern Nigeria became
the protectorate of the British. Southern Nigeria, together with the colony of Lagos was also
declared the colony and Protectorate of the British in 1906. Upon the commencement of
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colonial rule, English law was introduced, first into the colony of Lagos and subsequently
into the rest of Nigeria. 1 These laws became applicable and the courts were empowered to
enforce the common law of England, the doctrines of equity and statutes of general
application in force as at January 1, 1900.2 Customary laws and practices of the indigenous
people were also preserved and they were applicable provided that they were not repugnant
to natural justice, equity and good conscience, and were not incompatible with statute.3 In
1914, both the Northern and Southern protectorates were amalgamated and became the
country known today as Nigeria. However, owing to religious, political and geographical
diversity, the amalgamated entities continued to be administered separately.4 A legislative
council constituted in 1862 (called the Lagos Legislative Council) made laws for the colony
of Lagos and Southern Nigeria while in the north; laws were made by the Governor-General
of Nigeria. Even today, this dichotomy continued to impact on the legal and political
landscape. For example, in the North, the Penal Code which is based on criminal justice
according to Islamic laws is used.5 In the Southern part of the country, sharia system is not
recognised and the Criminal Code Act is the major legislation defining criminal conduct and
punishment.6
2.1.2 Constitutional Framework
Nigeria became independent in 1960 and became a Republic in 1963. The country had
operated a number of constitutions both during colonial era and post-colonial rule. Earlier
colonial constitutions operated a unitary system of government,7 while latter constitutions
promoted federalism which was eventually inherited and operated since independence.8
Under the Constitutions of 1960 and 1963 respectively, Nigeria was divided into three
Regions. These regions had extensive powers under the constitutions relative to the federal
government. The regions had separate constitutions and coat of arms. They also had residual
powers to legislate on matters which were not allocated to either the federal government or
1 See Supreme Court Ordinance No 11 of 1863, Ordinance of the Settlement of Lagos 1862-
1870 compiled by A Montague (1874).
2 See Supreme Court Proclamation No 8 of 1900.
3 See Supreme Court Ordinance No 6 of 1914 Nigeria Ordinance, Orders and Regulations
(1914).
4See National Assembly, ‘History of the Nigerian Senate’
<http://www.nassnig.org/nass/history.php> accessed 19/05/2015.
5 See Penal Code Act Cap P3 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004 (hereafterin
Penal Code Act).
6 See Criminal Code Act cap C38 LFN 2004 (hereinafter Criminal Code Act) The Criminal
Code is mostly used for the analysis in the thesis.
7 For example Clifford Constitution 1922 and Richards Constitution 1946.
8 See McPerson Constitution 1951; see also Lyttleton Constitution 1954.
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the regions. The 1979 constitution reversed this trend, it gave more powers to the Federal
government and abolished separate constitutions for the constituent entities. 9 The extant
constitution, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (CFRN 1999),
substantially reproduced the 1979 constitution by allocating much of the legislative powers
to the federal legislature.10
2.1.3 The Legislative Process
The CFRN 1999 recognises a multi-tier system of government consisting of the federal,
states and local governments.11 At the federal level, Nigeria operates a bi-cameral legislature
with two legislative Houses of the National Assembly. The National Assembly consists of
the Senate and the House of Representatives which are the upper and lower legislative
houses respectively.12 This legislative arrangement is replicated in all the states of the
federation except that the states operate unicameral legislatures. Legislative powers are
defined by the constitution and are divided among the federal and states’ legislative
authorities depending on whether they fall under the exclusive or the concurrent legislative
lists.13 Only the National Assembly has the powers to make laws with respect to matters on
the exclusive legislative list. 14 The National and States’ Assemblies have concurrent
authority to legislate on matters on the concurrent list.15 The residual matters are left to only
the states. Banks and banking, currency, coinage and legal tender, fingerprints identification
and criminal records, and trade and commerce as well as the regulation of wireless, and
broadcasting and telecommunications are items under the exclusive legislative list. 16 Since
the constitution also expressly provides that the National Assembly has the powers to make
laws on matters ‘incidental or supplementary’ to any of the items on exclusive legislative
list, 17 states would be excluded from legislating on such matters. Under the constitution,
references to incidental and supplementary matters include references to offences.18
9 In 1967, the regions were divided into 12 states, Nigeria is now made up of 36 states and
the Federal capital territory, Abuja.
10 See Section 4(1) – (5) CFRN 1999; see also notes on The Legislative Process below.
11 See Part I of First Schedule CFRN 1999.
12 ibid s 4(1).
13 ibid s 4(2) –(7).
14 ibid s 4(1) - (5); see also Attorney-General of the Federation v Attorney-General of Abia
State & 35 Ors (2001) 11 Nigerian Weekly Law Report (NWLR) 689.
15 See s 4(4)(a), 7(b) CFRN 1999.
16 ibid items 6, 15, 28, 62, 46, 66 of Pt I, Second sch.
17 ibid item 68 of Pt 1 second sch.
18 ibid s 2(a) of Pt 1 second sch.
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Law making process at the National Assembly follow constitutionally laid down procedure.
A bill may originate from either house of the National Assembly. In order to become law, it
must be passed by both Houses of the National Assembly and assented by the President. A
bill must be read three times and referred to a committee of the house before it becomes law.
The first reading of a bill involves reading the title of the bill in the legislative house where
it originated. The bill is not debated or opposed at this stage. The purpose and objectives of
the bill are explained and debated at the second reading. If the bill passes second reading, it
is referred to a committee of the house which examines the provisions of the bill. The
committee may invite presentations and comments on the bill from stakeholders and the
public. Following debates at the second reading and subsequent presentations by
stakeholders, the provisions of the bill may be amended at this stage. The committee then
tenders the bill to the whole house for the third reading. If a bill is passed by two-thirds
majority of the house, it is sent to the other house where it follows the same process (first,
second, committee stage and third readings). If passed by two-thirds majority of the second
House of the National Assembly, it is sent to the executive for presidential assent. If
assented by the president, it becomes law otherwise both houses of the National Assembly
require a two-third majority to override the presidential veto.19 Any bill which fails to pass
legislative approval within the tenure of a particular National Assembly automatically lapses.
2.1.4 The Judicial System
Nigeria operates a hierarchical structure of courts.20 The Supreme Court is the court of last
resort in all appellate matters.21 It is followed by the Court of appeal from which all appeals
to the Supreme Court originates. Appeal lies from the decisions of Federal and states High
courts and customary and sharia courts as well as from martial courts and Tribunals to the
Court of Appeal. 22 Although, federal and states high courts are courts of co-ordinate
jurisdictions, the federal high court has exclusive jurisdictions over issues relating to banks,
banking and other financial institutions, and actions by or against the Central bank of
Nigeria relating to coinage, legal tender and fiscal measures.23
Under the constitution, the judiciary is independent and neither the National Assembly nor
the States’ Houses of Assembly can make any laws purporting to oust the jurisdiction of a
19 ibid s 58.
20 See s 6.
21 ibid ss 233, 235.
22 ibid s 240.
23 ibid s 251(d).
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court or a judicial tribunal established by law.24 The principle of judicial precedent is also
recognised by the courts and decisions of courts in England can be cited as authorities in
Nigerian courts.
The judicial process in Nigeria has been hindered by a number of factors including
inexpedient legislative processes and delays in the judicial process itself. Also, where laws
fail to evolve in response to specific developments, courts have been known to engage in
‘judicial legislation’ violating well-established rule of law that judges/courts must act jus
dicere (to apply the law) and not jus dare (to make the law).25
2.2 Part II- Overview of E-Payment Systems in Nigeria
2.2.1 Development of Banking and Payment Systems in Nigeria
Banking business started early in Nigeria, however, the history and development of banking
had a chequered history. Lack of confidence in the financial sector was mostly responsible
for this position. Since the inception of banking activities, there has been a spate of systemic
failures and banks’ distress. The first incidence of bank failures occurred in the 1950s when
21 out of the 25 banks then in existence became distressed. In the 1990s, the industry was
hit by another wave of distress which led to huge financial losses to both investors and the
government. The imminent distress of some banks led to consolidation in the banking
industry in 2004. The resultant mergers and takeovers significantly reduced the number of
banks in Nigeria from 89 deposit-taking banks to 25 in 2006. Subsequent mergers and
acquisition has left the banking industry with 21 banks. However, according to the Central
Bank, the primary regulator of the financial industry, banks continued to show ‘serious
liquidity strain’ and had to be given financial support by the apex bank.26 As a result of the
threat of bank failures, customers did not only fear for the safety of their deposits with the
banks, they were also unwilling to trust alternative payment instruments provided by
bankers.27
24 ibid s 8.
25 See for example FRN v Fani-Kayode (2010) 14 Nigerian Weekly Law Report (NWLR)
481, where the court admitted electronically generated evidence in spite of the fact that at
that time, the clear letters of the Nigerian Evidence Act did not specifically provide for this.
26 Sanusi Lamido Sanusi ‘Development in the Banking system in Nigeria’
<http://www.cenbank.org/documents/speeches.asp> accessed 25/05/2012.
27 See eg Akudo C Anyanwu, Absalom E Ezugwu, Sale E Abdullahi, ‘Electronic Payment
Systems (EPS): Facilitating the Development and Adoption in Nigeria’ (2012) 9(2)
International Journal of Computer Science 1.
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As a further result of the above, the economy remained largely cash based. The CBN
estimated that in recent years, more than 65 per cent of money in circulation was outside the
banking sector and therefore beyond the control of the regulatory authorities.28 To resolve
this problem, the government, through the CBN, introduced a number of policy reforms.
Central to the reforms is the development of e-payment systems. The CBN Guidelines on
Electronic Banking was introduced in 2003 to regulate the emerging e-banking and e-
payment systems. A National Payments Committee was also established by the CBN in
2005. The committee was charged with initiating reforms to increase the diversity and
liquidity of payment instruments. The instruments are expected to be adaptable to local
circumstances and boost economic development.
Also, in 2005, the CBN formulated the National Payment Systems Vision (NPSV) 2020 to
develop e-payment systems specifically. 29 A key objective of the NPSV 2020 is the
development of a payment system which is ‘nationally utilised and internationally
recognised’.30 In spite of the implementation of different government policies however,
success was minimal in terms of the expected migration to e-payment systems.31 Therefore,
in 2011, the CBN launched the ‘Cashless Nigeria’ project. The main objective of the project
is to promote e-payments systems. One of the significant aspects of the cashless policy is
the introduction of processing fees for cash transactions.32 In principle ‘processing fees’ are
actually penalties for using cash instead of alternative e-payment systems. Although, aimed
at boosting acceptance of e-payment, the policy is controversial. For example, according to
Ledingham;
...the Bank's [central or regulatory bank’s] role is to facilitate and encourage
overall payment system efficiency by continuing to offer currency as just one
payment technology amongst several. Alternative payment technologies and
28 See CBN, ‘Annual Report and Statement of Account 2009’
<http://www.cenbank.org/out/2010/publications/reports/rsd/Annual%20Report%202009.ht
ml> accessed 12/06/2012.




31See CBN, ‘Payment Systems’ <http://www.cenbank.org/Paymentsystem/rtgs.asp>
accessed 12/05/2012.
32 See CBN letter titled ‘Industry Policy on Retail Cash Collection and Lodgement’
(IITP/C/01 Circular BPS/DIR/GEN/CIR/01/003) dated 16th March 2012.
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innovations can be freely allowed within this framework, and users can be
allowed to choose freely amongst those competing technologies.33
In effect, one could argue that mandatory requirement to use e-payment is inconsistent with
the overall function of central banks to promote payment systems. It may even be argued
that such a policy is autocratic and unconstitutional.34 However, even if it is assumed that
mandatory use of e-payments is defensible for economic and developmental reasons, it
would also be reasonable to assume that policy would put in place measures, legal and
otherwise, to safeguard users and consumers of the alternative e-payment systems. It is
significant to mention that a proposal to regulate the e-payment industry, the Payment
Systems Management Bill 2009 was not passed into law and lapsed with the tenure of the
legislative house where it was proposed. Consequently, e-payment services and transactions
are presently regulated by industry guidelines issued by the CBN. These are Electronic
Banking Regulations 2003 (hereinafter CBN E-banking regulations), Regulatory
Framework on Mobile Payment Services in Nigeria 2009 (hereinafter CBN mobile
payments regulations), Guidelines on stored Value and Pre-paid Card Issuance and
Operation 2010 (hereinafter CBN prepaid/stored value card guidelines), Standards and
Guidelines on Automated Teller machines (ATM) Operations in Nigeria 2010 (hereinafter
CBN ATM Guidelines), and Guidelines on Point of Sale (POS) Card Acceptance Services
2011 (hereinafter CBN POS Guidelines). The implications and limits of the regulatory
guidelines particularly in the multi-stakeholder environment of electronic transactions are
considered below.
2.3 Legal Aspects of E-Payments
2.3.1. What is E-Payment (Systems)?
Payment means the exchange of value for goods and services or the discharge of some
monetary obligation owed by one person to another.35 Although, the concept of payment is
closely tied to money, money has not always been the instrument of payment. For example,
barter was used prior to money. However, currency was the first form of money which
derived its legitimacy from the authority of the state, thus it was referred to as legal tender
money.36 Again, however, in spite of its legal status, cash as a form of payment was both
33 Peter Ledingham, ‘The Policy Implications of Electronic Payments’ (1996) para 18,
<http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/speeches/0030141.html> accessed 01/07/2012.
34 See notes below in 2.3.3 Money as a Social Construct p 28.
35 Charles Proctor, Mann on the Legal Aspects of Money (6th edn, OUP 2006) 66.
36 ibid.
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cumbersome and inconvenient particularly for large and trans-border commercial
transactions. Non-cash payments became widely used because of bankers’ intermediation
and guarantee. Thus non-cash instruments such as cheques, bills of exchange and later credit
cards came to be used extensively for personal and business payments. It is to be noted that
while cash may be transferred anonymously and without the intervention of intermediaries,
intermediaries are indispensable to non-cash-payments. These payments are therefore
effected by systemic processes and operational arrangements which enable the transfer of
monetary value from payer to payee. These systemic processes are commonly referred to as
payment systems. 37
Payment systems are generally defined as composite systems consisting of rules, standards
and instruments used to exchange financial value between parties discharging an
obligation.38 They consist of institutions, the various forms of money, and the channels for
communicating payment instructions,39 as well as the organisational, institutional and legal
and regulatory frameworks which make up the system. 40 Accordingly, Geva defines a
payment system as “…any machinery facilitating the transmission of money in the payment
of a debt, which enables the debtor to avoid the physical transportation of money and its
physical delivery from the payer to the payee.”41 Electronic payments are distinct in two
ways. One, they utilise electronic network systems. Two, they are achieved without face-to-
face interaction. They have therefore been defined as payments initiated, processed and
received electronically. 42 In the context of e-commerce, e-payment systems enable the
exchange of value electronically for goods, services or information. Therefore, the European
Central Bank defined e-payments more aptly as payments made over the internet using
remote payment card transactions, online banking systems or e-payment providers with
which the consumer has set up individual accounts.43 This definition clearly implicates the
37 Ludwig Gramlich, ‘Electronic Payments and Electronic Money-Some General Remarks
on Factual and Legal Developments’ (2008) 2 Masaryk UJL & Tech 39.
38 Austin Briggs and Laurence Brooks, ‘Electronic Payment Systems Development in a
Developing Country: The Role of Institutional Arrangements’ (2011) 49 EJISDC 3, 1.
39 C.E.V Borio and P. Van den Bergh, ‘The Nature and Management of Payment System
Risks: An International Perspective’ (BIS Economic Papers No 36 1999).
40 Briggs and Brooks (n 38) 16.
41Benjamin Geva, ‘The Concept of Payment Mechanism’ (1986) 24(1) Osgoode Hall LJ 1,
4.
42 David B. Humphrey, Lawrence B. Pulley, and Jakka M. Vesala Cash, ‘Paper and
Electronic Payments: A Cross-Country Analysis’ (1996) 28(4) Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking 914.
43 European Commission, Towards an Integrated European Market for Card, Internet and
Mobile Payments (COM 941 2011) para 2.3.
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internet, card networks and banks and non-bank e-payment service providers within e-
payment systems.
It is important to state that there is generally no law which defines e-payments in Nigeria.
Nevertheless, the definition provided by the Payment Systems Management Bill (which was
never passed) provides an indication of the legal direction on e-payments in Nigeria. The
bill defines payment systems as ‘a system which enables payment to be effected between a
payer and a beneficiary’.44 It also defines ‘electronic funds transfer’ (EFT)45 as;
Any transfer of funds which is initiated by a person by way of instruction,
authorisation or order to a bank to debit or credit an account maintained with that
bank through electronic means and includes point of sale transfers, automated
teller machine transactions, direct deposits or withdrawal of funds, transfers
initiated by telephone, internet and card payment.46
It is important to note further that the definition (of ETF) under the proposed law appears to
indicate that only banks will be engaged in ETF transfers and that there will always be some
form of credit or debit account maintained by the customer at the bank. This assumption is
erroneous and makes the definition deficient in a significant way. As will be argued later in
this chapter, individuals can use e-payments without having any sort of account and
providers of e-payment services are not generally limited to banks. The relevant arguments
are integrated into the discussion on institutional arrangements below and are not considered
further here.47 Further analysis below considers the legal status of e-payments and the
limitations if any on its use and enforceability.
2.3.2 Legal Status of E-payments
The major attributes of legal tender money are that it is accepted by virtue of legislative fiat
and without the need to inquire into title except where it is counterfeit.48 The primary
question here is whether e-payments automatically function as money as a matter of social
or industry practice or whether it is a legally recognised and binding form of payment in
Nigeria.
44 s 1 Payment Systems Management Bill 2009.
45 EFT is used as a generic term synonymously with e-payment.
46 s 1 Payment Systems Management Bill 2009 (emphasis added).
47 See further notes below in 2.3.4.4 Payment Institutions – Institutional Framework for E-
Payment Systems in Nigeria at p 37.
48 Proctor, (n 35) 39-42.
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Under the CBN POS Guidelines, all merchants are mandated to accept cards in payment for
goods and services. 49 The regulation provides that ‘Merchants shall accept cards as a
method of payment for goods and services …A merchant shall under no circumstance ...
discriminate against any member of the public who chooses to pay with a card or by other
electronic means’.50 As noted previously, it is legislation which compels the acceptance of
money as an instrument of payment. To answer the question therefore, it is important to
understand the current concept of legal tender in Nigeria.
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Act established the legal tender status of the Nigerian
currency, the Naira. The Act provides;
The unit of currency in Nigeria shall be the Naira... The Bank shall have the
sole right of issuing currency notes and coins throughout Nigeria and neither
the Federal Government nor any State Government, Local Government, other
person or authority shall issue currency notes, bank notes or coins or any
documents or tokens payable to bearer on demand being document or token
which are likely to pass as legal tender.51
The Act further provides;
The currency notes issued by the Bank shall be legal tender in Nigeria at their
face value for the payment of any amount …[and] A person who refuses to
accept the Naira as a means of payment is guilty of an offence and liable on
conviction to a fine of N50, 000 or 6 months imprisonment.52
These provisions indicate that all payments are liable to be made in cash and there is a
statutory obligation to accept cash in payment. As a general rule therefore, a creditor is not
bound to accept payment otherwise than by legal tender currency.53 By juxtaposing the
foregoing provisions of the CBN Act and that of the POS guidelines, one can make a case
for and against the legal status of e-payments relative to cash payments. On the one hand,
one may argue that the guidelines cannot have the effect of compelling the acceptance of e-
payments. This is because legal tender is strictly defined as bank notes and coins issued by
the Central Bank of Nigeria. The clear terms of statute therefore exclude payment
49 See items 4.5.2, 4.5.3 CBN POS Guidelines 2011.
50 ibid items 4.5.2 & 6.
51 ss 15 & 17 CBN Act.
52 ibid ss 20(1), 20(5).
53 ibid.
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instruments issued by other private or public authority. By inference, payment instruments
such as electronic money or pre-paid cards issued by private institutions cannot be money
and there is no obligation to accept them in payment.
On the other hand, and in favour of enforcing the acceptance of e-payments, one can also
infer a positive interpretation of the mandatory acceptance clause in the POS regulations. It
can be argued for instance that while legislation may define legal tender, this does not
preclude regulations from prescribing the acceptance of other forms of payments or
payment instruments. As Hove rightly argues, the concept of 'legal tender' as it exists today
- for traditional cash - can differ significantly from country to country. 54 Cohen also
debunks the state theory of money.55 He maintains that the modern concept of money is that
money is whatever people come to believe will be accepted by others for whatever reason.
He argues that consequently, state power is by no means the only source of trust in money.56
As was also observed by the court in Reference Re Alberta Statutes,57 money has a wider
meaning than legal tender money. Accordingly, Proctor argues that with developments in
technology and the amplification of means of payments, the meaning of money will
correspondingly expand.58
The above observations are consistent with the view that money or currency does not
constitute the only instrument of payment. Again however, even if one concedes that e-
moneys are effective payment instruments, this cannot be construed to also mean that the
law will enforce them or compel the acceptance of cash alternatives. It is therefore possible
to interpret the provisions of Items 4.5.2 and 6 of the CBN POS guidelines cited above, to
mean that a merchant can make a choice between both forms of payment and he is not
obliged to accept one or the other. It is difficult to conclude whether or not this is the correct
interpretation of the status of e-monies and e-payments in Nigeria. Legal and judicial
authorities from other jurisdictions are also unhelpful in this regard as they present
conflicting notions and opinions.
54 Leo Van Hove, ‘Making Electronic Money Legal Tender: Pros and Cons’ (Economics
for the Future - Celebrating 100 years of Cambridge Economics, University of Cambridge
September 17-19 2003) 5,
<http://www.ibrarian.net/navon/paper/Making_electronic_money_legal_tender__pros___co
ns.pdf?paperid=1674497 dge> accessed 06/04/2015.
55 George Knapp, The State Theory of Money cited in Benjamin J. Cohen, ‘Electronic
Money: New Day or false Dawn?’ (2001) 8(2) Review of International political Economy
197, 202.
56 ibid.
57 [1938] 100,116 cited in Proctor, (n 35) 13.
58 ibid 9.
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It has been suggested for example that electronic moneys are neither money nor payment,
and non-cash payments, although important from an economic point of view are of ‘a
different and minor legal quality’.59 It has also been argued that it is the right to be paid
money rather than money itself that is pushed around the payment systems. 60 Goode
suggests that the intangibility of electronic payments leads to some confusion. As he
observes, ‘We also use terminology which confuses the payment message with the act of
payment. Thus bankers refer to wire transfers and electronic funds transfers, conjuring up a
picture of electronic currency, invisible and intangible, hurtling through the ether! 61 Harry
Leinonen expresses the view that, ‘...in a completely e-based system...Both money and
payments have been transformed into a row of bits processed in a large network of
numerous interconnected computers.’62
Judicial authorities have also not been unequivocal in their approach. In Foskett v Mckeown
the court expressed the view that neither money nor property passes through the payment
systems which are in fact “a series of debits and credits that are causally and transactionally
linked.”63 The decision in R v Preddy,64 appears to suggest that ‘funds’ in electronic fund
transfer systems cannot be stolen. Although, legislation was passed to overrule the courts in
some cases,65 the foregoing observations suggest that the question of whether or not e-
payment is money is not merely academic or tenuous. As the authorities indicate, technical
interpretations may still inhibit the full acceptability of e-payments because they may be
deemed mere payment processes or mechanisms which do not have the effect of
crystallising into money.
2.3.3 Money as a Social Construct
Both legal and economic literature make useful proposals regarding the ways to navigate the
trajectory, that is, whether e-payments have the same effect as money or otherwise. Geva’s
correct assessment is that the concepts of e-money and legal tender are not inherently
59 Gramlich, (n 37) 41.
60 Rhys Bollen, ‘The Development and Legal Nature of Payment Facilities’ (2005) 16
Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice 130.
61 Roy Goode, Commercial Law (3rd edn, Penguin Books 2004) 449.
62 Harry Leinonen, ‘Payment Habits and Trends in the Changing e-landscape 2010+’
(Helsinki Expository Studies A: 111 2003) <http://www.suomenpankki.fi/pdf/157714.pdf.>
accessed 01/05/2014.
63 Foskett v Mckeown (2001) 1 AC 102, 128 [Millet LJ].
64 (1996) 3 All ER 481.
65 See eg Fraud Act 2006 which repealed s 15A Theft (Amendment Act) 1996 and overruled
the House of Lords decision in R v Preddy.
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incompatible since not all money is legal tender money.66 For some legal scholars however,
the solutions appear to be more direct. They canvass a strict adherence to the concept of
legal tender money by creating a legal tender status for electronic moneys. Proctor argues
for example that for money to function as a medium of exchange, a store of value or unit of
account, it requires the authority of law or the state.67 In other words, a state issued or state
recognised legally enforceable electronic money system. Although rational, this position
finds little support in the literature and will arguably be difficult to promote in the Nigerian
context. First as discussed above, cash is legal tender which cannot be lawfully refused, and
is in fact legally mandated to be accepted for all transactions. Therefore, a parallel regime of
legal tender status for electronic money may create legal inconsistencies. Second, because
of the nascent stage of development of e-payments, there is little doubt that given a choice,
merchants will prefer the well-recognised and easily identifiable ‘hard cash’ to the more
volatile electronic moneys or fund transfer systems.
Consequently, while conferring legal tender status on e-payments or e-moneys may
admittedly address the conjectures surrounding the legal status and effect of e-payments,
such an approach is unpersuasive and is unlikely to become generally accepted. One
argument supporting this position stresses stakeholders’ disposition to the continued
existence of cash. It was argued that it is improbable that Central Banks will be willing to
dispose of their powers to issue legal tender currency as this serves an economic as well as a
social function. According to the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, ‘Reserve Bank provision
of currency under a statutory monopoly is seen as a useful public service and one which
provides a basis on which other payment arrangements and contracts must ultimately rest.’68
Regarding the position of users as stakeholders, it was also argued that the main incentive
for cash is anonymity, and since ‘anonymity will always be in demand’, it (anonymity) will
keep currency in being.69 In essence, user demand will keep legal tender currency viable
without more. As Goodhart and Krueger further argue, the one circumstance where one
might expect information technology to bring an end to the use of national currency would
be when an (authoritarian) government prescribes that all transactions must go through an
66 Geva, (n 41) 13-20.
67 Proctor (n 35) 9.
68 Ledingham, (n 33).
69 Charles Goodhart and Malte Krueger, ‘The Impact of Technology on Cash Usage’ (2001)
London School of Economics Discussion Paper 374, 13
<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/25048/1/dp374.pdf> accessed 07/04/2015.
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electronic devise. 70 They concluded that indeed cash cannot be eliminated because they
cannot be refused legally.
As a middle ground for the above arguments and as an alternative to making e-moneys legal
tender, it has been proposed that the new forms of money be allowed to achieve acceptance
through a process of self-recognition. The rationale for this position is that money is a social
rather than a legal construct, therefore, by a process of evolution, electronic means of
payment will achieve self-recognition independently of the concept of legal tender. 71
According to Weatherford, ‘money is a system of thought, a way of organising social
behaviour, and an integral part of modern culture, but money need not necessarily be an
object’.72 To support this position, one may consider a practical analogy. When we speak of
payment, we think of parting with money. In the same way when we make e-payments, we
think we have parted with money and not information or data or whatever designation may
be assigned to e-moneys and e-payments. Also, if we are dispossessed of cash or currency,
we think of it as theft or fraud, if our payment card is stolen, we also do not think we have
lost information, we think of it as a potential loss of money whether in an account or on the
card. This demonstrates that ‘money’ takes its meaning from context and the term resides in
function rather than form. 73
However, as Goodhart and Krueger argue, social recognition of e-payments will not develop
in a vacuum. The way to achieve the needed recognition is to strive for the establishment of
an effective legal framework which boosts acceptability of e-payments by creating a
positive response linked to the government. 74 Such a framework has the potential to
establish viable competition between e-payments and its more entrenched competitor,
cash,75 and to change perceptions of e-payments whether or not they are accorded legal
tender status.76 According to Ledingham, the specific framework for the success of e-
payments are rules relating to security of electronic transactions particularly those which
deal with risks and liabilities. As he argues;
70 ibid.
71 ibid.
72 Jack Weatherford, ‘Dump Bronze Age Bucks for Electronic Money’ (USA Today Apr.
1993: 13A) cited in Barbara A. Good, ‘Will Electronic Money Be Adopted in the United
States?’ Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Working Paper 9820, 6.
73 See eg Suffel v Bank of England (1882) 9 QBD; see also Reference Re Alberta Statutes
[1938] 100,116 cited in Proctor (n 35) 13.
74 Goodhart and Krueger (n 69).
75 See Van Hove (n 54).
76 See Benjamin Geva, ‘Legal Aspects Relating to Payment by E-Money: Review of Retail
Payments System Fundamentals’ (2001) Int’l Fin & Econ L 5 Y B 255.
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Any arrangements for making monetary payments require satisfactory legal
underpinnings. It is important that all of the parties to a payment - the payer, the
recipient, and any other parties such as banks or clearing systems who may be
involved as intermediaries - clearly understand their rights and obligations, and any
risks they may face. The rules need to specify clearly who carries risks at the
various stages that a transaction may pass through, and what happens when things
go wrong.77
In effect, the formulation of rules which establish liability structure, particularly in
cases of fraud and theft are essential to the functioning and acceptability of the
systems. The sections below examine the classifications of e-payment systems and
institutional arrangements for e-payments in Nigeria. It is argued that the CBN
regulations and other banking and financial regulations are inadequate to regulate new
e-payment service providers and the threats they pose to the payment system.
2.3.4 Classifications of E-payment Systems
E-payment systems are complex because they cover a wide range of payment institutions,
payment mechanisms and payment instruments, and are driven by technological changes
and modifications. Classifications of the systems have therefore been based largely on the
subject perspective of writers, 78 the jurisdictions which are the subject of inquiry or the
literature consulted.79 However, according to the European Central Bank (ECB), ‘...it is
becoming increasingly difficult to categorise e-payment services, since formerly specific
functions and distribution channels are blurring and merging to create hybrid products,
multi-channelling and new role-sharing models.’80
Based on the complexity indicated above, an incursion into the extensive and diverse body
of literature on the classifications and categorisation of e-payment systems is unnecessary
because it is impossible to replicate existing classifications to a greater or lesser extent. It is
therefore more useful, for the purpose of highlighting the legal issues involved, to classify e-
77 Ledingham (n 33) Para 32.
78 This may be legal, technical or scientific or economic perspective.
79 See eg Andrew G Haldane, Stephen Millard and Victoria Saport (eds) The Future of
payment Systems (Routledge International Studies in Money and Banking 2008); see also
Dennis Abrazhevich, Electronic Payment Systems: A User-Centered Perspective and
Interaction Design (Eindhoven 2004).
80 European Central Bank (ECB), ‘E-payment Without Frontiers’ (Issues Paper for ECB




payment systems based on their broad and generic characteristics in Nigeria. These are one;
the purposes served by the systems, whether retail or wholesale payments. Two, the channel
of payment, whether they are offline or online e-payment systems. Three, the instrument of
payment, that is, whether they are account based or electronic money system. Four, the
institutions involved in providing the services, whether they are banks, or non-bank
financial institutions or non-financial institutions.
2.3.4.1 Purpose served by Payment -Wholesale and Retail Systems
Wholesale systems are used for large electronic transactions and often involve interbank
clearing and settlement systems. They use the Inter-Bank Settlement System Electronic
Fund Transfer (NEFT) similar to the Federal wire clearing House Interbank System (CHIPS)
in the US, and the Clearing House Automated Payment System (CHAPS) in the UK. Retail
e-payments are devised for low-value consumer payments such as payment for goods and
services, bill payments, peer to peer payments and payments at points of sale. Relative to
wholesale payments, retail payments are higher in volume but lower in value. They are
implemented using different payment instruments and channels particularly payment cards,
Automated Teller machines (ATMs) and points of sale networks and terminals which are
discussed further below.
2.3.4.2 Payment Channels - Online and Offline Systems
Electronic payments are further distinguished as online or offline systems. Online systems
require real time authentication for payment to be completed. 81 Offline payments include
payments by cheques, cash or payment on delivery. It is significant to mention that the
adoption of payment channels such as Automated Teller machines (ATMs), points of sale
and mobile phones have increased access to online payment systems in Nigeria. Conversely,
the channels have implications for security of users and consumers of e-payment services.
For example, theft and fraud in financial transactions increased at an unprecedented scale
since the introduction of ATMs in Nigeria. Between 2010 and 2012, ATM fraud was the
most pervasive form of fraud on electronic payment channels and the leading consumer
complaint to the Central Bank of Nigeria.82 Similar security challenges are expected as
points of sale proliferate and become more widely used in Nigeria. A point of sale (POS) is
an electronic devise which enables participating merchants to process and accept payment
cards as a means of payment for goods and services. Due largely to low deployment of the
81 See further notes in (a) Authenticating Technologies p 76.
82 See Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation, ‘Annual Report and Statement of Accounts
2010, 2011 and 2012’ <http://ndic.org.ng/publications.html> accessed 12/09/2013.
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terminals and reluctance of merchants to use them, proximate POS, such as merchant
terminals, are yet to achieve the expected levels of acceptance in Nigeria. However, mobile
terminals such as mobile devices and virtual terminals such as the internet are increasingly
used for banking and payments.
Mobile devices constitute points of sale when used to transfer funds or to pay for goods and
services. Mobile phones in particular are used to access bank accounts, transfer funds, pay
bills and make peer to peer payment on the internet. Mobile phones installed with near field
communication (NFC) technology could also be used to make payments by interacting with
POS terminals. Mobile payments are relatively new innovations but have been widely
accepted in Nigeria. The increasing proliferation of mobile phones and the ability to
dispense with bank accounts are the major factors driving the adoption of mobile payments.
For example, the number of mobile phone subscription increased from about 1.5million in
2002 to almost 160million in 2013. Nigeria has over 180 million mobile phone subscribers
as at February 2015. 83
A number of user and security challenges are associated with mobile payments. User
challenges include constraints imposed by lack of technical knowledge and the complication
of mobile applications. Regarding security, mobile terminals presents challenges similar to
other electronic devices such as computers. For example, mobile phones are susceptible to
security breaches such as hacking which may render users liable for unauthorised or
fraudulent transactions made through their phones. Also, payment applications developed
for use on mobile devices are not currently subject to the Payment Card Industry Payment
Applications Data Security Standards (PCIDSS).84 More crucially, as argued later in this
chapter, ambiguity surrounds the regulatory framework for mobile payment providers
relative to banks and other financial service providers in Nigeria.
83See NCC, Subscriber Statistics
<http://www.ncc.gov.ng/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=125:subscriber-
statistics&catid=65:industry-information&Itemid=73>, accessed 24/05/2015.
84 See PCI Security Standards Council, Payment Card Industry (PCI) PA-DSS Program
Guide, v3.0 16-18 <https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PA-
DSS_Program_Guide_v3.pdf> accessed 03/02/2015.
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2.3.4.3 Payment Instruments –Account Based and Electronic Money Systems
The proposed law on Payment Systems Management in Nigeria defines a payment
instrument as ‘an instrument, authority or a process enabling a payer to issue a payment
instruction.’85 Payment instruments can be account based or stored value systems.
Account based systems operate on pre-existing debit and credit system. They are described
as notational systems where money is represented by records in bank accounts and
transferred electronically as information over computer networks. 86 Account based systems
may use debit and credit cards, or prepaid or stored value cards as well as smart cards. Debit
cards are linked to and charge purchases of goods and service to the customer’s account.
They are the most commonly used payments cards in Nigeria and many proprietary ATM
cards issued by banks also function as debit cards. Debit cards in Nigeria are also issued in
conjunction with International card schemes particularly VISA and MasterCard. Whereas
debit cards charge the holder’s deposit with the issuing bank, credit cards represent a credit
extended to the holder by the issuer of the card which allows a customer to purchase goods
and services against a pre-set limit. Credit cards are not common in Nigeria. The most
important factor contributing to this is lack of infrastructure for credit checks such as
identification and address verification processes.87
Stored Value and Prepaid card are often used as generic terms for e-payment systems
operated without a link to designated bank accounts. Precisely because they dispense with
deposit accounts, prepaid and stored value cards are expected to gain popularity in Nigeria.
For the unbanked population, which is established to be in the majority, the cards offer
alternatives to conventional deposit accounts. 88 However, while prepaid and stored value
cards are used interchangeably within the card industry, there is a clear distinction to be
made between the two systems. Prepaid cards are issued to persons who deposit funds into
an account of the issuer. The issuer collects personal information such as names, addresses,
phone numbers and signatures during the fund deposit process. Stored value systems do not
typically involve the deposit of funds or collection of personal information as value is stored
85 s 1 Payment Systems Management Bill 2009.
86 Clifford Neuman and Gennardy Medinvsky, ‘Internet Payment Services’ in Lee W
McKnight and Joseph P. Bailey (eds) Internet Economies (Massachusetts Institute of
Technology 1997).
87 See eg Presidential Implementation Committee on the National Identity Management
System, Consumer Credit System and National Outsourcing Initiative, ‘National Policy and
Institutional Framework for an Identity Management system for Nigeria’
<https://www.nimc.gov.ng/sites/default/files/nimc_policy.pdf> accessed 06/04/2015.
88 See notes on Promoting Financial Inclusion below.
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directly on the cards. Therefore, although, the two systems have the prepaid element as a
common denominator, prepaid systems use the physical card as a token to access value
recorded remotely and linked to the card, and is largely analogous to account based systems.
Stored value systems actually store and access value from the physical card’s chip and are
similar to electronic monies discussed below. 89
The above distinctions are not implied in the regulatory guidelines in Nigeria. For example
the CBN guidelines provide that both prepaid and stored value cards may be issued by
banks and non-banking organisations. Under the guidelines, deposit-taking banks or
financial institutions licenced by the CBN with clearing capacity may issue stored
value/prepaid cards. Other deposit-taking institutions without clearing capacity may also
issue the cards acting in conjunction with institutions having clearing capacity.90 Mobile and
telecommunications operators may also operate money transfer schemes with stored/value
prepaid cards subject to obtaining the requisite approval of the CBN. 91 Although the
Guideline recognises that stored value cards may be issued anonymously, it nevertheless
requires that issuers of both stored value and prepaid cards fulfil minimum Know Your
Customer (KYC) requirements.92 That is, issuers must collect the names, addresses and
telephone numbers of prospective users. As discussed below and more comprehensively
later in the thesis, this process of collection of personal information by banks and non-banks,
ostensibly for the issue of prepaid and stored value cards, raises fundamental questions
about the security and protection of consumer information.
Generally, smart cards are multi-application cards embedded with micro-processing chips.
They can be used for a number of purposes including e-payments. Smart cards have been
classified based on whether they are single or multi-purpose cards, or closed or limited
purpose cards, or according to whether they are contact or contactless cards or hybrid or
proximity cards.93 Multi-purpose smart cards are poised to play a vital role in the future of
e-payments in Nigeria. For example, government has commenced the implementation of a
multi-purpose national identity card scheme which would operate through the smart card
89 See generally Wolfsberg Group 2011, ‘Guidance on Prepaid and Stored Value Cards’
<http://www.wolfsbergprinciples.com/pdf/Wolfsberg_Guidance_on_Prepaid_and_Stored_V
alue_Cards_Oct_14,_2011.pdf> accessed 18/07/2011.
90 Item 3.1 CBN prepaid/Stored Value Card Guidelines 2012.
91 ibid item 3.9.
92 ibid item 4.1 & 5.1.
93 Phoebus Athanassiou and Natalia Mas Guix, Electronic Money Institutions: Current
Trends, Regulatory Issues and Future Prospects European (ECB 2008) 7.
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technology. The card will store fingerprints and biometrics information of the user. It will
also have payment functionalities including serving as a bank card.94
As noted earlier, payment instruments can also be electronic money systems. Although,
account based systems (discussed above) involve the use of some form of “electronic
money”, ‘real electronic money’ refers to token or stored value systems. It is rightly defined
as ‘...electronic store of monetary value on a technical device that may be widely used for
making payments to undertakings other than the issuer without necessarily involving bank
accounts in the transaction, but acting as a prepaid bearer instrument’. 95 Therefore,
electronic currency is stored value or token systems similar to conventional cash. They are
variously referred to as electronic cash, digital cash or electronic money.
Corresponding to this definition, electronic money in Nigeria is stated to mean monetary
value stored electronically in a centrally held electronic devise.96 To qualify as e-money,
such stored value must have been issued on receipt of funds, accepted as a means of
payment otherwise than by the issuer, be transferable, and have defined cash out
capabilities.97 The distinguishing qualities of e-money are its ability to mimic the anonymity
of cash, suitability for micro-payments and lack of credibility requirements for users. In
spite of its qualities and similar to developments in other countries, innovations to develop
electronic currencies in Nigeria have been largely unsuccessful.98
For the specific purpose of the analysis here, it is important to mention that e-moneys can be
issued by banks and non-banks. 99 When operated on mobile platforms, mobile money
systems in Nigeria can be card account based, bank account based or stored value (e-money)
based.100 Card account based systems links payment cards to a mobile phone for the purpose
of initiating and concluding payment transactions. Bank account based systems link
payment instructions to the customer’s bank account, whether current, savings or
domiciliary accounts. In stored value account based systems, mobile moneys are driven by
system based accounts such as pre-paid cards or reloadable value accounts. 101 Further
94 See further notes in 5.1.1 NIMC’s Electronic National Identity Card at p 137.
95 European Central Bank, Report on Electronic Money (ECB 1998) 7.
96 See Item 5.1 CBN Mobile Payments Regulations 2009.
97 ibid.
98 E-cash, Mondex, Pay Word, MicroMint and NetCash are examples of failed electronic
money initiatives. Globally, Bitcoin is the most successful electronic currency system.
99See generally items 2.2.1-2.2.3 CBN Mobile Payments Regulations 2009.
100ibid item 2.2.
101 ibid items 2.2.1-2.2.3.
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analysis below demonstrates that this interconnection and interrelationship between mobile
systems and financial services raise issues for law and regulation.
2.3.4.4 Payment Institutions – Institutional Framework for E-Payment Systems
in Nigeria
Banks are still the dominant e-payment services providers in Nigeria, however, non-bank
service providers are becoming increasing relevant. As noted above, non-bank service
providers can issue stored value and prepaid cards. Mobile payment services can be also be
operated solely by non-bank organisations approved by the CBN.102 According to the Bank
of International Settlement, declining hardware and software costs as well as greater
expertise in developing related payment applications has increased the participation of non-
traditional financial institutions and even non-financial institutions in payment services in
some countries.103 In Nigeria, these institutions act as payment intermediaries, they process
payment transactions and may be collectors and processors of payment information. This
development has certain implications for existing institutional arrangements in the payment
industry.
To illustrate this, it is important to mention that three main sectors generally converge
around e-payments. These are the banking industry, telecommunications sector and web
services. As noted previously, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is the primary regulator
of the Nigerian financial industry and to regulate e-payments, the CBN relies largely on the
provisions of banking legislation, 104 and a patchwork of ad hoc regulations and
guidelines.105 While the various guidelines empower the CBN to licence payment services
providers in Nigeria, under the banking laws, the CBN has no express powers to regulate
nonbank or non-financial institutions. This apparent contradiction can be explained from
two perspectives. It is possible to argue on the one hand that by virtue of its powers to
regulate payment systems generally, all payment activities are subject to regulation by the
CBN.106 This is particularly so in view of the provision of section 2(d) of the CBN Act
which states that the promotion of a sound financial system is one of the objectives of the
Central Bank.107 Under section 47(2), the Act also provides that ‘... in furtherance of the
102 ibid items 2.3.1.1, 3.2.2.1, 3.2.2.3.
103 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, Retail Payments in Selected Countries:
A Comparative Study (Bank of International Settlement 1999) 17.
104 These are Central Bank of Nigeria Act Cap C4 LFN 2004 (hereinafter CBN Act) and the
Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act Cap B3 LFN 2004 (hereinafter BOFIA).
105 See notes in 2.2.1 Development of Banking and Payment Systems in Nigeria p21 at 23.
106 See s 47 CBN Act.
107 ibid s 2(d).
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provisions of section 2(d) of this Act, the Bank shall continue to promote and facilitate the
development of efficient and effective systems for the settlement of transactions (including
the development of electronic payment systems)’.108
On the other hand, it may be argued that since some service providers are neither banks nor
other financial institutions, they cannot be subject to CBN regulation. Under the laws, the
CBN is only empowered to regulate banks, banking business and other financial
institutions.109 A bank is defined under the CBN Act as ‘a bank’ licensed by the CBN.110
Banking business also means;
...the business of receiving deposits on current account, savings account or
other similar account, paying or collecting cheque drawn by or paid in by
customers; provision of finance or such other business as the Governor may, 
by order published in the Gazette, designate a banking business.111
In contrast to the above definition, many e-payment service providers are usually non-
deposit taking and may not maintain any form of customer account. In the strict sense
therefore, payment services may be merely ancillary to their core activity. This means in
effect that the CBN can neither license a non-bank or non-financial institution payment
service provider, nor enforce financial regulations on the relevant service provider. The
point highlighted here can be illustrated by e-money schemes in Nigeria. In e-money
schemes, issuers may adopt one of the three mobile money models. They can operate the
bank-focused model, where a bank delivers banking services to existing and prospective
customers using the mobile phone as a delivery channel. This model can only be deployed
by licensed deposit-taking financial institutions including deposit money banks,
microfinance banks and discount houses.112 Issuers of e-moneys may also adopt the bank-
led model where banks, or a consortium of banks, partnering with other organizations,
jointly seek to deliver banking services leveraging on the mobile banking system.113 The
third model which is the non-bank led model is of particular interest. The model allows
corporate organisations that have been duly approved by the CBN to deliver mobile
payments services to consumers. It can only be operated by organisations other than
108 ibid s 47(2).
109 See ss 1, 2 & 59 BOFIA.
110 See s 60 CBN Act.
111 s 66 BOFIA.
112 See item 2.1 CBN Mobile Payment Regulations 2009.
113 ibid item 2.1.2.
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licensed deposit money banks and telecommunication companies.114 Therefore, in the strict
sense, telecom companies are excluded from participating as lead providers in e-money
schemes in Nigeria.115 Nevertheless, they may operate as value and mobile money service
providers in conjunction with banks while playing the major role of providing network
infrastructure for the use of the scheme. 116 The question then is to which regulatory
authority are such mobile network providers subject particularly when it comes to protecting
users’ (personal) information?
To further highlight how law, policy and regulation may conflict on the critical issue of
regulation, the provisions of current CBN regulations and that of the Payment Systems
Management Bill noted earlier in this chapter, may be examined. The CBN regulations
recognise non-bank participants in the payment industry. These participants including
merchants, merchant acquirers, switching companies, and POS terminal owners and
payment service terminal aggregators and providers are referred to as ‘stakeholders’ in the
Nigerian payment industry. 117 However, as noted in the analysis of the definition of e-
payment systems above, the law then proposed to regulate payment services, the Payment
Systems Management Bill, defines electronic transfer of funds (ETFs) without recognition
of the roles of these industry stakeholders.118 The Bill defines ETFs rather restrictively as,
‘… any transfer of funds which is initiated by a person by way of instruction, authorisation
or order to a bank to debit or credit an account maintained with that bank through electronic
means...’.119 This definition suggests that only banks are involved in EFTs and the user of a
payment service must have some sort of account with the bank. This is in direct contrast to
the realities of the e-payment industry. As discussed earlier, modern e-payment instruments
do not necessarily require that the holder have an account held at a bank. All that is required
is a form of account which can be debited or credited. This may be a card account or a
system account.
The provisions of the Payment Services Regulations (PSR) (UK) further clarify the point
here. The PSR defines payment services to include the issuing of payment instruments or
acquiring payment transactions, offering mobile or fixed phone payments and payments
114 ibid item 2.1.3.
115 ibid.
116 ibid item 2.1.
117 See items 2 & 3 CBN POS Guidelines 2011.
118 See notes in 2.3.1. What is E-Payment (Systems)? p 23 at 25.
119 s 1Payment Systems Management Bill 2009 (emphasis added).
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from other digital devices as well as money remittance services.120 The main advantage here
is that the law clearly defines categories of payment service providers rather than a general
and ambiguous categorisation of “industry stakeholders” adopted in the CBN guidelines.
Furthermore, the PSR did not delimit payment services and fund transfers to banks and
other financial institutions. It recognises and includes remittances made using IT
infrastructures and delineates such transfers as payment services irrespective of the
involvement of banks. From this perspective, one may argue that even if it intends to
exercise regulatory powers over non-banks, the provisions in its proposed payment service
bill amounts to the CBN literally “shooting itself in the foot”. The provision would be
restrictive in the sense that it fails to take cognisance of other activities which may
constitute transfer of funds, or of other organisations which may offer payment services.
According to the CBN itself, telecom providers were excluded from leading mobile money
services specifically to prevent a regulatory collision with the Nigerian Communications
Commission which regulates telecommunication.121 However, this explanation only furthers
the argument that a lacuna will then exist in regulation. In essence, if the CBN cannot
regulate payment services offered by industry subject to other regulators, it means such
services would either be largely unregulated or left to regulators without expertise to
monitor payment services. In chapter five, the data protection implications of the national
electronic identity card, the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) registration and the biometric
verification code are analysed to highlight the problems in the context of regulating the
processing of personal information.122
For the purposes of concluding the arguments here, it is relevant to note, as suggested by
some commentaries, that e-payments and e-money systems erode the powers of Central
Banks. As far back as 1996, Hughes had argued that new e-payment mechanisms challenge
traditional banking activities because the new mechanisms not only operate outside the
scope of national laws that apply to banking transactions, but also impact on laws that
promote safety and soundness.123 Kobrin had also argued, quite emphatically, that new
payment systems will eventually displace the relevance and powers of central banks and
120 Payment Services Regulations 2009 SI 2009/209, sch 1 pt 1 para 1(a)-(g).
121 See Mobile Banking: Why we did not Licence MTN, Others, CBN
<http://mobilemoneyafrica.com/mobile-banking-why-we-did-not-licence-mtn-others-cbn/ >
accessed 12/06/2012.
122 See further notes in 5.1 Challenges of Data Protection in E-payment Systems in Nigeria
p 135.
123 Sarah Jane Hughes, ‘A Call for International Legal Standards for Emerging Retail
Electronic payment systems’ (1996) 15 Ann Rev Banking L 198.
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render them dispensable in the regulatory scheme for new payment systems.124 Although,
this assessment is exaggerated, it is mostly correct. For example, while it can be argued that
central banks will continue to be relevant because cash will remain in demand, it is also
reasonable to argue that central banks, such as the CBN, are incapable of regulating the
broad scope of services and providers involved in e-payment systems. A contrary approach
is likely to deepen the regulatory lacuna which can be exploited either by the
institution/providers themselves or by criminal/outsiders. The correct conclusion must be
that participation of nonbanks institutions poses particular risks to e-payment because they
provide alternative points of entry into payment systems for criminals.125 In the context of
payment security and privacy therefore, the question of how or the extent to which e-
payment service providers should be regulated is important. The concluding section of this
chapter highlights the significance of e-payment to growth and development in Nigeria.
2.4 E-payment Systems and Development in Nigeria
The main advantages of electronic payment systems are its speed, efficiency and elimination
of congestion and handling charges associated with the clearing of paper cheques. Its
pragmatism in avoiding the use of cash and the risks associated with cash is another of its
fundamental advantages. E-payments also facilitate business and payment processes, and
have become a key mover of the information society because they are essential
infrastructure for electronic commerce.
The adoption of e-payment systems in Nigeria is centred on two main considerations. These
are one, the need to achieve control and regulation of monetary policies, and two, the need
to promote the digital economy in line with global trends.126 The following sections examine
how these translate to specific economic and developmental advantages.
2.4.1 Consumer Convenience
It is trite that relative to e-payments, cash is cumbersome. It is also trite that in contrast to
the anonymity of cash, e-payments leave audit trails which forestall or aid the resolution of
disputed payment claims. Furthermore, because of its capacity to effect instant payments, e-
payments engender confidence in the non-reversibility of payments and thereby guarantee
124 Stephen J. Kobrin, ‘Electronic Cash and the End of National Markets’
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/1149333> assessed 11/02/2012.
125 See eg Weiner et al, ‘Nonbanks and Risk in Retail Payments’ (2008) Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City Working paper 07-02.
126 See Central Bank of Nigeria, ‘Payment Systems’
<http://www.cenbank.org/Paymentsystem/> accessed 12/05/2012.
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the finality of transactions. Finally, because consumers are likely to handle less cash, the use
of e-payment systems has the potential to reduce the incidence of robbery and theft in
Nigeria. As the CBN observed, the adoption of e-payments by consumers is expected to
lead to increased convenience, more service options, reduced risk of cash-related crimes,
and cheaper access to banking services. The services are also expected to lead to increased
access to credit and financial inclusion. In terms of convenience therefore, e-payments are
expected to deliver payment services that are relatively safe, efficient and fast for the
Nigerian consumer.
2.4.2 Reduction in the Cost of Cash
From economic and fiscal perspectives, cash was adjudged an inefficient form of payment.
According to the CBN, the cost of cash had continued to rise and was projected to hit an all-
time high (about 192 billion Naira (approximately 1.4 billion USD) in 2012.127 A major
objective of various policy implementations and development of technical infrastructure in
the area of e-payments is therefore to reduce the cost of cash handling. As noted in a
research conducted by Humphrey et al, the social cost of cash relative to that of e-payments
is one of the major justifications for adopting e-payments. Commenting on the cost
advantages of a switch to e-payments in some European economies, the authors observed:
If a country is able to shift from an all paper- based to an electronic-based payment
system, annual savings of perhaps 1% of GDP can be realised. This is because
electronic payments, depending on application (point of sale, bill payment, or even
employee disbursement) are from one half to two-thirds lower than their alternative
paper-based non cash instrument.128
2.4.3 Promoting Financial Inclusion
The development of e-payment systems is both a social and a political process and evidence
points to the usefulness of e-payment systems as a tool for developing new banking culture,
achieving financial inclusion and enhancing governance. 129 The Financial Action Task
127 See Central Bank of Nigeria Press Release on Cash Collection Policy
<http://www.cenbank.org/Out/2011/pressrelease/gvd/PRESS_STATEMENT_ON_THE_N
EW_CBN_CASH_COLLECTION_POLICY.pdf > accessed 12/06/2012.
128 David Humphrey et al, ‘Cost Savings from Electronic Payments and ATMs in Europe’
(2003) Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper 03-16, 2.
129 Eg Kenyan M-Pesa reportedly reduced the population of financially excluded from 60%
in 2006 to 25% in 2013, see Katrina Manson, ‘Mobile Phones are Route to Financial




Force (FATF) defines financial inclusion as access to financial services at an affordable cost
in a fair and transparent manner. It involves taking into account the under-served,
undocumented and disadvantaged and vulnerable groups in the provision, availability,
affordability and convenience of payment services. 130 Together with financial literacy,
financial inclusion has been identified as an important index for economic development and
eradication of poverty.131
For Nigeria, these observations translate into one major advantage, the use of e-payment to
facilitate the integration of the unbanked population into the financial sector. Research
indicates that out of 80 million adult Nigerians, 64.1 percent which represents 56.3 million
adults do not have a bank account.132 The main reasons for this include the historical
attachment to cash, imbalances in rural/urban development resulting in the concentration of
banks and other financial institutions in cities and big towns, illiteracy, and until very
recently, a lack of political will on the part of the government to initiate necessary reforms
in the payment systems.
Corresponding to the attainment of financial inclusion is the ability of regulatory authorities
to better perform effective oversight functions. In other words, financial inclusion enables
regulators to monitor the funds in circulation and foreclose on the informal economy. Other
far reaching implications of financial inclusion include increase in subscriber base for e-
services, support for privatisation and liberalisation and the promotion of foreign
investments as well as the development and sustenance of e-governance initiatives. 133
Arguably therefore, with the potentials of ICT integrated payment systems, the Nigerian
financial industry is a prospective foreign investment yield.
2.4.4 Developing E-commerce
According to the OECD, developing economies can leverage ICT to leapfrog the digital gap.
One of the ways in which they can achieve this is by participation in e-commerce. Also,
according to the OECD, e-commerce will ultimately form one of the indices for adjudging
130 See World Bank/Financial Action Task Force (FATF) ‘Guidance on Anti-Money
Laundering and Terrorist Financing Measures and Financial Inclusion’ (OECD/FATF 2013)
<http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/aml_cft_measures_and_financial_in
clusion_2013.pdf> accessed 07/03/2015.
131 See eg Micheal Chibba, ‘Financial Inclusion, Poverty Eradication and the Millennium
Development Goals’ (2009) 21(2) European Journal of Development Research 21.
132 See Central Bank of Nigeria Microfinance Policy Framework for Nigeria Revised April
2011<http://www.cenbank.org/Out/2011/publications/dfd/Reviewed%20Microfinance%20P
olicy%20July%2012%202011.pdf> accessed 21/04/2012.
133 See eg Gramlich L, (n 37).
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economic growth.134 E-commerce generally refers to commercial transactions occurring
over electronic networks, particularly the internet. It includes the sale or purchase of goods
or services conducted over computer networks by methods specifically designed for the
purpose of receiving or placing of orders. E-commerce transactions can be between
enterprises, households, individuals, governments, and other public or private
organisations.135 Depending on the parties to the transaction, e-commerce business models
may include business to business (B2B), business to consumer (B2C), and consumer to
consumer models. Others such as government to citizens (G2C), government to business
(G2B) and government to government (G2G) involve transactions with or between
governments.136
As far back as 2001, the UNCTAD identified the potential of B2B e-commerce to reduce
the marginalisation of producers from developing economies by enabling them to compete
in the global market.137 However, corresponding to increasing internet access, B2C e-
commerce is growing and also poised to meet similar developmental needs. E-commerce
started effectively in Nigeria in 2010 and has developed in terms of number of participating
e-retailers, merchants and consumers. E-retailers such as Jumia.com and Konga.com operate
Amazon type platforms and claim to be filling combined orders of over 1000 a day only few
months after their launch.138 E-commerce in Nigeria has also attracted significant foreign
investment. Reports from the financial industry indicate an increase in online payments
from $314million in 2010 to $488million in 2012. A projected rise to $630million was made
for 2013.139
The above developments imply that for an evolving digital economy such as Nigeria,
secure and efficient e-payment mechanisms would further drive e-commerce in particular
and economic growth in general. At the level of the financial industry, e-payment
solutions that serve e-commerce spur innovation and promote competitiveness. Already
134 OECD, Guidelines to Measuring the Information Society (OECD Publishing 2011).
135 ibid 72.
136 See OECD, ‘Glossary of Statistical Terms’
<http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=4722> accessed 16/04/2012.
137 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (ŬNCTAD), ‘E-Commerce 
and Development Report 2001’ <http://unctad.org/en/docs/ecdr2001_en.pdf> accessed
29/11/2014.
138See Xan Rice, ‘Internet Sales Flourish in Nigeria’ Financial Times (London, 13 May
2013)<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3f455b7e-b1bb-11e2-9315-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3KV2wH7cP> accessed 29/11/2014
139 See Eromosele Abiodun, ‘E-commerce Attracts N8.25bn Foreign Investments’ This Day
Newspapers (Lagos, 27 March 2014) <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/e-commerce-
attracts-n8-25bn-foreign-investments/174641/> accessed 29/11/2014.
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in Nigeria, consumers have a wide array of choice between stored value and pre-paid
cards. At governmental levels, e-commerce makes governments and their agencies
proactive and creative. New technologies demand new laws and new entities need to be
licensed and regulated. In appropriate circumstances, government could levy fees,
charges, penalties and taxes, and thereby potentially expand its revenue base. For
businesses, a major advantage of e-commerce is the growth of small and medium sized
businesses through expansion of potential geographical markets. The accompanying
reduction in the cost of access saves the overhead costs of doing business particularly the
cost of store rental and personnel for small businesses. Individuals could also be gainfully
(self) employed as e-retailers making e-commerce a major entrepreneurship and micro-
enterprise driver. It is therefore not difficult to understand how increased global access
aided by payment modernisation can lead to poverty eradication, job creation, and
perhaps an end to monopolies of traditional banking and payment services.
It is notable that in spite of its advantages, a major setback for e-commerce in Nigeria is
the slow uptake of online payment systems. While payment for goods and services
bought online could be made offline, this is generally considered less efficient than
online payments. In Nigeria however, most consumers still prefer to pay cash-on-delivery
and e-retailers encourage this simply to speed up the growth of their
businesses.140Acceptance of new payment systems is also marginal because providers
and/or their products are new and trust issues exist. If unaddressed, these acceptance
challenges may manifest as the “chicken and egg” effect. A payment system exhibits
“chicken and egg” or ‘network effects’ when no one wants to belong to the payment
network or use a payment instrument or process unless lots of other parties already use
the system. Ultimately because everyone waits for others to use the system, it never gets
used.141 Arguably therefore, breaking the deadlock and overcoming the chicken-and-egg
effect entails addressing factors, such as insecurity and trust which precipitate adverse
choices. As will be argued later in the thesis, this would involve laws and regulations
which strengthen security and promote trust online.
140 See Ben Uzor, ‘E-retailers Switch Tactics as Mistrust of Online Shopping Hamper
Growth’ Business Day (Lagos, 21 March 2014) <http://businessdayonline.com/2014/03/e-
retailers-switch-tactics-as-mistrust-of-online-shopping-hamper-growth/> accessed
30/11/2014.
141 Michael L. Katz, ‘Increasing Connectedness and Consumer Payments: An Overview’




Perhaps one of the most controversial justifications for promoting e-payment systems is its
ability to serve as an instrument of crime control. According to the CBN, e-payments can
curb the risks of violent crimes such as theft and bank robbery.142 In other words, since
criminal associations prefer cash payments on account of its associated anonymity, e-
payments can be useful in mitigating the prevalence of economic and organised crimes such
as money laundering, kidnapping, drug dealing and terrorist financing. E-payments perform
these functions by creating audit trails and eliminating the anonymity associated with cash
transactions.
While the justifications underlying the crime control functions of e-payment systems are
logical, the argument has a flip side. Firstly, anonymity, which is sought to be eliminated by
e-payment systems, is as much a concern of individuals and legitimate businesses as it is of
criminals. It is therefore not necessarily logical to associate desire for payment anonymity
with criminal inclinations. Secondly, available evidence suggests that e-payments aggravate
rather than reduce crimes, particularly theft and fraud. The Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) reported in 2010 that pre-paid cards and mobile and internet payment systems are
vulnerable to abuse and are being used for money laundering and terrorist financing. The
biggest of the reported cases involved USD 5.3million. 143 Also, in 2010, ATM fraud
accounted for more than 50% of the total loss to fraud and forgeries in the Nigerian
financial sector.144 Therefore, as the internet has greater propensity to facilitate criminal
behaviour, it is rational to expect that e-payment systems would be further exploited by
criminals. This calls for an examination of the various modalities which are currently
employed or which may be used for crime prevention, detection and reaction in e-payment
systems.
Conclusion
This chapter serves the purpose of introducing the Nigeria legal system as a foundation and
reference point for later analysis in the thesis. It examined the constitutional, legislative and
judicial arrangements within the Nigerian legal system and highlighted the links between
142 Central Bank of Nigeria, ‘Further Clarifications on the Cashless Lagos Project’
<http://www.cenbank.org/cashless/> accessed 21/05/2012.
143 Financial Action Task Force (FATF), ‘Money Laundering Using New Payment
Methods’(2010)<http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ml%20using%20ne
w%20payment%20methods.pdf.> accessed 08/12/2013.




English law and Nigerian law. The chapter also provided a general overview of the legal
and institutional arrangements in the Nigerian financial industry. It highlighted the
problematic aspects of e-payment systems and demonstrates how the development of
different payment instruments, and the involvement of different sectors in the provision and
delivery of payment services impact on these arrangements. The analysis suggests that
multi-stakeholder engagement in e-payment services is likely to promote regulatory
conflicts and arbitrage and have far reaching implications for the overall security of the
systems. The chapter further draws the inference that the advantages of convenience,
innovations and development offered by e-payment systems are rivalled by the
disadvantages of insecurity and crime. The analysis in chapter three identifies and examines
the main ways in which cybercrime threaten e-payment systems.
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Chapter Three
Cybercrime Threats to E-payment systems
Introduction
Payment institutions and payment instruments often require internet connection to initiate
and complete banking and payment transactions. As was highlighted in chapter two, e-
payments aggravate regulatory problems because of their multi-stakeholders’ provider
nature and the interconnection and interdependence between institutions directly or
indirectly involved in the systems. It is further argued in this chapter that crimes on e-
payment systems are dependent on the ability of criminals to extract and misuse personal
information processed by the provider institutions. The chapter therefore provides an in-
depth examination of the processes for exploiting e-payment systems in Nigeria particularly
at the level of organisations.
The chapter starts with an exposition of the challenges of fraud reporting and how these
contribute to undermining the threats posed by cybercrime to e-payments in Nigeria. It then
maps the threat landscape by considering the threats posed by hacking, phishing and
malware propagation. The chapter follows with an examination of how these activities
potentially compromise identity information and lead to identity related cybercrimes. The
chapter concludes with an assessment of how the financial industry in Nigeria has
responded to the threats of cybercrime and the extent to which the responses conform to
recommended information security standards in the payment industry.
3.1 Internet Fraud in Nigeria
Fraud was already an endemic problem in Nigeria before the widespread use of computer
systems. However, the use of electronic systems was widely acknowledged as a great
facilitator of the crime. Using computers and the accessibility enabled by the internet,
fraudsters send spam mails typically requesting assistance to transfer some illegally sourced
funds or legacy to bank accounts abroad. Perhaps on account of limited infrastructure for
electronic money transfers and the stigmatisation of the Nigerian political class as highly
corrupt, these mails appear credible and were particularly successful with foreigner victims.1
The scale of the problem was such that the then former US secretary of state, Colin Powell
1 See eg Harvey Glickman, ‘The Nigerian “419” Advance Fee Scam: Prank or Peril? (2005)
39(3) Canadian Journal of African Studies 460.
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was quoted to have referred to Nigeria as ‘a nation of scammers.’ 2 While sweeping
statements such as this have been contested,
3
much international suspicions continue to trail
activities of Nigerians on the internet whether social or commercial.4
Nevertheless, the adoption of e-payment systems tilted the threat landscape significantly. In
terms of prospective victims, and the methods and schemes for internet crimes, targets have
become more domestic and schemes have evolved to match the increasing population online.
In other words, cybercrime hitherto seen as a crime targeting foreigners has become both a
domestic as well as an international concern. The significance of this development was first
seen in the widespread fraud associated with Automatic Teller machines.5 In order to reduce
the incidence of ATM frauds, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) mandated all banks and
card issuers to migrate from magnetic stripe cards to EMV cards, also called Chip and PIN
cards.6 According to the CBN, the use of Chip and PIN cards has led to the reduction of
fraud on ATMs by 99% because the cards integrate technologies that make it difficult to
forge or clone them.7 However, the CBN itself admitted that fraud has migrated to other
platforms particularly Card Not Present (CNP) transactions and other web based payment
applications.8 More specifically, reports on fraud and forgeries in the Nigerian financial
industry through 2009 to 2012 identified ‘computer fraud’ or ‘cyber-fraud’ as the leading
cause of losses to financial institutions.9 According to the report, computer fraud represents
52.47 per cent of total amount lost to fraud and forgeries in 2012.10 The Nigerian Electronic
fraud Forum (NEFF) attributed 70% of all known cases of electronic fraud to phishing
2 Howard W French, ‘://www.nytimes.com/1995/10/20/world/the-leader-of-nigeria-is-
elusive.html> Leader of Nigeria is Elusive’ The New York Times (New York 20 October
1995) <http accessed 20/09/2013.
3 See eg Olumide Longe and Adenike Osofisan, ‘On the Origin of Advance Fee Fraud
Electronic Mails: A Technical Investigation Using Internet Protocol Address Tracers’
(2011) 3(1) The African Journal of Information Systems 17.
4 Eg PayPal for sometime denied registration to users traced to a Nigerian IP address and
only recently included Nigeria on the list of countries and regions it supports’ see ‘Countries
and Regions supported by PayPal’
<https://developer.paypal.com/webapps/developer/docs/classic/api/country_codes/ >
accessed 21/05/2014.
5 See previous notes in 2.3.4.2 Payment Channels - Online and Offline Systems p 32.
6 See Item 1.4.2(c) CBN E-banking Guidelines 2003.
7 See Nigeria Electronic Fraud Forum (NeFF) Annual Report 2012. (No further reference
could be provided for the report. Although, a copy was given to the researcher for the
purpose of the research, it is unclear whether it was subsequently published or made
available.)
8 ibid.




scams.11 The reasons for the shift to CNP transactions include the ubiquity of the internet
and increasing payment mobility in Nigeria.
3.2 The Challenges of Fraud Reporting
In spite of the statistics above, there are indications that much of the published figures
represent a mere fraction of the threats posed to e-payment systems. Banking regulations
require banks to report cases of frauds and forgeries relating to e-banking and to highlight
such reports on the returns on frauds and forgeries made to the Central Bank.12 However,
evidence suggests that gross under-reporting of fraud meant that such returns are unreliable
as a source of statistics. For example, the Nigerian financial market has been described as ‘a
market where fraud information is kept top secret’.13 As noted in the NEFF Annual Report,
this secrecy not only impugns the integrity of fraud records but also aids criminality. In
other words, because criminals are fairly certain that victim organisations are unlikely to
publicise attacks or report fraud incidences to regulatory authorities, they (the criminals)
leverage the situation to attack the banks one after the other using the same fraud type. This
also leads to a situation where fraudsters in the markets need not be innovative and only
propagate in an already fertile market.14
The main explanation identified as contributing to industry’s propensity to keep fraud
information secret (“culture of secrecy”) is underlying reputational concerns surrounding
organisations’ fraud reporting. 15 As a report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) also notes, underreporting of cybercrimes generally, derives from victim
shame and embarrassment, and perceived reputation risks for corporations. 16 In the
particular case of Nigeria, it can be argued that competition for larger market share of e-
payment services may further contribute to this. For example, because it is relatively new,
the market for e-payment services is highly competitive and operators struggle for
dominance by consistently developing and marketing different payment solutions to both
customers and non-customers. It is therefore safe to assume that to preserve the reputation
of their brands, there would be less willingness on the part of providers to admit that fraud
occurs or is pervasive on their payment platforms or networks.
11 NeFF (n 7).
12 See item 4.3 (b) CBN Guidelines on Electronic Banking 2003.
13 NeFF (n 7) 6.
14 ibid.
15 Regulator 2.




Also specific to Nigeria, it can be argued that the terminologies used to describe crimes
connected to computers create further barriers to effective reporting. For example, there are
instances where organisations will admit that they have experienced incidences of computer
crime or computer fraud but have not been victims of cybercrimes.17 On the one hand, the
perceptions and understandings of computer crimes tend to be of crimes committed by
insiders such as employees who misuse passwords or exceed authorised access.18 Usually,
computer crimes can be dealt with by applying organisations’ disciplinary procedures
including dismissal of the guilty insider/employee.19 Cybercrimes on the other hand are
those crimes committed by outsiders such as hackers and phishers who use exploit software
to infiltrate or remotely gain access to information systems. 20 To further highlight the
distinctions, a policy maker argued that connectivity to the internet is a requirement of
cybercrime while computer crimes can be committed on standalone computers and within
closed systems.21
In practice therefore, distinctions are made between malicious misuse which are identified
as computer crime or insider fraud and unauthorised access which is often explained as
outsider fraud or cybercrime. Although, the distinctions go beyond mere semantics, they are
generally unhelpful. As will be argued later in chapter four, pervasive and ubiquitous
computing has undermined continued differentiation between computer and cybercrimes.22
Nevertheless, the significant point to note here is that even when available, statistics may be
misleading because computer crimes would be classified differently to cybercrimes. This
puts into perspective the fact that statistics on cybercrime in Nigeria is incomplete and
unreliable. It also underlines the assumption that the scale of cybercrime is perhaps broader
than any reporting or empirical work could capture.
3.3 Identity Related Cybercrimes
It has been aptly noted that value in cyberspace is attached to information. Therefore, the
focus of cybercriminals is the acquisition of information in order to extract its value.23 In the
context of e-payment systems, the value attached to information is money or money’s worth.
17 Payment service provider 2, 3, and 4.
18 Payment service provider 2 and 3.
19 Payment service provider 4.
20 Payment service provider 2, 3 and 4.
21 Policy maker 1.
22 See further notes in 4.1.1 (Not) Defining Cybercrime p 88.
23 See David S Wall, Cybercrime: The Transformation of Crime in the Information Age
(Polity Press 2007) 36.
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Before examining the different means by which criminals access information used for
identity crimes, it is relevant to consider the concept of identity.
3.3.1 What is (Digital) Identity?
Identity is a complex concept because there are different and multiple identities serving
numerous social contexts.24 There are also different dimensions and perspectives on identity
and identities have been analysed from personal, social, legal and historical and
philosophical perspectives.25 Hence we may speak of personal, legal and cultural identities
as well as national, religious and gender identities. Developments in information technology
have also led to the recognition of online or virtual or digital identities. Considering its
scope, a discussion of the broad concept of identity may be endless and sterile in the context
of this thesis. However, in order to understand the forms of identity at risk in identity-related
cybercrimes, the notions of identity, digital identity and identification are considered.
The term ‘identity’ is not defined by law or policy in Nigeria. Generally however, identity is
understood as the condition or fact of being some specific person or the condition of being
the same as someone assumed, described or claimed.26 Identity therefore means sameness or
oneness as against similar or alike. A person’s identity is composed of information which
relates to him and singles him out from a general population.27 For transactional purposes in
the real world or offline, identity is often defined from individual, social, and legal
perspectives. At the level of the individual, the concept of identity refers to the unique
features, attributes and characteristics that distinguish a person. It may be established
through personal or physical attributes such as appearance, facial or voice recognition or
permanent attributes such as a person’s DNA code. Socially constructed and legal identities
are established by social or legal attributes assigned to a person by the society or the law or
state. These include a person’s name, address, and other identity credentials such as birth
certificate, driver’s licence and international passports issued by the state. Identification is
the process of determining who a person is usually through one or a combination of
individual, social and legal attributes. Identification is therefore the process of associating
24 Emily Finch, ‘The Problem of Stolen Identity and the Internet’ in Yvonne Jewkes (ed)
Crime Online (Willan 2007) 29.
25 See eg Luciano Floridi, ‘The Informational Nature of Personal Identity’ (2011) 21 Minds
& Machines 549; see also Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy (1890)
Harvard Law Review 193.
26 Kurt M. Sanders and Bruce Zucker, ‘Counteracting Identity Fraud in the Information
Age: The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act’ (1999) 13(1) International Review
of Law, Computers & Technology.
27 Clare Sullivan, ‘Digital Identity and Mistake’ (2012) 20(3) International Journal of Law
and Information Technology 223.
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one or more attributes with a person in order to define that person to the level sufficient for
the contemplated purpose.28 It differs from authentication which is the process of verifying
or ascertaining an individual’s identity.29
It is notable that while physical attributes and identity credentials are often sufficient to
verify identities within the confines of physical environments, they become less reliable in
the context of remote and distanced transactions online.30 According to Clarke, in the
context of information systems, identification involves linking a stream of data with an
individual.31 Human identification is therefore the association of data with a particular
human being. 32 Such data associated with humans constitute their digitals identities.
Implying correctly that individuals as well as devices can possess digital identity, 33
Cameron defines digital identity as a set of claims made by one digital subject about itself or
about another digital subject. 34 Also, following this notion of identity, the OECD observed
that as it relates to natural persons, digital identity involves the use of electronic identifiers
by individuals in their interaction with information systems through a digital network such
as the internet. 35 A person’s digital identity would therefore include transactional
information such as credit and debit card details as well as relational information such as
usernames and passwords.36 Therefore, in the context of electronic means of payment,
usernames, passwords, and personal identification numbers (PINs) or biometric templates
generated or assigned to users at enrolment will constitute part of their identity information.
If tokens such as payment cards are issued, primary account numbers (PAN), card
verification code (CVV), and personal identification numbers (PINs) will also form part of
the identity information.
28 Thomas J Smedinghoff, ‘Introduction to Online Identity Management’ 4
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/colloquia/EC/Smedinghoff_Paper_-
_Introduction_to_Identity_Management.pdf> accessed 21/07/2012.
29 See notes on Authenticating Technologies below.
30 See eg Roger Clarke, ‘Human Identification in Information Systems: Management
Challenges and Public Policy Issues’ (1994) 7(4) Information Technology and People.
31 ibid 6.
32 ibid.
33 For example, an internet protocol or IP address represents a computer’s digital identity.
34 Kim Cameron, ‘The Laws of Identity’<https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/ms996456(d=printer).aspx#lawsofiden_topic3> accessed 21/02/2015
35 OECD, ‘Digital Identity Management for Natural Persons: Enabling Innovation and Trust
in the Internet Economy Guidance for Government Policy Makers’ (OECD Digital
Economy Papers 186 2011) 3, <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-
technology/digital-identity-management-for-natural-persons_5kg1zqsm3pns-en>accessed
15/03/2014.
36 See eg Sullivan, (n 27).
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From the perspectives of identity-related cybercrimes, digital identities can be problematic.
The first problematic aspect relates to the tendency to separate digital identities from real
world identities. For example, digital identities often have no direct reference to the
individual using them and may be changed, revoked or discarded at the will of the user or a
service provider. The identities can also be multiple and transient and may be anonymised
or pseudonymised to achieve further disconnection with a person’s real world identity.
Accordingly, the notion of a separate digital self and digital citizenship have been advanced
and promoted in recent discourse of digital identities. 37 However, it is arguable that
differentiating offline and digital identities not only tend to over-simplify the problems of
identity but also serve limited analytical purposes when conceptualising identity-related
cybercrimes.38 Apart from the fact that digital identities can relate to real world identities,
new technologies also integrate and interlock real and digital identities across multiple
domains making separation or differentiation between the identities difficult. For example,
data which is anonymised or pseudonmyised for identity purposes may be de-anonymised or
de-pseudonymised.39 For the purpose of criminal exploitation of identities therefore, the
increasing links between offline and online identities makes identity theft and fraud easier.
The smart card based national e-identity card proposed in Nigeria is a classic example in
this respect. The card is proposed as a multi-purpose national identity card to be used for
offline and online identification purposes. It embeds all identity information of the holder
including unique biometric information. It is also expected to serve as an authentication
token for banking and payment systems. 40 However, as a token, the identity card can be
stolen. As a means of verifying identities, it could be compromised since online
authentication processes can generally be defeated.41 Criminals can also subvert the national
identity database, which stores the identity information, for identity theft and fraud.42 It is
therefore arguable that access to the card or information on the card means that a fraudster
can build complete or composite identity profile of a victim or use the card for both online
and offline identity crimes. As stated in a Report on Identities in the UK;
37 See eg ‘The 2014 CLSR-LSPI Lisbon Seminar on ‘The Digital Citizen’- Presented at the
9th International Conference on Legal, Security and Privacy Issues in IT Law (LSPI) 15-17
October 2014’ (2015) 31 Computer Law & Security Review 163.
38 See eg Angel Adrian, ‘No One Knows you are a Dog: Identity and Reputation in Virtual
Worlds’ (2008) 24 Computer Law and security Report 366.
39See eg Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques (WP
216 10 April 2014) 4.
40 See ss 27, 28, 29 Nigerian Identity Management Commission Act (NIMCA) 2007.
41 See notes on Authenticating Technologies below.
42 See notes in 5.4.3 Challenges of Identity Management p 169.
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Creating a false identity or stealing another person’s identity is often achieved
through obtaining key personal information, so the distinction between a person’s
‘identity’ (in terms of their overall sense of self) and the identification used to
distinguish between people online is being increasingly blurred in practice.
Ultimately, stealing sufficient information could enable a criminal to effectively
take over victims’ online identities.43
The examples highlighted above suggest that even if it was possible in theory to
differentiate between real world and digital identities, malicious actors and technologies
considerably limit the extent to which we may do so. Therefore, it is more useful to think of
digital identities the same way we think of the notion of identity generally. Correspondingly,
if identity is correctly the sum total of the characteristics which determine who a person is,44
then digital identity should be the composite or totality of information about an individual.
For the purposes of further analysis in the thesis, the relevant point here is that personal
information requires protection irrespective of the nature of the information and the
organisation collecting it.
The second problematic aspect of digital identities concerns their legal status. It will be
argued later in the thesis that it is challenging to determine whether generally, identities or
identity information are capable of being stolen under the law. It will also be argued that the
protection of identity information is linked to the more restrictive legal concept of ‘personal
information’. Therefore, it is the law which defines specific information as linked or
linkable to an individual for protection purposes. For the purposes of further analysis in this
chapter, it suffices to state that identity crimes generally refer to the misuse of another’s
personal or identifying information. From the perspectives of information systems, identity-
related crimes are committed by defeating the verification or authentication strategies of a
networked system. This enables a person to identify himself as someone else. Depending on
the nature of the transaction, circumventing authentication processes may enable the identity
criminal to access benefits to which he is not otherwise entitled or to avoid detriments to
which he would otherwise be subject.45 Invariably, identity/personal information is at rsisk
of theft when criminals compromise proprietary systems of service provider organisations.




45 Russell G Smith, ‘Biometric Solution to Identity-related Cybercrime’ in Yvonne Jewkes,
(ed) Crime Online (Willan Publishing 2007) 44, 45.
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The following sections explore the vectors or means through which criminals’ access and
exploit identity information in e-payment systems.
3.3.2 Threat Vectors and Activities
As the common denominator for the provision of e-payment services, the internet provides
access to both legitimate and illegitimate users. Therefore, the main vectors of criminal
attack on e-payment systems correspond to the payment channels, instruments and
institutions analysed in chapter two. These would include the databases and websites of
banking and non-banking e-payment service providers as well as e-commerce sites. They
would also include payment channels such as ATMS and POS terminals. For example,
payment terminals and websites are attractive to criminals because they provide a viable
source of harvesting personal financial information such as PANs, PINs, CVVs and
usernames and passwords. Databases are also attractive because of the large amount of
personal information accessible through the source. E-commerce sites provide the platform
both for harvesting and for the use of fraudulently sourced or stolen account and payment
details. The common threat actions identified include hacking or unauthorised access into
information systems, and phishing, and malware propagation. For organisations, these
threats increase the risks of data breaches and the possibilities of identity related crimes.
3.3.2.1 Hacking (Unauthorised/Illegal Access to computer Systems)
Hacking refers to unauthorised intrusion, disruption, manipulation and exploration of a
computer system. It involves attacks against the availability, confidentiality and integrity of
computer systems and data. Hackers illegally access computer systems to explore and/or
steal information.
46
Although hackers attack individual and standalone systems, for payment
systems, the main threats posed by hacking lays in the possibility of hackers compromising
customer information in custodian systems such as banks’ and other payment service
providers databases. Such compromise may entail breach of confidentiality or theft of
personal and financial information. For example, hackers can manipulate web applications
to make fraudulent transfers from compromised accounts to accounts under the control of
the hacker. Apart from stealing data, hackers can also generally compromise websites to
leverage further damaging attacks such as to propagate malware or launch denial of service
(DoS) or phishing attacks.47
46 Douglas Thomas and Brian D Loader (eds) Cybercrime Law Enforcement Security and
Surveillance in the Information Age (Routledge 2000) 6.
47 For example, as a symbol of protest, the website of Nigerian electoral body, the
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was hacked by a group identifying
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Technical security experts in Nigeria estimate that over 3000 ‘maliciously crafted attacks’
are directed at payment service operators every day.
48
However, evidence suggests that
hacking is still more of a perceived than an actual threat in the industry. It was argued for
example that ‘Nigerian hackers’ are made up mainly of “hacktivists” or cyber-activist often
motivated by political agenda of correcting perceived inequalities and injustice. 49
Correspondingly, the main targets of the “hacktivists” are websites belonging to government
and its agencies.50 These explanations carry an underlying assumption that hackers are less
likely to attack private or financial organisations because their (hackers’) motivations are
seldom financial.
It was also argued that since financial databases and information systems are often more
secure than those of government organisations, hackers are unlikely to succeed even if they
attack financial systems. In effect, hackers lack the technical skill and knowledge to defeat
the up-to date and robust technical security of the financial industry making financial
information generally less accessible to criminals.51 Summed up as a simple argument,
service providers’ views are that hackers are more active in the political rather than the
financial arena, and that both the robustness of security and the low technical skills of the
hackers have reduced the possibilities and potency of cyber-attacks. Invariably, this
accounts for why there does not seem to be reports of hacking and data breaches or data
theft incidents in the Nigerian financial industry.
If one accepts these explanations as mirroring the position of industry, then, it must also be
assumed that any proposal to control the threats of hacking is speculative and premature.
However, this assumption is not supported by the literature or empirical evidence. The data
suggests that the crimes are being contested and acknowledged at the same time. For
example, it was contended that cybercrimes are not presently a problem for law enforcement
in Nigeria because the crimes are not very pervasive.52 At the same time, the observation
was made that ‘The integrity of the payment systems is at stake unless we do something
about controlling cybercrimes’.53 Furthermore, measures taken by the financial industry
suggest haste, if not desperation, to counter e-payment fraud. The establishment of the
itself as the Nigerian Cyber Army Team NCA in the wake of the March 2015 general
elections.
48 IT security expert 1.
49 Payment service providers 2, 3 and 4.
50 Payment service provider 2 and 3.
51 Payment service providers 1, 2, 3, 4, 6.
52 Law enforcement 1.
53 ibid.
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Nigeria Electronic Fraud Forum (NeFF),54 and introduction of the Bank verification number
(BVN),55 are examples which point at attempts to find a solution to problems which by
industry assessment are ‘non-existent’.
As analysis earlier in the chapter suggests, a better explanation is that because it raises
reputational concerns, organisations would not readily admit that their systems have been
hacked. Moreover, as argued by a service provider, an organisation’s obligation is limited to
reporting fraud and not “mere threats”. 56 “Mere threats” in this instance refers to security
breaches resulting from hacker infiltration. This observation appears to suggest that unless a
breach of security leads to fraud, then service provider organisations are not obliged to
comply with reporting obligations. If the clear, albeit technical distinctions between a data
breach and a security breach is applied, this observation would be correct. A data breach is
a type of security breach which involves the release or loss of personal information which
can be used for identity-related crimes. Other security breaches may not lead to such losses.
For example, a security breach may include defacement of websites, hacktivism, or
distributed denial of service (DDoS) which do not necessarily involve the theft or
compromise of personal information.57 In practice therefore, a data breach would be a
security breach but a security breach will not necessarily lead to a breach of data or loss of
personal or identifying information. In effect, the observation must be taken as implying that
data and security breaches do occur, but are not reported unless fraud also occurs. It must
also be taken to imply that since there is no regulatory or statutory reporting requirement for
data breaches, organisations are justified to deal with data breaches as internal security
problems.
While the notion of data or security breaches may be technical and contestable, the
perceptions of hackers and their motives are less correct. As noted above, assumptions are
made that hackers can be categorised according to their intent and they generally lack the
skills to infiltrate more secure systems and networks. The literature suggests that these
assumptions are mistaken and incorrect. Gragido et al argue for example that although
54 The Neff was set up as an alternative forum for fraud reporting on account of limited
success of the Central Bank of Nigeria to compel banks and other non-bank financial
institutions to report fraud.
55 The BVN involves enrolment and use of bank customers’ biometric information for
banking and payment transactions; see further notes in 5.1.3 CBN Bank Verification
Number (BVN) p 139.
56 Payment service provider 7.




hackers are traditionally categorised as insurgents, this characterisation has changed in the
contemporary context. As they observe;
Previous books on hackers and hacking tended to get weighed down by the
personality traits of hackers—depicting mainly male, acne-faced teens and
young adults dressed in black and perpetrating their crimes in black-lit rooms of
various types … Hackers who face large corporations are typically well
financed, are organized, and have analysed the saleability of the information
they pilfer.58
Contrary to arguments typifying hackers and their attacks therefore, the point here is that
hackers could be highly skilled and could potentially attack any organisation. However,
even if one concedes, for the purpose of argument, that financial organisations, such as
banks are secure from hackers, this does not lead to the invariable conclusion that
information which may be targeted for fraudulent use is secure. As demonstrated in chapter
two, multiple organisations, including non-bank e-payment service organisations, now
collect and store personal information. Therefore, any system could be compromised and
personal information thereby accessed used for fraud. To state the point differently, even if
hackers target non-financial databases, it is incorrect and misleading to conclude that they
have non-financial motives or that they pose no threats to financial information. To further
support this point, research indicates that hackers have become notoriously erratic as their
attacks fail to follow any logical sequence of whether or not victims have money or valuable
information. Accordingly, since hackers are unpredictable, organisations should be doubly
concerned.59
Moreover, since criminals are also likely to hack information systems of smaller or non-
financial organisations and even individual devises of users, these may provide alternative
access into systems and networks of larger (financial) organisations. Mobile payments for
example are capable of providing access points to information held in banks’ databases.
They may also enable attacks on telecom companies using mobile devices as gateway for
electronic payments.60 Available statistics show that some of the largest data breaches have
involved not only banks or other financial institutions but also retailers. For example data
58Will Gragido et al, Blackhatonomics an Inside Look at the Economics of Cybercrime
(Elsevier 2012) 3-4.
59 Verizon 2012 Data Breach Investigation Report (DBIR)
<http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach-investigations-report-
2012-ebk_en_xg.pdf accessed> 15/05/2013.
60See Symantec, Internet Security Threat Report (ISTR) Vol 17 April 2012, 25.
60
breaches at TJX in the United States indicate that any organisation within the payment
system is susceptible to attacks and hackers would exploit the weakest and most vulnerable
link in the payment chain. Therefore, bigger organisations could suffer direct losses and
collateral losses as a result of data breaches in smaller organisations.61 According to the
Verizon 2015 PCI Compliance Report, no country, industry, or company is safe from
cybercrime.62 As Newman and Clarke also rightly observed;
…as far as the internet is concerned, any business that is connected to it is at
risk of criminal attack, even if that business is not directly or even specifically
the target of the criminal. Since information has become the key ingredient in e-
commerce…all e-commerce becomes a target.63
Finally, it is arguable that the availability of crime statistics in the context of cybercrimes is
tied to the ability to detect the threats and data breaches in the first place. In other words,
assumptions that financial systems have not been compromised may actually be indicative
of non-detection rather than the absence of threats or breaches. As later analysis in the thesis
demonstrate, the likelihood of detection further diminishes where there is a dearth of
forensic investigative skills as appears to be the case in Nigeria. 64 Overall therefore,
although it is difficult to establish the pervasiveness of hacking as a threat to new e-payment
systems in Nigeria, alternative explanations demonstrate that this cannot be taken as absence
of this threat.
3.3.2.2 Phishing
Phishing refers to fraudulently obtaining financial information from the victim, typically
through the use of e-mail and spoofed sites. 65 The Anti-phishing Working Group (APWG)
identifies two forms of phishing attacks. The first involves the use of social engineering
61 Eg in the TJX cases, affected banks were reported to have incurred costs of over $1
billion to replace compromised cards, see Stacy L Schreft, ‘Risks of Identity Theft: Can the
Market Protect the payment System’ (2007) Economic Review Fourth Quarter Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
62 Verizon, ‘Verizon 2015 PCI Compliance Report Insight for Helping Businesses Manage
Risk through Payment Security’ 4.
<http://www.verizonenterprise.com/placeholder/resources/reports/rp_pci-report-
2015_en_xg.pdf accessed 13/05/2015.
63 Graeme R Newman and Ronald V Clarke, Superhighway Robbery: Preventing E-
commerce Crimes (Routledge 2003) 46.
64 See notes in 4.6.1 Lack of Computer Forensics Capacity in Law Enforcement p 130.
65 Kenneth C Laudon Carol and Guercio Traver, E-Commerce 2011 Business Technology
Society (7th edn Pearson 2011).
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methods and the second the use of technical subterfuge or pharming.66 In social engineering
or e-mail based attacks, the phishing scam involves three phases. In the first phase, the
criminals identify legitimate organisations offering electronic services such as online
banking. They then design spoofed sites which are similar or look-alike websites of the
legitimate business. The second phase involves sending out e-mails (called spammed e-
mails) similar to those of the legitimate organisations. Generally spam is understood to
mean unsolicited and unwanted electronic messages. However, the OECD includes the word
‘harmful’ in its definition because spam is increasingly being viewed as a vector for
malware and phishing scams. 67 The spam mails will usually request users to provide
personal details such as passwords, PINs or other identifying information. In the third phase,
the scammers use the information supplied to log into the victims account and to unlawfully
transfer money or commit other identity-related offences.68
In contrast, pharming or malware based attacks employ a technical method using malware
installed on username or Domain Name Server (DNS) or embedded in spam mails. The
malware automatically re-directs users to the spoofed site whenever they attempt to access
legitimate services such as electronic banking. It then prompts the users to enter personal
log on information which is subsequently used for identity fraud.69 Malware based methods
are also used to perpetrate man- in -the -middle attacks, an attack which enables the phisher
using designated malware, to intercept messages or instructions intended for legitimate
businesses or organisations. 70
Phishing scams are blended and adjusted to new technologies in payment systems and are
increasingly able to target both individuals and institutions. More significantly, payment
services and the financial sector are the most targeted sectors for phishing scams. 71
Although not clearly defined in Nigeria, phishing is conceived as the use of technology to
perpetrate deceit and is said to account for an estimated 70 per cent of fraud in e-payment
66 Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG), Phishing Activity Trends Report, 3rd Quarter
2014 <http://docs.apwg.org/reports/apwg_trends_report_q1_2014.pdf.> accessed
09/04/2015.
67 OECD defines spam as unsolicited, unwanted and harmful electronic messages; see
OECD, ‘Policy Guidance on Online Identity Theft’ (OECD Ministerial Meeting on the
Future of the Internet 17-18 June 2008) 3<http://www.oecd.org/sti/consumer/40879136.pdf
accessed> 12/09/2013.
68 ibid.
69 UNODC, The Globalisation of Crime: A Transnational Organised Crime Threat
Assessment (UNODC 2010) 204.
70 See further notes below at p 82.




Phishing activities in Nigeria are generally correlated to the APWG classification
into socially engineered phishing methods using fraudulent e-mails and malware based
phishing. Citing specific examples, the following sections demonstrate the pattern and
trends of phishing scams in Nigeria.
(a) Spam mails
Spam mails used to perpetrate fraud on e-payment systems often request recipients to update
their account details by following a clickable link to their bank or other organisation’s
website. Payment service providers in Nigeria confirm the rising incidents of spam and the
fact that in spite of aggressive user awareness initiatives, many consumers continue to fall
for the scam.
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However, it can also be argued that the response rate to scam mails is
increasing because of the innovativeness and creativeness of criminals in constructing
believable mails which mirror those sent by organisations to their customers. The examples
in tables 3.1 and 3.2 depict such scam mails.
Table 3.1 sample spam mail
Absent the tell-tale signs of bogus or fictitious mails such as grammatical and spelling
errors, e-mails such as the above appear credible and can more easily convince the
72 See NeFF Annual Report 2012.
73 Payment Service provider 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7.
Dear Valued Customer,
As part of our continuous efforts towards providing you with excellent customer service and ensuring
efficiency in transaction processing, we request that you kindly update your records with the Bank by
going to https://xxxbanknig.com/update//login.aspx
This update will help us to prevent any unauthorised or illegal use of our customers identity and to
confirm that you are truly the owner of the account you are operating. Failure to update your account
now will lead to termination of your account and internet banking services for security reasons.
Click here now for the update.
If this message is in your spam folder kindly move the mail to your inbox to enable you click on the
account update link.
XXX bank is committed to protect the identity of its internet users. Help us to serve you better. It’s all
about your security.
Thank you for choosing XXX bank.
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recipients. Notably, scammers also exploit privacy and security concerns among users
and appear to have created “scammers’ diction” to match these concerns. For example
new scam mails now purports to come from non-existent “privacy departments” of
commercial banks. One of such ‘privacy scam mails’ reads as follows;
Table 3.2 – Sample privacy spam mail
(b) Spoofing
As described above, fraudulent e-mails usually contain a clickable link leading to a
website identical to that of the bank which purportedly sent the e-mail. The user/victim
is prompted to click on the link. However, rather than take him to the bank’s legitimate
site, the link takes the victim to an identical or ‘spoofed’ website of the bank. A spoofed
site is a bogus site and once the user enters his password and account details, these are
captured by the phisher and the information may be used to access the user’s bank
account (internet banking fraud) or to perpetrate other identity related fraud. The most
common use of the information is transferring money from the victims account to an
account under the control of the phisher.
(c) Domain Based Phishing
This form of phishing is close to the one described above. The main difference however is
that in domain based phishing, the sites are not spoofed. The fraudster registers a domain
name similar to the trademark of an organisation with only slight differences. The victim is
then directed to this website rather than to the authentic site of the bank. While more
computer savvy persons may detect spoofing, domain based phishing may be more difficult
to identify. It is therefore a method devised to make the sites more believable and increase
the chances of users falling for the scam. Generally, in Nigeria, prospective companies may
No Reply@XXXcontacts.com
To Recipients,
Dear XXX Bank Nigeria Customer,
Notice attention to us by The CBN To Upgrade Our security,
To cashless policy and enable all our customers tranzact Cashless.




(c) 2013 XXX Bank Nigeria
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be refused registration on grounds that certain names are prohibited or infringe on existing
names or trademarks.
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However, there is no such practice for domain names registration
and it has been argued that domain name spoofing is aided by the lack of effective
regulation of domain name registration generally. 75
A further challenge identified with respect to domain based phishing is associated with the
regulation of Internet Service Providers (ISPS) in Nigeria. Although the Nigerian Advance
Fee Fraud Act requires that all ISPs be registered with the Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission (EFCC),
76
full compliance with this law is difficult to achieve. This is because
some organisations use foreign ISPs and while foreign ISPs are also required to appoint
agents in Nigeria and register, most of them fail to do so. The challenge then is that such
ISPs cannot be regulated and it is often difficult for law enforcement agencies to solicit their
assistance in shutting down offending websites.
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(d) Context-aware Phishing
Jakobbson describes Context-aware phishing as a form of phishing in which the attacker
exploits some knowledge about the victim to enhance the efficacy of the attack.
78
In
context-aware phishing, criminals depend on available information about an individual to
collect additional information either from the individual himself or from other sources.
Therefore, phishers can use a combination of information sourced from the internet,
personal interactions, public records and physical world information to commit identity
crimes online. In Nigeria, Information from social networking sites such as Facebook and
professional network sites such as Linked-In were identified as particularly susceptible to
exploitation for context-aware phishing.
79
Since the phisher may already have some
background information such as the victim’s first name, surname, mother’s maiden name, e-
mail, telephone number, profession or address, phishing or forged e-mails sent to the victim
are personalised and more believable.80 For example a scam e-mail to a bank customer will
74 IT Security expert 1.
75 See eg Mike Rodenbaugh, ‘ICANN Policy Developments on Abusive Domain Name
Registration’<http://rodenbaugh.com/downloads/pdf/IPLitigator_AbusiveDomains.pd>
accessed 19/02/2013.
76 See s 13 Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act Cap A2 Laws of the
Federation of Nigeria 2004.
77 Law enforcement agent 1.
78 Markus Jakobsson, ‘Modelling and Preventing Phishing Attacks’ <http://markus-
jakobsson.com/papers/jakobsson-fc05.pdf> accessed 15/02/2014.
79 Law enforcement 1.
80 See notes on Spear Phishing below.
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not address the victim as ‘Dear Customer, rather, it may contain the victim’s title and first
name such as ‘Dear Dr Jane Doe.’
81
(e) Smishing/ Vishing
Vishing and smishing are not necessarily referred to by these terms in Nigeria. It is more
usual to describe them simply as SMS fraud. Vishing is a combination of voice and phishing.
It involves the use of social engineering over the telephone system and deploys features
such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP).82 Smishing is short message service (SMS)
based phishing scam which targets users of mobile phones through fraudulent text
messages.83 In a typical Nigerian smishing or SMS scam, the prospective victim is informed
via SMS that he has won a lottery or has been drawn among the winners in a competition,
often one that he has not entered at all. The message might also inform the prospective
victim that he has won an all-expense paid holiday to an exotic location or has been chosen
to receive supplies of certain products for a designated time.
84
To enable the organisation to
fully process or make other arrangements to facilitate the victim’s access to the winnings,
holidays or products, he is advised to contact the organisers through a phone number. If the
victim makes the call, he is prompted to ‘confirm’ his personal information including his
name, address, bank account number, date of birth, mother’s maiden name, place and
address of workplace. He may also be asked details of his national identity card number and
even information such as spouse name, and the names and age of children and even car
registration number.
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While seemingly incongruous, much of the information gathered
through this process is used in context phishing (described above) to demonstrate familiarity
with the victim or to build trust. This in turn could be used for other fraudulent purposes
such as identity fraud involving applying for debit cards on the victim’s account or for SIM
swap frauds.
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As observed by a security expert, smishing frauds are particularly enabled by lack of data
protection requirements. He contends that organisations such as MNOs are implicated in the
fraud because they sell subscribers information including phone numbers for marketing
purposes and for other purposes which may be unknown or undisclosed by the “information
81 Law enforcement 1.
82 See eg OECD, ‘Policy Guidance on Online Identity Theft’(n 67).
83 ibid.
84 Law enforcement 2.
85 ibid.
86 See notes on Account-take Over Fraud and SIM Swap Fraud below.
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buyers” at the time of the sale. 87 Furthermore, although, the scams are perceived as
generally targeting users, they also victimise organisations. For example, smishing scams
exploit and undermine reliance on the transaction notification system put in place by banks
to check incidents of fraudulent transactions and payments. A transaction notification or
‘alert’ is an SMS or e-mail sent to an account holder whenever any credit (credit alert) or
debit (debit alert) transaction occurs on the account. There are also “log in alerts” designed
to inform users of recent logs into their accounts and advising them to change passwords or
contact their service providers/banks if they did not initiate the log-in. 88 To undermine this
system however, fraudsters send fraudulent SMS alerting users of e-banking or e-payment
services to fictitious log-ins or transactions. The users are then advised to follow certain
links or call designated numbers for assistance. Invariably links lead to spoofed sites and
phone numbers are answered by fraudsters who then collect personal or identity information
under the guise of providing technical or other assistance. 89
(f) Spear Phishing
Spear phishing uses a combination of social engineering and technical subterfuge and is
often successful because the phisher has obtained preliminary information about the victim
as explained above. Spear phishing targets employees of an organisation rather than
individual users. An e-mail purportedly from a trusted or known source within or outside the
organisation is sent to the employee. The mail usually contains a link or an attachment
which if clicked or opened by the employee installs malware which transmits organisational
passwords to the phisher.
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Similar to hacking, this form of phishing may lead to large scale
data breaches because it provides access to information in proprietary systems. In spite of
the fact that organisations can themselves be victimised by phishers, it is common for
organisations simply to blame users and consumers for any form of phishing attack and thus
shift fraud liabilities to unsuspecting users.91
Also, notwithstanding the threats to organisations, phishing scams are generally perceived
as familiar frauds utilising very basic technology. As service provider 2 observes,
‘…phishing is very basic technology and there is nothing hi-tech about it.’ Law enforcement
agent 3 also argues that phishing scams threaten naïve and negligent users of information
87 IT Security expert 1.
88 See example in Table 6.1- Sample spam login alert p 207.
89 Law enforcement 2.
90 Richard G. Brody, Elizabeth Mulig and Valerie Kimball, ‘Phishing, Pharming and
Identity Theft’ (2007) 11(3) Academy of Accounting and Financial Services, 43.
91 IT security expert 1.
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systems and presents no new challenges for the criminal law. Based on the antecedents of
electronic fraud in Nigeria, the rationale for this perception is not far-fetched and easily
understood. The use of deception to commit crimes in Nigeria is not new. The Nigerian mail
scam popularly referred to as 419 or advance fee fraud has gained notoriety over the years
for both online and offline frauds. 92 In 419 scams, the fraudsters typically bait their victims
by demanding that small amounts of money (or advance fees) be transferred to them as tax,
fees or charges to accelerate the release or transfer of a larger sum. The fraudsters will
usually claim that the whole or part of the larger sum is the ill-gotten wealth of a corrupt
politician, a disputed or unclaimed inheritance or government payment for some unexecuted
public sector contracts.93
However, in spite of the similarities between that phishing and 419 scams, they are
distinguishable in a number of ways. It can be argued for example that 419 scams operate
independently of the internet and are now easily identified that fewer people fall for the
scam. Also, while 419 scams tend to target victims especially in foreign countries, phishing
scams focus more on e-payment service providers and e-commerce sites whether they are
local or international. Phishing scams are also potentially more dangerous because they can
reach a wider range of victims using more convincing form of deceit such as pharming or
spear-phishing. For example, although 419 or advance fee fraud have been rated one of the
highly successful criminal tactics, the mails are often characterised by tell-tale signs such as
poor grammar and spelling errors which tend to make deception discernible and obvious. As
a result, a common theme in research into advance fee fraud is that people fall for the scam
not so much because it is convincing but more because they are motivated by greed and are
themselves inclined to fraudulent or criminal behaviour.94 In comparison, phishing scams
contain well-designed copy-cat websites and logos of genuine organisations making the
scams more difficult to detect. Accordingly the Microsoft Security Intelligence report 2013
observed as follows:
Malicious websites typically appear to be completely legitimate and often
provide no outward indicators of their malicious nature, even to the experienced
computer user. In many cases, these websites are legitimate websites that have
92 The 419 scam is named after its violation of section 419 of the Nigerian Criminal Code
which creates the offence of obtaining property by false pretence.
93 See eg Harvey Glickman, ‘The Nigerian “419” Advance Fee Scams: Prank or Peril’
(2005) 39(5) Canadian Journal of African Studies 460.
94 See eg M.C Ogwezzy, ‘Cybercrime and the Proliferation of Yahoo Addicts in Nigeria’
(2012) 1 International Journal of Juridical Sciences 86.
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been compromised by malware, SQL injection, or other techniques in an effort
by attackers to take advantage of the trust users have invested in them.
95
As a further example, it used to be possible to identify phishing sites by looking out for
technical indicators which may alert a user that the website is spoofed. This includes the fact
that spoofed sites are served in the bar over HTTP as opposed to HTTPS and are often
hosted on IP addresses as opposed to a registered domain. As research established, these
indicators are becoming less useful as spoofed sites can be served over HTTPS because they
have been copied and pasted.96 Therefore, as noted previously, phishing attacks are more
sophisticated, and increasingly incorporate elements of context to become credible and
effective.97 In order to illustrate how phishing undermine the integrity of genuine websites,
one service provider admitted that there are over 100 spoofed sites of his organisation (a
bank) and the technical unit is unable to keep pace with taking them down. He argues that
this gives the criminals a edge as all the organisation can do is to accelerate the pace of user
awareness.
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Finally, it is important to mention that although both 419 and phishing scams can be linked
to criminal organisations as well as lone offenders, potentially, anyone with access to the
internet can purchase a phishing kit and execute an attack. 99 This considerably increases the
poll of perpetrators and victims of phishing scams. As will be demonstrated in subsequent
analysis in chapter four, the differences between 419 and phishing scams limit the
applicability of provisions of the law dealing with fraud and deception offences in
Nigeria.100
3.3.2.3 Malware
The activities of Hackers and phishers are facilitated by propagation of malware or
malicious code or software. Malware has therefore been referred to as both a standalone
95 Microsoft, Microsoft Security intelligence Report (vol 14 July through December 2012),
65.
96 See Xun Dan, John A Clark and Jeremy L Jacob, ‘Defending the Weakest Link: Phishing
Websites detection by Analysing User Behaviours’ (2010) 45(2-3) Telecommunication
systems 215.
97 See Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 above.
98 Payment service provider 4.
110 see eg OECD, ‘Policy Guidance on Online Identity Theft’ (n 67).
100 See further notes in 4.3 Phishing- Fraudulent Representation and Computer-related
Fraud p 112.
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cybercrime, 101 and an ‘infrastructure supporting cybercrime.’ 102 Malware is the use of
unintentionally installed software to collect and transmit personal information on an
information device. Its main purpose is to subvert a system to function in a way otherwise
than that intended by the legitimate user. Methods used to propagate malware include the
key loggers, Trojans, viruses and worms and bots or botnets. According to Anderson et al,
botnets for example provide a versatile platform for a variety of criminal business models.
They can be used to send spam messages, to commit click fraud, harvest accounting details
and credentials, and for phishing. Targeting botnets at organisations can also result in denial
of service attacks which can deny users’ access or ultimately bring down the website. 103
Malware constitute substantial threats to e-payments generally. For example, in 2007, the
Estonia’s government was forced to shut down government and financial institutions
following a coordinated attack by over one million computers worldwide which have been
organised into a botnet.
104
Also, in 2014, the malware Gameover Zeus (or GoZeus) which
steals financial information such as online banking details was identified as the most
sophisticated spyware so far.105
A report by Microsoft suggests that malware constitutes a significant threat to computers
and networks in Nigeria. As at 2012, the report indicated that malware was detected on 7.0
of every 1,000 computers scanned in Nigeria.
106
This represents a score of 7.0 computers
cleaned per 1000 scanned (CCM) compared to a worldwide average CCM of 6.0.
107
More
recent reports also suggest that malware propagation is still relatively high in Nigeria.108 In
addition, the use of smartphones and other mobile devices with connectivity to the internet,
as well as the development of mobile applications in Nigeria provide a fertile environment
101 See OECD, Anti-spam Toolkit of Recommended Polices and Measures (OECD
Publishing 2006).
102Ross Anderson et al, ‘Measuring the Cost of Cybercrime’ (2012) 19
<http://weis2012.econinfosec.org/papers/Anderson_WEIS2012.pdf> accessed 03/08/2012.
103 ibid.
104 See eg Clay Wilson, ‘Botnets, Cybercrime, and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and
Policy Issues for Congress’ (Congressional Research Service 2008)
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32114.pdf> accessed 02/09/2013.
105 See FBI, ‘U.S. Leads Multi-National Action against GameOver Zeus Botnet and




106 see Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Vol 14 2012.
107 ibid.




Mobile applications are particularly vulnerable because there is
generally lack of verification for mobile software and traditional security controls such as
firewalls and encryption are not sufficiently optimised for mobile devices.110 Therefore,
because it increases the possibility of users installing unregistered third party applications,
mobile devices also increase the potential victim pool for malicious code writers.
3.4 Criminal Misuse of Identity Information
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the activities of cybercriminals compromise the
integrity of data. Although, this compromise, often referred to as data breaches, may also be
due to accidents, errors, or negligence,111 in the particular case of corporate and proprietary
systems, criminal compromise caused by hacking, phishing and malware may precipitate
data breaches. However, malicious breach of data is seldom an end in itself, and in e-
payment systems, stolen or compromised identity information may be used in three main
ways. The first is using the information to commit fraud on existing accounts, also called
existing account fraud. This type of fraud involves the fraudster using stolen identity
information to gain access into or control over the victim’s existing bank account or
payment cards. The second fraud, referred to as new account fraud involves the use of stolen
or compromised identity to open new accounts or new lines of credit in the victim’s name.
In the third variant of the fraud, the fraudster combines stolen identity information with
identity information relating to a fictitious or non-existent person to form a new or synthetic
identity.
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In Nigeria, account-takeover fraud is the most pervasive. 113 They manifest
majorly as account/card fraud, Card not present transaction fraud, internet banking fraud
and SIM swap fraud.
3.4.1 Account Takeover Fraud
Account take-over fraud involves impersonating an account holder in order to make
fraudulent transfers, or payments or withdrawals from the account. A typical account
takeover fraud involves a fraudster applying for a debit card on another person’s account. A
payment service provider cites an example of an instance where after “due verification” his
bank issued a debit card to a fraudster under the belief it was dealing with the authentic
109 For the statistics on mobile phone subscription, see (n 83) at p 33.
110 See (n 84) at p 33.
111 These are unintentional breaches caused by insiders, third party security companies and
so on and are often referred to as non-malicious data breaches.
112 Stacey L. Schreft, ‘Risks of Identity theft: Can the Market Protect the Payment System?
(2007) Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review Fourth Quarterly 5.
113 Law enforcement 1, 2.
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account holder. 114 According to the provider, the whole transaction was unknown to the
genuine account holder until the fraudster used the card to make purchases at a point of sale.
Notably, the provider argues that the loss was minimised by the fact that only a single
fraudulent payment is possible on the account because of the transaction notification system
put in place by the bank.115 However, the fraudster knowing this makes a single but large
purchase up to the limit allowed on the card. On receiving a transaction notification, (or
debit alert) of an unfamiliar and large transaction, the account holder had contacted the bank.
The only indicator of fraud, as stated by the service provider, is the fact that the fraudster
applied for the card outside the State in which the account was domiciled. However, in spite
of this indicator, the bank declined to indemnify the account holder. The bank had argued
that refund would only be made to the account holder subject to the bank establishing to its
(the bank’s) satisfaction that the customer was not complicit in the fraud. It is relevant to
note that most service providers confirm that their organisations will take the same approach
to a refund in similar circumstances. 116 In addition to raising questions about identity
management, this example has implications for allocation of liability in contested and
fraudulent payments.
3.4.2 Internet Banking Fraud
Internet banking fraud is a form of account-takeover fraud. It is perpetrated when fraudsters
have obtained a customer’s identity information such as accounts and authentication details
using hacking, phishing scams or malware based attacks. The fraudster uses the information
to gain access into online banking services often to make fraudulent transfers or payments
into accounts or payment cards under the control of the fraudster. The commission of
internet banking fraud is particularly aided by the use of ATMs and prepaid cards. To make
tracing and detection more difficult for example, the fraudster (often acting in conjunction
with others) immediately collects the proceeds of the crime from ATMs using prepaid
cards.
117
According to law enforcement 2, the process of collecting criminal proceeds
through ATMs make trailing and arrest of criminals difficult because prepaid cards can be
obtained under fictitious names in spite of industry’s Kow Your Customer (KYC)
requirements. Also, similar to account takeover fraud, liability for internet fraud is displaced
by bankers and other service providers’ insistence that account holders were negligent,
fraudulent or collusive.
114 Payment service provider 6.
115 See notes on transaction notifications at p 66 .
116 Payment Service Providers 1, 2,4,5,6, 8.
117 Law enforcement agent 2.
72
3.4.3 Card Not Present Transaction Fraud
Card not present transactions fraud involves the theft of genuine card details that are then
used to make purchases over the internet, by telephone or by mail order. 118 The most
frequently perpetrated fraud is on e-commerce sites particularly the websites of local and
international airlines. Typically, fraudsters have acquired information through any of the
methods discussed above, or have stolen a payment card or somehow obtained information
on a card. Transactions for the purchase of airline tickets are initiated and the details of the
cards are entered as if the owner is making the purchase. 119 Crucially, this fraud undermines
the advantages gained by migration from magnetic stripe cards to chip and PIN or EMV
cards mentioned above. This is because online, the security integrated into the (EMV) cards
is lost as neither the chip nor the PIN is required for the fraud.
3.4.4 SIM Swap Fraud
Subscriber Identity Module or SIM swap is a fraud enabled and facilitated by both the use
of mobile phones and mobile banking applications. To perpetrate the fraud, a fraudster
applies for a replacement of mobile SIM cards issued to someone else. Presumably, the
fraudster already has the victim’s personal information including his name, address, age,
occupation and other relevant information. The fraudster then lodges a report with the
mobile service provider to the effect that the SIM is lost, and using the information which he
has acquired, he applies for a replacement. If the SIM is replaced, the fraudster, posing as
the accountholder may then download mobile banking or payment applications with respect
to the account associated with the particular phone number. Often fraudsters can initiate
fund transfers or make payments for goods and services using the fraudulently installed
mobile banking or payment applications to intercept SIM based one time passwords
(OTPs).
120
It is notable that to curb this fraud, the Nigeria Communications Commission
(NCC) introduced biometric registration of telephone subscribers, however the processing
of subscribers’ information raise equally fundamental questions about the nature and
security of identity information.121
118 See eg Financial Fraud Action UK <http://www.financialfraudaction.org.uk/Media-cnp-
fraud.asp> accessed 13/09/2013.
119 Law enforcement agent 2.
120 ibid.
121 See notes in 5.1.2 NCC SIM Registration p 138.
73
3.5 Industry Responses to cybercrime Threats –Private Ordering
and Technical Security Standards
The remaining part of this chapter analyses the responses of the financial and payment
industry to the threats of cybercrime. It considers in particular the established global private
ordering systems and the extent to which they have been integrated and adopted in Nigeria.
The section provides important background for later analysis in the thesis on the limits of
technology to control identity-related cybercrimes in e-payment systems.
3.5.1 Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Regulations on Privacy and Security
Industry standards for protecting privacy and security are contained in the CBN E-banking
Guidelines 2003 and the CBN POS Guidelines 2011. In the case of internet banking, the e-
banking guidelines require banks to put in place procedures for maintaining the banks
websites. The procedures include ensuring that access is limited to authorised staff only.
Banks must also ensure that updates of critical information are subject to dual verification
and that website information and links to other websites are verified for accuracy and
functionality. In addition, management should implement procedures to verify content,
software and interactive programs available to customers on the banking website and ensure
that links to external websites contain disclaimers and disclosures on the consequences of
following such links. Where service is outsourced, the guidelines provide that banks have
the obligation to ensure that the internet service provider (ISP) has implemented firewall to
protect the banks website.122 ISPs in turn are required to exercise due diligence to ensure
that only websites of financial institutions duly licensed by the CBN are hosted on their
servers. The Guidelines provide that ISPs that host unlicensed financial institutions would
be liable for all acts committed through the hosted websites.123
The POS Guidelines further stipulate that computer networks for transmitting financial data
over the internet must be demonstrated to meet the required standards specified for data
confidentiality and integrity. The precise standards specified by the regulations are that all
payment service providers comply with the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards
(PCIDSS), use as a minimum of 3DES encryption standard, and apply a minimum of two-
factor authentication to verify users’ accessing their systems and services.
124
The use of
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is optional as the e-banking guidelines provide that banks
122 See generally item 1.4.3 CBN E-banking Guidelines 2003.
123 ibid item 1.4.8.
124 See item 3.1 CBN POS Guidelines 2011.
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may need to consider the use of PKI for authentication of users.
125
These requirements are
further considered under respective headings below.
3.5.1.1 Industry Private Ordering System - Payment Card Industry Data
Security Standards (PCIDSS)
PCIDSS is an established global standard for cardholder account protection across all
parties in the payment chain. These include acquirers, third party processors and
merchants.
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The standards also apply to all entities that store, process or transmit
cardholder data. It was developed in response to increasing incidence of cardholder account
theft and is intended to help organisations proactively protect customer account data.127The
standards are administered by the Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council
(PCISSC), often simply referred to as the Council. Most Nigerian Banks are affiliated to
global card schemes particularly VISA and MasterCard. They are therefore also obliged to
comply with the PCIDSS by contractual agreements with relevant card schemes or networks.
PCIDSS standards are stated to follow common sense steps that mirror best security
practices.
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They are set to address vulnerabilities which may appear almost anywhere in
the card processing ecosystem including points of sale (POS), personal computers, servers,
web shopping applications, and unsecure transmission of cardholder data to service
providers. They also cover vulnerabilities which may extend to systems operated by service
providers and acquirers, including financial institutions.
129
The security controls are
particularly vital for protecting Primary Account Number (PAN) and ensuring that service
providers and payment card processors never store sensitive authentication data such as card
verification value (CVV) or PINs after authorisation.
130
The PCIDSS focus primarily on
internet facing card transactions, however, it applies to POS, mobile payments and
telephone based order transactions as far as the provisions can be applied in such
contexts.131 The core framework of PCIDSS consists of twelve requirements organised
under six functional goals as follows:
125 Item 1.5.2 E-banking Guidelines (emphasis added).
126 PCI payment Security standard Industry PCI Quick Reference Guide Understanding the
Payment card Industry Data Security Standard Version 2.0 4.
127 ibid.
128 ibid version 2.0 5.
129 ibid version 2.2 4.
130 ibid version 2.0 11.
131 ibid version 2.0.
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Goals PCI DSS Requirements
Build and Maintain a Secure
Network
1. Install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect
cardholder data
2. Do not use vendor-supplied defaults for system
passwords and other security parameters
Protect Cardholder Data 3. Protect stored cardholder data




5. Use and regularly update anti-virus software or
programs
6. Develop and maintain secure systems and applications
Implement Strong Access
Control Measures
7. Restrict access to cardholder data by business need to
know
8. Assign a unique ID to each person with computer access
9. Restrict physical access to cardholder data
Regularly Monitor and Test
Networks
10. Track and monitor all access to network resources and
cardholder data
11. Regularly test security systems and processes
Maintain an Information
Security Policy
12. Maintain a policy that addresses information security
for all personnel132
Table 3.3 -PCIDSS Goals and Requirements
The above table shows that PCIDSS requires a combination of physical, technical and
operational measures to be implemented to protect cardholder data whether in storage or
transmission.
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Much of the criticisms of the PCIDSS and how they translate in the Nigerian context are
considered in greater details in chapter six. For the purposes of the analysis here, it is
relevant only to emphasise that complying with the standards is mandated by the Central
Bank of Nigeria (CBN). Item 3.1 of the POS Guidelines provides as follows:
All industry stakeholders who process and/or store cardholder information shall ensure
that their terminals, applications and processing systems comply with the minimum
requirements of the following [PCIDSS] Standards and Best Practices … In addition,
all terminals, applications and processing systems, should also comply with the




standards specified by the various card schemes. Each vendor must provide valid
certificates showing compliance with these standards, and must regularly review status
of all its terminals to ensure they are still compliant as standards change. There will be
a continuous review and recertification on compliance with these and other global
industry standards from time to time.
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Another point worthy of mention is that in spite of this regulatory directive, statistics are
disputed on the levels of compliance with the PCIDSS. As at 2011, only two of the potential
target organisations were reported to be PCIDSS compliant. Contested reports also put the
level of compliance at 2% in 2012 and up to 50% in 2013.
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3.5.1.2 Data Security – Authentication, Data Encryption, Digital Signature and
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
The CBN guidelines also specify standards on authentication and encryption to be adopted
by providers of electronic financial services. Generally, secured electronic communications
are expected to meet four requirements. These are Privacy, Authentication, Integrity and
Non-repudiation (PAIN).136 Non-repudiation constitutes an assurance that neither of the
parties can deny sending or receiving communication. In financial transaction terms, non-
repudiation implies the finality of electronic payments. Integrity relates to the assurance that
the data has not been altered. Privacy gives the assurance that no one apart from the
intended parties has seen or read the contents of the message. Authentication provides proof
of parties’ identities and ensures that a message originated from the claimed source or
entity.137 Authentication is central to achieving privacy, integrity and non-repudiation in
electronic transactions and is discussed further below.
(a) Authenticating Technologies
Authentication is the process of verifying or establishing identities. It differs from
identification which is the process of associating one or more attributes with a person.
Identification addresses the initial criteria for developing identity credentials, that is, who
are you? Authentication asks the question, are you who you claim that you are? In other
words, authentication addresses the question, how can you prove that you are the person
registered or enrolled by the system? The OECD therefore defines authentication as the
134 Item 3.1 CBN POS Guidelines.
135 IT Security expert 2.
136 See item 4.2 (d) (ii) CBN E-banking Guidelines.
137 See generally OECD, ‘OECD Recommendation on Electronic Authentication and OECD
Guidance for Electronic Authentication’ (June 2007)
<http://www.oecd.org/sti/interneteconomy/38921342.pdf> accessed 12/09/2013.
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process which establishes ‘the validity and assurance of a claimed identity of a user, device
or another entity in an information or communications system’. 138 Authentication is
important for two reasons. One, it operates as a link between the claimed identity and the
right and privileges flowing from that identity. Two, it ensures a sustained and continuous
process of identification. For example, whereas identification is a one-off process,
authentication is a repetitive process which occurs at every attempt to log into the providers
system.139 It is described as an essential component of any strategy to protect information
systems and networking, as well as financial data, personal information and other
information assets from unauthorised access or identity theft.140 Financial authenticators are
traditionally based on what the user knows such as PINS and passwords, or what he has,
such as payment cards and tokens, or who he is which includes biometric characteristics
such as fingerprints, iris scan and voice or facial recognition. Authentication processes may
combine two or more identifiers to give a higher level of trust about the identity of a user.
This is referred to as two factor authentication (2-FA) or multi-factor authentication. 141
As already noted above, regulatory guidelines in Nigeria prescribe a minimum of two-factor
authentication (or 2FA) for organisations verifying users’ accessing payment information
systems and services.142 For example, the regulations on mobile money provide that ‘all
accounts activated by the consumer on the mobile application is linked to the mobile phone
number [and] This mobile number shall be used as the second factor authentication for
mobile transactions.’143 Although, payment service providers argue that their organisations
follow the CBN 2FA requirement,144 research indicates that this is not the case. A survey
shows for example that while ATM transactions conform to 2-FA, many online banking and
payment services still use single factor authentication.145 It was noted that while ATMs
verify identity based on a combination of what the user knows (such as PINs) and what he
has (such as the payment card), online banking systems continue to authenticate users by
138 ibid 16.
139 See Thomas J Smedinghoff, ‘Introduction to Online Identity Management’ 4
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/colloquia/EC/Smedinghoff_Paper_-
_Introduction_to_Identity_Management.pdf> accessed 21/07/2012.
140OECD, ‘OECD Recommendation on Electronic Authentication and OECD Guidance for
Electronic Authentication’ (n 137).
141 For more comprehensive analysis of authentication protocols, see Xinyi Huang et al, ‘A
Generic Framework for Three-factor Authentication: Preserving Privacy in Distributed
Systems’ (2011) 22 (8) IEEE Transaction Parallel and Distributed Systems 1390.
142 See item 3.1 CBN POS Guidelines.
143 Item 4.1.9.7 CBN Mobile Payment Regulations 2009.
144 This point was made by all payment service providers interviewed during the fieldwork.
145 O.S Adeoye, ‘Evaluating the Performance of Two-factor Authentication Solution in the
Banking Sector’ (2012) 9(4) International Journal of Computer Science Issues 457.
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usernames or user-IDs and passwords which are all based on a single authentication
protocol of what the user knows. If this position is correct, it can be argued that the 2FA
minimum requirement is not applied uniformly across instruments, processes and channels
of e-payments in Nigeria. 146 It is perhaps on account of this lack of uniformity that the
CBN introduced the biometric verification number (BVN). The BVN exercise entails the
registration of bank customers’ biometric information which is to be used in combination
with other authenticating technologies for banking and payment purposes.147
However, for the purpose of the arguments here, it is important to note that even where they
are complied with, 2FA have limited use for e-commerce. For example, to satisfy the
requirement of 2FA, some banks in Nigeria have also introduced token and SMS based one
time passwords (OTPs). A OTP is a unique password valid for a login session or
transaction.148 Although, OTPs would satisfy 2FA because they involve the use of tokens or
mobile devices (what the user has), they are only effective in bilateral relationships such as
one existing between banks and customers. In other words, tokens are proprietary as they
only support transactions with organisations that issue them.
Furthermore, notwithstanding how they are effected, a major challenge with authentication
processes is their susceptibilities to criminal attacks. PINs, passwords, usernames and
tokens can be stolen or compromised by hackers, phishers and malware. Recent research
suggests that criminals can bypass authentication even in very sophisticated technologies
such as those embedded in chip and PIN cards.
149
SMS based OTPs are particularly
susceptible to criminal compromise including Man-in-the middle attacks discussed
below.150 It has also been argued that irrespective of layers of authentication processes,
authenticators themselves have varying degrees of reliability. Those associated with
biometric characteristics for example carry the risk of false performance.151
More crucially, authenticating technologies only function one way. This means that they
authenticate one party such as the user to the provider but not vice-versa. In effect, while an
146 ibid.
147 See further notes in 5.1.3 CBN Bank Verification Number (BVN) p 139.
148 Regulator 2.
149 Mike Bond et al, ‘Chip and PIN: Cloning EMV Cards with the Pre-play Attack’ (2012)
<http://arxiv.org/pdf/1209.2531v1.pdf> accessed 21/09/2013.
150 See eg Colin Mulliner et al, ‘SMS-based One Time Passwords: Attacks and Defence’
(2014) <https://www.eecs.tu-berlin.de/fileadmin/f4/TechReports/2014/tr_2014-02.pdf>
accessed 09/04/2015.
151 Bruce Schneier, Secrets and Lies: Digital Security in a Networked Environment (Wiley
2004).
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organisation may be fairly certain that it is dealing with the genuine user, the user may have
no means of ascertaining that he is dealing with the organisation he intends to deal with.
This creates a gap in mutual authentication leading to lack of trust. To bridge the gap,
banking regulations in Nigeria simply provide that banks must ensure that adequate
information is provided on their websites to allow potential customers to make an informed
conclusion about the bank's identity and regulatory status of the bank prior to entering into
e-banking transactions. 152 However, since technologically based security are often
complicated and may be beyond the scope of the knowledge of individual users, secured
information systems are often configured to execute mutual (self) authentication to the
users.153 In practice, a combination of data encryption, digital signatures and public key
infrastructure (PKI) is used to achieve the needed mutual authentication. The following
discussion on encryption, digital signature and public key infrastructure (PKI) demonstrates
the technical processes of information security and the challenges of their implementation in
Nigeria.
(b) Data Encryption
Encryption is the technological process used to convert plain or readable text into
unreadable or cipher text.
154
The purpose of encrypting a message is to make it secret so that
it is only intelligible to the intended recipient. Encryption is achieved by using a
combination of mathematical formula called the cryptographic algorithm and a secret value
referred to as the key. The mathematical formula or algorithm is used to encode or
transform the message from plaintext to cipher text. However, the essence of encryption is
not wholly to prevent a third party from obtaining the cipher text, it is also to prevent the
deciphering of the message. This is where the key function becomes relevant. The key is a
special knowledge or secret value used to encrypt the plaintext and to decrypt the cipher text.
It is shared by the sender and recipient of the message, and messages can only be decrypted
(converted from cipher text into plaintext) by a person or entity who knows the key.
Therefore, even if an attacker intercepts the cipher text, he cannot access the plaintext unless
he also knows the secret value or the key. A common example given to illustrate message
encryption is Caesar’s cipher. Caesar’s algorithm substitutes each letter in the message with
152 See item 4.1(f) CBN E-banking Guidelines.
153 Web pages requiring SSL connections layered on HTTPS, an asymmetric algorithm
supported by PKI is an example in this respect; see International Engineering Task Force
(IETF), ‘Network working Group, Request for Comments HTTPS over TLS’
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2818> accessed 09/09/2013.
154 Burton Rosenberg (ed), Handbook of Financial Cryptography and Security (Chapman &
Hall 2010).
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a letter which is 3 letters later in the alphabet and writes around to A from Z. Thus A
becomes D and B becomes E and so on. The plaintext DOZEN would become cipher text
CRCHQ. This formula is the algorithm and the number 3 is the key.155 The algorithm here
and the key appear quite basic, unsophisticated and insecure. They can be easily broken or
guessed as there are fewer combinations to try, 26 alphabets in all.
156
The strength of encryption therefore depends on the complexity of the algorithm and the
length of the key. To be effective, a key must be sufficiently lengthy and must remain secret.
A longer key generates longer combinations and makes it difficult to guess the key or to
break it by brute force. 157 Cryptographic keys may be a private key or a public key. In
private key encryption, also called a shared key, secret key or symmetric key, the same key
is used to encrypt and decrypt the message. Examples of private key systems include the
Data Encryption Standard (DES) and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) used to encrypt
financial data. Consistent with this explanation, the prescribed standard for encrypting
financial data in Nigeria is 3DES or TDES.158
It is to be noted however that even when key lengths are sufficiently strong, there are
attendant problems of key management and distribution. This is particularly true of private
key cryptosystem on the internet. Since private key systems use the same key to encrypt and
decrypt the data, the key is susceptible to compromise because it could be stolen or
intercepted in the process of exchange on the open networks of the internet.159 Therefore,
users need to find an additional secure channel for exchanging the key. To address the
challenges of key distribution, public key encryption was developed. Public or asymmetric
key encryption use different keys to encrypt and decrypt information. The public key system
operates in pairs of private and public key. The public key is available to everyone and is
used to encrypt information. The private key is required for decryption and kept secret by
the owner of the keys. While the two keys are mathematically linked, they are designed in
such a way to make it impossible to compute the private key from the public key. Relative
155 See generally Charlie Kaufman, Radia Perlman and Mike Speciner, Network Security:
Private Communication in a Private World (Prentice Hall 1995).
156ibid.
157 Alfred Menezes, Paul Van Oorschot and Scott Vanstone, Handbook of Applied
Cryptograhy (CRC Press 1997).
158 See item 3.0 CBN POS Guidelines.
159 Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms and Source Code in C
(John Wiley 1996).
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to private key systems, public keys can be more secure because no key exchange is
necessary and although the keys are linked, it is impossible to derive one from the other. 160
(c) Digital signatures
As the above discussion demonstrates, the private key and public key cryptosystems are
technically separate, however, in practice, a combination of different cryptosystems is used
to achieve composite information security. For example, because of its speed, symmetric or
private key is used to encrypt data. The private key is itself encrypted using the public key
of an asymmetric key pair. A hash function is deployed to ensure the message has not been
altered. In this case, only the private key holder can unlock the symmetric key and once the
symmetric or shared key is retrieved, the recipient can now decrypt the original message.
This produces a complex encryption process often difficult to break.
To illustrate, in order to create secure communication and ensure the authenticity of data
between A and B, A first runs the message through an encryption algorithm to calculate the
value of the message. This is the hash function which uses the number of words and the
number of letters in a message to calculate the message value. The result produces a unique
message called the message digest which has a value of say 500. A then encrypts the
message digest with his (A’s) private key (the key pair in public key system). This creates a
digital footprint called a digital signature because only A has access to his own private key.
A then generates a random key to encrypt the actual message. The random key is a
symmetric or shared key for the particular transaction. It is also called a session key and
needed because of the difficulties associated with key exchange and management in a
symmetric key system discussed above. The session key is used once and then discarded.
However, to send this particular session key to B securely, (the random key being a
symmetric key is also the only key that can be used to decrypt the message and is still in A’s
possession), A encrypts the random key with B’s public key. In this way, only B can decrypt
the random key since he is the only one having his own private key. There is now multiple
encryption; encrypted actual message, encrypted session key and encrypted digital
fingerprint or signature.
In order to decrypt the message, B performs an inverse activity. B uses his private key to
decrypt the random or session key. He then uses the recovered random key to decrypt the
actual message. Although B now has the message and the key, he has no way of establishing
160 Sanjay G. Kanade, Dijana Petrovska-Delacretaz and Bernadette Dorizzi, Enhancing
Information Security and Privacy by Combining Biometrics with Crypography (Morgan and
Claypool 2012).
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that the message has not been altered. To check that the message has not been altered and is
indeed sent by A, B uses A’s public key to decrypt A’s digital signature and recovers the
message digest. B then runs the digest through the same algorithm or the hash function used
to compute the digest. B generates a new message digest. However, B can only be sure that
this is the same message sent by A if the new digest matches the original message digest
precisely, in this case if the value is also 500.161
The process described above is the digital signature. In digital signature algorithms, the
private key is used to sign a message and the public key is used to verify the signed
signature. The process can be summarised simply as follows:
Creation
Message ← Hash function → message digest ← session key ←private key ꞊ digital 
signature
Verification
 Digital signature ꞊ public key → session key →message digest ← hash function → 
message
Digital signatures are distinguished from simple electronic signatures by the technical
process used to produce the signature. 162 However, as the mere execution of digital
signatures does not also guarantee an entity’s ownership of a public key, the reliability and
effectiveness of digital signatures depend on verification operated under the public key
infrastructure regime.
(d) Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
PKI is needed because in spite of the complexity of the digital signature protocol described
above, public key encryption is still susceptible to criminal compromise such as man-in-the
middle (MITM) attacks. In a MITM attack, the attacker interjects himself between the two
parties intending to communicate securely by impersonating himself as one to the other. The
attacker does this by breaking the secure communication and inserting himself between the
parties. He may then intercept and modify the communication to his own advantage. In the
hypothetical scenario cited above for example, if A is a bank customer and B is the bank, a
MITM attack can be perpetrated when A sends a message requesting B’s public key and M
161 See generally Kaufman, Perlman and Speciner, (n 155); see also Menezes, Van Oorschot
and Vanstone, (n 157).
162 See eg definitions of digital and electronic signatures in Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of
the European Parliament and of the Council on Electronic Identification and Trust Services
for Electronic Transactions in the Internal Market of 23rd July 2014, art 3 (hereinafter
Regulation (EU) No 910/2014).
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(the attacker) intercepts the message using malware or associated phishing or hacking
tactics. Once he intercepts the message, M poses as B and sends his (M’s) public key to A.
A using this public key (which he believes to belong to B) sends an encrypted message to B
e.g. to ‘pay £1,000 into X’s account’. M again intercepts the message to B and decrypts it
with the corresponding private key because the published public key sent to A really
belongs to M. M then modifies the message to read ‘pay £10,000 into M’s account’. M
encrypts the message with B’s public key (which he earlier intercepted) and sends the
message to B. B, believing the message to be from A acts on the instruction and pays M.163
Since MITM attacks exploit real time processing, what the attacker does in lay terms is to
intercept usernames, passwords, account numbers or payment card information for onward
relay to the bank’s server which cannot then distinguish the authentic user from the attacker
because the information is encrypted. As noted earlier, encryption is not meant to protect the
cipher-text as such but to prevent the retrieval of the plaintext from the cipher-text.
Irrespective of the origin of the information therefore, encryption can be used to protect it.
In effect, digital signatures based on public key systems do not also necessarily guarantee
that encrypted information originated from an authorised or legitimate user. They do not
solve the problem of how one can establish that one is communicating with the holder of the
authentic or legitimate corresponding private key. Consequently, the problem associated
with mutual authentication already noted above re-emerges. PKI is the additional technical
infrastructure designed to support identity verification in digital signature systems.
PKI provides a way to validate the rightful owner of a public key. It is a framework for
secure exchange of information based on public key cryptography and consists of the formal
procedures used to verify keys by Certification Authorities or CAs. Although trust in a key
system could be established bilaterally without the services of a trusted third party, public
key cryptography usually implies that a trusted third party acts to certify the identity of an
entity by means of an individual certificate.164 According to the ITU specifications, the
main components of the PKI are the digital certificates, the certification authorities, key
management systems, and the laws, policies, software and standards regulating the security
163 The above example is often given in different variants to explain man-in-the-middle
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of information based on public key system.
165
The digital certificate strongly binds a public
key to the name of the owner and is digitally signed by a trusted party called the
Certification Authority.
166
The CA therefore attests the identity of an entity and verifies that
the entity has the private key that corresponds to the public key associated with the
certificate.
167
Accordingly, “certificate for electronic signatures” have been correctly defined
as ‘an electronic attestation which links electronic signatures validation data to a natural
person and confirms at least the name or the pseudonym of that person’.168
Apart from issuing certificates, CAs also revoke certificates and are expected to create
certificate revocation lists and maintain archives of status information about expired
certificates.169 CAs may themselves be certified by other CAs which creates a chain of trust
until the user encounters the root Certification Authority which is a self-signed CA.170 In
addition to providing mutual authentication, PKI also generally meets the requirements of
Privacy, Authentication Integrity and Non-repudiation (PAIN). For example, CAs provide
mutual authentication by establishing the identity of an entity associated with a certificate.
Digital signatures provide non-repudiation. Data encryption guarantees the privacy for
communications. The hash function used in the encryption process ensures integrity of the
data. Although PKI is not a mandatory requirement, the ITU recommends deployment of
PKI for organisations providing secure services such as online banking and e-commerce
services.171 However, The Guidelines on Electronic Banking in Nigeria exempts mandatory
use of PKI. The Guidelines provide, “…. Banks may [only] need to consider the use of
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for authentication of users for e-banking services.172
The final requirement for the optimal functioning of the PKI is a legal framework. Digital
signature laws provide this legal infrastructure. The laws provide the reference mechanism
for establishing whether authentication protocols were duly executed and the evidential
value to be attached to digital signatures. Remarkably, Nigeria does not also have a digital
165ITU-T Recommendations X.509 (11/2008) <http://www.itu.int/ITU-
T/recommendations/rec.aspx?rec=X.509>accessed 14/12/2014.
166 See eg ITU, ‘Security in Telecommunications and Information Technology: An
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signature law. Further implications of this deficiency for prevention of identity-related
cybercrimes and for displacing existing fraud liability regime are discussed fully in chapter
six.
It is therefore important to note that while data security measures are essential, they do not
in themselves translate to composite protection in cybersecurity terms. Accordingly, the ITU
defines cybersecurity in the following terms:
…the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards,
guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices,
assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment
and organization and user's assets. Organization and user's assets include
connected computing devices, personnel, infrastructure, applications, services,
telecommunications systems, and the totality of transmitted and/or stored
information in the cyber environment.173
The Internet Crime Complaint Centre (IC3) also depicts the process of combating internet
crimes as an intricate puzzle comprising of pieces such as detection, compliant, mitigation,
liaison, analysis, deterrence, investigation and prosecution and prevention. 174 The ITU
definition and the IC3 observation suggests that the means for achieving cybersecurity
include but are not limited to data security standards. It also suggests that its components
include the protection of cyber structures and infrastructure, and the protection of users and
user devices. Cybersecurity therefore implicates the consideration of laws, policies and
actions for ensuring protection from cyber threats. These must include prevention and
deterrence, identification and discovery, damage control and recovery as well as laws and
policies that promote these measures. Therefore, whereas data security standards are often
set by industry and applied at organisational levels and to different types of information,
standards to protect personal information are set by laws such as data protection law.
Conclusion
As with cybercrimes generally, the scale and nature of fraud on e-payment systems are
unknown. An examination of records, reports and organisational perspectives reveal that
173 ITU-T, ‘Rec. X. 1205 04/2008: Overview of Cybersecurity’ (2008) 2
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.1205-200804-I> accessed 09/04/2015.
174 Federal Bureau of Investigation Internet Crime Complaint Center, ‘Internet Crime
Report 2014’ 6 <https://www.ic3.gov/media/annualreport/2014_IC3Report.pdf> accessed
01/06/2015.
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there are no reliable estimates or assessment of cybercrimes that threaten e-payment systems.
This is mostly due to the pervasive “culture of denial” in the Nigerian financial industry and
policy inconsistency on definition and classification of the crime. However, in spite of lack
of statistics, it is difficult to support assertions that cybercrimes are not pervasive on
payment networks and systems. While payment service providers contend the threats of
hacking to their own systems, they tend to argue that phishing is pervasively used to
victimise users of e-payment services. The analyses however indicate that both service
providers and users are susceptible to the cyber-threats, and in particular, service providers
are likely to suffer large scale data breaches in consequence of hacking, phishing and the
propagation of malware.
Therefore, as a basis for analysing the legal and regulatory frameworks in the remaining
chapters of this thesis, this chapter established the cybercrime threats to e-payment systems.
It also identified the relevant challenges posed by digital identities. The arguments in the
chapter further demonstrate that at the level of policy and industry, industry’s data security
standards represents the main response to the threats posed to identity information.
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Chapter Four
Criminal Law Responses to Identity-related Cybercrimes
Introduction
Cybercrimes may be broadly classified according to whether they are crimes using
computers or crimes of computer misuse. 1 Crimes using the computer are typically
traditional crimes such as fraud and theft. Computer misuse crimes include hacking which is
a crime exclusive or specific to the technology. The underlying assumption behind the
classification is that crimes using the computer could be dealt with by existing criminal
legislation, while crimes exclusive to technology require new laws. This is largely contested
by an alternative view which proposes that crimes using the computer, along with the real or
exclusively-technology crimes, need to be regulated differently to real world crimes and
both crimes require new laws.
This chapter examines these propositions in the context of the Nigerian criminal laws. It
aims to determine whether and the extent to which the laws could be used to address
specific cyber-threats such as hacking, phishing and identity theft and fraud. By
comparative analysis of laws and judicial interpretations from the UK, the chapter will
identify and discuss the problematic areas of the extant criminal laws and the proposed
cybercrime law in Nigeria. Also, against the background of the empirical data the chapter
will explore the societal, policy and judicial perceptions which may affect the effectiveness
of criminal legislation in Nigeria.
The chapter therefore proceeds by examining the meaning and scope of cybercrimes. It
follows with the analysis of the criminal law as they relate to relevant cyber-threats. The
arguments focus in particular on the position of the Criminal Code Act and the proposed
cybercrime law, the Cybercrime Bill 2014. The chapter concludes with the analysis of the
administration and enforcement of the Cybercrime Bill.
1 It is relevant to note that the use of the term ‘computer’ in relation to the crime is itself
merely symbolic as the crimes can now be committed using other devices such as mobile
phones or even non-devices such as the cloud infrastructure.
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4.1 The Nigerian Law on Cybercrime
4.1.1 (Not) Defining Cybercrime
It was noted in chapter three that distinctions are made between computer crimes and
cybercrimes depending on whether the crime is committed by a person internal or external
to an organisation and whether it is committed on standalone or networked systems. For the
purpose of the distinction, cybercrimes are limited to crimes committed using networked
systems of the internet while computer crimes may be committed only on standalone
computers. In spite of its apparent attempt at pragmatism, this distinction has become
increasingly insignificant as a basis of definition. As the UNODC correctly asserts, ‘In the
hyper connected world of tomorrow, it will become hard to imagine a ‘computer crime’, and
perhaps any crime that does not involve electronic evidence linked with internet protocol (IP)
connectivity.’2 Brenner also argues that ‘At some point, we can do away with cybercrime
laws because most crimes will involve computers in some way, and all crimes will be
cybercrime.’
3
In effect, if computers will invariably become associated with most criminal activities,
limited practical and legal advantages are derivable from any distinction. Following earlier
analysis in chapter three, the notion that a crime is computer crime also carries the
implication, at least at the level of organisations, of a wrongdoing internal to the
organisation rather than one which is essentially criminal. It therefore presupposes and/or
precludes the application of the criminal law to ‘computer crimes’ and suggests that
perpetrators may be punished within the organisation rather than by the law. In essence the
distinctions undermine the severity or seriousness of ‘computer crimes’ relative to
cybercrimes. Generally, and correctly so, the UNODC considered distinctions between
computer and cybercrimes as merely technical and legalistic if not impractical.4
Notably however, the UNODC offers two possible explanations for making the distinctions
between cybercrimes and computer crimes particularly in developing countries like Nigeria.
The first explanation is the possibility that cybercriminals in developing countries tend to
focus more on domestic victims and possibly standalone computer systems. The second
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possible explanation is the inability of law enforcement in developing countries to identify
transnational content in cybercrime due to capacity challenges.5 In the Nigerian context,
both explanations have some merit but the second explanation perhaps captures the problem
more aptly. As arguments in chapter three suggest, cybercriminals in Nigeria victimised
foreigners long before widespread victimisation of domestic users of computers and the
internet.6 Considering this context, it could be misleading to assume that the distinction
between computer and cybercrime derives from the fact that cybercriminals focus on
domestic victims or operate on standalone computers. Conversely, the relative inactivity of
law enforcement and the judiciary in the area of cybercrime prompts the assumption that the
second explanation offered by the UNODC is more applicable in Nigeria. In other words,
capacity challenges may account for the artificial distinctions between these two concepts.7
Nevertheless, even if one takes the position that distinctions between computer and
cybercrimes are unnecessary and ineffective, it is important to acknowledge that defining
cybercrime remains a conceptual challenge. For example, while scholarly articles and
commentaries in Nigeria appear to have engaged considerably with computer-related crimes,
none has offered much help in the area of defining cybercrimes.8 Criminal theorists have
also argued against the notion that some crimes are essentially “cybercrimes”. Grabosky
contests the classification of a separate head of criminal law as cybercrime and argues that
cyberspace is no more than a new environment for committing old crimes.9 Brenner argues
that unless they present new ways of imposing criminal liability, cybercrimes are no
different to terrestrial or traditional crimes. 10 She opines that there is nothing like
cybercrime as such and all crimes are just simply crimes.11 Wall prompts an inquisition into
both the rationale and the terminology used to describe the crime and argues that while the
term has acquired considerable linguistic agency, it has no agreed meaning. He further
posits whether we should be asking if there are actually such things as cybercrimes and if
there is anything ‘cyber’ about the crimes.12 Describing it as ‘the transformation of criminal
5 ibid 6.
6 See notes in 3.1 Internet Fraud in Nigeria p 48 at 49.
7 See notes below in 4.6.1 Lack of Computer Forensics Capacity in Law Enforcement.
8 See eg Mohamed Chawki, ‘Nigeria Tackles Advance Fee Fraud (2009) 1JILT 1; see also
Taiwo Oriola, ‘Advance Fee Fraud on the Internet: Nigerian Regulatory Response’ (2005)
21(3) Computer Law and Security Review 237.
9 Peter N Grabosky, ‘Virtual Criminality: Old Wine New Bottles?’ (2001) 10 Social &
Legal Studies 243.
10 Brenner, (n 3).
11 ibid.
12 David S Wall, Cybercrime The Transformation of Crime in the Information Age (Polity
Press 2007) 9-10.
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or harmful behaviour by networked technology’, 13 Wall made the point that the term
cybercrime is emotive rather than legal or scientific.14 A similar point was made by Fafinski
who noted that cybercrime is not a legal term of art.15 Accordingly, correlate terms such as
internet crime, computer crimes, and computer-related crimes, high-tech crime or
information age crime have been used to describe cyber-related reprehensible conduct.
Although each terminology may carry some variants in meaning, the literature suggests that
while there are new and novel wrongful conducts which challenge traditional criminal law,
cybercrime is no more than a useful metaphor to describe these perceived wrongful
activities in the context of the peculiar environment of computing and networking.
In the particular context of the analysis here, defining cybercrime has limited use. Firstly, it
is generally acknowledged that definitions are pointless if one considers the potentials of
technology to generate deviant and wrongful behaviour and the difficulty (if not
impossibility) of anticipating the scope of future wrongdoing which may be associated with
computers or computing. Consistent with this position, the Council of Europe (CoE)
Convention on Cybercrime, credited to be the first comprehensive attempt at addressing the
problems of cybercrime, merely enumerated the specific activities which may constitute
cybercrime rather than attempt to define the term.
Secondly, because there is considerable overlap between the general area of crime and
cybercrime, cybercrimes are arguably still crimes. Crimes are generally acts or omissions
forbidden by the criminal law and whatever their nature or scope, activities amounting to
cybercrimes will not be criminal unless and until they are so defined by the criminal law.
Accordingly, the Nigerian law prohibits the punishment of any person for an offence unless
the offence is defined by law and the punishment thereof prescribed by the relevant law.
Section 36(8) of the constitution provides, ‘No person shall be held to be guilty of a criminal
offence on account of any act or omission that did not, at the time it took place, constitute
such an offence,…’ Similarly section 11 Criminal Code Act provides that ‘A person shall
not be punished for doing or omitting to do an act unless the act or omission constituted an
offence under the law in force when it occurred.’ This is in line with the rule of international
law which applies the maxim Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege meaning nothing is
recognised as a crime and no punishment appertains except as provided by law.16 Therefore,
even for the purpose of the analysis here, the term cybercrime is used quite presumptuously
13 ibid.
14 ibid.
15 Stefan Fafinski, Computer Misuse (Willan Publishing 2009) 5.
16 See eg Universal Declartion of Human rights 1948, art 11(2).
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as extant criminal laws in Nigeria do not mention cybercrimes generally or expressly
criminalise acts amounting to cybercrime.17
In order to aid the difficulties of definition, a helpful recourse is provided by the broad
classifications of cybercrimes into crimes using computers or crimes of computer misuse.
Crimes using the computer are typically traditional crimes such as fraud, and the threats
they pose relate to the nature of the crime, and the scope, and reachability of the criminals.
Computer misuse crimes, such as malware propagation are new crimes exclusive or specific
to the technology. This distinction is helpful because it focuses on identifying areas where
computer technology challenges the extant criminal laws. This may be in the sense of
enabling relatively new forms of offending or in the sense that the technology merely aids or
aggravates the commission of known or existing offences. The underlying assumption is
often that crimes using the computer may be dealt with by extant or traditional criminal law
while real cybercrimes require specific cybercrime legislation.
Therefore, a classification based approach avoids a prejudgement of the law because it
forces an assessment of the extant criminal laws along with new or proposed responses to
the crimes. In other words, examining the laws within the contexts of the classification
forecloses conclusions that the criminal law in Nigeria does not deal with cybercrimes at all.
For example, on the one hand, the empirical data suggests that a majority of stakeholders
concede that cybercrime specific legislation is needed to combat emerging cyber threats.18
On the other hand, the data suggests that extant criminal laws are being used or could be
used to effectively combat cybercrimes. As Law enforcement 3 asserted, ‘... the problem is
not that we don’t have the laws, what we lack is the capacity’ (that is, computer forensic
skills). Another law enforcement agent cites examples of cases where existing criminal laws
have been used to convict cybercriminals.19 In the view of a policymaker however, ‘so-
called cybercrime convictions’ are obtained through misuse of the plea bargain system as
offenders are simply encouraged to plead to lesser or ‘provable’ traditional crimes to avoid
indefinite prison detention. He asserts further that there are no data, facts, statistics, or cases
to back up the claims of successful prosecution for cybercrimes. 20 The analysis below
therefore starts by examining the responses of extant criminal laws to the respective threats
17 See notes below in 4.2 Hacking under the Criminal Laws.
18 18 Respondents in all expressed this view. A similar position has been argued in the
literature, see eg Oriola, (n 8).
19 Law enforcement 1.
20 Policy maker 2.
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identified in chapter three. It then follows through with an assessment of how the proposed
law on cybercrime aims to deal with the new threats.
4.2 Hacking under the Criminal Laws
Hacking is defined in chapter three as the use of technical means to access computer
systems unlawfully or without authority. Hacking threatens e-payment systems because it is
often the precursor to large scale breaches in proprietary networks. Although, it is
considered a crime specific to technology, hacking has been variously compared to
traditional crimes such as criminal trespass, burglary, or damage to property.
21
Accessing
computer or network systems without authority is not expressly mentioned or criminalised
under the Nigerian laws. However, a preliminary examination of the laws is necessary here
to determine whether hackers could be prosecuted for trespass or related offences.
4.2.1 Hacking as Trespass
The Criminal Code Act criminalises housebreaking, burglary and like offences when
committed with intent to commit a felony.
22
The Criminal Code provides as follows:
A person who breaks any part, whether external or internal, of a building, or
opens by unlocking, pulling, pushing, lifting, or any other means whatever, any
door, window, shutter, cellar flap, or other thing, intended to close or cover an
opening in a building, or an opening giving passage from one part of a building
to another, is said to break the building.
23
A person is deemed to have entered a property as soon as any part of his body or any part of
any instrument used by him is within the building.
24
Based on the provisions of the Criminal
Code, housebreaking or burglary must be committed with intent either to commit a felony or
a further offence. Also from the provisions, the offences can only be committed with respect
to homes, houses, buildings or similar property.
25
In context therefore, the provisions would
not accommodate the notion of hacking which entails “breaking into” a computer system
rather than a building, and where as noted below, the hacker need not have any ulterior
motive of committing a further offence.
21 See eg Law Commission, Computer Misuse (WP No 110 1998).
22 s 410-417 Criminal Code Act.
23 ibid s 410 (emphasis added).
24 ibid.
25 ibid ss 410-416.
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4.2.2 Hacking as Damage to Property
Under the criminal code, any person who wilfully and unlawfully destroys or damages any
property is guilty of an offence.
26
Property is defined as ‘everything, animate or inanimate,
capable of being the subject of ownership’. 27 Offences relating to property include
destruction or attempt to destroy or cause injuries to any building or structure whatever,
whether completed or not, any vessel, whether completed or not, any stack of cultivated
vegetable produce, or of mineral or vegetable fuel, a mine, or the workings, fittings, or
appliances of a mine.
28
Damage in the context of documents, writings or inscriptions
includes acts which obliterate or render the document illegible in whole or in part.29
As the definition of property above clearly includes tangible property which is capable of
being owned, it seems reasonable to conclude that the physical computer is property. To the
extent therefore, that a hacker is deemed to have caused damage to the computer, a charge
of damage to property can be sustained. It is however arguable whether the same
interpretation could be applied to programs or information contained on the computer. For
example, property is defined to include ‘inanimate property’. While inanimate property may
correctly be interpreted to include all forms of property including information, the law
appears to have excluded such an interpretation. Sections 444 to 462 (of the Criminal Code)
mentioned only buildings, mines, vessels, fittings and so on as the categories of property
capable of being the subject of criminal damage. It would therefore seem reasonable to
argue that the damage to property can only be committed in relation to ‘tangible (inanimate)
property’ and not intangible property. If this is accepted as the correct interpretation of the
law, one may also conclude that information or programs in the computer do not qualify as
property. By extension, a hacker cannot be charged with damage if he copies, transfers,
modifies or even erases personal information held on computer systems.
There is no case on this point in Nigeria but cases from the UK put the legal difficulties here
in perspective. In Cox v Riley,
30
The defendant, a disgruntled employee had erased a
computer programme which controlled a computerised saw belonging to his employers. He
was charged with damaging the circuit card on the computerised saw. The prosecution
argued that by removing the information stored upon the card, the defendant had damaged
the card within the meaning of section 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act (CDA) UK 1971. It
26 ibid s 451.
27 Ibid sch. Pt 1.
28 Ibid ss 443-462.
29 Ibid s 442.
30 (1986) 83 Cr App R 54.
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was argued on behalf of the defendant that since the programme or information did not exist
in tangible form, it was not property which could be damaged within the meaning of the
law.
31
The court rejected the argument and upheld the defendant’s conviction on the grounds
that erasing the program from the printed circuit card used to operate the saw also
constituted damage to the printed circuit card (which is tangible property) within the
meaning of the CDA.
32
Notably conviction was obtained in the case because damage to the
information invariably also damaged the saw.
In R v Whiteley,
33
the appellant, a computer hacker had gained access into a computer
network and altered data contained on discs in the system, thereby causing the computers to
malfunction. On a charge for damage to property brought under section 1(1) of the CDA
1971, it was contended on behalf of the defendant that a distinction must be made between
damage to the disc itself and damage to the intangible information held on it. It was argued
further that impairment or alteration to the disc affects only the information but not the
value or usefulness of the disc itself. Therefore, damage to software or to intangible
information is not damage to the physical computer which is the tangible property. The
court held that although the law requires that damage be to tangible property, it is not a
requirement of the law that the damage itself be tangible.
34
The court in this case considered
rather controversially, the nature of the damage itself rather than the character of the
property. In other words, it was the damage which was intangible rather than the property.
Nevertheless, the decision shows the unwillingness of the courts to apply the concept of
‘damage to property’ where mainly intangible property is involved. Invariably, to constitute
damage under the law, the damage must also extend to or include some tangible property.
Subsequent amendment to the law addressed the problems caused by the above
interpretations of the English laws. The law now provides that ‘For the purpose of the
Criminal damage Act 1971, a modification of the contents of a computer shall not be
regarded as damaging any computer or computer storage medium unless its effect on that
computer or computer storage medium impairs its physical condition.’
35
By this provision,
destruction, modification or otherwise tampering with data is no longer tied to tangible
property and recourse cannot be taken to the offence unless such modification invariably
31 ‘property’ means ‘property of a tangible nature, whether real or personal, including
money…’ see Criminal Damage Act (UK) 1971 s 10.
32 Cox v Riley (1986) 83 Cr App R 54, 56.
33 (1991) 93 Cr App R 25.
34 ibid 27; see also Morphitis v Salmon (1990) Crim LR 48.
35 Police Justice Act 2006, s 36 which amended s 3 Computer Misuse Act 1990.
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leads to damage of the physical computer. According to Fafinski, the provision was
intended to address the potential for overlapping liability with the criminal damage charges
arising from cases such as Cox v Riley above. He argues correctly that the section thereby
‘partitions electronic vandalism from physical vandalism’.
36
Absent any such distinction under the Nigerian law, it must be taken that damage to
property means damage to ‘tangible inanimate property’. Information stored on a computer
being inanimate but not tangible, cannot be “damaged” within the meaning of the criminal
law. Moreover, as “damage” is implicit in the offence of damage to property, the basis of
any logical extension further diminishes. For example, the concept of damage is inconsistent
with the notion of hacking in the strict sense. By definition, hacking is unauthorised access
to computer systems without reference to a resulting damage or the intent of the hacker. In
other words, a hacker may access information, copy, and transfer or modify data without
causing damage to the computer. In fact, as Nelson argues, ‘it is far more common for the
computer hacker to access a network without resulting in damage and to exit without ever
been detected’.
37
As the case of Amadi v Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN)
38
also demonstrates, if an
offender is at all convicted where his conduct or activities involve hacking, it would be
because the prosecution looked to the results or effects of his action rather than the actual
wrongful conduct which produced the result. The facts of Amadi’s case are clearly that the
defendant had accessed the systems of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
(EFCC) without authority. He had cloned the website of the organisation and sent fraudulent
mails purporting to be from the organisation. The defendant was however not charged with
any offence having direct bearing on the underlying activity of hacking. It was argued that
the prosecution obtained a conviction because it looked to the results (attempt to obtain
money by false pretence) rather than the original wrongful activity (of hacking).
39
The effect
of this reasoning is that defendant would not have been charged at all if he had simply
hacked into the website and there was no evidence of his underlying motive to obtain money
under false pretences.
36 Fafinski, (n 15) 41.
37 Brennan Nelson, ‘Straining the Capacity of the Law: The Idea of Computer Crime in the
Age of Computer Worm’ (1991) 11 Computer LJ 299, 319.
38 (2008) 12 SC (pt III) 55.
39 Law enforcement 1.
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Arguably, the most basic reason for taking this approach is to avoid the pitfall of charging
the defendant with a non-existent offence. As mentioned earlier, a person cannot be
punished for an offence which is unknown to law. In R v Gold & Schifreen,
40
the court in
England applied the same reasoning to the specific case of computer related wrongdoing.
The court quashed the conviction of the defendant on the grounds inter-alia that the act of
accessing computer systems without authority did not constitute a criminal offence under
English law.
41
According to Lord Brennan; ‘The Appellants’ conduct amounted in
essence, …, to dishonestly gaining access to the relevant Prestel data bank by a trick. That is
not a criminal offence. If it is thought desirable to make it so, that is a matter for legislature
rather than the courts.’42
The case further highlights the difficulty of forcing computer crimes into existing criminal
laws. Given the arguments above, the conclusion can be drawn that the position of the
Nigeria law is that if a person breaks into the computer system of a financial or other
institution or into a private account, such person incurs no criminal liability. A person can
only be criminally liable if it can be shown that he has committed another or further offence
such as damage to the physical computer or (attempted) theft or fraud. The following
section examines the draft law on cybercrime to determine how it proposes to deal with
hacking in Nigeria.
4.2.3 Hacking Offences under the Cybercrime Bill 201443
A useful start point here is a brief highlight of the proposed law. The Cybercrime Bill 2014
was for an “Act to provide for the Prohibition, Prevention, Detection, Response,
Investigation and Prosecution of Cybercrimes and Other Related Matters.’ 44 It implements
most of the provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime relating to
offences, procedural powers and jurisdiction and international cooperation, and extradition
and mutual assistance. 45 It is important to note that prior to the bill, several bills for
cybercrime laws presented to the National Assembly were either not debated or not
40 (1988) 1AC 1063.
41 ibid 1071 para D and E.
42 ibid.
43 The bill was Cybercrime Bill 2013 at the time of collecting data for this research.
44 Cybercrime Bill 2014 [SB 669].
45 See Council of Europe ETS No 185 Convention on Cybercrime 2001; see also Additional
Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime, Concerning the Criminalisation of acts of a
Racist and Xenophobic Nature Committed through Computer Systems 2003.
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subsequently passed into law.46 The process (of presenting several bills) spanned over a
period of 10 years.47 The Cybercrime bill creates three categories of hacking offences. One,
access to computer systems without authority, two, access in excess of authority and the
three, unauthorised access with intention to access the contents of a computer.
48
4.2.3.1 Access without Authority (Basic Hacking Offence)
Section 6(1) provides as follows:
Any person, who without authorization or in excess of authorization,
intentionally accesses in whole or in part, a computer system or network,
commits an offence and liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term of not
less than two years or to a fine of not less than N5,000,000 or to both fine and
imprisonment.
Under the foregoing provisions, intentionally accessing information systems without or in
excess of authority is a Choate offence. Given the lacuna identified above relating to the
difficulty of showing resulting damage in damage to property cases, this provision
represents an attempt to bridge the gap in the criminal law. As the above provision shows,
hacking will be an offence irrespective of whether consequences such as harm or damage
results. Also, for the purpose of liability, a substantive offence need not be committed or
even attempted; all that is required is that the offender accesses the computer system
without or in excess of authority. Hence reference to the crime as ‘basic hacking’. 49
However, construed literally, the provision is also inordinately wide and prone to latent
ambiguities. For example, it does not carry the implication that the offender should intend to
secure access to data or information or that he even knows that access is unauthorised.50
Therefore, although the word intentionally supposedly underlines the mens rea of the
offence, the effect of the provision is to create a strict liability.
46 Although there could be more, 15 bills in all were located from manual search of
legislative files at the National Assembly.
47 Although the Cybercrime bill 2014 was reported to have been signed into law on 16 May
2015 just before the expiration of the tenure of the last government (government tenure
expired on 29 May 2015), the version of the bill eventually passed into law was not
available at the time of submitting this thesis.
48 See s 6(1)-(2) Cybercrime Bill 2014.
49 Law Commission, Criminal Law-Computer Misuse (LAW COM No 186 cm 819, 1989)
para 2.1.
50 Compare Computer Misuse Act (CMA) (UK) 1990 s 1.
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Based on the above observation, one may query the jurisprudential basis or even the moral
culpability of the basic hacking offence. It has been argued for example that criminalisation
(of hacking) is manifestly undesirable because it encroaches on certain fundamental
freedoms. As Nelson argues;
We might propose that the unauthorised access of a computer database is
immoral because it violates the dignity of those who have labored and produced
something of value over which they expect to exercise a certain amount of
control. We might also argue that computer hacking is a moral affront to the
right to privacy when a database contains personal
information…However…According to the “alternative ethic,” computer
hacking is an expression of a fundamental human impulse.
51
This “alternative ethic” also holds that criminalisation inhibits the hacker instinct essential
for innovation. It further associates the hacker with the ideals of intellectualism and
fanatism.
52
Infact, as Chandler suggests, the personal computer would never have existed
without hackers.
53
Although, it is largely inaccurate, this controversial notion of the hacker
persists in contemporary discourse and even the courts have tacitly endorsed it. In R v
Bedworth,
54
the jury accepted the defence of computer addiction in acquitting the defendant.
Also, in R v Cuthbert,
55
although the defendant was nonetheless convicted, the court
considered him as deserving sympathy because of lack of malicious intent. The public
support for ‘pentagon hacker’ Gary McKinnon in the UK and the eventual quashing of the
order to extradite him to the US further suggests that the society differentiates between
“ethical” and criminal hackers.56
Similar to the position above, the ethical and moral values at stake in computer hacking in
Nigeria are also contestable. It was argued in chapter three that there is a tendency in
Nigeria to undermine the hacker threats and see hackers as little more than activists (or
51 Nelson, (n 37) 309.
52 See Helen Nissenbaum, ‘Hackers and the Ontology of Cyberspace’ (2004) 6(2) New
Media & Society 195,199-200.
53 Amanda Chandler, ‘The Changing Definition and Image of Hackers in Popular
Discourse’ (1996) 24 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 229.
54 (unreported) 1991 in Yaman Akdeniz, ‘Section 3 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990: An
Antidote for Computer Viruses’ in Fafinski, (n 15) 54.
55 (unreported) in Fafinski, (n 15) 60.




hacktivists) who attack government owned websites in pursuit of radical social or political
agendas.
57
Therefore, from the perspectives of organisations, there is no security urgency
attached to the hacker threats. In addition, there appears to be perceptions that in terms of
financial losses, cybercriminals pose relatively less serious threats. Law enforcement 1 notes
for example that since most people have not been victims of cybercrimes, they tend to
under-estimate the threats. Therefore, as he noted, ‘…they [the people or society] often
imply that we [law enforcement] deal with the big criminals … [that is] the treasury
looters… rather than petty [cyber] criminals.’
58
These perceptions of cybercrimes and cybercriminals are also well documented in the
literature. In their research into the social organisations of internet fraudsters in Nigeria,
Tade and Aliyu found that mass youth unemployment and the corruption and impunity of
public and political office holders were the explanations offered for the emergence of the
yahoo-boys (internet fraudsters) sub-culture in Nigeria. The authors argue that the
sustenance of the sub-culture itself is aided by society’s propensity towards celebrating
wealthy individuals irrespective of the source of wealth. Accordingly, since the system also
fails to punish large scale fraud and corruption perpetrated by public officials, the society
and the cybercriminals justify their crimes on grounds of necessity and survival and societal
tolerance towards economic crimes generally.59 To support the correctness of this position,
music which extols the exploits of cyber-fraudsters has been promoted by popular media in
Nigeria.60
It is remarkable that even among law enforcement and lawmakers, the view that hackers are
relatively harmless also appears to be accepted. As noted by one law enforcement agent,
since hacking and other cybercrimes only target financial data or money as against more
serious crimes where victims could be assaulted or killed, they must be regarded as less
57 See notes in 3.3.2.1 Hacking (Unauthorised/Illegal Access to computer Systems) p 56
particularly at 57.
58 Law enforcement 1.
59 Oludayo Tade and Ibrahim Aliyu, ‘Social Organisation of Internet Fraud among
University Undergraduates in Nigeria’ (2011) 5(2) IJCC 860.





He therefore described the offence as one perpetrated on the basis of ‘your money
or your money, and never your money or your life’.
62
While this position undermines the fact that some online crimes can result in or be used to
initiate real world assaults or injury, and therefore portrays a limited understanding of
cybercrimes generally, this point is not considered further here.
63
The important inference in
relation to the issue here is that views such as the above undermine the seriousness of
hacking and related offences and may imply that law enforcement would rather dedicate
time to the “more serious” offences than to comparatively “harmless crimes” such as
hacking.
Finally, inferences drawn from records of legislative debates (on the cybercrime bill 2014)
suggest that lawmakers also struggle to understand the basic hacking offence and the
rationale behind its criminalisation. One lawmaker argued for example;
‘…the moment somebody has access to your computer, as long as it is not for
something illegal or criminal and he is not taking your computer away
permanently, you cannot say the person has committed an offence. If …I pick
your computer system and I try to crosscheck a file, I do not think it is an
offence. 64
Consequent upon observations such as the above, lawmakers made proposals to amend the
basic hacking offence in the cybercrime bill 2014. One of the proposed amendments states
that, ‘Any person who uses a computer to hack, obtain information or extract data or
otherwise, create harm to the computer network has committed an offence.’ 65 Another
provides that, ‘Any person who without authorisation intentionally accesses in whole or in
part a computer system or network for fraudulent purposes commits an offence’.66 Although,
the amendments were not reflected in the bill eventually passed by the Nigerian Senate, the
debate nevertheless indicates that the lawmakers miss the very mischief at which the law is
61 Law enforcement 3.
62 ibid; the idea here is that one can only lose money with cybercrime whereas people lose
their lives to more serious crimes like armed robbery. This danger is often depicted in
Nigeria by the statement ascribed to armed robbers who would ask victims at gunpoint for
‘your money or your life’ meaning failure to surrender your money results inevitably in
death. No one knows the exact origin of the phrase or whether armed robbers actually use it.
63 See eg (n 105) below.




aimed. That is, that a person cannot hack or access a computer system simply because he
wants to or because he can. Therefore, proposals that the hacker should have fraudulent or
other intent to damage or otherwise make the computer unavailable would be irrelevant to
the context of the offence.
The utilitarian and retributive theories of punishment provide some explanations which
highlight the confusion surrounding the basic hacking offence. To illustrate, if one considers
hacking from the perspectives of the retribution theory of punishment, it is possible to
understand the jurisprudential basis of contesting a basic hacking offence. The theory
proceeds on the principle that it is morally right to hate criminals and society extracts
retaliation (for the crime) through the suffering of the offender based on a principle of
equality or like for like.
67
Accordingly, punishment is justified only in response to a
violation of the moral order. This implies that justice is inherent to the act of punishment
and that punishment is consistent with and equal to the severity of the offence.68 In context,
to be fit for punishment, the hacker must cause some harm for which society seeks to extract
desert. As noted above, unless hacking is followed by some form of secondary offending,
the hacker may cause no actual harm or damage. Consequently, the basis upon which
society seeks to vilify him may be unclear.
Conversely, when viewed from the utilitarian perspective of punishment, the hacking
offence appears more defensible and pragmatic. The Utilitarian conceives punishment as
having a goal beyond merely extracting retribution for a wrongful act. Utilitarians argue that
punishment is itself evil and may only be administered if it promises to exclude some
greater evil.
69
Therefore, punishment is justified only if it maximises utility in the sense that
when balanced against the pains and cost, society finds punishment efficacious and
profitable in preventing the mischief in question. According to Bilz and Darley, utilitarians
assess what will happen as a result of different punishments, and weigh these outcomes
against one another, and society may impose punishment only if the net result is that society
will be better off.
70
To this end, punishment must be seen as having an instrumental value or
67 Immanuel Kant ‘Justice and Punishment’ in Gertrude Ezorsky, Philosophical
Perspectives on Punishment (Albany State University of New York Press 1972) 102-106.
68
ibid.
69 See Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation- A New
Ed. Corrected by Author (Volume 1 Oxford London 1823).
70 Ken Worthley Bilz and John M Darley, ‘What’s Wrong with Harmless Theories of
Punishment’ (2004) 79 Chi-Kent L.Rev. 1215,1222.
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socially beneficial consequences which utilitarianism conceives as deterrence, restriction
and reformation of the offender.
Applied to hacking, the utilitarian approach shows that criminalisation is not necessarily
aimed at extracting retributive justice for an inherent wrongfulness. It aims rather to achieve
ends beneficial to society, which include protecting computers and networks and developing
electronic transactions and commerce for the broader economic well-being of the society.
This is consistent with the main justification often provided for criminalising hacking. That
is the need to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer and
information systems. Indeed, the underlying rationale for most basic hacking offences is that
they serve as deterrent to the criminal and prevent secondary offending. According to the
Law Commission for example, ‘Basic hacking is proposed to be ‘a simple means of
deterring all hacker, whether fraudulent or malicious or not…’
71
Nevertheless, while the utilitarian theory is useful in explaining and justifying an offence of
basic hacking, its approach to punishment may give rise to concerns which are again
relatable to the societal context in Nigeria. The utilitarian theory considers it immaterial that
punishment fit the crime and may often impose punishments which appear excessive
relative to the crime.
72
However, reasonably, and on grounds of principle and pragmatism,
the seriousness of an offence is measured by the actual harm inflicted and punishment must
reflect such seriousness.
73
The argument here is that if punishment is perceived as too severe,
tensions may arise within the criminal justice system prompting a need for balance. To
illustrate, section 6(1) of the cybercrime bill cited above, imposes punishment of 2 years
imprisonment or fine of 5Million naira or both fine and imprisonment for the basic hacking
offence. Against the background of the moral, social and even judicial perceptions of
hacking noted above, one must consider the possible effects of this punishment on
legitimising the offence.
To further illustrate, under the Nigerian Criminal Code, offences such as breaking and entry
are not punishable unless a person breaks in with intent to commit felony.
74
Stealing which
71 The Law Commission, Computer Misuse (WP No 110 1998) para 3.9.
72 According to Bilz and Darley for example, ‘if we ask, how much should we punish? He
(the utilitarian) might answer “Exactly as much as is necessary to offset the bad effects of
the crime”, see Worthley and Darley, (n 70) 1223.
73 See eg HLA Hart, Postscript: Responsibility and Retribution’ in Punishment and
Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Oxford Clarendon 1968) 210, 235-36.
74 See s 410 Criminal Code Act.
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is a felony is punishable with three years’ imprisonment.
75
Although, the Criminal Code is
uncontrovertibly outdated,76 these examples indicate that stiffer penalty for basic hacking
may seem comparatively excessive if not outrightly illegitimate. In addition, precedents
show that Nigerian courts tend to punish economic criminals comparatively less severely
and they may impose small fines in lieu of imprisonment.77 The Scottish Law Commission
put the inherent difficulties here in perspective when it noted that ‘The disadvantage (of a
basic hacking offence) is that, on conviction of an offence …, a court might find it
impossible to pass a more severe sentence…without reference to the actual or intended
consequences.’78
Specific to the Nigerian context, it can be further argued that because hackers are often
characterised as well-educated, young, technology-savvy individuals,
79
questions may arise
on the desirability and utility of punishment. One may ask for example, whether it is
desirable to expose such individuals to the full impact and severity of the penal system with
its attendant stigmatisation and implications for recidivism.
80
The question is particularly
relevant because with a fine of 5Million Naira 81 as an option to imprisonment, most
convicted hackers are likely to end up in prison.
The above observations also find support in the fact that section 6(1) of the draft
cybercrime law prescribes a mandatory minimum punishment which effectively bars
judicial discretion on punishment. More precisely, since the bill provides that hacking
attracts imprisonment for a term of not less than two years or to a fine of not less than
N5,000,000 or to both fine and imprisonment,82 the courts cannot exercise discretion either
to reduce the length of imprisonment or the amount of the fine. Section 382 (1) of the
Nigerian Criminal Procedure Code encapsulate the rule in this respect. It provides;
75 ibid s 39.
76 The Criminal Code is a colonial heritage enacted in July 1916.
77 See eg Ihuoma Chiedozie, ‘Nigerian Wonder: N27 Billion Pension Thief Gets N750,000
fine’ The Punch Newspaper (Abuja, January 29
2013)<http://www.punchng.com/news/nigerian-wonder-n27bn-pension-thief-gets-n750000-
fine/> accessed 04/08/2014.
78 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Computer Crime (Scot Law Com No 106 1987)
para 4.5-4.8.
79 Law enforcement 1 and 3; see also Tade and Aliyu (n 59).
80 See eg Isik Yusuf, ‘Improving Prison Operations’ (6th International Conference on
Human Rights and Prison Reform Bangkok, Thailand 4th - 8th march, 2014)
<http://www.internationalcure.org/Sixth-Presentations/Bangkok%20Yussuf.pdf >accessed
05/05/2014.
81 This is approximately $25,000.
82 S 6(1) Cybercrime Bill (emphasis added).
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Subject to the other provisions of [the] section, where a court has authority
under any written law to impose imprisonment for any offence and has not
specific authority to impose a fine for that offence, the court may, in its
discretion, impose a fine in lieu of imprisonment.
However, under section 382(5), the provisions of section 382(1) shall not apply in any case
where a written law provides a minimum period of imprisonment to be imposed for the
commission of an offence. In effect, by prescribing a minimum mandatory sentence, the
draft cybercrime law has eroded the courts’ powers to exercise discretion on punishment.
The approach to punishment taken under the Bill could therefore not only raise questions
about the reformatory nature of the punishment and its overall utility to the society, it could
also place additional pressure on the prison system which could ill-afford it.
It is important to conclude this section by stating that the argument here is not that hackers
should not be punished. On the contrary, the argument is that further considerations be
given to the issue of punishment particularly considering the nature and severity of the
crime and the characteristics of likely offenders. Discretion on punishment by the courts for
example could lead to more lenient punishment for “ethical” hackers who may then be
rehabilitated or reformed. This position promotes the legitimacy of punishment and helps to
avoid speculations of legislative overkill. As Nelson rightly observed, ‘Where the law has
lost the appearance of legitimacy, those who are called upon to behave or to refrain from
behaving in a particular way are less likely to comply.’
83
4.2.3.2 Unauthorised Access in Excess of Authority
As mentioned above, the draft law also creates the offence of accessing computer systems in
excess of authority. Under section 6(1) ‘Any person, …who without authorisation or in
excess of authorization, intentionally accesses in whole or in part, a computer system or
network, commits an offence…’.
The overall effect of the provision is to criminalise both accesses without or in excess of
authority. However, access in excess of authority is particularly significant because of the
relative greyness created by lack of corresponding provision in some computer crimes
legislation. For example, section 1 of the CMA criminalises access without authority and is
silent on access in excess of authority.
84
This has produced controversial and inconsistent
83 Nelson, (n 37) 321.
84 See CMA s 1.
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judicial decisions. In DPP v Bignell85, the Court of Appeal had upheld the argument that
access in excess of authority is not a breach of sections 1 and 17(5) of the CMA. The court
noted that based on its express provisions, the relevant sections of the CMA were directed at
external hackers rather than authorised internal users who have authority to access their
employers’ systems.
86
The basis of the decision included a consideration of an arguably
equivocal opinion of the Law Commission. The commission had drawn a distinction
between outsiders’ and insiders’ access to computer systems. According to the Commission,
insiders are people with legitimate access to a system who nevertheless exceed that
(legitimate) access or use it for a wrongful purpose, while outsiders are what is typically
thought of when talking of ‘hackers’.87
However, in R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and another, ex parte
Government of the United States of America, 88 the House of Lords relied on the same Law
Commission report and held that the construction of sections 1 and 17 of the CMA was not
to exclude misuse or ‘hacking’ by insiders or employees. As the court noted;
Read as a whole, the report makes it clear that the term 'hacking' is used
conveniently to refer to all forms of unauthorised access whether by insiders or
outsiders and that the problem of misuse by insiders is as serious as that by
outsiders.89
Therefore, by implying that the hacker is both a person who acts ‘without authorization or in
excess of authorization,’ section 6(1) of the Cybercrime Bill avoids the tenuous distinctions
which the English courts have had to make.
Furthermore, the provision arguably diminishes the needless and artificial distinctions
between computer crime and cybercrime. As noted in chapter three, organisations tend to
differentiate between insider and outsider fraud. The distinction in turn forms the basis of
treating insider related computer frauds as computer crimes. However, the law now
proposes to criminalise both accesses that breach code based restrictions as well as access
based on employee misconduct. The invariable conclusion is that the insider who exceeds
his authority is as much a criminal as the outsider who has no authority at all. Financial
organisations must therefore report incidents of employee access to customers’ personal
85 [1998] 1 Cr App R 1.
86 ibid 12-13.
87 Law Commission, Criminal Law-Computer Misuse (n 49) para1.20.
88 [1999] 4 All ER 1.
89 ibid 10.
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financial data if done in excess of authorisation as a breach of the criminal law. It is
however to be noted that while the specificity and clarity of the provision (of section 6(1) is
desirable in principle, its practical effects are contestable. For example, it is doubtful
whether organisations will report ‘internal hacking’ because it has become a crime any more
than if there is no criminal sanction. As was previously argued, there are reputational issues
attached to security breaches whether they emanate from outsider or insider sources. As a
result, organisations may be even less willing to press criminal charges against insiders and
are more likely to use internal disciplinary procedures. Therefore, it can be argued that
unless there is also a statutory requirement to report data breaches, the provision of section
6(1) regarding access in excess of authority may be largely ineffective.
Correspondingly, given the observations made with respect to access without authority
above, it is arguable whether the approach of the courts, society or law enforcement will
differ if a person merely acts in excess of his authority. In other words, the same arguments
relating to relative harmlessness of the act and the severity of punishment may apply with
equal force. In R v Hardy,90 the English court took such an approach. The defendant, a
police officer accessed police records and computers meant for police purposes for his
personal purposes. He was charged with abuse of office and breach of duty of trust. In
sentencing the defendant, the Judge referred to evidence of his good character and the
difficulties he would face in prison, and thereby imposed a sentence of 28 weeks
imprisonment, suspended for two years, and a period of community punishment. Although,
the conviction was subsequently quashed on appeal and substituted with 9 months
imprisonment, the case nevertheless demonstrates that courts may be predisposed to treating
defendants charged with exceeding access with leniency. Consequently, offenders may be
regarded as constituting even less of a threat than those who access with no authority at all.
4.2.3.3 Unauthorised Access with Intent to Obtain Computer Content
The proposed law appears to recognise that hacking is seldom an end in itself and thereby
catalogues intended misuse which may follow accessing computers without or in excess of
authority. Section 6(2) of the bill provides,
Where the offence provided in subsection (1) of this section is committed with
the intent of obtaining computer data, securing access to any program,
commercial or industrial secrets or confidential information, the punishment
90 Attorney General’s Reference (No 1 of 2007) 2007 All ER (D) 102 (Mar).
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shall be imprisonment for a term of not less than three years or a fine of not less
than N7,000,000.00 or to both fine and imprisonment.
91
On the face of it, the provision seems to complement section 6(1) by creating a ‘hierarchical’
level of offending.
92
Nevertheless, the provision is prone to fundamental interpretational
challenges. It may be argued for example that the utility and effectiveness of the offence
created by section 6(2) hinges on the correct construction of the word ‘access’.
93
To see how,
the bill provides that “access” in relation to an application or data means the following:
…rendering that application or data, by whatever means, in a form that would
enable a person, at the time when it is so rendered or subsequently, to take
account of that application or data including using the application or data or
having its output from the computer system in which it is held in a displayed or
printed Form, or to a storage medium or by means of any other output device,
whether attached to the computer system in which the application or data are
held or not.
94
Considering the aspects of the definition of access highlighted above, it can be argued that
the basis on which a person could be charged for ‘unauthorised access’ under section 6(1) at
all is if he has secured access to a program or data in the first place. For ease of reference,
part of section 6(1) (already cited in full above) is reproduced as follows, ‘Any person, who
without authorization or in excess of authorization, intentionally accesses in whole or in part,
a computer system or network…’ The implication here is therefore that when the hacker
commits the section 6(1) offence, he arguably has already committed the section 6(2)
offence, or at least part it, (that is securing access to program or data). In other words, by
merely accessing the system, without ulterior motive, the hacker has already taken account
of or used an application or data and has consequently secured or obtained access to data or
programs.
To further illustrate this point, an example given by the UK Law Commission is instructive.
In the view of the Commission, there are three stages involved in logging into a computer
system for access purposes. The first stage occurs when the computer user enters his identity
code, his name, initials or password. In the second stage, the computer verifies the identity
91 S 6(2) Cybercrime Bill 2014 (empahasis).
92 See Law Commission, Criminal Law-Computer Misuse (n 49 ) para 3.11.
93 See eg decision of the US courts in State v Allen 917, P.2d 848 (Kan 1996); see also State
v Riley 846 P.2d 1365 (Wash 1993).
94 S 48 Cybercrime Bill 2014.
108
of the user and if it recognises the user, grants access to the third stage where the user is
allowed to use the facilities of the system.
95
According to the Law Commission, at stage
three, the user unquestionably secures access to data or program held on the system and is
therefore guilty of an offence. At stage two, he is guilty of an offence when he is verified by
the computer because he intended thereby to obtain access to data or programs. The
Commission also considers that the user is guilty of an offence at stage one because he
already obtained information about data or program stored in the computer by finding out
whether or not identification combination he presents is recognised as valid by a program
held on the computer. In effect, securing access to a program includes running the
program.
96
Following this reasoning, section 1 of the CMA defines unauthorised access in
terms of causing the computer to perform any function with intent to secure access to any
program or data.
97
Section (1) 2 CMA provides that where a person secures access to a
program under section 1 of the law, he is nevertheless guilty of an offence although he does
not intend to access;
(a) any particular program or data;
(b) a program or data of any particular kind; or
(c) a program or data held in any particular computer.
This provision shows the broader breath of the CMA. For example, it is arguable that
because it does not limit access to specific programs or information, the provision of section
1(2) above presupposes that by accessing a computer at all, a person already accesses any
or some data or programs. By logical inference therefore, it is unnecessary to further specify
that he access any particular program.
Against the background of this clarification, a person must be taken to have accessed data or
programs once he logs into a system because ‘logging-in’ itself utilises a computer program.
Therefore, since access to programs and data is a sine qua non to the basic hacking offence
under section 6(1) of the proposed cybercrime law, unless the provision (of section 6(2) is
framed in terms of securing access to a specific program, and not to any program, the
section (or at least part of it) is repetitive and redundant. Consequently, it is open to the
defendant charged with the sections 6(1) and (2) offences to argue that he intends only to
commit the section 6(1) offence.
95 Law Commission, Criminal Law- Computer Misuse (n 49) paras 3.16-3.18.
96 ibid.
97 CMA 1990 s 1.
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The thrust of the foregoing argument is that by proposing to punish intent to secure access
to a computer program or obtain data, section 6(2) seems to be a duplication of the section
6(1) offence. If this position is taken as correct, it may then be argued that charging a
defendant with both offences has the potential of creating double jeopardy.
98
This may be
fatal considering that the section 6(2) offence is more serious and attracts a stiffer penalty
and is arguably the main mischief against which legislation is directed.
Even regarding the outstanding leg of section 6(2), that is, intent to obtain commercial or
confidential information, the provision may be faulted on the grounds that what constitutes
this category of information is not clear. The law fails to define this but defines content data
as information stored on a computer memory.
99
The question this raises is whether
‘commercial or confidential information (whatever it means) are the only categories of data
which may be stored on the computer memory and thereby accessed by the hacker? Section
2 of the CMA also illustrates the point here. The section provides that a person is guilty if he
commits an offence under section 1 CMA with intent inter-alia to commit any offence
classified as further offences under the law. The CMA however omitted to define specific
categories of further offences. According to the Law Commission, this approach was
intended to create a ‘preparatory offence’ which covers a broad scope of ‘further offences’
or ‘ulterior intent’ offences. To provide the basis and justification for the offence, an
example was cited of a hacker who breaks into the computer system of a banking
organisation and succeeds in transferring funds. While he could be charged with theft
immediately the fund transfer succeeds, the Commission expressed the view that it is
unclear whether the hacker could be charged with attempted theft if he fails on account of
being inhibited by the bank’s computer security system. The Law Commission rationalised
that the difficulty in such cases lay in the speed with which it is possible to transfer funds in
computerised systems which makes it difficult to distinguish preparation from attempt for
the purpose of allocating criminal liability. It was argued that when he defeats security
checks such as gaining access by trying a large number of alternative passwords, the hacker,
was merely at the preparatory stage for the substantive crime of theft. But because thereafter,
transfer can be instantaneous, it becomes difficult to locate the point during the criminal
transaction, at which he could be charged with attempted theft. The Commission opined
that while attempt is not clearly discernible in cases such as this, the law should be such that
98 The rule against double jeopardy is a cardinal principle of criminal law in Nigeria. In the
strict sense, it means a person may not be tried twice for the same offence. However, it can
also be pleaded in cases where multiple punishments may be imposed for the same offence,
in which case the defence might apply to the court to strike out duplicate charges.
99 See s 42 Cybercrime Bill 2014.
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‘a person, if he were detected trying to find the password, would at that stage have
committed the offence of obtaining unauthorised access to a computer with intent to
steal.’100
The basis of the preparatory offences was therefore to pre-empt secondary offending by
exposing the hacker to prosecution at an early stage. However, because it is difficult to
anticipate all categories of wrongdoing which a person may achieve by hacking into a
system, the provision covers all types of secondary offending and not merely specific ones.
As the Commission noted;
We did not consider that it would be prudent or indeed possible to draw up a list
of offences that might constitute such a ‘further’ offence, because it is not
possible to draw up a finite list of the nefarious ends that a person might try to
achieve by first securing unauthorised access to a computer. An indictment for
the ulterior intent offence would contain particulars of the further offence
allegedly intended.
101
Correspondingly, drawing up a limited number of acts which may follow a hacking incident
such as intent to obtain confidential data and so on, as done by section 6(2) of the Nigerian
Cybercrime bill is limiting and undesirable. This is more so because intent is a notoriously
difficult element to prove. It is trite law that a person is taken to intend the actus reus or
forbidden act of a crime either in the ordinary, core sense of “intention” or in the sense that
he recognised that the actus reus was a virtually certain consequence of his action.
102
In spite of this clear direction, intention is a subjective concept and a particular actus reus
could support multiple intentions. In essence, if a person hacks into a system, it may be
difficult to establish what he intended to further achieve. In R v Delamare,
103
the intent of
the defendant was to commit fraud on an account. In DPP v Lennon,
104
the defendant
intended to, and did overwhelm the target website to cause a denial of service attack. In
other words, while obtaining certain content may seem a natural or direct or foreseeable or
virtually certain reason for hacking into a system, the overt act of hacking can also support a
100 Law Commission, Criminal Law- Computer Misuse (n 49) para 3.52.
101 ibid para 3.54.
102 AP Simester et al, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (Hart
Publising 2010) 127.
103 [2003] EWCA Crim 424.
104 [2006] EWHC 1201.
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number of intent. This may include potentially more serious offences,105 and those unrelated
to computers.106 The core of the argument here is that section 6(2) is limiting because it
defines the specific results which must be intended by the hacker. The provision is therefore
narrow and lacks neutrality, qualities which must be avoided even by technology focused or
technology specific laws.
107
In view of the above, a proposal may be made to expand the ambit of the proposed
legislation. For example, although the position of the Nigerian law is that preparatory acts
cannot attract criminal liability,
108
the provision of the Criminal Code clearly covers
scenarios such as those discussed above. The Criminal Code provides;
It is immaterial, except so far as regards punishment, whether the offender does
all that is necessary on his part for completing the Commission of the offence,
or whether the complete fulfilment of his intention is prevented by
circumstances independent of his will, or whether he desists of his own motion
from the further Prosecution of his intention. It is immaterial that by reason of
circumstances not known to the offender it is impossible in fact to commit the
offence.
109
Given this provision of the Code, even if the intention of the draftsman was to avoid the
pitfall of so called ‘preparatory offences’, the section 6(2) offence can still be more broadly
defined. Rather than defining the offence restrictively in terms of intent to obtain computer
data, program or commercial or industrial secrets, the offence could be defined in terms of
unauthorised access with intent to commit a felony, a misdemeanour, or to commit any
offence defined by the cybercrime law or the general criminal law. For example, under the
Code, breaking and entering is an offence if committed with intent to commit a felony. A
felony in turn encompasses a wide scope of other offences and is punishable with a
minimum of three years imprisonment. This is a more dynamic approach since the Criminal
Code also accommodates the notion of general rather than specific intent. Section 24
105 For example, the Law Commission cited the hypothetical case of hacking into a hospital
computer which contains details of blood groups and rearranging the data with the intention
that a patient should be seriously injured by being given the wrong blood; see Law
Commission, Criminal Law-Computer Misuse (n 49) para 3.55.
106 ibid para 3.57.
107 See eg M Gercke, Understanding Cybercrime: A Guide for Developing Countries (2nd
edn ITU 2011).
108 See Dibia v State (2012) l PERL 8564 (CA); see also Yakubu Sanni v State (1993) 4
NWLR (pt 285) 99, 199.
109 s 4(2) Criminal Code Act.
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provides that ‘Unless the intention to cause a particular result is expressly declared to be an
element of the offence constituted, in whole or part, by an act or omission, the result
intended to be caused by an act or omission is immaterial’.
110
Therefore if D breaks into the
computer systems of P bank, whether or not he intends to obtain personal data or program,
he could be charged with the basic hacking offence and sundry offences. These may include
intent to commit fraud, theft, blackmail or other computer-related or real world offences
rather than the prosecution restricting itself to specific content offences.
4.3 Phishing- Fraudulent Representation and Computer-related
Fraud
It is pertinent to state that the position and clarity of the law on phishing is important for
three reasons. The first is that by the admission of the financial industry itself, phishing
scams are the most pervasive method of compromising personal (financial) information in
Nigeria.111 The second reason relates to the pre-disposition of payment service providers to
attribute security breaches to consumers and thus deny liability for fraudulent payments and
fund transfers.112 The third concerns assumptions that the laws which criminalise 419 scams
also deal effectively with phishing.113
4.3.1 The Nigerian Criminal Law on Phishing, False Pretence and Electronic
Payment Fraud
The laws in Nigeria did not mention or define phishing. However, it is generally an offence
to obtain property by false pretence and with intent to defraud. Section 1(1) of the Advance
Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act (hereinafter AFF Act) provides as follows:
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment or law, any person
who by any false pretence, and with intent to defraud
(a) obtains, from any other person, in Nigeria or in any other country for himself
or any other person;
(b) induces any other person, in Nigeria or in any other country, to deliver to
any person; or
110 ibid s 24.
111 Nigeria Electronic Fraud Forum (NEFF) Annual Report 2012.
112 See notes in 3.4.1 Account Takeover Fraud at p 70 at 71.
113 See notes in (f) Spear Phishing p 66.
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(c) obtains any property, whether or not the property is obtained or its delivery
is induced through the medium of a contract induced by the false pretence,
commits an offence under this Act.
114
A false pretence is defined as;
… a representation, whether deliberate or reckless, made by word, in writing or
by conduct, of a matter of fact or law, either past or present, which
representation is false in fact or law, and which the person making it knows to
be false or does not believe to be true.’115
In Federal Republic of Nigeria v Mike Amadi,
116
the provisions cited above were applied to
prosecute a cybercriminal. The defendant was charged with attempt to obtain money by
false pretences contrary to sections 5(1), 8(b) and 1(3) of the Advanced Fee Fraud and Other
Related Offences Act (AFF Act). He was also charged with forgery contrary to section 468
of the Criminal Code Law. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant was convicted on
the counts of attempt to obtain money by false pretence and forgery and acquitted on the
count of uttering forged document.
117
The significant aspect of the case is that while it is cited as the major breakthrough in
cybercrime conviction in Nigeria,
118
the claim can generally be faulted. For example,
although the facts indicate that the defendant hacked into and cloned the website of the
EFCC, the defendant was not charged with any offence(s) bordering on (mis)using
computer or using the internet as a medium for the attempted crime. The references to the
facts of computer use in the case are as follows:
PW2…Based on his investigations informed me that the Internet Service
Provider for the cloned EFCC website is Multi-Links…requesting them to
provide the details of the subscriber to that number…based on the
information,…the accused person was arrested at his residence, we met the
accused person using his computer. We arrested him and recovered the system.
114 Similar provisions are contained in s 419 Criminal Code Act.
115 s 20 AFF Act; see similar provisions in s 418 Criminal Code Act.
116 (2006) 1 Economic Crimes Law Report 15.
117 See Mike Amadi v Federal Republic of Nigeria (2008) 12 SC (pt III) 55.
118 Law enforcement 1.
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We recovered the receipts of the purchase of the Internet number….. the 1st E-
mail that complained against the fake E-mails that were purportedly sent…
119
By refraining from bringing any charges for wrongful use of the computer or the internet,
the prosecution in Amadi’s case arguably avoided what has been described as the
procrustean attempt to force the facts a case into the language of an Act not designed to fit
them.120 The only aspect of the case relied on to qualify it as a cybercrime conviction relates
to the admission of e-mails as evidence. However, this only further diminishes the basis of
classifying the case as one of cybercrime because while the admission of e-mail as evidence
is relevant, it is hardly significant. The AFF itself defines ‘document’ to include a document
transmitted through fax or telex machine or any other electronic or electrical device, a
telegram and a computer printout.
121
By definition therefore, email evidence is already
admissible under the AFF Act. As the Nigerian Supreme Court confirmed, the defendant
was convicted because he had made false pretences to an identified person by means of
letters (e-mails) containing the false pretence. 122
More significantly, since the evidence in Amadi’s case was obtained largely through an
agent provocateur, it can be argued that evidence was carefully and deliberately collected.
One may therefore ask whether the court would have reached a similar conclusion if it had
been faced with a classic case of fraudulent transfer or attempt to transfer funds
electronically. This is in particular where the false pretence was not made to any identified
person but to a machine.
To make the argument clearer, reference may be made to judicial decisions in the pre-Fraud
Act era in the UK. Although, UK law defined sundry fraud offences before the Fraud Act,
123
the courts still faced difficulties when interpreting the concepts of obtaining property by
deception or false pretence in relation to computerised systems. For example, the relevant
sections of the Theft Act 1968 provides that ‘A person who by any deception dishonestly
obtains property belonging to another, with the intention of permanently depriving the other
of it, shall on conviction on indictment be liable to imprisonment…’
124
"Deception" means
119 Amadi v Federal Republic of Nigeria, (n 117) 74 paras 5-15, 35.
120 See R v Gold & Schifreen (1988) 1AC 1063, 1073 para B.
121 s 20 Advance Fee Fraud Act.
122 Amadi v Federal Republic of Nigeria, (n 117) para 35.
123 The law created eight deception offences which make it criminal for a person dishonestly
to bring about a number of specified consequences by deception. See Theft Act 1968 ss 15-
16 (repealed by Fraud Act 2006).
124 Theft Act 1968 s 15(1) (repealed).
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any deception (whether deliberate or reckless) by words or conduct as to fact or as to law,
including a deception as to the present intentions of the person using the deception or any
other person.’
125
According to the Law Commission, the concept of deception was
introduced by the Theft Act 1968 in place of the older concept of ‘false pretence’ which was
broadly synonymous with fraudulent misrepresentation. The aim was to ‘move the focus
away from the defendant’s conduct to the deceived person’s mistaken belief.
126
According
to the Commission, ‘the word “deception” seems to us… to have the advantage of directing
attention to the effect that the offender deliberately produced on the mind of the person
deceived, whereas “false pretence” makes one think of what exactly the offender did in
order to deceive.’
127
The authorities suggest therefore that the distinguishing factor is that false pretence may be
made by one person without necessarily deceiving the person to whom the false pretence
was made, whereas deception requires that the deceived party be actively misled. As the
Commission observed;
[To] say that the defendant has deceived another person implies that the other
person believed in the truth of the defendant’s false representation. Sometimes
however, a person believed in the truth of the defendant’s false representation
without actively considering whether or not it is true. Arguably such a person
has not been truly deceived.128
However, as the Law Commission further noted, although the change in nomenclature, that
is from false pretence to deception, was not expected to have significant practical effects,
the outcome of a number of cases suggest otherwise. 129 In R v Lambie, 130 the Court of
appeal applied the distinction to quash the conviction of the appellant for obtaining
pecuniary advantage by deception under section 16(1) of the Theft Act 1968. The Court
conceded that the facts had established that the appellant had made a false pretence or false
representation in that she had made a representation that she was authorised by the bank to
use her credit card, when in fact she had exceeded her credit limit. The Court however
further reasoned that to sustain a conviction under s 16(1) of the Act, it was necessary to
show that that the person to whom the representation was made had acted or relied on that
125 ibid s 15(4).
126 Law Commission, Fraud (Law Com No 276 Cm 5560 2002) para 3.26.
127 ibid.
128 ibid para 3.29.
129 ibid para 3.27.
130 [1981] 1 All ER 332.
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representation. Since the evidence in the case had shown that the shop assistant to whom the
false pretence was addressed was not thereby deceived, the court allowed the appeal and
quashed the conviction.131 This case is particularly relevant in the context of payment cards.
For example it suggests that in spite of the fact that a card is stolen or used without authority,
the ‘fraudster’ may be acquitted because although he had made a false pretence, the
merchant was not consequently deceived.132
R v Preddy133 further highlights the complications introduced by the concept of deception in
fund transfer cases. The facts are briefly that the defendants had by means of applications
containing false statements obtained or attempted to obtain mortgage advances from
building societies or other lending institutions. They obtained advances which were effected
through telegraphic or electronic transfer and which involved the debiting of the lenders
account and the corresponding crediting of the accounts of the appellant or his solicitor. The
court rejected the contention that the credit on the appellants account represented ‘property
belonging to another’ which was obtained by false pretence. As the court reasoned, the
debiting of a bank account and the corresponding crediting of another’s bank account
brought about by dishonest misrepresentation does not amount to the obtaining of property
within the meaning of section 15 of the Thefts Act 1968.
134
Accordingly, the credit being a
chose in action never belonged to lenders and came into existence belonging to the
payee/appellants. This decision means in effect that an individual who obtains any form of
payment or any form of banking transfer by deception cannot be prosecuted because he has
not thereby obtained property belonging to anyone.
135
The difficulty created by Preddy was addressed by amending the Theft Act. A new section
15A made it an offence to dishonestly obtain a money transfer by deception. However, as
subsequent cases show, this again did not wholly cure the defect in the law. In particular,
problems persisted because courts continue to hold that a person rather than a computer
must be deceived in such contexts.
136
Therefore, with regards to the question whether a
computer can be deceived, the authorities were at first conflicting. The court in R V Charles
131 R v Lambie [1981] 1 All ER 332, 334 - 340.
132 See eg R v Charles (1977) AC 177.
133 [1996] AC 815.
134 ibid 833-835.
135 See eg Law Commission, Offences of Dishonesty: Money Transfers (Item 11 of the Sixth
Programme of Law Reform 1996) para 1.7.
136 See eg Holmes v Governor of Brixton Prison (2004) EWCH 2020 (Admin); see also
Rhys Bollen, ‘Continuing Confusion over What a Payment Is’ (2005) Cambridge Student
Law Review 31.
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noted orbiter that deception is the misleading of a particular person or thing.
137
However, in
R v Gold & Schifreen, the court considered, again orbiter, that a machine such as a computer
cannot be deceived. According to the court;
The prosecution had to prove that the [respondents] intended that someone
should accept as genuine the false instrument they had made. The suggestion
here is that it was a machine...which the [respondents] intended to induce to
respond to the false instrument...If that is a correct analysis, the prosecution case
is reduced to an absurdity...138
To address the problems highlighted above, the Fraud Act repealed the problematic
provisions of the Theft Act.
139
It criminalised express or implied representation, including
representations made to machines or devises whether or not they are acted upon by any
(intended) human recipients.
140
The Act provides, ‘For the purposes of this section a
representation may be regarded as made if it (or anything implying it) is submitted in any
form to any system or device designed to receive, convey or respond to communications
(with or without human intervention)’.141 It has been argued, quite correctly, that these
provisions mean that there is no limitation to the ways in which a representation can be
made and include representation posted on a website or sent through an e-mail.
142
The
correct interpretation is therefore that the provision covers all forms of phishing activity
whether directed at a person or a computer.143
As noted above, the Nigerian law defines and applies the concept of false pretence.
However, having considered the subsequent legal problems raised by the concept of
deception under the Theft Act and how the Fraud Act resolved them, the relevant point for
consideration is the position reflected in the Nigerian law. In other words, does the concept
of false pretence in Nigeria reflect the position of the English law under the repealed
provisions of the theft Act or does it embrace, without need for reform, the interpretation of
the Fraud Act to effectively deal with phishing?
137 R v Charles (n 132) 178.
138 R v Gold & Schifreen (n 120) 622-623 (Lord Lane CJ).
139 See Theft Act 1968 ss15, 15A, 15B and 16.
140 Fraud Act 2006 s 2(4), (5).
141 ibid s 2 (5).
142 See Anne Savirimuthu and Joseph Savirimuthu, ‘Identity Theft and Systems Theory:
The Fraud Act 2006 in Perspective’ (2007) 4(4) Scripted 441-444.
143 ibid.
118
If one accepts the distinctions made above between false pretence and deception, it is
possible to argue that since deception is not an element of the offence under Nigerian law,
then the question of whether a computer is deceived in phishing scams or fraudulent transfer
of funds can become irrelevant. As the definition above shows, the AFF Act simply defines
false pretence without requiring that it be made to any person or thing.
144
As also noted
above, this was indeed the intended effect of a false pretence as distinguished from
deception.145 However, even if this interpretation is correct, on judicial authority, there is a
lacuna here. Amadi v FRN gives some indications of the reasoning of the court and what
would perhaps have been its response if there had been a suggestion that false pretence was
made to a machine or a computer. According to the court;
…counsel for the appellant has submitted that before a conviction can be
sustained for the offence of attempt to obtain money by false pretences…there
must be a fraudulent pretence contained in a document from an accused to
another clearly identified person. It must be clear that the document emanated
from the accused and it was meant to be received and was infact received by the
victim if such pretence is contained in a letter or other documents.
146
The court appeared to accept that this is the correct position of the law when it held that the
prosecution had discharged the burden (of proving that fraudulent pretence contained in a
document from an accused was made to another clearly identified person). In other words, a
false pretence is required to be directed at a person.
147
To further support this finding, the
court restated the provisions of section 5 of the AFF Act to the effect that, ‘…it shall be
sufficient in a charge of an attempt to commit an offence under this Act to prove that the
letter or other document was received by the person to whom the false pretence was
directed.’
148
Considering this further requirement, not only is it essential that the false pretence be
directed at a clearly identified person but it must also be received by the person to whom the
pretence was made. These requirements are arguably difficult to meet in the context of
fraudulent fund transfers over the internet. By nature, phishing mails need not be directed to
144 See s 1 AFF Act.
145 See R v Lambie (n 131).
146 Mike Amadi v Federal Republic of Nigeria (n 117) 74 paras 10-15 (emphasis added).
147 See Uzoka v Federal Republic of Nigeria (2009) LPELR -4950 (CA) 8-29 (emphasis
added).
148 s 5(1) AFF Fraud Act 2006.
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any particular person. They may originate as spam aimed at inducing prospective victims to
click on links to spoofed sites. Also, malicious software can be used to trick out personal
(financial) information without the knowledge of the victim. In either case, the fraudulently
obtained information could be fed into the computer system of a banking organisation and
fund transfers may be achieved by tricking the system independently of any human
intervention.
It is notable that in addition to directing the false pretence to a clearly identified person, the
definition of false pretence under section 1 subsection 1 of the AFF (already cited above)
also requires that there be intent to defraud. Although the law did not also define what
constitutes intent to defraud, the courts have established that this carries an element of intent
to cause economic loss. In Awobokun v The State,
149
the Nigerian Supreme Court quoted
with approval the definition of intent to defraud given in Welham v DPP as
follows; ….‘with intent to defraud’ means ‘with intent to practice fraud’ on someone or
other. It need not be anyone in particular. Someone in general will suffice. If anyone may be
prejudiced in any way by the fraud, that is enough….’
150
Based on judicial authority, intent
to defraud must also manifest in relation to persons and not machines. By logical extension
therefore, if a person cannot deceive a machine or computer, he cannot also defraud a
computer.
The analysis above shows that in spite of the fact that the AFF Act prefers the term ‘false
pretence’, logical application of the law means that the Nigerian courts will follow the
interpretations of the English Courts under the repealed provisions of the theft Act. False
pretence therefore has the same implications and effect as deception.
4.3.2 Computer Fraud under the Cybercrime Bill
The foregoing analyses demonstrates that the problem is not so much that it is completely
impossible to secure convictions in cases where computers constitute an aspect or a medium
of fraud, but that the cases do not reflect the true nature or character of the crime.
Accordingly, one would expect the proposed law on cybercrime to address the issues less
technically and more pragmatically. However, a perusal of the provisions shows that this is
not the case. Section 12 of the bill creates ‘computer related fraud’. It provides;
(1) Any person who knowingly and without authority or in excess of authority
causes any loss of property to another by altering, erasing, inputting or
149 (1976) 4 SC 2.
150 Welham v DPP (1961) AC 103, 133 (emphasis added).
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suppressing any data held in any computer, whether or not for the purpose of
conferring any economic benefits for himself or another person, commits an
offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term of not less than
three years or to a fine of not less than N7,000,000.00 or to both fine and
imprisonment.
(2) Any person who with intent to defraud sends electronic message to a
recipient, where such electronic message materially misrepresents any fact or
set of facts upon which reliance the recipient or another person is caused to
suffer any damage or loss, commits an offence and shall be liable on conviction
to imprisonment for a term of not less than five years or to a fine of not less than
N10,000,000.00 or to both fine and imprisonment.
151
First, it is unclear why the phrase ‘…without legal authority or in excess of authority’ was
included in the definition of computer related fraud in section 12(1) above. For example,
one may be constrained in thinking up cases where causing loss of property to another by
altering, erasing, inputting or suppressing data could be done with legal authority or in
excess of authority, except perhaps for the purposes of investigation by law enforcement.
The section would perhaps be clearer if the offence is defined with reference to mental
elements such as knowingly or intentionally or recklessly causing loss of property to another.
Exceptions may then be limited to use by law enforcement or protection of national security
if this was intended.
Second, by stating in section 12(2) that reliance must be placed by the recipient or another
person on the electronic message, the bill merely restates the position of the extant criminal
law. In other words, the fraudulent electronic messages must be sent to a recipient who must
have suffered damage or loss by reliance on it. On account of the peculiarities of phishing
mails and the dangers they pose to information systems, one would have expected the bill to
criminalise the very act of sending fraudulent/phishing mails. Like the AFF Act therefore,
the implications of the provision is that the law will always look to find results such as the
commission of actual fraud.
To illustrate this point, if a person sends a mail purporting to be from a bank requesting for
the account details of the recipient or asking that money be transferred by the recipient to
him or any other person, the effect of the provision (of section 12(2) will be that no offence
has been committed unless and until the recipient responds to the bait and losses money in
151 s 12 Cybercrime Bill 2014 (emphasis added).
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consequence. More fundamentally, unlike the express provisions of the Fraud Act,
152
the
provisions imply that the fraudulent electronic messages must be addressed to a human
recipient not a machine. The difficulties inherent in this approach have been discussed
above and need not be repeated here. However, it is necessary to note that separation of
digital identity of things from that of humans would facilitate legal recognition that things
like computers can also be deceived. As will be argued later in chapter five, such
distinctions would also considerably abridge the needlessly infinite category of personal
information. For the purpose of the arguments here, it is important to note that the inference
is that the new provisions in the cybercrime bill are not sufficiently precise to cause a shift
in the approach the courts are likely to take to phishing scams and computer fraud.
4.4 Spamming, Malware Distribution and Modification and
Damage of Computer Programs
Spamming and malware distribution are examples of exclusively technology crimes because
they cannot be committed independently of computers and networks systems. There are
therefore understandably no provisions in existing criminal legislation dealing with this area.
Under section 8 of the Cybercrime Bill, any direct or indirect act without authority and with
intent to cause unauthorised modification to any data held in a computer or network is an
offence. Also, any damage, deterioration, alteration, or suppression of data including
transfer of data without authority is an offence. Both offences are punishable with 3years
imprisonment or 7million Naira fine or both.
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For the purposes of the section, a
modification is defined as follows:
A modification of any data held in any computer system or network takes place
where, by the operation of any function of the computer, computer system or
network concerned any-
(i) program or data held in it is altered or erased;
(ii) program or data is added to or removed from any program or data held in it;
or
152 See Fraud Act 2006 s 2 (5).
153 s 8(1), (2) Cybercrime Bill 2014.
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(iii) act occurs which impairs the normal operation of any computer, computer
system or network concerned.
154
Damage in the context of the law means impairment to the integrity or availability of data
program, system or information.
155
Section 9 of the Bill creates the offence of system
interference. This consists of activities similar to section 8 above or any other form of
interference in the computer system, which prevents the computer system or any part of the
system, from functioning in accordance with its intended purpose. Such interfere attracts
imprisonment of not less than 2years or 5million naira fine or both.
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While it is not specifically stated, the provisions above may be extended to modifications,
damage or interference caused by spamming, and denial of service attacks. Section 9 in
particular may apply to spamming to the extent that spam mails interfere with computer
systems without causing modifications or any of the consequences prescribed by section 8.
Also, if spam disguises malicious software, an offence would be committed. Section 10(5)
provides that using automated means or device or computer program or software to retrieve,
collect, or store passwords, access codes or other means of gaining access into a program,
data or database held in a computer system is an offence. The offence attracts imprisonment
of not less than five years or a fine not less than 10million naira or both.157
As the above provisions show, bare spamming is not an offence unless it also interferes with
the functioning of the system or is disguised as malware to collect or harvest identity
information. On the one hand, this may be a good approach considering that spamming may
raise arguments similar to those considered under hacking above. In other words, one may
need to justify the offence by evaluating its harmfulness. 158 This is more so because spam
may originate not only from criminals but also legitimate businesses and to that extent may
constitute abusive market practices rather than a crime. On the other hand, because
fraudulent or phishing mails often originate as spam, arguments justifying the
criminalisation of phishing made above apply with equal force. One way to resolve the
conflict is to regulate ‘legitimate spamming’ through data protection laws which define
organisations obligations with respect to the processing of personal data.
154 ibid s 8(3).
155 ibid s 42.
156 ibid s 9.
157 ibid s 10(5).
158 see previous notes in 4.2.3.1 Access without Authority (Basic Hacking Offence) p 97 at
101.
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Finally to address the threat posed by malware, the cybercrime bill criminalises the unlawful
development, production, possession, sale, distribution, or otherwise propagating malware,
exploit software and other tools designed to overcome the security of computer systems.
159
Disclosing passwords, access codes or other means of gaining access to a program or data in
a computer or network knowingly or without authority are also offences under the bill.
160
Apart from their specific relevance in the context of controlling fraud on e-payment
platforms, these latter provisions are also helpful in undermining the distinctions between
computer and cybercrimes. While not expressly directed at insiders for example, section
10(3) captures the activities of insiders who may abuse their positions to access password,
access codes and similar identifying information. In effect, the provisions bring even such
insider activities within the ambit of cybercrimes rather than restricting them to computer
crimes.
4.5 Identity Theft and Identity Fraud under the Criminal Code Act
and the Cybercrime Bill
Putting the problem of identity theft in e-payment systems in perspective, Schreft
noted as follows:
Identity theft is profitable precisely because today’s economy is information
dependent. Information flows where cash once changed hands at the point of
sale. False information is the equivalent of counterfeit currency or stolen and
forged checks. It is no wonder that identity theft is a problem of the modern
payment system.
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Chapter three discussed the notion of identity and noted that hacking, phishing and malware
propagation are used by criminals to target identity or personal information. It was argued
further in the chapter that the successful prosecution of the activities often result in identity
theft and identity fraud. However, before considering the position of the criminal law on
identity crimes, it is necessary to highlight the conceptual differences between identity theft
and identity fraud as they tend to be used interchangeably or defined one in lieu of the other.
As an example, the OECD defines identity theft as occurring ‘when a party acquires,
transfers, possesses, or uses personal information of a natural or legal person in an
unauthorised manner, with the intent to commit, or in connection with, fraud or other
159 See s 10(1), (5) Cybercrime Bill 2014.
160 ibid s 10(3).
161 Stacey L. Schreft, ‘Risks of Identity theft: Can the Market Protect the Payment System?
(2007) Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review Fourth Quarterly 5, 21.
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crimes’.162 This definition is not particularly apt as it combines the elements of two separate
conducts. One is the unlawful obtaining of personal information and the other is the
subsequent misuse of that information. The first conduct which may be described as the
‘true identity theft’,163 includes the exposure of another’s personal information without
explicit permission 164 or ‘any impersonation of a specific individual.’ 165 The second
conduct, identity fraud, is the unauthorised use of another’s personal information to achieve
financial gain.’166
Therefore, as the British Home Office correctly defines it, identity theft is ‘the act whereby
someone obtains sufficient information about an identity to facilitate identity fraud (“ID
fraud”) irrespective of whether, in the case of an individual, the victim is alive or dead.”167
This definition is useful in two ways. One, it shows, as the OECD itself pointed out, that
identity theft is a part of a larger chain of wrong-doing.168 Two, it confirms that although it
may be preparatory or preliminary to the commission of identity fraud, identity theft carries
no implication of intention to commit or actual commission of identity fraud. The explicit
suggestion is that identifying information be in sufficient proportion to be capable of
facilitating identity fraud whether or not fraud subsequently occurs.
Neither identity theft nor identity fraud was specifically mentioned under the Nigeria law.
However, theft or stealing is a crime. Under section 383(1) of the Criminal Code Act, ‘A
person who fraudulently takes anything capable of being stolen, or fraudulently converts to
his own use or to the use of any other person anything capable of being stolen, is said to
steal that thing. Section 383(2), provides additionally that a person who takes or converts
anything capable of being stolen is deemed to do so fraudulently if he does so with intent,
inter-alia,
169
to permanently deprive the owner or any person who has any special property
in the thing of the property.
170
Generally, "property" includes everything, animate or
162 OECD, Online Identity Theft (OECD 2009), 16.




165 Lynn M. LoPucki, ‘Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem’ (2001-
2002) 80 Tex L Rev 89, 90.
166 ibid.
167Home Office Identity Fraud Steering Committee (2006)
<http://www.bournemouthcrimeprevention.co.uk/download/printableversion.pdf>accessed
11/08/2012.
168 OECD, Online Identity Theft (n 162).
169 s 383(2)(c)-(f) Criminal Code Act.
170 ibid s 383(2)(a)-(b).
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inanimate, capable of or being the subject of ownership.’
171
Correspondingly, a thing
capable of being stolen is every inanimate thing whatever which is the property of any
person, and which is movable or capable of being made movable.
172
For the purpose of the
offence, it is immaterial that the thing is made movable in order to steal it,
173
but a person
shall not be deemed to take a thing unless he moves the thing or causes it to move.
174
Physical objects, animals and other intangible property such as a thing in action are capable
of being stolen, whereas land is not capable of being the object of theft.
175
The elements of
a theft offence are therefore ownership, fraudulent conversion, movability and indeed
moving the property, as well as intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property or
the thing in the property stolen.
176
In creating an offence referred to as ‘personation’, the Criminal Code Act criminalises the
impersonation of another by misrepresenting one’s identity with intent to fraud. Section 484
of the Act provides, ‘Any person, who, with intent to defraud any person, falsely represents
himself to be some other person, living or dead, is guilty of a felony’.177 While it is possible
to argue that based on this later provision, identity fraud is criminalised in Nigeria, there is
some grey area with respect to identity theft. The question which must be asked here is one
which pervades the literature.
178
That is, given the provisions of the relevant law, in this case,
the Nigerian Criminal Code, can information (and by extension personal information) be the
subject matter of theft?
The Nigerian Courts have not decided this question, but it has been raised and considered by
the courts in England. In Oxford v Moss,
179
the court had to interpret sections 1 and 4 of the
Theft Act in relation to the alleged theft of confidential information. Under section 1, ‘A
person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the
intention of permanently depriving the other of it’.180 Section 4(1) provides that “Property”
includes money and all other property, real or personal, including things in action and other
171 ibid s 1(8).
172 ibid s 382.
173 ibid.
174 ibid s 383(6)
175 ibid s 382.
176 See eg FRN v Yaro (2012) 3 SCNJ 236-237.
177 s 484 Criminal Code Act (emphasis).
178 See eg Jonathan Clough, ‘Data Theft? Cybercrime and the Increasing Criminalisation of
Access to Data’ (2011) 22(1-2) Criminal Law Forum 145.
179 (1979) 68 Cr App R 183.
180 See Theft Act (UK) 1968 s 1.
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intangible property.’ The facts of the case are briefly that the defendant while a student at a
university dishonestly took physical possession of a proof examination question paper. He
returned the paper after reading it. He was charged with theft of intangible property, that is,
the confidential information on the proof examination question paper, contrary to sections 1
and 4 of Theft Act. The court acquitted the defendant on grounds that confidential
information did not fall within the meaning of intangible property under section 4(1) of the
Theft Act. According to the court, confidence consisted in the right to control the
publication of the proof paper and was a right over property other than a form of intangible
property.
181
Against the background of the above decision and considering the position of the Nigerian
law on the elements of the theft offence, one may speculate on the likely outcome of a
charge of information theft in Nigeria. In the first place, it is unclear whether courts in
Nigeria will define intangible property to include information.182 However, even if it is
assumed that information is (intangible) property, there are other elements of the offence to
be considered. The courts have suggested for example that ownership is crucial to a
conviction for theft. According to the Supreme Court;
Ownership is a most vital and indispensable essential or ingredient of the
offence of stealing. ... It is the baseline of the offence of stealing. [Therefore,]
Before an accused could be convicted of the offence of stealing property, there
must be evidence that the property is owned by a person, the person could be a
natural person or an artificial person…
183
It may seem an obvious answer that the owner of personal information is the person to
whom the information relates. As McNally argues, identity theft victimises the owner of the
identity, whereas the victims of identity fraud are entities or organisations such as banks and
credit card issuers who are fooled or deceived by the fraud. 184 Accordingly, the victim of
the theft is also the owner of the information. However, under the Nigerian Criminal Code,
a person having possession or special interest in the property stolen has the rights of
ownership.
185
In effect, personal information on proprietary computers and networks may
also be deemed to be the property of organisations. It would therefore seem that along with
181 Oxford v Moss (1979) 68 Cr App R 183, 185.
182 See previous notes in 4.2.2 Hacking as Damage to Property p 93.
183 Onagoruwa v The State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt 303) 86.
184 Megan M. McNally, ‘Trial by Circumstances: Is Identity Theft a Modern –Day Moral
Panic?’ (ProQuest LLC 2008) 9.
185 See s 383(2) (b) Criminal Code Act.
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resolving whether information is intangible property, the courts will also have to resolve the
question of ownership.
In addition, the law requires that inanimate things capable of being stolen must also be
movable or made movable by the thief. Conversely, in data terms, ‘theft’ may involve the
mere copying of the information rather than taking or moving. By processes of replication
and duplication, data can be ‘stolen’ even while literally, it remains unmoved. Furthermore,
even if moving could creatively be extended to include copying, (as in cases where
information is copied from hard drive to flash drive), the fact that the ‘thief’ has not
permanently deprived the owner of the information is arguably fatal to a charge of theft.
This is even more compelling when one considers that the information may be backed up.
The court in Oxford v Moss applied the same reasoning when it held that since taking of the
examination paper did not permanently deprive the owner of the intangible property, a
material element of the offence was not satisfied.
186
The Nigerian Court of Appeal has also
affirmed this position when it held that for the purpose of the theft offence, there must be an
intention to deprive the owner permanently of the property or ‘animus furundi.’
187
The conclusions may be drawn therefore, that unless the law adopts a definition which
accommodates the peculiarities of information appropriation, the theft of personal
information is a legal impossibility. It is however to be noted that in spite of the lacuna that
could exist in identity theft cases, much debate still surrounds the criminalisation or
otherwise of bare theft of identity. In England for example, there is still no separate or
specific offence of identity theft.
188
Identity theft can only be dealt with by the provision of
Fraud Act relating to false representation, or because it is a precursor to identity fraud, by
the law on criminal attempts, provided clear evidential links exist.’
189
As Finch correctly
points out, even in spite of the Fraud Act, bare theft of identity information cannot ground
criminal liability.190 Walden further argues that criminalising identity theft is problematic
because the term ‘identity theft’ is a misnomer since information itself is not generally
capable of being stolen.
191
186 See Oxford v Moss (n 181).
187 FRN v Yaro (n 176).
188 Compare Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act 18 USC 1028.
189 Ian Walden, Computer Crimes and Digital Investigations (OUP 2007) 116.
190 Emily Finch, ‘The Problem of Stolen Identity and the Internet’ in Yvonne Jewkes (ed)
Crime Online (Willan 2007) 29.
191 Walden, (n 189).
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Along similar lines, it has been argued that people do not steal but merely assume false
identities.192 Koops and Leenes argue for example that the term identity theft is misleading
as it conjures the image of victims chasing after thieves running away with their identities.
As they further argue, identity criminals do not steal identities, in reality, they use identity
as a tool to steal money.193 Therefore, since it is often difficult to establish the fact of
identity theft unless and until further (identity) crimes are committed, it seems pointless to
criminalise the bare theft of identity information. 194 The further inference here is that in the
context of harm and victimisation, identity theft is a sterile terminology. Invariably, if a
fictitious or fraudulently obtained identity is never used, then one can argue that the identity
was never stolen, even if the information was retained for future criminal use. Perhaps, also
taking this view of identity theft, the drafters of the Nigerian Cybercrime Bill refrained from
specific criminalisation of identity theft. Under the head identity theft and impersonation,
the cybercrime bill provides;
Any person who in the course of using a computer, computer system or network-
(a) knowingly obtains or possesses another person’s or entity’s identity information
with the intent to deceive or defraud, or
(b) fraudulently impersonates another entity or person, living or dead, with intent to-
(i) gain advantage for himself or another person;
(ii) obtain any property or an interest in any property;
(iii) cause disadvantage to the entity or person being impersonated or another person;
or
(iv) avoid arrest or prosecution or to obstruct, pervert or defeat the course of justice,
commits an offence and liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term of not less
than three years or a fine of not less than N7,000,000.00 or to both fine and
imprisonment. 195
Apart from its criminalisation of the theft and impersonation of the identity of entities other
than individuals, which is arguably commendable on account of its usefulness in the areas of
spoofing and website cloning,196 the proposal leaves the position of the law unchanged. In
other words, although the offence quoted above is titled identity theft and impersonation, the
192 McNally, (n 184).
193 Bert-Jaap Koops and Ronald Leenes, ‘ID Theft, ID Fraud and/or ID-Related Crime:
Definitions Matter’ (2006) 9 Datenschutz und Datensicherheit 553.
194 See eg McNally, (n 184).
195 s 13 Cybercrime Bill 2014.
196 For example, this may suggest quite correctly, that the identities of corporate
organisations could also be stolen.
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proposed law did not infact create an offence of identity theft. With its emphasis on
subsequent use such as intent to deceive or defraud, the proposed law merely re-created the
impersonation offence which already existed under the Criminal Code. The only difference
being its reference to computer systems. Consequently, even under the Cybercrime Bill,
bare theft of identity information will not constitute an offence. However, consistent with
the definition of identity theft earlier given, and earlier discussion on the risks and
justifications for hacking, as well as the analysis of the concept of theft above, the omission
to expressly criminalise identity theft may be fatal. For example, the same arguments that
‘basic hacking’ or mere unauthorised access suffices to ground criminal liability is
applicable to theft of identity information as the criminalisation of identity theft may serve
as deterrence to other identity related offences.
Furthermore, as the analysis of the theft offence above shows, if a person steals property
belonging to another, the law does not require that the item be valuable or that the thief do
specified acts concerning the property. It is sufficient merely to establish that the item
belongs to another, that it is capable of being stolen and was indeed stolen. By the same
token, if a person obtains bank details, PINs, and passwords unlawfully, fraudulently or
without authority, he must be deemed to have committed identity theft. We do not have to
look further into whether or how he intends to use the information to render him criminally
liable. The argument applies with equal force even if the identity is fictitious in the sense
that it does not belong to anyone. The analogy must be between a person who stole a gun
and another who bought a gun. In both cases, if possession is unlawful, the person who
bought a gun even for self-protection is guilty of a crime.197 Therefore, although the term
identity theft may be less apt, if a person obtains a credit card, or a passport or identity
document in a fictitious name, he must be deemed to have committed identity theft.
4.6 Administration and Enforcement under the Cybercrime Bill
Administration and enforcement are perhaps the most important aspects of cybercrime
legislation. This is particularly so because it is virtually impossible to regulate criminal
behaviour unless there is also a means to ensure the enforcement of sanctions.
198
As the
analysis above imply, the extant criminal laws in Nigeria contain no specific provisions on
cybercrime and therefore no provisions on enforcement. In spite of this position, the
197 See for example the reasoning of the US Supreme Court in State of North Carolina v
Antonio Monroe (Supreme Court of North Carolina No 153A14 of 15th April 2015).
198 Amalie M Weber, ‘The Council of Europe Convention Cybercrime’ (2003) 18(1)
Berkeley Technology Law Journal 425.
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Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) assumes the powers to investigate and
prosecute cybercrimes in Nigeria. By its own admission, however, these powers are not
specifically conferred by law, rather, the Commission acts pursuant to its general mandate to
investigate economic crimes. 199 Accordingly, neither the EFCC nor any other law
enforcement agency in Nigeria could lay exclusive claim to powers to investigate
cybercrimes.
It is notable that the Cybercrime Bill 2014 maintains the status quo. The bill did not provide
for the establishment of an implementing or enforcement agency for the law. It proposes
rather to establish a Cybercrime Advisory Council (the Council). The Council shall
comprise of a representative each of the ministries and agencies listed under the schedule to
the bill.
200
The Council shall have the power to formulate and provide general policy
guidelines for the implementation of the law. It shall also have the power to advice on
measures to prevent and combat computer-related offences, cybercrimes, threats to national
security and other cyber security related issues. The bill further provides that the Office of
the National Security Adviser (ONSA) shall be the co-ordinating body for the
administration and enforcement of the law. The Council shall meet a minimum of four times
a year presided over by the National Security Adviser (NSA).201
It is notable that the explanations provided for the above provisions on enforcement include
the need to keep the costs of enforcement low, and to facilitate the development of capacity
across the broad spectrum of law enforcement in Nigeria as well as the need to address the
“fight or battle for turf”. 202 In the sections below, it is argued that although these
explanations seem rational, they also re-enact the politics and policy inconsistencies which
have impacted on the development of the law in the area of cybercrime and cybersecurity in
Nigeria.
4.6.1 Lack of Computer Forensics Capacity in Law Enforcement
As stated above, one argument justifying decentralisation of enforcement of the proposed
cybercrime law is the need to ensure that each law enforcement agency in Nigeria develops
computer forensics capacity. Computer forensics involves the collection, preservation and
199 See s 6(b) & ss 14-18 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act Cap E1
LFN 2004; see also EFCC (Establishment) (Amendment) Bill 2010 [HB 351] C 349.
200 Under the Schedule, virtually all law enforcement agencies in Nigeria and some
ministries, and departments (22 in all) will be represented on the Council. See Schedule to
the Cybercrime Bill 2014.
201 ibid ss 25(1), 26(1) (a) –(b).
202 Policy maker 1, 2, 3.
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presentation of evidence derived from information systems in a form which complies with
the law and makes the evidence viable or admissible in court.203 It entails investigators
knowing how to identify, intercept or retrieve messages even when they have been deleted,
encrypted or hidden in a vast database.204 Therefore, on account of the technicalities and
complexities of information systems, regular law enforcement agents would require further
training not only in the technical aspects of the investigation but also on its legal, ethical and
regulatory implications. This training has cost and policy implications.
To illustrate, it appears to be accepted that there is lack of capacity in computer forensics
across the broad spectrum of law enforcement in Nigeria. 205 According to a policy maker,
due to this capacity deficiency, the Cybercrime Prosecution Unit set up in 2010 is yet to
undertake a single prosecution to date.206 As he further argues, this is because there is only a
“pocket of experts” within the law enforcement while there are virtually none within the
judiciary.207 Also according to a law enforcement agent, most computer forensic experts,
including himself, have achieved forensic expertise only through personal efforts and
personal funds.208 The suggestion here is that government has not invested in the training of
the existing “pocket of experts” so far. If this assumption is correct, then one must ask
whether, considering its cost implications, it is realistic or even reasonable to assume that
government would invest in capacity development across the broader spectrum of all law
enforcement agencies in Nigeria as anticipated by the drafters of the Cybercrime bill.
One may argue further that since computer forensics is both specialised and technical, and
most agencies already have their core speciality,209 it may be difficult to see how different
agencies could develop capacity to an efficient or proficient level to investigate and
prosecute cybercrimes. In other words, even if in theory, it is possible for every law
enforcement agency to embark on training and capacity development for investigation and
203 See US Cert, ‘Computer Forensics’ (2008) <https://www.us-
cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/forensics.pdf> accessed 01/04/2015.
204 Jerry Wegan, ‘Legal Issues in Computer Forensics’ (2004) 8(1) Proceedings of the
Academy of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues 45.
205 Although usually with the objective of shifting the responsibility for training elsewhere,
all stakeholders including law enforcement agents, IT security experts, regulators and
service providers made this observation.
206 That is as at June 2013 when the interview was conducted.
207 Policymaker 2.
208 Law enforcement 2.
209 For example, the EFCC was set up to combat economic crimes including money
laundering, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) was set up to
investigate drug trafficking and other drug related offences, the National Agency for the
Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) has as its core speciality combatting child
and people trafficking and so on.
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prosecution of cybercrimes, one could argue that this would create a “Jack of all trades”
situation where capacity exists but at superficial and incompetent levels. Perhaps for similar
reasons, lawmakers argued against the designation of the ONSA as the co-ordinating agency
for the cybercrime law during their debate of the Cybercrime Bill. As the lawmakers argued,
‘The National security Adviser is not a Minister; his office is not a Ministry or an
Institution…That is the status of the National Security Adviser. It is not an institution…that
we can confer statutory duties upon…’210 According to another lawmaker, ‘…it looks like
we are overburdening the National Security Adviser’s Office with crime prevention and
control. Therefore, we are transforming that office into something that it is not intended to
be.’211 It is remarkable that in spite of these observations, the enforcement provisions in the
bill were retained. Nevertheless, the observations underline both the perceived
incompetence and expected inefficiency of the ONSA as an advisory council in the place of
a cybersecurity agency.
Finally, in addition to lack of capacity, there also appears to be lack of consensus on
whether and when government should commence capacity development in computer
forensics. On the one hand, it was suggested that capacity development should commence
regardless of passage of a law on cybercrimes.212 On the other hand, it was argued that
capacity development in lieu of legislation is anticipatory and therefore wasteful.213 Applied
to the context of enforcement, one would argue that these positions imply that the capacity
gap would further deepen while legislation is anticipated or even that capacity development
would never commence unless a cybercrime law is passed.
4.6.2 The Politics of the “Fight for Turf”
The empirical data further suggests that decentralised approach to enforcement and
omission to create a central cybercrime or cybersecurity agency is a deliberate attempt to
address problems associated with the “fight for turf or battle for turf” among law
enforcement agencies in Nigeria. Battle for turf describes ‘in-fighting’ among law
enforcement agencies who each want to be empowered to the exclusion of others to
investigate and prosecute cybercrimes. 214 The motivation for the fight is perceived
“esoterism” of cybercrime and expectations of government funding for any agency
210 Senate Hansard, vol 1 No 27 of Thursday 23rd October 2014, 17.
211 ibid.
212Policy maker 1, 2.
213 Law enforcement 3.
214 Policy maker 2, policy maker 1 also refers to the fight for turf as “agency ego”.
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mandated to enforce the cybercrime law.215 On account of the fight for turf, the success of a
cybercrime bill passing into law depends on whether it purports to confer implementation
and enforcement powers on certain agencies to the exclusion of others. Invariably, if the
agencies involved in the fight believe a proposal for law fails to take account of their
interests, they “lobby” law and policy makers so that the bill is abandoned as early in the
law-making process as possible.216
Therefore, by refraining from designating an implementing agency, the Cybercrime bill
2014 aims to eliminate the fight for turf. In other words, since all law enforcement agencies
would have equal powers to implement the law, none could claim it as its exclusive reserve
and none could allege it was excluded. While this approach appears logical, the logic is
undermined by the fact that the approach fails to take account of the rivalry which may
result when respective agencies implement the same the law. For example, different
agencies may withhold critical intelligence information on the basis that a particular aspect
of cybersecurity is also their turf. The critical point therefore is that the enforcement
provisions in the law and justifications for the provisions overlook the cost implications of
computer forensics trainings and the technical nature of cybercrime investigations, as well
as the ‘politics’ (of turf) which have inhibited the development of the law in the first place.
Conclusion
The foregoing analyses demonstrate that the Nigerian criminal law is inadequate to address
cybercrimes that threaten e-payment systems whether they are crimes using the computer or
crimes of computer misuse. The analyses of specific cases also show that the courts in
Nigeria have had little opportunity to test the applicability of the criminal law to cybercrime.
The arguments support the proposition that because of the unique dimensions of traditional
crimes on the internet, they need to be regulated, along with technology-specific crimes, by
separate legislation other than those dealing with conventional theft or fraud.
The examination of the provisions of the proposed law, the Cybercrime bill 2014, also
identified the specific arears where gaps exist or where interpretational challenges may
defeat the purpose of the law. It was pointed out in particular that significant improvements
were not implemented by the proposed law regarding the criminalisation of phishing and
215 Policy maker 2.
216 There is no clear agreement on what lobby means here. It was argued by some
stakeholders that it entails offering financial and other incentives to lawmakers while the
lawmakers themselves contend that it only means convincing lawmakers to support an
ideological or policy position through arguments and representations. See for example (n
19) at p 11.
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identity related crimes on the internet. Moreover, discussions in the chapter imply that while
it is arguably useful to have legislation to punish cybercriminals, issues related to societal
tolerance of cybercrime, the jurisprudence of crime and punishment, peculiarities of internet
transactions and enforcement challenges may inhibit the effectiveness of criminal legislation.
Corresponding to the need to punish cybercriminals, there is a need to limit opportunities for
the crime in the first place. To this end, chapter five evaluates alternative legal measures to
control cybercrimes. In the context of e-payment systems and services, this involves an
examination of data protection standards and practices in sectors and organisations prone to
criminal compromise of consumer payment data.
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Chapter Five
Data Protection in Nigeria
Introduction
In chapter three, it was argued that both individuals and organisations are susceptible to
criminal attacks for information which may be used for identity fraud. While criminals
leverage social engineering tactics to obtain information from individuals, they use
technical means such as hacking to compromise computer and network systems of
payment service providers. As also argued in chapter three, hacking could result in
potentially large scale identity theft and fraud and measures such as the PCIDSS are
intended to reduce payment card fraud by improving the security of card holder data. The
final part of the chapter however pointed out that data security standards are aimed at
security breaches generally while data protection laws regulate the protection of personal
data which may be used for identity-related crimes.
This chapter examines the legal and regulatory frameworks for data protection in Nigeria.
The chapter starts with a brief examination of the privacy and security implications of data
processing activities that relate to e-payment systems. It then considers the state of the
Nigerian law on data protection generally. In this respect, it examines the provisions of the
constitution and guidelines on data protection in the banking and telecom industry. It also
examines relevant provisions of a draft law on data protection in Nigeria which is
modelled closely to Canadian Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents
Act (PIPEDA) 2000.
The chapter concludes that regulation of data processing is inadequate and ineffective in
Nigeria because law and regulation have failed to clearly articulate the nature of the
information subject to data protection. Law and regulation have also failed to set out
uniform principles on data protection and provide for enforcement measures which could
make laws effective in the multi-stakeholders’ environment of e-payment services.
5.1 Challenges of Data Protection in E-payment Systems in Nigeria
Two fundamental privacy concerns are associated with users’ information in electronic
transactions. The first relates to the ways in which the collection, processing, and use of
personal information in computer-networked environment contribute to the loss of
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individual power and autonomy.1 This view considers the effects of data processing on the
individual’s inalienable and fundamental right of privacy. Privacy in this context is viewed
as an end in itself.2 In other words, it entails a subjective privacy right or interest where a
person desires privacy irrespective of whether he is harmed by any intrusion. This
approach to privacy is essentially intuitionist.3 Abusive market practices such as direct
marketing is an example in this respect. As Clarke argues, the interest in this form of
privacy relates to the intrusion inherent in most direct marketing techniques.4 Arguably
therefore, while the activity is not inherently harmful, it is intuitively invasive, and
concerns arise regardless of harm or the absence thereof.
The second concern, which is of particular relevance to this thesis, focuses on the
detrimental effects arising from processing of personal information. This includes the
possibilities of organisational misuse and third party access.5 One may consider in this
respect, sale of consumer information by collecting or processing organisations, or theft
and fraud arising from data breaches. In effect, the possibility of misuse, theft, loss or
unauthorised access to information by sophisticated hackers raises equally fundamental
privacy issues. As noted in a British government White Paper, the principal potential
dangers posed by computerised systems to privacy include the possibility of access to
personal information by people who should not or need not have it. It also includes the
possibility of using the information for purposes or in the contexts other than for which it
was collected.6 Concerns in this respect are often associated with security of the data, and
possibilities of misuse and theft rather than simply privacy for its own sake.
Corresponding to the above, the broad issues that generate concerns in Nigeria are the
collection of personal information across multiple organisations in the private and public
sectors. In the context of e-payments, this is reflected in the multi-stakeholder and multi-
provider approach to the provision of e-payment services and the interconnection among
the organisations providing the services already discussed in chapter two. The analysis
1 See eg Oscar H Gandy, Jr. ‘Legitimate Business Interest: No End in Sight? An Inquiry
into the Status of Privacy in Cyberspace’ (1996) U.Chi. Legal F. 77.
2 See eg Richard Posner, ‘Privacy, Surveillance and the Law’ (2008) The University of
Chicago Law Review 245.
3 James Q. Whitman, ‘The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty’
(2004) 113 Yale Law Journal 1151, 1154-5.
4Roger Clarke, ‘Direct Marketing and Privacy’ (1998)
<http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/DirectMkting.html> accessed 21/11/2013.
5 Daniel J.Solove, ‘Identity Theft, privacy and the Architecture of Vulnerability’ (2002-
2003) 54 Hastings Law Journal 1227.
6 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Computers and Privacy (Cm 6353, 1975)
para 8.
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here further demonstrates that broader processing activities, whether proximate or
seemingly unconnected to e-payments, have implications for identity related crimes in e-
payment systems. Three separate but interrelated developments particularly contextualise
the problem. The first concerns the National Identity Management Commission’s (NIMC)
National electronic identity card system. The second relates to the Nigeria
Communications Commission (NCC) Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) registration
project, and the third is Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Bank Verification Number (BVN)
system.
5.1.1 NIMC’s Electronic National Identity Card
The National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) is the central identity
management authority in Nigeria. As part of its identity management program, the
Commission launched a general multi-purpose electronic identity card and the assignment
of National Identification Numbers (NINs). The proposed identity card will contain 13
applications (applets) and will offer PIN and fingerprints authentication, digital signature
and payment functionalities.7 The NIN shall be used mandatorily, among other things, for
opening individual and personal accounts and in all consumer credit transactions.8 The
NIMC’s value proposition for the financial services industry also includes the use of the
national e-identity card as bank card and access by financial institutions to its personal
information depository, the National Identity Database (NIDB). The NIDB would
presumably be the largest identity database in Nigeria.
The identity card project itself has been lauded as ‘one of the most sophisticated smart card
projects to date’,9 however, it raises questions about fraud and security. For example, a
national identity card enabled with-payment capabilities could contain all kinds of identity
related information. Also, considering the NIMC’s value proposition, if both the card and
the NIMC database could be accessed by different payment and non-payment
organisations, it can be argued that it would be difficult to determine whether organisations
are able to access only information necessary for the provision or delivery of specific
services or whether they can access all personal information stored on the card. It may also
7 See NIMC, ‘Facts about the National e-ID Card’ <https://www.nimc.gov.ng/?q=facts-
about-national-e-id-card>accessed 12/04/2015.
8 See ss 27, 28, 29 Nigerian Identity Management Commission Act (NIMCA) 2007.
9 See ‘NIMC Nigeria includes identity and payment on the same card, thanks to NXP
Semiconductors, MasterCard and SPS’
<http://www.prweb.com/releases/2013/11/prweb11329639.htm> accessed 13/03/2014.
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be difficult to establish whether such organisations subsequently misuse the information,
by marketing or otherwise trading in it. 10
Furthermore, since the law mandates the use of the card for offline and online
identification purposes, the increased link between offline and online identities makes
identity theft and fraud easier. As noted in chapter three, access to the card or information
on the card can facilitate identity fraud.11 Therefore, the NIMC’s identity card and central
database could provide an access point in a way which put users’ personal (financial)
information at risk of theft. In a research into the risks of a national identity database for
the UK,12 similar observations were made as follows:
The lack of constraints on the misuse of National Identity Register-derived
data once it has been obtained has serious implications…anyone who obtains
National Identity Register data is in an ideal position to produce false
documents that can be used as a starting point for “identity theft”. Far from
undermining identity-based crime, the National Identity Register could easily
facilitate it.13
5.1.2 NCC SIM Registration
The Nigerian Communication Commission (NCC) is the regulatory body for the telecom
industry in Nigeria. In 2011, the Commission launched a SIM registration exercise which
entails the collection of the names, addresses, gender, date of birth as well as the capture of
photograph and fingerprint biometric of SIM subscribers by mobile network operators
(MNOs). 14 This development is significant for two reasons. One, prior to the process, such
large volume of data about individuals have not been collected or collated in privately
operated databases. Therefore, in general terms, the attendant risks of the exercise have not
be analysed or accessed. Two, and specific to e-payments, with the introduction and
adoption of mobile banking, phone numbers have become increasingly associated with
account and other financial information. For example, in mobile payment systems, mobile
10 See observations made earlier regarding trading in personal information, see notes in (e)
Smishing/ Vishing at p 65.
11 See notes in 3.3.1 What is (Digital) Identity? p 52 particularly at 54.
12 See Identity Cards Act 2006 c 15.
13 Simon Davies, Ian Hosein & Edgar A Whitely, ‘The Identity Project; An Assessment of
the UK Identity Cards Bill and its Implications’ (The LSE Identity Project Report 2005)
196, <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/684/1/identityreport.pdf>accessed 11/04/2015.
14 See Nigerian Communications Commission’s Draft Regulations for the Registration of
All Users of Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) Cards in Nigeria 2010.
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phone numbers operate as second factor authenticator.15 In addition, banks use phone
numbers to send transaction notifications to their customers, both to alert the customers of
the most recent transactions and to reduce the incidence of fraud.16
However, in spite of the new uses of phones numbers for financial transactions and the
attendant possibilities of fraud, MNOs and banks do not attach the same importance to
phone numbers. On the one hand, MNOs seem to operate under the assumption that they
have proprietary rights over issued numbers and may re-assign telephone numbers at will
and without notice to registered subscribers. On the other hand, bankers, who are
traditionally obliged to protect their customers’ financial information, 17 regard such
information as personal. This position indicates that without legal guidance, different
views about the value of user information would lead to reduced protection across different
sectors involved in the provision of e-payment services.
An example cited by a service provider underline the problems which may arise here.
According to the provider, a mobile phone service provider had re-assigned a bank
customer’s phone number to another subscriber while he (the customer) was outside the
country, and because the number had remained inactive for 6 months. Meanwhile, the
(customer’s) bank continued to send transaction notifications on the account to the
telephone number which now ostensibly belonged to a new subscriber. The customer
complained about the possibility that the bank had been disclosing his account information
to another person and alleged that this could lead to fraud. The bank on its part insisted that
the fault (if any at all) lay with the mobile service provider which disconnected the
customer without notice.18 This case exemplifies the links between a phone number and
bank details. In the context of identity-related cybercrimes, the case highlights the threats
of SIM swap discussed in chapter three. 19
5.1.3 CBN Bank Verification Number (BVN)
The Bank Verification Number (BVN) is a relatively recent initiative of the CBN. It
requires banks to enroll their customers’ biometrics for identification purposes.
Registration for biometrics includes the capture of facial image, the 10 fingerprints and
other unique features of the individual. After registration, customers are issued BVNs. The
15 See previous notes on (a) Authenticating Technologies p 76 at 77.
16 See notes in (e) Smishing/ Vishing p 65 at 66.
17 This is often based on the recognition of the common law duty of secrecy, see for
example Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461.
18 Payment service Provider 3.
19 See notes in 3.4.4 SIM Swap Fraud p 72.
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BVN is a uniform and single identity that will be acceptable across the Nigerian financial
system as all bank accounts operated by any individual will be tied to the individual’s
unique BVN.
The approach is positive in that Nigeria is the first country to implement such a project on
a national scale to combat identity related crimes in payment systems, however, it also
raises questions about how personal information would be secured. For example,
collection of personal information by different banks implies the existence of multiple
databases with attendant security problems. As the UK Information Commissioner’s
Office observed, ‘The more databases that are set up…, the greater the risk that the
information will be lost, corrupted or misused.’20 It is arguable that considering attendant
issues of cost and size, the safeguards applied to the information would differ even across
the financial sector. Consequently, user information may become more accessible to
criminals in organisations without standard and effective safeguards.
Generally therefore, because e-payments are integrated and interconnected multi-provider
systems, the protection of consumer data must be addressed in a uniform or comprehensive
way. It is argued in the remaining part of this chapter that resolving the challenges of data
protection centre on answering three questions. One, what is the meaning and scope of the
concept of “personal information” in Nigeria. Two, are there general or uniform principles
for protecting personal data? Three, what mechanisms are in place for ensuring effective
and efficient implementation of data protection standards?
5.2 Regulation of Data Processing in Nigeria – Laws, Regulations
and Guidelines
It is important to note from the outset that Nigeria has no general law on data protection.
There are however provisions in the constitution relating to the general area of privacy and
certain aspects of information privacy. The telecommunications and banking sectors also
provide data processing guidelines for organisations in the respective sectors. A proposal
for a generally applicable data protection law, the Information Privacy and Data Protection
Bill 2013 was drafted by the Nigerian Identity Management Commission in 2013 but was
not debated by the Nigerian National Assembly. The analysis that follows examines the




5.2.1 Constitutional Provisions on Privacy Protection
As mentioned above, the Nigerian constitution contains provisions which cover the general
rights of privacy. Section 37 of the Constitution provides, ‘The privacy of citizens, their
homes, correspondence, telephone conversations and telegraphic communications is
hereby guaranteed and protected.’21 Although, the provision contains reference to specific
aspects of information privacy, that is correspondence, telephone conversations and
telegraphic communications, the constitutional provision does not cover data protection.
This assertion can be supported by highlighting the distinctions between privacy and data
protection.
5.2.1.1 Distinguishing Data protection from Privacy
Bygrave defines data protection as a set of measures (legal and non-legal) aimed at
safeguarding persons from detriment resulting from the processing of (computerised or
manual) information on them. 22 According to Kuner, ‘Data protection …is a specific
aspect of privacy that gives rights to individuals in how data identifying them or pertaining
to them are processed, and subjects such processing to a defined set of safeguards.’23 The
Committee on Data Protection described data protection as a set of legal framework aimed
at safeguarding personal data.24 From these definitions, components implicated in data
protection include privacy protection, personal data, and legal safeguard for protection.
Most legislation on data protection often establishes the links between privacy and data
protection.25 As examples, the objective of the EU Directive on Data protection was to
ensure that member states protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons,
and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data. 26
Similarly, the purpose of the proposed data protection law in Nigeria is to establish rules to
govern the processing of personal information in a manner that recognises the right of
21 s 37 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) 1999.
22 Lee Bygrave, ‘Data Protection Law: Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits’
(2002) The Hague: Kluwer Law International 23.
23 Christopher Kuner, ‘Regulation of Transborder Data Flows under Data Protection and
Privacy Law’ (OECD Digital Economy Paper No. 187 2011), 13.
24 Report of the Committee on Data Protection (Cmnd 7341, 1978) para 2.05-2.13.
25 See eg Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of the Individual with regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data (ETS no 108) 1981 (hereinafter Convention ETS
no 108); see also Council Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with regard
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data [1995] OJ
L281 (hereinafter Directive 95/46/EC).
26 See Directive 95/46/EC, art 1; see similar provisions in Convention ETS no 108, art 1.
142
privacy of individuals with respect to their personal information.
27
On account of this
relationship with privacy, it is usual for data protection to be used synonymously with
privacy.28 However, it has been noted that this near universal consensus, that privacy is
synonymous with data protection, is both misleading and questionable. 29 As Kuner
observes, although the concepts are related, they are not synonymous. 30 Hert and
Schreuders describe the concepts as ‘twins but not identical.’31
The conceptual and theoretical arguments in this area surround the notion that while data
protection is inescapably grounded in the jurisprudence of privacy, it (data protection) is
not wholly about privacy and is a concept both wider and narrower than privacy. Kuner
argues that under European law, privacy is a broader concept because it includes issues
relating to the protection of rights unrelated to data protection such as personal or physical
space, family and home life, moral integrity, honour, and reputation.32 The Committee on
Data Protection in England also puts the distinction in clear perspective when it noted;
There are aspects of privacy which have no immediate connection with the
handling of personal data in information systems, such as intrusion into the
home, power of entry and search, and embarrassing publicity in the media.
There are also aspects of data protection which have no immediate connection
with privacy. For example, the use of inaccurate or incomplete information for
taking decisions about people is properly a subject for data protection, but it
may not always raise questions of privacy.33
In other words, privacy is broader because it serves a range of other values and interests
apart from data protection.34 In contrast, the object of data protection, personal data, is
distinct and separable. The aspect of data protection which relates to privacy, rightly
referred to as data privacy by the Data Protection Commission in the UK, deals with how
the handling of personal information by information systems impacts on the privacy of the
27 See s 1 Personal information and Data Protection Bill 2013(emphasis added)
28 Kuner (n 23).
29 Lee Bygrave, ‘The Place of Privacy in Data Protection Law’ (2001) 24(1) UNSW Law
Journal, 277.
30 Kuner (n 23).
31 P de Hert and E Schreuders, ‘The Relevance of Convention 108’ (Council of Europe
Conference on Data Protection, Warsaw, 19-20 November 2001) cited in Christoper
Kuner, European Data Protection Law (2nd edn, OUP 2007) 2.
32 ibid (Kuner), 3.
33 Report of the Committee on Data Protection (Cmnd 7341, 1978) para 2.03.
34 see eg Durant v Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746.
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individual.35 Privacy in this sense clearly refers to protection from possibilities of misuse,
loss or theft of the individual’s personal information.
The distinctions between privacy and data protection underline the limits of section 37 of
the Nigerian constitution quoted above. It can be argued for example that by enumerating
specific areas of information privacy, that is, correspondence, telephone conversations and
telegraphic communication, the Nigerian constitution overlooks the plenary of information
which may require legal protection. As shown by the foregoing analysis, this includes
personal information. The foregoing discussion also demonstrates that the constitution
only articulates a general right of privacy of the individual to keep certain information
private. It does not extend to the right to regulate access to that information when it has
been disclosed. It follows therefore that unlike general rights of privacy which may be
subjective, (in that a person determines what is private to him), data protection prescribes
objective standards for protection for information categorised as personal.
The above distinction is also particularly useful because it establishes the underlying
rationale for data protection in the first place. For example, it demonstrates that individuals
seldom possess the right or ability to decline disclosure of personal information when
engaged in certain forms of transactions. In effect, the question is not so much whether
consumers should disclose personal information or whether organisations’ are able to
collect it, but whether the consumers want the particular service. 36 In view of this position,
data protection laws create corresponding obligations to regulate the use of the information
which consumers must disclose. Put more explicitly, the implementation of data protection
laws does not strictly prohibit the processing of information but rather restricts the ability
of people and organisations to gain access to information about others. Accordingly, data
protection laws decrease the chances of pervasive information collection and illegal or
unauthorised access to personal information. It does not confer a right on a person to
withhold the information altogether, and it is on this basis that data protection is referred to
as Fair Information Practices or (FIRs).37
This view of data protection is consistent with developments in technology and the
demands of economic growth. As Lord Norman aptly noted;
35 Norman Lindop, ‘Legislating for Data Privacy’ in Colin Campbell, (ed.) Data
Processing and the Law (Sweet and Maxwell 1984) 155, 157.
36 South African Law Reform Committee, Privacy and Data Protection (Paper 109 2005)
5.
37 See eg Paul M Schwartz, ‘Beyond Lessig’s Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace
Filters, Privacy Control, and Fair Information Practices’ (2000) Wis L Rev 743.
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It is the nature of modern society that the individual, in return for goods and
services and in the expectation of continued support, voluntarily gives
information about himself to those agencies and organisations who can offer
him these commodities. Often he must be aware that information will pass into
highly sophisticated networks, the existence of which and the capacity of
which may be outside his direct experience or even beyond his understanding;
the acceptability of the social transaction to the individual must be based on
the fundamental confidence which he has that the organs of society will deal
justly with him and that his relative impotence will not be exploited.38
From the foregoing, it can also be inferred that another objective of data protection is
balancing the respective interests of individuals and the requirements of legitimate
businesses with regard to personal information. The Council of Europe Convention
reinforces this notion when it enjoined member states to adopt laws which protect the
interests of data subjects (individuals whose data is being processed) while advancing
legitimate interests of businesses.39 As observed in the Convention, restrictions on flows of
personal data could cause serious disruption in important sectors of the economy, such as
banking. 40 Accordingly, to ensure efficient conduct of industry, commerce and
administration, it is necessary to reconcile the fundamental values of the respect for
privacy and the free flow of information.41
Data protection is therefore distinct form privacy not only because it encompasses interests
which are not necessarily ‘private’ but also because it creates a legal framework for
balancing individual rights to information privacy and the legitimate interests of businesses’
need to know. This distinction further underlines the limitations of organisational data
security standards and practices examined in chapter three. As noted in that chapter, data
security is served by organisational and technical measures. These measures protect data
itself irrespective of its content or the legal qualification, and are not necessarily focused
on protection of personal data. Encryption for example will protect any content whether
personal information, payment instruction or as depicted in the MItM attacks, even
criminal content.42 In contrast, Data protection laws require the standard of protection for a
specific category of information, that is, personal information. Therefore, the distinctions
38
Lindop, (n 35), 157.
39





42 See previous notes on (d) Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) p 82.
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further reinforce the notion that in Nigeria, technology is not an alternative to, but
complementary of legislation.43
5.2.2 Freedom of Information Act 2011
The Freedom of Information Act (FOI) 2011 is another law which purports to protect
personal information. The FOI protects official personal information held by public
institutions. Although the law defines personal information, the definition is narrow and
applies specifically to public authorities.44 The most outstanding provision of the law
require public institutions to deny any application for information that contains personal
and other information exempted under the law. 45 Beyond this provision, the FOI Act does
not contain specific principles for regulating data processing by public institutions to
which it applies and does not confer enforcement powers on any authority.
5.2.3 Guidelines on Data Processing in Telecom and Banking Sectors
Both the Nigerian telecommunication and banking industry provide guidelines on data
processing. Part VI of the Nigerian Communications Commission Consumer (NCC) Code
of Protection Regulations, titled “Protection of Consumer Information” sets out data
processing rules for NCC licensees.
46
Under the Regulations, NCC licensees are required
to conform to the following data protection principles;
(a) Fair and lawful collection and processing
(b) Processing for limited and identified purposes
(c) Personal data to be relevant and not excessive
(d) Personal data to be accurate
(e) Personal data not to be kept longer than necessary
(f) Processing in accordance with the Consumer’s rights
(g) Protection against improper or accidental disclosure; and
(h) Transferability of personal data to third party47
43 See further notes in 6.4 The Limits of Technology, Industry and Users in Controlling
Identity-related cybercrimes in e-payment systems in Nigeria p188.
44 See further notes below in 5.3 Meaning and Scope of Personal Information in Nigeria.
45 See s 14(1) (2) Freedom of Information Act 2011.
46 See s 35 Nigerian Communications Commission Consumer Code of Practice
Regulations (Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazettee Vol 84 No 87 of 10th July




Similarly, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Guidelines on Electronic Banking provides
that banks should protect the ‘privacy’ of the customer’s data by applying the following
principles:
(i) that customer’s personal data are used for the purpose for which they are
compiled.
(ii) consent of the customer must be sought before the Data is used
(iii) data user may request, free of cost for blocking or rectification of inaccurate
data or enforce remedy against breach of confidentiality
(iv) processing of children’s data must have the consent of the parents and there
must be verification via regular mail.
(v) strict criminal and pecuniary sanctions are imposed in the event of default.48
It is important to mention here that the two guidelines only state data processing principles
in sparse terms. For example, they contain no accompanying explanations in terms of what
the principles mean or the conditions for assessing whether organisations are in
compliance. Generally principles of data protection set the standards which organisations,
and sometimes government must comply with in processing personal data. The principles
often center on ensuring data quality, data security, and lawfulness as well as transparency
or fairness of data processing.49 In the context of identity-related crimes, principles such as
safeguard requirements will prevent unauthorised or criminal access to personal
information held by organisations. Principles such as purpose identification, lawful
processing of data and consent will also check organisations’ misuse including sale or
transfer to third parties or even accidental disclosures. The principles are therefore
fundamental when considered from the perspective that both payment service providers
and non-service providers collect large volume of user information which may be used for
identity-related cybercrimes. However, to be effective, the principles have to be clearly set
out and the rights, duties and obligations of the parties must be explained to outline
responsibility and accountability. This guidance is lacking in the industry guidelines
highlighted above.50
48 See item 3.0(d) (ii) CBN E-banking Guidelines.
49 See eg Directive 95/46/EC, see also the African Union Convention on Cybersecurity
and Personal Data Protection (African Union Instrument LC12490 (2014).
50 Compare the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998 (UK) pt I sch I & Pt II sch 1.
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In addition to the above, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the Nigerian
Communications Commission are the regulatory or enforcement authorities for the purpose
of ensuring compliance with the principles. However, apart from vague references to
penalties, there is nothing in both regulatory frameworks to suggest robust enforcement of
the industry data protection guidelines. Under the E-banking guidelines for example, it was
simply stated that, ‘Banks should protect the privacy of the customer’s data by ensuring:
strict criminal and pecuniary sanctions are imposed in the event of default.’
51
The
provision does not define the nature of the criminal sanction or the offence a person may
be charged with. The extent or limit of the pecuniary damage is also not spelt out. More
fundamentally, the provision seems to confer the right to impose sanctions on the
organisations to which the Guidelines apply rather than vesting the Regulator (CBN) with
the power. Based on the wordings of the Guidelines therefore, it is the banks that should
ensure protection and at the same time they are the ones to impose criminal and pecuniary
sanctions upon default. 52 This appears contradictory of the essence of regulation because
the effect would be to render an organisation both the defendant and the arbiter in its own
case.
Even if an alternative interpretation is applied, as for example that the bank is to apply
criminal or pecuniary sanctions against an officer (of the bank) directly guilty of the
default, the effect is the same. As already argued in chapter three, banks seldom admit to
any form of liability or breach of data. The question then is whether it is reasonable to
expect the same organisations to impose punishment or penalties on themselves. Therefore,
against the background of the wording of the regulatory guidelines alone, it is possible to
argue that there is failure of regulation in the area of data processing as far as the banking
sector is concerned.
Under the NCC Regulatory Instrument, Nigerian Communications Commission Consumer
Code of Practice Regulations, the power to regulate and impose sanctions is clearly placed
on the Regulator. The Regulations provide:
Any Licensee that contravened any of the provisions of these Regulations is in
breach thereof and is liable to such fines, sanctions or penalties, including any
penalties determined under the Nigerian Communications (Enforcement
51 Item 3.0(d), (v) CBN E-banking Guidelines.
52 ibid.
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Processes, etc.) Regulations 2005, as may be determined by the Commission
from time to time.
53
It provides further that the Commission will monitor compliance with the Code on a
regular basis and publish quarterly reports of identified breaches and the remedial action
taken with respect to such.
54
The Commission will also investigate consumer and industry
complaints regarding compliance with its data protection rules and other provisions of the
code.
55
The only offence recognised with respect to data processing is under the SIM
registration regulation of the NCC which penalises contravention of the purpose limitation
requirement.56
It is notable that regulatory powers under the NCC Consumer Code are more
comprehensive than under banking guidelines. However, it is unclear whether the
provisions are effective. For example, no evidence could be found of the NCC’s published
report on data breaches. It must therefore be assumed that it is either there has never been a
breach of this regulation or that regulatory oversight is ineffective.
5.2.4 Draft Law on Data Protection- Information Privacy and Data Protection
Bill 2013
A Bill titled Information Privacy and Data Protection Bill 2013 (hereinafter draft law)
proposes to regulate the processing of Personal Information of Individuals by organisations
other than government institutions.57 The draft law is modelled on the Canadian Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) 2000,58 It contains ten
principles of data protection and makes provisions for the establishment of a Privacy
Protection Office and the appointment of a Privacy Commissioner vested with certain
functions and powers.
59
Processing by government institutions, by individuals for domestic
purposes, and for journalistic, artistic or literary purposes are exempted from the operation
of the law.
60
Although, as noted above, the bill was never debated, and there is some doubt
53 s 9 pt I NCC Code of Practice Regulations (n 46)
54 ibid s 51 pt II.
55 See s 52 pt II Nigerian Communications Commission (Registration of Telephone
Subscribers) Regulations, 2011 (hereinafter NCC SIM Registratration Regulations).
56 ibid s 21(1).
57 See long title to the Personal Information and Data Protection Bill 2013; see also s 2(1),
(2).
58 See Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) SC 2000,
c 5 current to November 2013.
59 See sch 1 & s 4 Personal Information and Data Protection Bill 2013.
60 ibid s 2(2) (a)-(c).
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that it was ever presented to the National Assembly, its provisions offer an understanding
of the direction of law and policy in the area of data protection in Nigeria, and are referred
to as necessary in the analyses that follow.
5.3 Meaning and Scope of Personal Information in Nigeria
It was noted earlier in chapter three that the determination of what constitutes personal
information is fundamental to how and whether organisations protect specific types of
(personal) information or a broader category of information which may be classified as
identity information. 61 Personal information is therefore the central concept of data
protection. Its significance lay in its use for identification purposes and the potential
misuse for identity related crimes. However, while the terms personal data or personal
information is used frequently, and often presumptuously, its meaning is neither obvious
nor static. As Professor Kang noted, personal information is the central component of all
definitions of information privacy, yet it is the ‘the least self-explanatory’.62 In order to
argue intelligibly about how to protect personal information therefore, it is necessary to
define the concept and its scope.
5.3.1. Definitions of Personal Information under Laws and Regulations in
Nigeria
Two laws and a regulatory instrument define personal information in Nigeria. The
Freedom of Information (FOI) Act defines personal information as ‘any official
information held about an identifiable person, but does not include information that bears
on the public duties of public employees and officials.’
63
As noted above, the FOI Act is
mainly directed at information processing by public institutions and is not comprehensive.
The Nigeria Identity Management Commission (NIMC) Act defines personal information
as a person’s full name, other names by which the person is or has been known, date of
birth, place of birth, gender, address of the individual’s residence in Nigeria and address of
every other place in Nigeria where the individual has a place of residence.64 Identification
information is photographs of the individual’s head and shoulders, the individual’s
signature, fingerprints and other biometric information about the individual.65
61 See also previous notes in 3.3.1 What is (Digital) Identity? p 52 at 55.
62 Jerry Kang, ‘Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions’ (1998) 50(4) Stanford
Law Review 1193, 1206.
63 s 30(3) Freedom of Information Act 2011.
64 See second Sch para 1 Nigeria Identity Management Commission (NIMC) Act 2007.
65 ibid second Sch para 2.
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The definition adopted in a regulatory guideline by the Nigerian Communications
Commission (NCC) follows only a slightly different track. Under the NCC Regulations,
“personal information” refers to the full names (including mother’s maiden name), gender,
date of birth, residential address, nationality, state of origin, occupation and such other
personal information and contact details of subscribers specified in the Registration
Specifications.’ 66 The regulations define “Registration Specifications” as the Data
Dictionary, Guidelines on Fingerprint Quality, specifications for Digital Image Standards
and Quality, the XML Schema, Transmission protocol and the Technical Interface
specifications and such other specifications and amendments that may be made or issued
by the Commission, from time to time to guide the registration of subscribers and the
interaction of Licensees.67 In effect, personal data is very much what the NCC regards as
personal information and applies to the narrow area of telephone subscribers’ registration.
The above definitions indicate that laws and guidelines in Nigeria adopt different
approaches to defining personal information. Although, it is arguable this was intended to
reflect the types of personal information with which respective sectors or industry deals,
the differences in definitions highlight two problems. One, it suggests the delimitation of
the notion of personal information in respective sectors. Two, it implies that in sectors,
such as the banking industry, which has no definition of personal information at all, the
determination of what constitutes personal information may be left to individual
organisations. This approach produces relativity and justifies the application of different
security standards to the same information in different sectors or even within the same
sector.
Conversely, since the draft law on data protection proposes to regulate data processing in
all sectors except the public sector, it is useful to also examine its definition of personal
information. The draft law on data protection in Nigeria defines personal information as
‘… information about an identifiable individual, but does not include the name, title or
business address or telephone number of an employee of an organisation.’68 It is unclear
why the latter part of the definition ‘…but does not include the name, title or business
address or telephone number of an employee of an organisation’ was included or the
purpose it was intended to serve. This is more so since it is being proposed to remove the
66 s 1 NCC SIM Registratration Regulations, 2011.
67 ibid.
68 s 33(1) Personal Information and Data Protection Bill 2013 (emphasis added).
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same clause from the PIPEDA which the draft law models. 69 The only explanation
therefore is that the draft law included the provision simply because the PIPEDA is
phrased in similar terms.70 Notwithstanding the exclusion however, it appears that the
definition of personal information under the draft law is broader. For example, legislative
and judicial authorities in jurisdictions like the UK and Canada suggest that the correct
interpretation of “identifiable individual” is crucial to defining the categories and scope of
personal information. It is necessary to turn to these authorities to determine the meaning
and scope of ‘information about an “identifiable individual”.
5.3.1.1 Understanding the Meaning of Personal information from a
Comparative Perspective
According to the Canadian Supreme Court, the intent of the law in using the term
“identifiable individual” ‘… is to capture any information about a specific person…’
71
Also, according to the Canadian Federal Privacy Commissioner, personal information
includes any information that has even the smallest potential of being about an identifiable
individual.
72
Critiquing this position, one commentary noted that this approach justifies the
classification of all sorts of information as personal irrespective of whether or not the
information is sensitive, private, innocuous or well-known.
73
In effect, under the PIPEDA,
any information is personal information.
A similar approach to the above was taken by the EU Article 29 Working Party on Data
Protection (hereinafter WP29) in construing the notion of identifiability under EU law. 74
The EU Directive on Data Protection defines personal data as follows:
…any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data
subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or
69 see Bill C-12: An Act to Amend the Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act 19 October 2011.
70 see PIPEDA 2000, s 2(1).
71 Dagg v Canada (Minister of Finance) [1997] 2 S.C.R 403, 405.
72 See Federal Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘Annual Report to Parliament 2001-
2002’ 56 <https://www.priv.gc.ca/information/ar/02_04_10_e.pdf> accessed 12/01/2014.
73 See Kris Klein, ‘Canadian Privacy Data Protection Law and Policy for the Practitioner
(2012) International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP) Publication, 13.
74 The provisions of the EU Directive are preferred here because EU law is the reference
standard even for UK data protection law. Also, since reforms to the EU Data Protection
Law propose a regulation rather than a directive, it is anticipated that the UK law will
eventually be in complete harmonisation with EU law.
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more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural
or social identity.75
According to the WP29, the significance of the definition lay in the fact that it is
sufficiently broad to cover all information which may be linked to an individual and
instances where personal data might be at risk.76 Therefore, although the EU law provides
specific examples from which inferences may be drawn that information is personal, that is,
factors specific to a person’s physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social
identity, its position is not different to that taken by the Canadian authorities. This is
particularly so since the WP29 Opinion further noted that in order to determine whether a
person is identifiable, recourse must be taken to Recital 26 of the Directive. The Recital
provides that in order to determine whether a person is identifiable, “account should be
taken of all the means likely reasonably to be used … to identify the said person.”77 In this
respect, the WP29 asserts that all forms of information qualify as personal data unless the
possibility of identification does not exist or is negligible. 78 Personal data therefore
includes factual identifiers such as a person’s name, address, date of birth, and indirect
identifiers such as phone numbers. It also includes profile data drawn from a combination
of innocuous information,
79
and information relating to devices and objects such as IP
addresses,
80
web traffic surveillance tools including cookies, and geolocation and traffic
data.
81
The WP29 further indicated that prospective or merely speculative data can be
personal information when it noted that consideration must be given to the state of art in
technology because information which is currently unidentifiable may subsequently
become identifiable due to technological development.
82
The above implies that under EU law, identifiable information could also be any form of
information. Correspondingly, an individual is identifiable, if there is a possibility of
75 See Directive 95/46/EC, art 2(a).
76 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data (WP 136 20
June 2007) 4-5.
77 Directive 95/46/EC, recital 26.
78 Article 29 Working Party (n 76) 15.
79 ibid 14.
80 ibid; see also Article 29 Working Party, Privacy on the Internet – An Integrated EU
Approach to On-line Data Protection (WP 37 21 November 2000) 21.
81 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 13/2011 on Geolocation Services on Smart Mobile
Devices (WP 185 16 May 2011); see also Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and Council COM (2012) 11 final, art 4(1), (2) (hereinafter General Data
Protection Regulations)
82 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data (n 76) 15.
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identification even if identification is yet to occur. In effect, the scope of potentially
identifiable information is indeterminable and likely to constantly change in the
technological context. This approach to defining personal information is essentially
expansionist and is regarded as fundamental to protection particularly in view of
developing technologies.83 It is therefore possible to argue that if the interpretation of
“identifiable individual” in the Nigerian draft law follows either the Canadian or EU
approach, the result would be a broad and all inclusive definition of personal information.
The crucial question is whether this is the correct approach to interpretation. In other
words, should there be a threshold definition for personal information and what should the
threshold be? The following sections provide an answer by examining both the
expansionist approach and alternative proposals for definition of personal information.
(a) Personal information is all Information - Why not the Expansionist
Approach?
The objective of the expansionist approach to defining personal information is to protect
not only information considered personal already but also those which may become
potentially so. Its main advantage is flexibility which implies that new forms of personal
information created by new technologies could fall within its ambit. However, flexibility
also means the definition of personal information is open-ended, unstable and ambulatory.
For example, with the evolution of the ‘internet of things’, arguments now surround the
legal treatment of physical (even household) objects and the extent to which they might
constitute personal information. 84 Therefore, with developments in identification
technologies including re-identification techniques, data mining, profiling and the use of
big data as well as ubiquity brought about by cloud computing, almost any data can now
be personal.85 While the expansionist approach promotes flexibility therefore, the flip side
of the coin is that it can also produce speculations and uncertainty.
For example, additional consequences of adopting the expansionist approach include
increased administrative and compliance costs. These arise because organisations have to
protect information that is potentially but not actually identifiable. On the part of regulators,
additional cost is incurred to ensure compliance. Citing in particular information processed
83 ibid 4.
84 See Douwe Korff, ‘Comparative Study on Different Approaches to New Privacy
Challenges in Particular in the Light of Technological Developments’ (2010) EU Working
Paper No 2, 49.
85 see eg Article 29 Working Party, Statement of the WP29 on the Impact of the
Development of Big Data on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of
their Personal Data in the EU (WP 221 16 September 2014).
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by cloud service providers, Korff argues that enforcement authorities may have difficulties
establishing control over such data processing because the cloud service provider is located
in a foreign jurisdiction. 86 Therefore from the perspectives of enforcing the law, a broad
definition of personal data will entail increased administrative costs not only because it
requires protection for almost all data, but also because in spite of the costs, certain
organisations cannot be compelled to comply with the law. More crucially, the
expansionist approach appears to equate privacy protection with data protection. For
example, an all-inclusive definition of personal information creates a real risk of bringing
all information under the rubric of ‘personal’. On this point, Robinson et al argue that
enforcement and regulation of EU law is undermined by the strong links between privacy
and data protection.87 This observation is particularly relevant to Nigeria where both the
notions of data protection and privacy are relatively nascent and likely to be conflated.
The empirical data collected in the process of this research suggests that service provider
organisations in the Nigerian e-payment industry already assume that protecting personal
data also equals protecting the general privacy rights of users. As noted by some providers,
users generally exhibit bad privacy behaviour and choices. Users for example fail or are
incapable of changing default PINs, passwords, and other access codes.88 They also tend to
share personal (financial) information with friends, family and at times even with
strangers.89 This behaviour, it was argued, points both to failure to appreciate the nature of
threats in electronic transactions and a cultural bias towards disregarding certain
information as private. The conclusion therefore is that under a data protection regime, the
problem will not be so much that service providers fail to protect personal information but
that users’ behaviour is inconsistent with imposing data protection obligations on the
providers.
Citing examples of alleged bad privacy behaviour, a service provider noted that his
organisation has at various times monitored users on its ATM machines. Such observations
reveal that users would often disclose their PINs to complete strangers particularly when
they are struggling to remember the PINs. In his view, ‘If they [the customers] could trust
complete strangers and allow them [the strangers] to handle their cards and help change or
86 Douwe Korff, ‘The Use of the Internet & Related Services, Private Life & Data
Protection: Trends & Technologies, Threats & Implications’ (Council of Europe T-PD
2013) 07.
87 Neil Robinson et al, ‘Review of the European Data Protection Directive’ (Rand 2009)
14. <http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR710.html>accessed 13/05/2014.
88 Payment Service Provider 4.
89 Payment Service provider 8.
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remember their PINs, we can assume they do the same with friends and family.’90 Another
service provider stated that his organisation was also aware that users often solicit the
assistance of complete strangers either to activate their accounts or to change or input their
PINs (mostly on ATMs). As he noted, if people do this on ATMs which is relatively easier
to use, one can envisage what they will do when it comes to using the internet. His view is
that the internet is more complicated to use and less accessible than the ATM. Therefore
users are likely to give out even more damaging details such as card numbers, CVV, card
expiry date and so on just to have others help them initiate or complete transactions
online.91
Another example which appears to validate the fears of the providers relates to where a
seeming customer had attempted to retrieve a payment card which had been withheld by
the bank’s ATM because of incorrect PIN inputs. As the service provider noted, having
completed the necessary forms needed to establish the customer’s identity and satisfied
that the information provided matched those in the records of the bank, the ‘customer’ was
asked to provide his signature. However, as the provider noted, ‘… very curiously, he [the
customer] could not provide a matching signature’. 92 Upon the threat of arrest, the
‘customer’ admitted that the card belonged to his twin. According to the provider;
[To] prove to us that he had authority to use the card, right before us, he called
three other people who are privy to the account. His brother, whom he could
not reach, his brother’s wife, who confirmed she also knew the PIN but could
not remember, his own wife, who also did not remember the PIN. You do have
to ask how long this chain of trust should be, because it just goes on.
93
The above examples indicate that organisations already anticipate a regulatory breach or
failure based on their inability to regulate the behaviour of users. However, it can be argued
that this assumption is based on the lack of understanding between individual privacy rights
and behaviour and obligations which may be placed on organisations to regulate data
processing. It may also be argued that users’ privacy behaviour referred to by service
providers merely reflect cultural perceptions of privacy which, in the African context is
essentially communitarian rather than intuitionist.94 In effect, rather than representing a
90 ibid.
91 Payment service provider 4.
92 Payment service provider 6.
93 ibid.
94 Alex Boniface Makulilo, ‘Data Protection Regimes in Africa: Too Far from the
European ‘Adequacy Standard?’ (2013) 3(1) International Data Privacy Law 42.
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lack of desire for privacy, users’ behaviour may demonstrate the implicit de-emphasising of
the notion of individualism in association with privacy in the African context. This notion
is neither correct nor incorrect as cultures and individuals tend to define privacy
differently.95 Although, literature is sparse on the notion of privacy in the African context,
generally, it is conceived that Africans have less understanding of and little use for privacy.
According to Gutwick, the fact that the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights
omits a right to privacy is a vindication of this position.96 In his 2007 thesis on ‘The right to
Privacy in Nigeria’, Nwauche contends this position. He asserts that the conclusion that
Nigerians are not in need of privacy is based on a superficial assessment of our situation
and circumstances.
97
While his implicit argument was that people need and value privacy,
he supports the view only by reference to the constitutional right to privacy rather than by
specific evidence of how the need or value for privacy manifests in the Nigerian society.98
Makulilo’s exposition of the African literature on privacy however suggests that the
African culture of communism may be responsible for this perception. As he argues;
The main thrust of the literature is that privacy in Africa is undeveloped because
of the prevalence of the culture of collectivism as opposed to the Western
culture of individualism. Accordingly,…as Africans live in associations, an
individual is denied a space for claiming his/her right to privacy.
99
Also in their analysis of the South African culture of ubuntu and its relationship with
privacy, Olinger, Britz and Olivier, describe the African view of privacy as one founded on
communism rather than individualism. According to the authors, ethical decisions are
made based on the worldview that the group or community interests supersede that of the
individual. Privacy is therefore secondary to relationship building and concepts such as
95 Lee A Bygrave, ‘Privacy and Data Protection in an International Perspective’ (2010)
Stockholm Institute for Scandinavian Law 166; see also Subhajit Basu, ‘Privacy
Protection: A Tale of Two Cultures’ (2012) 6(1) Masaryk University Journal of Law and
Technology 1.
96 S Gutwirth, ‘Privacy and the Information Age’ cited in Alex Boniface Makulilo,
‘Privacy and Data Protection in Africa: A State of the Art’ (2012) 2(3) International Data
Privacy Law 163, 168.
97 E.S Nwauche, ‘The Right to Privacy in Nigeria’ (2007) 1(1) CALS Review of Nigerian
Law and Practice 64.
98 ibid.
99 Makulilo, ‘Privacy and Data Protection in Africa: A State of the Art’ (n 96) 163.
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protection of personal information are bound to be interpreted as secrecy rather than
protection in the context of such societies.
100
In context, rather than interpret the above cited user behaviours as lack of desire for
privacy, they are better understood as a different articulation of privacy interests, values
and priorities. As Bygrave argues, since concerns for privacy are uneven across cultures
and jurisdictions, the fact that many African countries lack comprehensive privacy
protection regimes is not to be taken as symptomatic of a propensity in African cultures to
place primary value of securing the interests and loyalties of the group at the expense of
the individual. He concludes that care must be taken not to paint countries and cultures into
static categories.
101
As Basu also rightly asserts;
…the existence of multiple cultures and philosophies prompts questions
regarding the appropriateness of hegemonic relations and the privileging of
one culture over another. The question is whether privacy is deemed inherently
valuable by all people or whether its value is relative to cultural differences.102
In addition to cultural specificity, it is also possible to argue that privacy is
individually relative. Therefore, as far as privacy goes, one could contend that a
person has the right to deal with his personal information however he likes. Judicial
authority and the literature support this point. To underscore this subjective notion of
privacy, the Supreme Court of Nigeria upheld a plaintiff’s right to refuse medical
treatment, a decision which ultimately led to her death. According to the court, as long
as there are no overriding state interests, the recognition of a person’s right to privacy
also entails his right to be left alone to choose any course of life.103 Concomitantly, it
can be argued that in the absence of a legal or moral duty to protect one’s personal
information, one may disclose personal information to anyone of one’s choice
including friends and family. Furthermore, because rights and duties are correlative
and inclusive, it is also possible to argue that it is infact impossible to owe such a duty
100 H.N Olinger, J.J Britz, M.S Olivier, ‘Western Cultures and Ubuntu- Influences in the
Forthcoming Data Privacy Bill’
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.117.3533>accessed
03/01/2014.
101 Bygrave, (n 95) 176.
102 Basu, (n 95) 15.
103 See Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal v Dr John Emewulu
Nicholas Okonkwo (2001) 7 NWLR Pt 711, 206, 244 para E.
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to oneself as this will also imply that one has a claim or right against himself. Many
years ago, Singer instructively observed as follows:
But it follows from this that to have a duty to oneself would be to have a right
against oneself, and this is surely nonsense. What could it mean to have a
right or a claim against oneself? (Could one sue oneself in a court of law for
return of the money one owes oneself?)104
In other words, it is to be presumed that it within a person’s right to violate or invade his
own privacy.105 As legislative and judicial authorities establish, what the law seeks to
protect is when access is unwanted or unwarranted, or where it is criminal. This position is
supported by Westin’s classic definition of privacy as ‘the claim of individuals …to
determine for themselves when, how and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others’. 106
The objectives of data protection laws were discussed earlier in this chapter. It was noted
that the laws emphasise rules to be applied by organisations when processing data. It is
therefore not so much about a person’s right not to disclose personal information but about
organisations’ duty of management and security. However, while the foregoing arguments
suggest that organisations’ assumptions about the objective of a data protection law and
how it affects individual’s rights of privacy are incorrect, they nevertheless underline the
existing biases and perceptions on data protection. It may therefore be correct to argue that
a vague and overly broad definition of personal information promoted in the expansionist
approach could aggravate the problems. It would make the determination of personal
information ad hoc and infinite and thus create uncertainty for organisations and regulators.
This position is correct in spite of the advantages of the expansionist approach in the area
of incorporating new technologies. Regarding similar concerns about the scope of
personally identifiable Information (PII) in the US, 107 Ohms correctly argues as follows:
No matter how effectively regulators follow the latest reidentification research,
folding newly identified data fields into new laws and regulations, researchers
will always find more data field types they have not yet covered. The list of
104 Marcus G Singer, ‘On Duties to Oneself’ (1959) 69(3) Ethics, 202.
105 Compare arguments by Allen, see Anita L Allen, ‘An Ethical Duty to Protect One’s
own Information Privacy’ (2014) 64(4) Alabama Law Review 845.
106 Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (Ătheneum, New York 1967) 7. 
107 The PII is the American equivalent of the European concept of personal data.
159
potential PII [personally identifiable information] will never stop growing
until it includes everything.108
Therefore, if we argue that data protection law is not equal to the protection of the general
right of privacy, it is only logical that we be clear about what data protection law protects.
The arguments below examine alternative approaches to defining personal information and
their utility in contrast to the expansionist approach.
(b) Risk of Harm based Approach to Defining Personal Information
The risk of harm based approach determines whether information is personal depending on
whether its use could cause harm. Two approaches appear to have been advocated here.
The first defines personal information progressively based on a multi-stage or multi–level
assessment of the risk of harm. The second proposes that information be defined as
personal only when the risk of harm is objectively assessed rather than subjectively
determined.
i. Risk of Harm as a Multi-stage Process
Following the first approach, Hon, Millard and Walden suggest that given the complex
technology environment, a two-stage technologically-neutral, accountability-based
approach to address privacy concerns in the context of personal data protection should be
adopted.109 The first stage is based on a risk of identification. At this stage, it is proposed
that appropriate technical and organisational measures should be taken to minimise the risk
of identification. It is therefore only if the resulting risk remains sufficiently high that data
should be considered personal. The second stage proceeds to assess the risk of harm
identified in the first stage and its likely severity. If sufficiently severe, appropriate
measures must be taken, regarding the personal data, with obligations being proportionate
to risks.110
Similarly, Schwartz and Solove’s reconceptualization of the concept of PII proposes a risk
of harm based approach dependent on whether information is identified or identifiable.
They argue that the problem with the expansionist approach is that it creates a continuum
of risk which equates identified information with identifiable information. To break the
108 Paul Ohm, ‘Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymisation’ (2010) 57 UCLA Law Review 1701, 1742.
109 W Kuan Hon, Christopher Millard and Ian Walden, ‘The Problem of ‘Personal Data’ in
Cloud Computing: What Information is Regulated? – The Cloud of the Unknowing’
(2011) 1(4) International Data Privacy Law 211, 214-222.
110 ibid 227-228.
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continuum, the authors suggested differential application of standards of fair information
practices (FIPs) (or data protection principles). In this respect, they identified three
categories of personal information as identified, identifiable and non-identifiable
information. Schwartz and Solove further proposed that for identified personal data, all
FIPs should apply, because this data already relates to a known individual and carries a
higher risk of harm. For identifiable information, only the core principles of FIPs
particularly data quality, data security and transparency should apply.111 This is because
identifiable information is yet to relate to a specific individual and may never do so. No
FIPs should apply to non-identifiable information because they are not relatable to any
person taking into account all means likely to be used for identification.
112
The above proposals are persuasive but are generally complex. They are persuasive
because in contrast to the disconnected notion of identifiability adopted by the draft law
and promoted in the expansionist approach, they take cognisance of real risk of
identification as well as the notion and possibility of harm resulting from the identification
process. The complexity however derives from the multi-stage or multi-level assessment
and application proposed by the authors. For example Schwartz and Solove propose a
model which means information which was at first unidentifiable may later become
identifiable. Once identifiable, the information triggers the application of all FIPs.
113
This
makes it difficult to see how the scope of the concept can be narrowed even by
reconceptualising personal information. Arguably, it simply produces a circular process
where unidentifiable information becomes identifiable at some point in time. This in turn
produces uncertainty around personal information similar to the expansionist approach.
The same argument applies to the proposal made by Hon et al to first minimise
identification and then apply data processing rules proportionate to the risk. One can argue
for instance that developments in re-identification and aggregation technologies suggest
that even when data is de-identified, a subject could subsequently become identifiable or
identified.114 In both proposals, the application of data processing rules proportionate to
the risks results in different levels of protection for personal information. Indeed, Schwartz
and Solove admit that at its best, their approach produces different levels of safeguard for
111 Paul M. Schwartz and Daniel J. Solove, ‘The PII problem: Privacy and a new concept




114 see eg Article 29 Working Party, Statement of the WP29 on the Impact of the
Development of Big Data (n 85).
161
different categories of data. 115 Significantly therefore, for nascent data processing
regulatory environments like Nigeria, the proposal may be complex to apply. For example,
since the proposal will translate into applying different rules to different categories of
personal information and even to the organisations processing the data, it can also create
confusion and inconsistencies in the application of data processing principles.
ii. Objective Risk of Harm –The Purposive approach
Gratton, 116 Cate117 and Calo118offer alternative views based on the identification of an
objective risk of harm. Similar to Millard and Walden, the authors argue that to establish
that information is personal, it is useful to query the nature of harmful consequences
arising from the use of such information. They however go further to suggest that it is
equally important to determine whether such harmful consequences are the focus of data
protection laws. In this respect, Calo distinguished between subjective and objective
privacy harms. He conceived subjective privacy harm as unwanted perception of
observation. Subjective harm denotes the degree of antipathy which an individual feels
towards being observed and may result in mental, emotional or psychological distress. This
harm is subjective in the sense that it is internal to the person being harmed.
119
According
to Calo, the key requirement in subjective privacy harm is that observation is unwanted. To
demonstrate this, he argues that when a person himself publicises personal information or
understands and agrees to its use, he does not invoke the sense of violation or harm.
However, a person feels violated if the same information was collected by surreptitious
means.120 Conversely, Calo argues that objective privacy harm is the unanticipated or
coerced use of information concerning a person against that person. To constitute objective
privacy harm, information use must be unanticipated.
121
Objective categories of privacy
harm are therefore negative and external actions justified by reference to personal
information. Examples include the unanticipated sale of a user’s information that results in
spam, or exploitation for crimes such as identity theft.122 Cate correctly associates the
115 Schwartz and Solove, (n 111) 1877.
116 Eloise Gratton, ‘If Personal Information is Privacy Gatekeeper, then Risk of Harm is
the Key: A Proposed Method for determining what Counts as Personal Information (2013)
24(1) Albany Law Journal of Science and Technology 1.
117 Fred H Cate, ‘The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles’ (2006)
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1156972> accessed 05/10/2014.






harmful consequences here not with the concept of individual control but with the need to
protect individuals from uses of information which are unfair or harmful in a tangible or
objective way.123
Following a similar track, Gratton argues that the categorisation of information as personal
must coincide with the ultimate purpose of data protection laws. As she observes, the
legislative intent behind data protection laws is protecting the privacy of individuals from
harmful consequences which may arise from organisational processing of personal
information. This is the purposive rule of interpretation, which examines the aims of the
drafters of a law and the objective underlying the legislation. Therefore, particular types of
data handling activities must carry an underlying risk of harm which is objective rather
than subjective.
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As Gratton, argues, being under surveillance or dignitary harm are
examples of harm which could fall under the subjective category. 125 However, harms
including financial, economic or physical harm other than distress would be objective
harms which are the proper concerns of data protection legislation. As an example
therefore, if financial information is released by or stolen from banks, it can lead to
objective harms such as fraud or identity theft.126 As a further example therefore, it can be
argued that while opinions may differ on how people feel about being monitored by closed
circuit television (CCTV), virtually everyone would be apprehensive of possible uses of
their information if their bank was hacked.
Based on the foregoing arguments, it would be correct to argue that the ‘objective risks of
harm’ test provide some guidance on how best to approach the notion of identifiability and
the concept of personal information in Nigeria. For example considering the characteristics
of subjective risk of harm discussed above, and nature of information gathering and
collection, it is arguable whether the objective of data protection laws is protection from
such harms. It was noted earlier that for the purpose of the law, the question is not whether
information can be collected, invariably they can, whether contractually or surreptitiously,
therefore data protection laws do not prohibit information collection. By logical extension,
it can be argued, that the law should not also focus on the subjective risk of harm
associated with such collection. Therefore, the definition of personal information would
depend on what use or processing could cause harm rather than what uses a person merely
finds inconvenient or simply dislikes.
123 Cate, (n 117).




Moreover, even if one does not agree that the above is the objective of all data protection
laws, it could be helpful to look at objectives from the points of views of respective
jurisdictions. Along these lines, it can be argued that the definition of personal data in the
EU is more aligned to protecting ‘dignitary privacy’,
127
hence its focus on all and any
information. In contrast, other laws lay emphasis on the prevention of commercial
exploitation of privacy.
128
The APEC framework focuses on preventing harm to
individuals from the wrongful collection and misuse of their information and even
incorporates a ‘preventing harm’ principle.129 Although the draft data protection law in
Nigeria models the PIPEDA, the objectives differ. One of the objectives of the PIPEDA is
to meet the adequacy requirement under EU law. In contrast, one of the main motivations
behind the Nigerian draft law on data protection is the prevention and control of identity
related crimes. According to the Nigerian Attorney General, the bill is ‘… a demonstration
of the government in its resolve towards providing assured and sustainable identity
infrastructure … [which] will in turn give the populace a decent robust and crime free
environment.’130
Therefore, because the jurisprudence of privacy is arguably not well understood and
enshrined in Nigeria, the (objective) risk of harm based approach helps to avoid the
conflation and dilution between the concepts of data protection and privacy. It was noted
above that organisations’ perceptions of data protection tends to be that a law would be
ineffective because of users’ behaviour towards protecting their (users) privacy. From
these perspectives, less focus on broader privacy rights will encourage compliance because
organisations do not see themselves as mere custodians of abstract privacy interests but as
having a purpose, that of preventing (objective) harm which may result from misuse or
misappropriation of personal information. The objective risk of harm approach is therefore
useful both in setting the threshold for identification and in the area of enforcement and
compliance.
A final point which needs to be mentioned, in particular as it relates to determination of
personal information in financial transactions such as e-payments, is the risk of under-
inclusiveness. Based on the risk of harm approach above, it can be argued that potentially
127 Avner Levin and Mary Jo Nicholson, ‘Privacy Law in the United States, the EU and
Canada: The Allure of the Middle Ground’ (2005) University of Ottawa Law and
Technology Journal 357, 388-389.
128 See eg Preamble to APEC Privacy Framework 2005.
129 ibid Principle 1.
130 ‘Adoke lauds NIMC over bill’ <http://citizensplatform.net/2013/02/adoke-lauds-nimc-
over-bill/>accessed 17/01/2104.
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identifiable (financial) data may be left out because even objective harm can be relative to
specific processing activities or information. A way out however is to consider an
exposition of identifiability developed around the concept of contextual harms. For
example, we may ask, what the possibilities are that IP addresses can lead to identification
much less to financial harm in e-payment systems. As noted by one commentary;
[T]he nature of IP addresses means that an address can either be dynamic or
static, and in most cases addresses tend to be dynamic. This means that each
time an individual makes an online connection, the IP address would be
different from the one they used the last time they went online.131
If this observation is correct and if things have digital identities as noted in the discussion
of identities in chapter three, then the appropriation of the identity of things to individuals
is confusing and needless. Ultimately, the correct interpretation of the notion of
‘identifiability’ and the definition of personal information in Nigeria must rest on the
answers to three main questions. These are; what is the purpose of the data protection law?
What is the nature of the harm it proposes to address? Do these harms fit into the niche
area of data protection or are they better addressed by broader privacy legislation?
5.4 Challenges of Enactment, Administration and Enforcement of
Data Protection Law
The foregoing arguments show the relevance of data protection law to the protection of
personal information particularly when held in proprietary databases. The analysis
underlined the need for a general legislation which would address the crucial issue of the
scope of personal information and include a comprehensive set of data protection
principles. However, unlike the cybercrime law, proposals for data protection have been
relatively sparse. The draft bill 2013 appeared to be the first comprehensive bill on data
protection.132 The empirical data suggests that similar to the cybercrime law, there are
institutional and systemic factors which impede the passage of a data protection law and
which may affect its effectiveness. These include institutional lobby, the pervasive culture
of compliance and identity management problems.
131 Ministry of Justice, ‘Summary of Responses Calling for Evidence on Proposed Data
Protection Legislative ital-communications/data-protection-proposals-cfe/results/summary-
responses-pFramework’ (28 June 2012) 12 <https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digroposed-
data-protection-legislation.pdf>accessed 23/05//2014.
132 It is more usual to find data protection requirements inserted as small sections within
cybercrime laws. See eg s 21 Cybercrime Bill 2014.
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5.4.1 Institutional lobby against legislating on data protection
The data suggests the existence of lobby interests for and against regulation of data
processing in Nigeria. On the one hand, and in addition to service providers’ perceptions of
the role and limits of data protection law highlighted above, service provider organisations
and their regulators also appear to view data protection requirements in any new legislation
as burdensome and over-regulation.133 According to one regulator, because of differences
in industry practices, industry regulators can more effectively oversee issues relating to
data protection and already do.134 Payment service providers themselves cite compliance
with the bankers’ duty of secrecy as the basis of ‘effective’ data processing practices. In
other words, the contention here is that a general law is not required for data protection in
Nigeria. On the other hand, some stakeholders query the existence or adequacy of any
industry regulatory initiatives in the area of data protection. A policymaker observed for
example that whatever rules the telecoms and banking industry claim to apply to data
processing must be known only to the industry. He argued that consumers are seldom
aware of such rules much less be able to enforce them. The policymaker concluded that the
very idea that industry is regulating itself is suspect and more transparency is needed if
indeed data protection rules exist.135
It is arguable that the above observations in themselves cannot be taken as
representative of the position of all sectors and industry processing data. However,
further inferences of the existence of lobby interests can be drawn from the provisions
of the draft law on enforcement. For example, although the law proposes the
establishment of the office of the privacy commissioner who will be a public officer, the
powers of the commissioner are minimal. The functions of the commissioner include
monitoring and supervising compliance with the provisions of the law.136 Specifically,
the Commissioner is empowered to carry out inspection of personal data and
information systems.137 As part of the remedial procedures under the draft law, the
Commissioner may receive complaints from individuals alleging organisations’
contravention of the law or may independently initiate investigations where there are
reasonable grounds for doing so
138
The independence of the Commissioner is
guaranteed by provisions of the draft law which provides that the commissioner shall be
133 Payment Service Providers 7, 8.
134 Regulator 1.
135 Policymaker 3.
136 s 4 (4) (a) Cybercrime Bill 2014.
137 ibid s 4 (4) (e).
138 ibid s 10 (1), (2).
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immune from civil or criminal prosecutions for activities carried out in good faith
during the conduct of his duties.
139
The Commissioner is also only accountable to the
National Assembly to which he is required to render annual reports concerning the
activities of his office on the application of the Act.
140
The above provisions of the law indicate that a notable aspect of the provisions is the
independence and apparent powers of the privacy commissioner. However, these powers
are neither specific nor adequate. For example, the Commissioner has no enforcement
powers such as the powers to impose fines or penalties, or even to make orders directing
organisations to cease specific activities. The law itself omitted the creation of any offence
and failed to prescribe penalties for infractions or contraventions of the law.
141
Corresponding to the threats to personal information from data breaches, the
Commissioner does not also have the power to require mandatory reports of data breaches
or to receive such reports. The provisions can be contrasted with those under EU law.142
For example, the UK Data protection Act (DPA) vests the Information Commissioner’s
Office (ICO) with more extensive administrative and enforcement powers.143 Also, unlike
the draft law, the DPA creates a number of offences and penalties. Unlawful obtaining of
personal data whether knowingly, recklessly and without the consent of the data controller
is an offence.144 It is an offence to unlawfully obtain or to sell personal data.145 Offers to
sell or advertisement indicating that personal data is for sale is also an offence. 146
Processing of personal data without notification to the Information Commissioner, or
failure to comply with enforcement notices are further offences under the Act.147 Offences
are generally punishable with fines, and to address the perceived ineffectiveness of fines as
deterrence to contraventions of the law, proposals were made for the imposition of
custodian sentences, in particular for the DPA section 55 offences.148
The law further empowers the ICO to impose large monetary penalties (up to £500,000)
for serious breaches of the Data Protection Act. The ICO may also institute criminal
139 ibid s 23(1), (2).
140 ibid s 27(1)-(3).
141 ibid ss 14, 15, 16, 17(a)-(c).
142See Directive 95/46/EC, recital 62.
143 See Data Protection Act 1998, s 40.
144 ibid s 55(1).
145 ibid.
146 ibid ss 55(4), (5), (6).
147 ibid s 47.
148 ibid s 55A-55E; see also Justice Committee, The Functions, Powers and Resources of
the Information Commissioner (HC 2012-13 962) 13-17.
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proceedings against a person who has committed an offence under the Act and a person
found guilty of an offence may be subject to a fine up to £5,000 in the Magistrates’
Court and unlimited fines in the Crown Court. Under the proposed reform to the EU law,
breach notification and reporting to the ICO will be mandatory, and enforcement
powers would be further expanded through the establishment of the European Data
Protection Board (EDPB).
149
In view of the propensity of organisations to undermine
regulation through non-compliance discussed below, it is arguable that enforcement
powers similar to that of the UK ICO’s are a prerequisite to the effectiveness of the
proposed data protection law in Nigeria.
Based on the foregoing, it seems safe to assume that the weak approach to
administration proposed in the draft law represents a form of compromise between those
proposing soft law and hard law approaches to data protection. In effect, the fact that a
law is proposed at all is likely to appeal to policymakers and other stakeholders
canvassing for a general law. Conversely, by watering down the regulatory powers, the
law will also arguably be acceptable to service providers/organisations with inclination
for soft law or industry regulation. Invariably, inadequate enforcement powers will
simply create a situation of a “bad law is better no law” which would not significantly
improve the status quo. Nevertheless, the critical point here is that the position taken by
the law appears to support the existence of institutional lobby against a data protection
law.
5.4.2 Non-compliance with Regulation- ‘The Culture of Impunity’
Besides the challenges of lobby groups, the empirical data also suggests that implementing
data protection law in Nigeria may be affected by the pervasive culture of non-compliance
with law and regulations. According to a lawmaker and a policy maker for example,
notwithstanding the breadth of legislation, regulation of data protection would fail because
of the pervasive ‘culture of impunity’ in Nigeria.150 It is instructive to mention that this
means non-compliance is a systemic problem rather than a peculiarity of any regulatory
regime. Generally, the culture of impunity is characterised by disregard for the rule of law
including disobedience of regulatory and court orders without fear of reprisals or
punishment. Accordingly, the OECD defines systemic failure of compliance as widespread
and durable non-compliance characterised by failures of public governance that devalue
149 See General Data Protection Regulation, arts 31-32.
150 Lawmaker 3, Policymaker 2.
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regulatory instruments. 151 Ultimately, systemic non-compliance breaks down the
credibility of government and governance under the rule of law, and creates unnecessary
costs through fruitless administration and implementation. 152 It also leads to the
postponement of the achievement of policy objectives and erodes confidence in the use of
the regulation, the rule of law, and government in general. The cumulative effect of non-
compliance is to undermine the efficacy of any legal or regulatory instrument.153
As noted above, non-compliance is a systemic problem of regulatory mechanisms in
Nigeria. However, it is possible to argue that these are generally aided by ineffective
regulatory oversight. The implications of lack of enforcement powers discussed above
support this view. In addition, and in the particular context of the draft data protection law,
perceptions that regulation is unfair may also exacerbate the problems of non-compliance.
To illustrate, it was noted in chapter three that personal information used for identity
related fraud need not be obtained exclusively from financial institutions’ databases. They
can be obtained from different databases including non-financial and government owned
databases.154 In recognition of this threat, data protection laws often require compliance
with data protection principles by both public and private sector organisations.155 This is
arguably good law and good practice. However, under the draft law on data protection in
Nigeria, government institutions’ are exempted from the operation of the law. The draft
law provides quite unequivocally that ‘This Act does not apply to any government
institution.’156
There are two possible bases for this exemption. The first is that similar to the Canadian
PIPEDA which it copies, the draft law exempts government institutions because they are
already regulated by other legislation. Even if this explanation is correct, it would still
mean data processing by public institutions remain largely unregulated. As noted earlier in
this chapter, the Freedom of Information Act is inadequate regarding public sector data
processing.
157
The alternative explanation is that the law is a reflection of the lack of
political will to subject government and its institutions to regulation and accountability.





154 See notes in 3.3.2.1 Hacking (Unauthorised/Illegal Access to computer Systems) p 56
at 59.
155 See eg definition of data and data controller under the Data Protection Act 1998 Act s 1.
156 s 2(2)(a) Personal Information and Data Protection Bill 2013.
157 See notes above at p 145.
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This explanation is particularly persuasive. For example, the draft law was proposed by the
Nigeria Identity Management Commission (NIMC), a government institution, however,
the same law proposes to exempt government institutions, ostensibly including the NIMC
itself, from its operation.
On both legal and ethical grounds, the exemption of government institutions may seem
unfair to private organisations that would be required to comply with the law. On ethical
grounds, it could be deemed unfair for the law to exempt the NIMC, which has the
potential to be the largest collector of personal information in Nigeria, while subjecting
smaller organisations to regulation.158 According to research, if people feel they are treated
unfairly by the government or a regulatory agency, they will often respond by refusing to
comply with regulatory requirements. Conversely, people who believe they have been or
will be dealt with fairly by a regulatory system are more likely to comply with its
requirements, whatever they are. 159 The exemption of government organisations may
therefore underline unequal power relations which may promote perceptions of oppression.
On legal grounds, the exemption suggests inequity in the application of the law which may
have consequences for the liability structure in the payment industry. For example,
payment service provider organisations may justifiably argue that data breaches originate
from government organisations that also collect personal information but without
observing the principles of data protection. This may lead to shifting liability for fraud
towards such organisations which could then escape any liability on grounds that they are
not subject to law.
It is important to mention that the above is not intended to undermine the attendant
problems of non-compliance with regulatory regimes in Nigeria but simply to underline
the factors which promote non-compliance. In the particular context of the draft data
protection law, the creation of different standards for private and public organisations
means the law itself invariably promotes non-compliance.
5.4.3 Challenges of Identity Management
Lack of credible identity management systems is perhaps the most significant basis for
questioning the enforceability of a data protection regime in Nigeria. To underline the
importance of identity management to data protection, one respondent explained it by
158 See notes above at p 137.
159 See OECD, ‘Reducing the Risk of Failure: Challenges for Regulatory Compliance’ (n
151) 19.
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analogy derived from local folklore. 160 According to the story, a village elder once had a
calabash
161
which he had engraved for identification and distinction. The calabash was
later stolen or misplaced. Unperturbed, the elder boasted to his friends that he would
readily find the calabash because he had a mark on it. One of his friends however pointed
out that this logic was defective and the reverse was actually the case. In effect, until he
(the village elder) finds the calabash, he cannot find the mark on it. The allegory is often
captured by the saying, ‘igba sonu, o ni o sami si, sebi ti o ba ri igba ni o ma ri amin’.
Literally this translates, ‘the calabash is lost and you boast that you have an identifying
mark on it, is it not when you find the calabash that you will find the mark?’ The moral is
quite straightforward, that is, unless there is an independent means of finding the calabash,
insisting on the mark as an identifier is illusory.
Translated into identity management and data protection contexts, the above analogy
means that merely having a data protection law provides scant protection unless the law is
also supported by credible identity management systems. Stated simply, there is misplaced
confidence in the identification process, which means that authentication becomes
problematic. Identity management is crucial in two aspects here. One, it helps to establish
that individuals are who they say they are. Two, it ensures that criminals who use stolen
identities can themselves be identified as fraudsters.162 Therefore, data protection is like
the ‘mark’ which represents the protection of personal information but which is limited in
utility until we find the ‘calabash’, a viable identity management system, from which we
can verify and authenticate identities. In essence if X says he is Y, it is difficult to disprove
it unless the system is dependable in terms of its identity records on X and Y. If it is
otherwise, organisations may be protecting ‘fictitious, forged or stolen identities.
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If this is a correct assessment of the problem, then the underlying question is whether or
not there is provision for a unique identification mechanism for individuals in Nigeria. It
was noted earlier in this chapter that the Nigeria Identity Management Commission (NIMC)
is the central identity management authority in Nigeria. It is relevant here to further
highlight some of NIMC’s value proposition for the system generally and e-payments in
particular. Overall, the NIMC’s identity infrastructure, the Nigerian Identity Database
160 IT security expert 1.
161The calabash is a product of the gourd plant valued in the African culture for its
versatility including use by men for sharing and drinking local wine.
162 See notes in chapter three which demonstrated that fraudsters have successfully applied
for payment cards on other people’s account or under false or fictious names. See notes in
3.4.1 Account Takeover Fraud p 70.
163 IT security expert 1.
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(NIDB) serves as a repository of personal information for identification and verification
purposes. It is therefore intended to facilitate government and private sector access to
common identity needs. For payment systems, the database serves as the basis of
implementing the Know Your Customer (KYC) requirement for financial institutions. The
national identity card which also operates as bank card combines a person’s real world
identities with his digital attributes and incorporates three authentication protocols. That is,
who a person is (biometrics), what he knows, (PIN) and what he has (the ID card).
Therefore, it satisfies the multi-factor authentication requirement for online financial
services and may function as a single sign-on for multiple applications. Invariably, it also
avoids the proliferation of payment cards, passwords and PINs. 164
Based on the above discussion, one could argue that since the national identity card
discussed earlier in this chapter incorporates individuals’ unique identity information
particularly their biometrics, it could serve as a unique identification token.
Correspondingly, the NIMC’s identity database as a central authority for verification of
identities operates as a form of Federated Identity Management (FIM) system.
165
This
position would be consistent with government objectives to provide unique individual
identifier, a national database, and an interoperable and secure identity management
system.166 However, if one accepts that in theory, a central identity system is needed, it
will also be relevant to outline the practical challenges of such a system. To illustrate, it is
trite that the risks of centralised identity management systems correspond to its advantages,
and that the larger the identity databases, the more its susceptibilities to hacking. Therefore,
as a central identity management system, the NIMC database is already a viable resource
for attack. This problem is aggravated by the fact that government has failed so far to
harmonise multiple and parallel identity management programs in the private and public
sectors.
164 See generally National Identity Management Commission (NIMC), ‘National Identity
Management System Project Enabling Cashless Nigeria Policy of the CBN’
(2013)<https://www.nimc.gov.ng/sites/default/files/value_proposition_cashless_economy.
pdf>accessed 11/04/2015.
165 In FIM systems, businesses rely on an identification process performed, and identity
information provided by a third party, see Information and Privacy Commissioner of
Ontario, ‘The New Federated Impact Assessment (F-PIA) Building Privacy and Trust-
enabled Federation’ (2009) <https://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/F-
PIA_2.pdf.>accessed 11/04/2015.
166 See Presidential Implementation Committee on the National Identity Management
System (n 164).
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As demonstrated by earlier arguments in this chapter, different organisations, both within
the private and public sectors, implement identification programs on a need to know or ad
hoc basis. It is argued further here that although central identity management implies
increased security risks and cost, the risks are compounded by the continued existence of
parallel identity management programs. For example, similar to the NIMC’s database,
databases of personal information operated by banks under the CBN BVN program can be
subverted for identity theft and fraud. Furthermore, theft or corruption in one database may
render information in other databases unreliable. It is also quite possible to register with
different identity information on different databases. While biometrics may aid
identification in such cases, it is possible for biometrics to be replaced or otherwise
compromised on one database to render it unreliable for identification in others.167 To
underline the security complexities and cost implications of large identity databases, it was
aptly noted as follows:
Any system that supports critical security functions must be robust and resilient to
malicious attacks, because of its size and complexity, the identity system would
require security measures at a scale that will result in substantially higher
implementation and operational costs... the proposed use of the system for a
variety of purposes, and access to it from a large number of private and public
sector organisations will require unprecedented attention to security.
168
Conclusion
The analysis in this chapter outline the relevance of laws to the protection of personal
information which may be used for identity related cybercrimes. The arguments also
outline the threats posed by multi-stakeholders engagement in e-payments and the danger
of divergent notions of personal information. It was argued that although the Nigerian
constitution protects privacy, the constitutional provisions are inadequate to protect
personal information because the concept of personal information is both broader and
narrower than the concept of privacy. An examination of the definition of personal
information in respective sectors particularly banking and telecom also suggests that the
data protection guidelines developed by industry is inadequate. The concept of personal
167 See further notes in 6.4.1.3 Security is never “Absolute” p 192.
168 Davies, Hosein & Whitely, ‘The Identity Project; An Assessment of the UK Identity
Cards Bill and its Implications’ (2005) The LSE Identity Project Report 2005 5,
<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/684/1/identityreport.pdf>accessed 11/04/2015.
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data lacks uniform definition which precipitates the conclusion that what constitutes
personal data differs according to industry and organisation. Using the definition proposed
by the draft law, the analysis further highlight the problematic areas of the concept of
personal information, and the need for legal clarity particularly in view of unclear
conceptions about privacy and data protection in Nigeria.
The chapter concludes with the identification of the administrative and enforcement
challenges of a data protection law in Nigeria. It was argued that based on the analysis of
the empirical data, lobby interests, and widespread non-compliance could undermine the
passage and effectiveness of the law. Crucially, the analysis identified deficiencies in




Theories of Regulation in Cyberspace
Introduction
The analyses in chapters three, four, and five demonstrate that e-payment systems are yet to
be regulated by the law in Nigeria. The arguments further demonstrate that although
proposals have been made for legal regulation which would control identity-related
cybercrimes, these have not transformed into laws. Therefore, the control of identity-related
cybercrimes in e-payment systems is left to self-regulatory initiatives developed by the
financial industry. It is argued in this chapter that self-regulation is both ineffective and
inefficient in controlling identity-related cybercrimes. In order to underpin the primacy of
legal regulation, this chapter introduces the theoretical frameworks that explain the
significance of laws to regulation of the internet and the activities it mediates.1
The chapter begins with a brief examination of the concept of regulation. It then considers
the cyberlibertarian and Cyberpaternalists’ theories of regulation of cyberspace as well as
Lessig’s theory of modalities of regulation. It will be argued in the chapter that Lessig’s
theory is a useful mechanism for understanding not only why legal regulation is imperative
but also how the law regulates effectively in cyberspace. Based on the literature and the
empirical data, it will also be argued that the theory is relevant for assessing the adequacy of
the payment industry’s self-regulatory mechanisms to control identity-related cybercrimes
in Nigeria. Lessig’s theory will therefore be used to explain the limits of technology and
industry self-ordering systems in the Nigerian e-payment industry. The chapter will
conclude with the exposition of how the theory translates to effective legal regulation in the
context of e-payment systems in Nigeria.
6.1 Regulation Generally
The meaning and scope of regulation is varied and contested. According to Morgan and
Yeung, ‘regulation is a phenomenon that is notoriously difficult to define with clarity and
precision, as its meaning and the scope of its inquiry are unsettled and contested.’2 It would
1 Examining the theories is consistent with the grounded theory approach in this research;
see in particular explanations on how theories elucidate the research data. See notes in 1.6
Data Analysis at p 12 particularly at 13 .
2 Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation (CUP 2007),
3.
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therefore be impossible to cover all definitions and theories of regulation in this thesis. For
the purposes of the arguments here, it is more useful to examine the narrow and broad
senses in which regulation is understood. In the narrow sense, regulation refers to
formalistic legal rules aimed at controlling the behaviour of entities or individuals. For
example, Selznick defines regulation as ‘a sustained and focused control exercised by a
public agency over activities that are valued by a community.’3 This implies regulation by
law or at least by state appointed actors with the objective that the larger society benefits. In
a broader sense, regulation is referred to as any form of behavioural control whatever its
origin. 4 This notion of regulation includes both state and non-state actors. Therefore,
according to Baldwin, Scott and Hood, a broader view of regulation would entail thinking of
regulation in three different senses. In the first sense, regulation can be thought of as a
specific set of commands which involves the promulgation of binding rules to be applied by
a body devoted to the purpose. In the second sense, regulation could be a deliberate state
influence which encompasses all state actions designed to influence business or social
behaviour. In the third sense, regulation may be understood as all forms of social and
economic influence which would include all mechanisms affecting behaviour whether they
are state based or from sources such as markets or self-regulatory mechanisms in
professions or trade. 5
The definitions above suggest that regulation could originate from formal laws made by the
state or from informal arrangements such as those derived from social norms or devised by
markets, or profession or industry. However, while formal and informal rules are both
sources of regulation, it has been argued that they have different efficiency levels in the way
they affect or modify the behaviour of the regulatory target. Lennes for instance argues that
intentionality or deliberateness is essential for adjudging whether an activity is regulatory or
not in the first place.6 In other words, to constitute effective regulation, there must be a
deliberate or conscious effort to bring about a regulatory end.7 Lennes arguments suggest
that informal regulatory initiatives are often diffuse and may lack intentionality or
deliberateness of those designed by law. This argument would be correct if as Baldwin,
3 P Selznick, ‘Focussing Organisational Research on Regulation’ cited in Anthony Ogus,
The Legal Form and Economic Theory of Regulation (Hart Publishing 2004) 1.
4 ibid.
5 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation Theory,
Strategy and Practice (2nd edn OUP 2012) 3.
6 Ronald Leenes, ‘Framing Techno-Regulation: An Exploration of State and Non-state
Regulation by Technology’ (2012) 5(2) Legisprudence Tilburg Law School Legal Studies
Research Paper Series No. 10/2012 143, 149.
7 ibid.
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Scott and Hood also opine, regulation is the deliberate supervision of private activity in the
interest of public rights, interests and welfare.8 In effect, the objective of regulation must
include the general protection of public interest rather than the narrow or sectoral interests
of a profession or industry. As to how to design such regulatory frameworks and to ensure
their legitimacy, it has been suggested that consideration must be given to their standard
setting capacity and behaviour modification attributes. Accordingly, Black defines
regulation as:
… the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others to
standards or goals with the intention of producing a broadly identified outcome
or outcomes, which may involve mechanisms of standard-setting, information
gathering and behaviour-modification.9
Black’s definition underlines the standard setting and behaviour modification nature of
regulation. Although she also argues that regulation is not necessarily confined to the state,
Black suggests that formal or legal rules are better at achieving standard setting and
modifying behaviour. Therefore, as she concludes, even when non-state actors such as
social norms or technologies influence how regulatory systems operate, and while
regulatory system might harness these towards a regulatory end, they do not in themselves
constitute regulation.10
In addition to standard setting, the notion that an activity is regulatory also indicates that
infringement of standards attracts sanctions or punishment. This, it has been argued, is also
often more noticeable in state or formal regulatory regimes. As Ogus points out, if the term
‘regulation’ is used to denote law which implements collectivist system, then it must be
taken that regulation contains the idea by a superior authority, which is the State. It therefore
has a directive function and compels individuals and groups to behave in particular ways
with threat of sanctions if they do not comply. As a public law therefore, it enforces
obligations which cannot be overreached by private agreement, because the state plays a
central role in its formulation.11 Balwin, Cave and Lodge also identify legislative mandate
as the one of the five criteria which collectively constitutes the benchmark for assessing
good regulation. According to the authors, legislative mandate implies that a regulatory
framework derives authorisation from an elected legislature. A further criterion identified by
8 Baldwin, Cave and Lodge, (n 5), 3.
9 Julia Black, ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’ (2002) 27 Australian Journal of Legal
Philosophy 1, 20.
10 ibid.
11 Ogus, (n 3), 2.
177
the authors is accountability and control which underlines the need for regulators to be
properly accountable and controlled. The third criterion which must be satisfied by a good
regulatory regime is due process which presupposes support for regulation because the
procedures are fair, open and accessible. Regulatory expertise which means trusting
regulator judgement based on specialised knowledge, skills and experience was identified as
the fourth criterion. Efficiency of the regulatory regime is the final criterion for assessing
good regulation. Efficiency implies that legislative mandate of a regulatory regime is being
implemented effectively.12
If the above views of regulation are correct, then one may argue that within the framework
of a broad theory of regulation, non-state actors have regulatory roles and their activities
may constitute regulation. However, it would also be possible to argue that to be effective,
informal regulatory mechanisms initiated by non-state actors must be deliberately and
intentionally put in place for public interest purposes. One could further argue that similar to
legal regulation or regulation by the state, regulation by non-state actors must contain
clearly defined rules which set standards and attach sanctions and punishment to non-
compliance. More fundamentally, to be legitimate, good regulation must meet the criteria of
legislative mandate, accountability, and due process, expertise and efficiency set out above.
It will be argued later in this chapter that non-state regulatory actors are incapable of
meeting these criteria. However, to elucidate the concept of regulation in the context of the
internet, the following sections examine theories of regulation in cyberspace and how they
aid the understanding of the limits of industry self-regulation in the area of controlling
identity-related cybercrimes.
6.2 The Cyberlibertarian and Cyberpaternalist Theories of
Regulation in Cyberspace
The nature of the legal problems in cyberspace and how they should be regulated has
attracted diverse and contested approaches. Barlow, Post and Johnson articulate the
philosophy of the cyberlibertarian school of thought, a pervasive philosophy in the early
stages of commercial use of the internet. The fulcrum of the libertarians’ argument is that
cyberspace ought not to be regulated because regulation is impossible, futile and illegitimate.
Barlow argues that because of its transborder nature, cyberspace is inherently autonomous
and therefore manifestly unregulable. Also, because it defies attempts by sovereigns and
nationalities to govern it, Barlow declares complete independence for cyberspace and
12 Baldwin, Cave and Martin, (n 5), 25-39.
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recommends governance built on democratic negotiations among the (net) citizens. As he
asserts;
You [the government] are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty
where we gather….Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity,
movement, and context do not apply to us…we believe that from ethics,
enlightened self-interest, and the commonweal, our governance will
emerge…We must declare our virtual selves immune to your sovereignty…13
Post and Johnson make similar arguments. They contend that cyberspace is a different
environment where legal and regulatory models applicable to terrestrial activities fail. They
argue further that among other factors, this is because the internet disregards physical
location, and transactions transcend national borders. According to Post and Johnson, since
content, transactions and participants exist, ‘everywhere, nowhere in particular and only on
the Net,’14 activities on the internet cannot be mapped to individuals and jurisdictions for
regulatory purposes. Regulating cyberspace will therefore lead to conflict of law problems,
produce laws having extra-territorial effects and promote regulatory arbitrage and evasion.
15
As the authors theorise for example;
Banking and securities regulators seem likely to lose their battle to impose local
regulations on a global financial marketplace. And … face serious challenges in
seeking to intercept the electrons that transmit the kinds of consumer fraud that,
if conducted physically within the local jurisdiction, would be easier to shut
down.16
Cyberlibertarians conclude that for the internet, a bottom–up or self-regulatory model of
control built around principles of freedom and society and expressed as rules established by
the market, networks and users should be adopted. Summing up the libertarian position,
Myszeweski notes that ‘Cyberlibertarians dream of a utopian world in which the internet
allows the free market to thrive without any government intervention, communities are
bound by common beliefs and values rather than geographical location, and government
13John Perry Barlow, ‘A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace’
https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html accessed 27/06/2014.
14 David R Johnson and David Post, ‘Law and Borders -The Rise of Law in Cyberspace’




hold little if any power over the people.’17 This view of regulation corresponds to the notion
that in the broad sense, regulation involves either state or non-state actors. However, the
relevant question is whether this approach to regulation also satisfies the criteria for good
regulation. For example, to what extent are the rules deliberately and intentional put in place
for public interest and welfare?
Cyberlibertarian are criticised particularly by alternative explanations offered by the
cyberpaternalists. Stated simply, the crux of cyberpaternalist argument is that the internet as
a medium of communication or commerce places no limits on the regulatory powers of
national governments. They contend that states have a legitimate duty to protect their
citizens from harm on the internet as everywhere else.18 As Wu argues, the notion of a free
internet promoted by cyberlibertarians is deeply flawed in the first place. He contends that
much of what is considered the free internet was privately regulated from the beginning
through technology such as firewalls deployed by corporations. The idea of a free internet is
therefore largely inaccurate and illusory.19 Shapiro concurs with this view when he observed
that the internet was neither inherently democratic, nor an automatic guarantor of liberty or
fairness.20
The cyberpaternalist arguments suggest that for the internet, rules were not deliberately or
intentionally made but are inherent to the technology or architecture of cyberspace. If this
position is correct, a further and logical suggestion would be a need to moderate the self-
evolving rules to serve a regulatory end such as the protection of users of the internet. As
demonstrated above, the cyberlibertarian position excludes such moderation by the law or
the state but rather implicates the users and markets as agents of self-regulation. However,
one must ask that if the market and users ordinarily assume regulatory roles, to what extent
can they be expected to develop rules that protect their shared rather than respective
interests? Weinstock and Gillen make useful arguments regarding this question.
According to Weinstock, the libertarian concept of self-regulation is both infeasible and
undemocratic because a bottom-up approach cannot develop given the insurmountable
collective action problems online. In other words, because formulating a global norm is
17 David Myszeweski, ‘Cyberlibertarianism in the Silicon Valley’ (2003) vol xxxi(5) The
Stanford Review.
18 See eg Jack L Goldsmith, ‘Against Cyberanarchy’ (1998) 65(4) The University of
Chicago Law Review 1199.
19 Timothy Wu, ‘Cyberspace Sovereignty? – The Internet and the International System’
(1997) 10(3) Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 647, 653.
20 Andrew L Shapiro, The Control Revolution How the Internet is Putting Individuals in
Charge and Changing the World We Know (Century Foundation 1999) 14.
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difficult if not impossible, participants online cannot support their visions of self-
governance.21 Therefore, a free sovereignty in cyberspace cannot emerge at all without the
backing of the territorial liberal state. 22 More fundamentally, Weinstock contends that
because of the propensity of market to dominate in self-regulatory schemes, libertarian
notions of regulation will fail to effectively guarantee the rights of users. Conversely, liberal
states, with experiences of guaranteeing such rights offline, would be more effective at
doing the same online. He concludes that state regulation of cyberspace is necessary for the
protection of democratic ideas. As he argues, ‘[an] untrammelled cyberspace would prove
inimical to the ideals of democracy and …state regulation of cyberspace is warranted to
promote those ideals.’23
Weinstock’s correct assessment is that because of the democratic values at stake, the state
is an essential participant in formulating regulation for the internet. This argument
becomes more persuasive if one considers the limitations on users when it comes to their
abilities to either identify or formulate coherent rules to protect those rights. As Gillen
also correctly argues, the rights at stake need to be identified in the first place and
expecting user-groups to resolve the dilemma in the way cyberlibertarians suggest is
unrealistic.24 In this respect, she notes as follows:
Self-regulation mechanisms can work quite well, but only where there is a clear
context and description of the rights and obligations involved….[since] it is not
clear, how user-led cyber-democracies of their own, can create a functional and
legitimate rights enforcement mechanism,…An assertion that this will evolve
organically will not actually cause this to happen and it certainly will not cause
it to happen in a sustainable and appropriate way.25
If the above is a correct assessment of users’ ability, then it would also be correct to assert
that technology and the market are the only determinant of what rights are at stake and
how to protect them. Conversely, since market systems or self-regulation allows
individuals and groups to pursue their own welfare goals, it promotes the primacy of
sector, individual or group interests. Therefore, without legal determination of users’
21 Neil Weinstock Netanel, ‘Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal
Democratic Theory’ (2000) 88(2) California Law Review 395, 405.
22 ibid 488.
23 ibid 403.




rights and legal regulation of the market, the market can become dominant and
manipulative, and may even fail. (Legal) Regulation is therefore justified on the grounds
that it is required to produce behaviour which is consistent with the protection of users’
rights.
Finally, with specific reference to criminal activities, it is possible to argue that the utility of
libertarian arguments is relative to time and context. For example, much of the
cyberlibertarian philosophy was influenced by concerns for freedom of speech and
censorship which may result from content regulation. As Perrit argues, conventional
(libertarian) thinking about internet regulation was driven by the suggestions that freedom
of speech and the press protected by liberal democracies could only be enhanced by
freedom of the internet. Consequently, the idea of internet regulation was associated with
autocratic regimes.26 However, since commerce and its implications for privacy and fraud
was a late comer to the internet, it is also arguable that much of earlier libertarian arguments
fail to effectively evaluate the risks posed to e-commerce. This development (of e-
commerce) shows that there is as much, if not more, concern about crime online as there is
concern about liberty and freedom. Cyberlibertarians therefore miss an important point, that
is, without government oversight, cyberspace will become the haven of criminals because
neither market nor individuals have control over criminal activities in terms of jurisdiction,
arrests or prosecution or punishment. In this context, self-regulation would be no regulation
at all.
The foregoing arguments underline not only the possibility but also the imperatives of legal
regulation of the transactions and activities on the internet. However, on account of the
complex technical environment of the internet, simply conceding to legal regulation does
not explain how that regulation is to be structured or implemented. For example, with few
exceptions,27 cyberpaternists often express commitment to legal or state regulation without
outlining a modality or approach workable in the context of the internet. Consequently,
paternalists have argued that because cyberspace is not an isolated sphere for law and
regulation, it must only be understood in the context of wider principles of law and
regulation. Easterbrook contends for instance, that having a separate law on cyberspace is
26 Henry H Perrit (Jr), ‘The Internet as a Threat to Sovereignty? Thoughts on the Internet’s
Role in Strenghtening National and Global Governance’ (1998) 5 Indiana Journal of Global
Legal Studies 423.
27 See eg Joel R Reidenberg, ‘Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy
Rules through Technology’ (1997) 76(3) Texas Law Review 553; see also Lawrence Lessig,
Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books 1999).
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no different to having a ‘law of the horse’.
28
This position concedes to law but rather old
laws than new ones. Also, by their own admission, writers like Goldsmith simply set out to
demonstrate that regulation of cyberspace is feasible and legitimate, but not to argue that
such regulation is efficient or democratic.29 Therefore, having argued that law is essential to
regulation in cyberspace, it is also important to commit to an approach of how legal
regulation is to be implemented effectively. Lessig’s theory of modalities of control
provides further explanations not only for why law is an effective regulator but also on how
it regulates on the internet. The following sections summarises the main points of Lessig’s
proposal.
6.3 Lessig’s Theory of Modalities of Regulation
Lessig identifies four modalities of regulation or ‘things that regulate’ in real space. 30 These
are law, architecture, norms and market. He argues that these modalities as constraints to
behaviour in real space are transposable to cyberspace. According to Lessig, law constraints
objectively because it provides a set of commands and threatens punishment for
disobedience. As in real space therefore, the constraints of law in cyberspace is the threat of
sanctions for violations of certain rights or punishment for certain behaviours.31 Norms or
social norms also constrain, although differently from law. Lessig posits that normative
constraints are imposed through slight and sometimes forceful sanctions imposed by
members of a community on each other rather than by organised or centralised action of the
state. 32 Correspondingly, norms regulate the internet because behaviour can earn the
disapproval of other users as contravening the norm of certain online fora.33
It is important to note from the outset that while instructive, Lessig’s conception of norm
regulation is problematic. In the sense that Lessig defines them, norms are socially
constructed set of constraining rules accepted by a community of users. Norms, Lessig
argues, stops people from smoking in a private car without first asking the permission of
other passengers because there are no smoking police or smoking courts.34 In the context of
electronic transactions however, it is difficult to understand what norms can develop or how
28 Frank H Easterbrook, ‘Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse’ (1996) U. CHI. LEGAL F.
207, 207-216.
29 Goldsmith, (n 18) 1201.
30









they will operate. For example, the proposal of regulation by norms would beg the question
of how generally acceptable norms would develop in the first place. As argued above, it is
difficult if not impossible for users to identify and articulate rights which require protection
online.35 This is particularly so since the cultural specificity of norms and the relativeness of
individual choice, as well the fluidity and mobility on the internet negates the permanence
of engagements needed to sustain the development of generally acceptable norms.
According to Goldsmith, the idea of a global norm would often be unattractive as several
billion of people using the internet would not agree on regulatory norms. 36 Notably, even
Lessig could not provide specific examples of normative responses. He noted rather vaguely
that ‘Norms could be used to respond to these threats … Norms among commercial entities,
for example, could help build trust around certain privacy protective practices.’37 However
he fails to provide any clues as to how the norms will develop. Rather, he concedes that,
‘how people who need never meet can establish and enforce a rich set of social norms is a
question that will push the theories of social norm development far.’38
The observations above suggest the need for accuracy and clarity in problematising the
respective modalities of regulation. As an alternative to the contested notion of collective
norms therefore, the analysis here opts for the term ‘users’. 'Users' is a more specific term
which underlines the fact that the problem surrounds a group of people more likely to make
individual rather than collective decisions. In the particular context of e-payment systems, it
addresses the ability or inability of respective users to articulate their choices in view of the
payment instruments, processes and providers they choose. Furthermore, on account of their
susceptibilities to social engineering, users are invariably part of the problem, it is proposed
here to make them part of the solution. In other words, the term elucidates the role of users
as part of the solution within Lessig’s regulatory proposal. Murray’s observations to the
effect that users are not to be considered as passive recipients of regulatory initiatives
support this point.39
As mentioned earlier, Lessig identified the market and architecture as further modalities of
regulation. As Lessig argues, the market, as the third modality of regulation, constrains
35 See arguments made following Weinstock and Gillen above.
36 Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a borderless World
(OUP 2006) 152.
37 Lawrence Lessig, Code Version 2.0 (n 30) 223.
38 Lawrence Lessig, ‘The Zones of Cyberspace’ (1996) 48(5) Stanford Law Review1403,
1407.
39 Andrew D Murray, The Regulation of Cyberspace Control in the Online Environment
(Routledge Cavendish 2007) 51.
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through differential pricing. This is based on the fact that prices signal the point at which a
resource can be transferred from one person to another.40 The fourth modality of regulation
is the architecture of an environment which encompasses either the way things are or the
way they are made or built.41 In the context of regulation, architecture can enable or limit
interaction with the environment, but unlike the other three constraining modalities,
architecture is independent of direct human imposition, and is often automatically deployed
or self-executing.42 Correspondingly, the architecture of cyberspace is its code.43 Code is
the software and hardware that makes cyberspace what it is and includes built-in
architecture such as its foundational and operating protocols, as well as designed controls
such as encryption technology, tracking software, and access and authentication protocols
such as PINs, passwords and access codes.44 Like real space code, the code of cyberspace is
self-executing. Similar to a locked door which shuts one out irrespective of one’s wishes,
the code of cyberspace such as encryption, passwords, and access codes deny the outsider
access to confidential information. Therefore, in contrast to laws which do not punish
people for unknown offences, and norms which are widely known and accepted within
communities, code constrains without objectivity and operates whether or not the party
being constrained is aware of it.45
As Lessig further argues, because of the self-executing and independent nature of code
regulation, the application of law or legal constraints in cyberspace is inherently limited. He
notes that ‘Various “trusted systems” – permit a far more “fine –grained control over access
to and use of protected material than law permits, and can do so without the aid of the
law.”46 To that extent therefore, code has regulatory potentials similar to and analogous to
regulation by law and indirectly or metaphorically, ‘code is law’.47 However, Lessig argues,
most persuasively, that because code can control better and more effectively than law, it
may be misused particularly by the market. As a result, code may not strike the balance or
protect the various values prescribed by law and may become quite arbitrary in application.
For example, code may be used to block otherwise lawfully available access or content such
as in cases where the holder of copyright uses technology of trusted systems to inhibit fair
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use or to protect his right beyond the limits prescribed by law.48 Code could also be used to
collect personal information without the knowledge and/or consent of the user that the
information is being collected. 49 The malicious and criminal use of encryption is a further
example of misuse of code. As was argued in chapter three, encryption could be used to
mask legitimate as well as criminal communication including the anonymity and
intractability of fraudulent transactions.50 Lessig’s argument is therefore that code is not
always a positive regulator and does not always constrain in a manner which promotes the
law, and may infact override legal control. Wu makes the point more forcibly by asserting
that code could be used as a mechanism of avoidance rather than of change.51
The foregoing arguments are correct and underline the fundamental problem with regulation
by code or technology in e-payment systems. As further arguments below demonstrate, code
application may cover all forms of industry malpractices including failure to apply correct
security and authentication protocols. It may also constitute the basis upon which
organisations deny liability for fraud arising from their own omissions. Conversely, code
can effectively constrain users by preventing them from engaging in practices that
undermine their own security. It is therefore accurate to say that without further moderation
of the code’s pervasive regulatory capacity, its effect is to completely override individual,
corporate or government decision making.
Accordingly, Lessig proposes direct regulation either of the code of cyberspace itself, or of
the institutions that produce the code.52 As an overriding regulatory modality, Lessig argues
that law can modify, alter or enforce the code of cyberspace in a way which promotes the
demands of commerce, society, policy and justice. 53 The same argument applies to
regulation of other modalities of market, and norms. Lessig concludes that law is the ‘most
obvious self-conscious agent of regulation’,54 and will affect the other modalities in a way
which aids their roles as tools for legal regulation.55 As Lessig concludes, the key policy in
cyberspace is a proper mix of the modalities of regulation. Notably, the mix need not
48
See eg Mark Stefik, ‘Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property
rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing’ (1997) 12 Berkeley Tech LJ 137.
49
Lawrence Lessig, ‘The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach’ (1999) 113(2)
Harvard Law Review 501, 519-520.
50 See notes in (d) Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) p 82.
51
Tim Wu, ‘When Code isn’t Law’ (2003) 89 Virginia Law Review 101, 106.
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operate in a set form or order. The order may differ depending on the behaviour or activity
which is the focus of regulation.56
It is important to mention that although Lessig’s approach to regulation in cyberspace has
been approved as correct,57 it has also been variously criticised. 58 In fact Murray offers an
alternative theory to resolve the regulatory problems online. 59 Murray’s concept of
‘polycentric regulation’60 implies that a network of regulatory actors operate in cyberspace.
Murray argues that regulation rarely, if ever emanates from a single regulatory source. He
also concedes that the malleability and flexibility of the environmental architecture (or code)
increases the susceptibility of the space to regulation. However, in contrast to Lessig,
Murray argues that because of the complexity of cyberspace and the attendant regulatory
web it creates, regulation would fail to produce predictable outcomes in cyberspace. As he
contends, while unpredictability can be reduced because of the inertial of the environmental
modalities of real or physical space, the malleability of the layered and complex
environment of cyberspace makes it difficult to predict the effects of regulation.61 In effect,
Murray expresses doubts that the regulatory modifications to the environmental modality
(the cyberspace code) will produce the expected regulatory effects anticipated by Lessig. He
argues that this is because any change in the ‘regulatory web’ can have immeasurable
consequences and make it impossible to determine the effects of even minor changes on the
regulatory subject. As to whether this implies that all regulatory attempts are doomed to
failure, Murray’s simple answer is a no. 62 His alternative is a dynamic matrix theory, which
is a model of network communitarianism designed to assist regulators in mapping when
external regulatory interventions could be effective.
According to Murray, the active matrix model requires the replacement of Lessig’s isolated
pathetic dot with a networked community or matrix of dots which has shared ideals, beliefs
and opinions. The model also entails the need to recognise that social modalities of law,
norms and market draw their legitimacy from the community of dots. Therefore, the model
56
Lessig, Code Version 2.0 (n 30) 224.
57 Eg Reidenberg first proposed ‘lex informatica’ or law of information which is analogous
to Lessig’s theory of code regulation. See Reidenberg, (n 27) 556-568; see also eg Jonathan
Zittrain, The Future of the Internet: And How to stop it (2nd edn, Penguin 2009).
58 See eg Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, ‘Demystifying Lessig’ (2008) Wisconsin Law Review
713, see also David G Post, ‘What Larry Doesn’t Get: Code, Law, and Liberty in
Cyberspace’ (2000) 52(5) Stanford Law Review 1439.





matrix would suggest that the regulatory process is in nature a dialogue instead of externally
imposed set of constraints.63
While Murray provides useful insights into the complexity of regulation in cyberspace, and
underlines the significant role of users within the active matrix,64 fundamental flaws of the
model include its seeming recourse to the libertarian position and its complexity.65 For
example, the model is built around a complex system of technical assessments and
feedbacks and even Murray cautions regulators to be willing to ‘take a leap of faith’ in the
uncertain and unpredictable regulatory environment of cyberspace.66 From the perspective
of a developing digital society like Nigeria, a complex regulatory approach implicates cost
and assumes regulators’ expertise in the technicalities of cyberspace workings. This by itself
may disincentive regulatory initiatives. Concerning his suggestions that legitimacy resides
with the community, Murray’s later modification and/or simplification of the active matrix
model highlights the weakness of the argument. As he concedes;
It surely cannot be true that the general will of the people, lacking the
imprimatur of legitimacy that is to be found in legislative assembly, can simply
decide which laws are “valid” and which are not. The danger of the active
matrix theory is that it comes perilously close to suggesting mob rule for
cyberspace… Equally it never was my intent to suggest, in the style of
cyberlibertarianism, that the will of the community overcomes the will of the
legitimate external regulator. Rather it was about modelling responses to
regulatory interventions in an attempt to model the high rate of regulatory
failure in cyberspace.67
In Murray’s view and consistent with the proposal in this thesis,68 it is undesirable and
counter-productive to undermine the role of the law, rather what should be done is to
suggest models for how law could work more effectively.69
63 ibid 234- 251; see also Andrew D Murray, ‘Nodes and Gravity in Virtual Space’ (2011)
5(2) Legisprudence 195, 206-209, 212 .
64 See previous notes on the limits of Lessig’s norms at p 182.
65 Murray, The Regulation of Cyberspace Control in the Online Environment (n 39) 250.
66 ibid 250-252.
67 Murray, ‘Nodes and Gravity in Virtual Space’ (n 63) 209.
68 See proposal for cybersecurity in chapter eight.
69 See eg Chris Reed, Making Laws for Cyberspace (OUP 2012); see also Emily B Laidlaw,
‘A Framework for Identifying Internet Information Gatekeepers’ (2010) 24(3) International
Review of Law, Computers & Technology 263.
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Lessig’s theory is therefore preferred because of its simplicity and utility in explaining the
challenges of regulating behaviour in cyberspace and the mechanisms for overcoming the
challenges. The theory is useful because it provides clarity and pragmatism in that it
involves a transposition of real world control mechanisms of law, norms, market and
architecture to the internet. It reinforces the notion that although there are new challenges in
internet mediated transactions, they are neither unresolvable nor insurmountable. As Agnew
and Pyke noted, a good theory must among other things, be simple, testable and predictive.70
More significantly, the theory is consistent with the notion that cybersecurity must account
for processes, devices, institutions, technologies, as well as users and laws and policies.71
For the purposes of further analysis here, Lessig’s theory provides the basis for validating
the assumption that respective regulatory modalities do not work effectively if they are
independent of legal regulation. With specific reference to the research data and to policies
and practices in the Nigerian e-payment industry, the following sections highlight the
respective limits of existing regulatory mechanisms in the e-payment industry. They also
demonstrate how lack of legal regulation implies further adverse consequences for
developing e-commerce, promoting trust and controlling identity-related cybercrimes.
6.4 The Limits of Technology, Industry and Users in Controlling
Identity-related cybercrimes in e-payment systems in Nigeria
6.4.1 The Limits of Technology (Code) Regulation
Chapter three discussed how code or technology is being used to address the problem of
fraud. Industry standards, particularly the PCIDSS, and technological solutions including
encryption and authentication technologies were examined. As the previous analysis show,
these technologies are the most pervasive response to identity related cybercrimes in e-
payment systems. This position is consistent with the view that code plays the most
important role in the regulation of cyberspace because it is self-executing when it comes to
constraining human behaviour. Technological based security systems are therefore of
immense importance to users of e-payment services because technology regulates behaviour
without requiring users themselves to change their behaviour. 72 However, there are
constraints on technology as a modality of control and three clear areas can be identified
which may inhibit efficient regulation by technology in Nigeria. These are cost, the industry
70 Agnew N and Pyke SW, ‘The Science Game’ cited in Vincent A Amfara (Jr) and Norma
T Mertz, Theoretical Frameworks in Qualitative Research (Sage Publications 2006) xvii.
71 See eg definition of cybersecurity at p 85.
72 See further notes below in 6.4.3 The Law and Regulation of Users.
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centred character of technology regulation and the fact that no security is completely
impervious to threats.
6.4.1.1 Technology is Expensive
The cost of implementing certain technologies may affect the willingness and voluntariness
of industry to deploy them. This is particularly relevant if one accepts the assumption that
organisations are profit-centric and may cut security costs to maximise profits. The PCIDSS
discussed in chapter three serves as a useful illustration here. It was noted in that chapter
that the level of compliance with the PCIDSS in Nigeria is contested.73 Research offers
some indications of why compliance might be a problem. According to one estimate, the
cost of fully implementing the PCIDSS for a merchant in Nigeria is about $20,000 USD
which is considerably more than the total operating capital of an average merchant.74
Thereafter, the business needs an additional $1000 per year for payment of software update
on electronic points of sale.
75
Merchants also have to bear additional cost of periodic system
vulnerability and compliance scan to third party firms appointed by PCIDSS operators to
ensure full and ongoing compliance. It was argued that this prohibitive cost can only be
borne by the big players in the industry such as banks and switching companies.
76
Invariably,
cost represents not only a barrier to entry into e-payment services, but may also lead to
compromise of security standards. As noted in the PCIDSS guidelines, prohibitive costs of
compliance invariably lead to compromise of consumer information. Therefore, businesses
unable to encrypt on account of technical constraints or business limitations adopt
compensating controls designed to mitigate associated risks.77
It is also notable that problems of compliance are aggravated by lack of regulatory oversight
of the PCIDSS. For example, although the PCIDSS requirements are couched in mandatory
terms, compliance is determined mainly through self-assessment. Also, while the Security
Standards Council (SSC) sets the PCIDSS, there is a lack of uniformity in the
implementation of the standards because each card brand has different programs for
73 See notes in 3.5.1.1 Industry Private Ordering System - Payment Card Industry Data
Security Standards (PCIDSS) p 74 at 76.
74 Fidelis C. Obodoeze et al, ‘Enhanced Modified Security Framework for Nigeria Cashless




77See Security Standards Council <https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/> accessed
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compliance, validation and enforcement.78 The Council does not therefore have the mandate
to validate or enforce any organisation’s compliance with the standards or to impose
penalties for non-compliance. Enforcement and penalties are governed by card brands and
their partners who may impose financial penalties or withdraw card acceptance services.79
This lax enforcement framework is compounded by lack of independent legal authority to
enforce the standards either on behalf of the Council or the card brands.80 Compliance is
therefore implemented through private contractual arrangements between card brands and
members of the payment network to which the PCI-Security SSC is not a party.
Therefore, in addition to cost, the fact that the PCIDSS is not a legal requirement affects the
level of compliance. If this position is correct, one may argue that legislation is required to
codify the requirements of the PCIDSS. A contrary approach would lead to the correct
conclusion that the PCIDSS is merely a tool to pre-empt government interference and stem
off legal regulation.81 As Smedingoff rightly observed, three legal trends are currently
shaping the landscape of information security. One is that laws are requiring a legal duty to
provide appropriate information security for a company’s data and electronic transactions.
Two, laws are setting legal standards for compliance, and three, laws have evolved a new
legal duty to warn the stakeholders affected by security breaches.82 Indeed, with specific
reference to developing countries, Rosenberg cautioned that the effect of failure to legislate
to regulate payment card transactions translates to governments effectively ceding consumer
protection to private law making by card associations and banks.83
6.4.1.2 Technology as Industry Regulation – Misuse in Evidential Matters
Another important aspect of regulation by technology is its near-total dependence on
industry for its implementation. As already noted above, code as a tool of market regulation
presents its peculiar problems. Infact, in market regulation terms, technology is not
necessarily regulation-enhancing and can in fact be used to foil regulation. An example is
78 Edward A Morse and Vasant Raval, ‘PCI DSS: Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standards in Context’ (2008) 24 Computer Law and Security Report 540, 553.
79 See Security Standards Council <https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/> accessed
11/09/2013.
80 Morse and Raval, (n 78), 551.
81 ibid.
82 Thomas Smedinghoff, ‘It’s All About Trust: The Expanding Scope of Security
Obligations in Global Privacy and E-Transactions Law’ (2007) 16(1) Michigan State journal
of International Law 5.
83 Arnold S. Rosenberg, ‘Better Than Cash? Global Proliferation of Debit and Prepaid Cards
and Consumer Protection Policy’ (2005) Berkeley University Press (Bepress) Legal Series
Paper 766.
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the (mis) use of technology to collect excessive personal information. It is argued further
here that on account of its highly technical nature, the deployment of technology is better
understood by industry and this may lead to discriminatory and even abusive use. Although
there is no authority on this point in Nigeria, decided cases in England demonstrate that
abusive uses of technology by the financial and payment industry can undermine the judicial
process and produce injustice.
In Job v Halifax PLC,84 the claim was for the sum of £2,100 (with interest) which the
claimant argued had been wrongfully debited from his account with Halifax bank through
the fraudulent use of his debit card. The bank admitted the debt, but argued that they were
justified because the money was withdrawn from the claimant’s account using his Card and
correct PIN. However, in giving evidence, the bank declined to disclose card authentication
keys because they were derived from a batch and would compromise other cards in issue. It
was argued for the bank that key management procedures were commercially sensitive
information and an outside expert witness could not verify the authentication codes in the
logs. However, it was contented for the claimant that these pieces of evidence were essential
to the bank’s claim that the transactions occurred. They were also relevant to prove that the
protocols were flawless and tamper-proof and particularly that the bank maintained
appropriate security controls on key management. Notwithstanding the failure of the bank to
produce the evidence, the claimant failed and judgement was given in favour of the bank. 85
Similarly in Rahman v Barclays Bank,86 the claimant sought reimbursement from his bank
for money debited to his account in consequence of the fraudulent use of his debit card by a
third party. Without putting the defendant/bank to strict proof, the court accepted its
explanation that the fraud was committed because the claimant was negligent in that he gave
the thief his card and other authenticating information. Also without proof, the court
accepted the defendant’s assertions about the security of its authentication process and of its
electronic banking system. As the court itself observed, ‘The bank did not put before the
court any detailed evidence about the security information it sought from the fraudster. It
had no record of the transaction, save in general terms.’87 An important factor in this case is
84 (Case number 7BQ00307 30 April 2009) in Alistair Kelman, ‘Case Judgement: England
and Wales’ (2009) 6 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 235.
85 ibid 238.
86 Rahman v Barclays Bank PLC (Clerkenwell & Shoreditch County Court Case No
1YE003643 24 October 2012) in Stephen Mason and Nicholas Bohm, ‘Commentary on




the fact that the claimant might have prejudiced his case by his alleged untruthfulness
regarding the circumstances surrounding the fraud. Nevertheless, as Mason and Bohm argue,
the fact that banks could succeed in defending claims by their customers without producing
crucial evidence is a disincentive to retain such evidence and produce it when required.
Conversely, if the law makes production of such evidence mandatory, banks would have no
choice but to retain the evidence. The authors concluded that, ‘If their [banks] defence fails
for lack of the relevant evidence, they will soon enough learn to make sure to retain and
produce it. Soft cases make bad law.’88
The above mentioned cases demonstrate how banking and payment systems can be used to
manipulate even legal and judicial processes using technology as a shield. Such
manipulations could lead to doubts as to whether justice was served in particular cases
involving disputed transactions between banks and their customers. While as noted above,
cases of this nature have not been decided in Nigeria, the provisions of the Evidence Act
give some indications that Nigerian courts may arrive at similar conclusions. For example,
although, the Nigeria’s Evidence Act permits the admissibility of electronic evidence, there
are no laws or rules stipulating the nature and characteristics of such evidence or the burden
and standards of proof required in electronic transaction cases.89
6.4.1.3 Security is never “Absolute”
As previous arguments in this thesis suggest, service providers often contest the ability of
criminals to access their organisations’ computer or information systems.90 Correspondingly,
providers deny liability for financial losses to consumers on grounds that the security of the
payment processes or instruments are impermeable or impenetrable. Invariably, the
arguments tend to be that it is the user or customer who has been negligent in some ways.91
One service provider underlined the context of this confidence when he contended the
alleged compromise of a customer’s payment card. As he argues, a customer had alleged
that his (the customer’s) debit card was used to make fraudulent withdrawals although he
(the customer) still had physical possession of the card. Accordingly, the provider
concluded;
88 ibid 187.
89 See ss 93- 97 Evidence Act (Nigeria) 2011.
90 See notes in 3.3.2.1 Hacking (Unauthorised/Illegal Access to computer Systems) on
Hacking p 56 at 57.
91 See notes in 3.4.1 Account Takeover Fraud p 70.
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The scenario he has just painted is impossible… our cards are EMV cards, they
are virtually tamper-resistant, so it’s not possible for him to have the card [in his
possession] and for someone to access the account at the same time…. They
need the card and his PIN. That’s why I said we will have problems with
people …, many people are dishonest.92
One may argue that the above implies that because new payment cards are based on EMV
technology, provider organisations may even decline to investigate incidents of card fraud
and may simply conclude that consumers have either been negligent or complicit in the
fraud. Contrary to the above however, arguments on asymmetric information below imply
that providers are in the position to determine how secure their EMV cards are and this
information may be known only to the provider.93 It was also noted in chapter three that
authenticators have different degrees of reliability. PINs, passwords, tokens and access
codes based on authentication protocols of what a person knows or has, are susceptible to
criminal attacks and can be forged or stolen by hackers and phishers. The discussion also
outlined the limits of the public key infrastructure (PKI) particularly when they are not
supported digital signature laws.94
It is important to mention here that while authenticators based on biometrics (or what a
person has) are generally rated as providing higher degree of reliability for authentication
purposes,95 biometrics also has security challenges. The technology is particularly relevant
because of its increasing and pervasive use for identification in Nigeria. It was mentioned in
chapters three and five that the CBN’s biometric verification number (BVN) system
proposes to authenticate accountholders by matching their biometrics against templates
collected by their banks.96 The NIMC’s national identity card and SIM registration by the
telecom industry all involve the collection of biometrics as a unique identifier. Therefore,
biometrics is poised to play a significant role in identification for political, social and
commercial purposes in Nigeria.97
92 Payment service provider 4.
93 See notes below at p 204.
94 See notes in (d)Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) p 82.
95 MasterCard, ‘Security Matters Insights on Advancing Security and Fraud Management
for Payments Spotlight on Biometrics’ (MasterCard 2014) 18-22
<http://www.mastercard.com/us/wce/PDF/SecurityMatters_2014.pdf.>accessed 04/06/2014.
96 See previous notes in (a)Authenticating Technologies p 76; see also notes in 5.1.3 CBN
Bank Verification Number (BVN) p 139.
97 E.g. fingerprint readers were used for voters’ identification during the Nigerian general
elections in April 2015.
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Biometrics is the automated recognition of individuals based on their behavioural and
biological characteristics. It is intrinsically bound to a person and can be used to establish
identity to a high degree of confidence. Unlike PINs, passwords and tokens, biometrics is
permanently mapped to a person and cannot be forgotten. 98 However, biometric
characteristics, whether biological 99 or behavioural, 100 also carry the risk of false
performance. That is, biometrics can generate false positives and false negatives. False
negatives deny access to otherwise authentic users while false positives grant access to
fraudulent users or impostors.101 The failure of fingerprint readers deployed during the
Nigerian general elections to identify authentic voters highlights the problems associated
with false negatives.102 In e-payments, e-commerce and e-banking false negatives and false
positives carry further implications of financial loss. False negative would lead to payment
systems declining otherwise authentic transactions while false positives would grant
fraudsters access to victim’s financial information or even to organisations’ databases.
In addition to the above, biometrics presents problems because of its irreplaceability and
permanence. For example, precisely because of its associability with a user, once biometric
data is compromised, a person can no longer use the same biometric characteristic to
authenticate himself to a particular system and possibly to associated systems. Hence the
description of biometrics as a ‘PIN you can never change’.103 More crucially, databases on
which biometric information is stored are prone to vulnerabilities and attacks. It was
observed in chapter five that the nature of the threat to identity databases includes its very
primacy as a target of hackers for identity theft.104 For example, compromised systems may
aid the replacement of legitimate user data with false data or the deletion of stored biometric
templates to facilitate re-enrolment. 105
98 See generally Sanjay G Kanade, Dijana Petrovska-Delacretaz and Bernadette Dorizzi,
Enhancing Information Security and Privacy by Combining Biometrics with Cryptography
(Morgan and Claypool 2012).
99 For example fingerprints, iris scan, voice or facial recognition.
100 For example Keystroke and speech pattern.
101 Alexander D Meadows, ‘Spoof and Vulnerability of Biometric Systems’ in Eliza Yingi
Du, Biometrics from Fiction to Practice (Pan Stanford Publishing 2013) 188, 195.
102 See eg Kim Yi Dionne, ‘Why Technical Breakdowns in the Nigerian Elections Raise
Questions about Monitoring’ The Washington Post (Washington, March 29
2015)<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/29/why-technical-
breakdowns-in-the-nigerian-election-raise-flags-about-monitoring/ >accessed 12/04/2015.
103 Russell G Smith, ‘Biometric Solution to Identity-related Cybercrime’ in Yvonne Jewkes,
(ed) Crime Online (Willan Publishing 2007) 44, 55.
104 See notes in 5.4.3 Challenges of Identity Management p 169.
105 See Meadows, (n 101) 195.
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As the above discussion suggests, it is more correct to assume that security compromise is
always a possibility. Therefore, as already noted above, industry standards such as the
PCIDSS and authenticating protocols such as digital signatures need to be translated into
legal requirements. While legal frameworks will not in themselves make security
invulnerable, they would provide a basis for accessing compliance and allocating liabilities.
6.4.2 Market Regulation and Constraints of the Payment Industry
Generally, industry initiatives to regulate itself are referred to as private ordering. Private
ordering is self-regulation voluntarily undertaken by private parties.106 It can be made to
assuage the specific interests of private groups or to satisfy technical requests. The PCIDSS
is an example of private ordering in e-payment systems and services. Although industry
standard setting is a rule making process and has a regulatory effect, the analysis here
stresses the point that even if industry was willing, it is unable to regulate e-payment to
prevent identity thefts and fraud without the coercive force of law. It is argued in particular
that market economy considerations create inefficiencies which limit the effects of
industry’s initiatives and disincline its investment in technological solutions.
6.4.2.1 Market Systems and Asymmetric Information
Information asymmetry exists in markets where information about goods and services are
unilaterally known to one party. This may be the seller or the buyer. In any case, markets
where information asymmetry exists are characterised by low quality products and high
prices because product cannot be distinguished by their characteristics. Where sellers have
information for example, the buyers are deprived of the benefit of making informed
decisions about prices and quality. In other words, because information about quality is
known only to the sellers, prices fail to signify quality to buyers, and sellers of low quality
products can sell at prices comparative to high quality ones. This information deficit has two
further consequences. First, it drives the sellers of high quality products out of the market
because they cannot increase the prices of their products on account of buyers’ ignorance
about quality. Following the first, the second consequence is the proliferation of bad quality
products in the market place leading to buyers’ withdrawal from the market and ultimately
market failure. 107 Translated into financial and payment services terms, asymmetric
106 See Niva Elkin-Koren, ‘What Contract Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering
Facilitating a Creative Commons’ (2005) 74(2) Fordham Law Review 375, 376.
107 See generally George Akerlof, ‘The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism’ (1970) 84(3) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 488; see also
Stacey L. Schreft, ‘Risks of Identity theft: Can the Market Protect the Payment System?
(2007) Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review Fourth Quarterly 5.
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information comes into play when providers of payment services promote or disclose the
good qualities of their product such as efficiency but withhold the negative features such as
insecurity.
108
Therefore, concerns about information asymmetry are useful for accessing the risk of
identity theft. As Schreft argues, since non-cash transactions involve transfer of personal
information from the consumer to the seller, the seller’s standard of safeguarding
information is material to the customers’ evaluation of the risk of the transaction. Where
there is laxity, the cost of the product should be reduced to reflect the risk of misuse. That is,
less secure products should sell for less and more secured product for more. However,
because information asymmetry exists, this is not the case. Both secure and insecure
products and services sell at relative prices. Providers of less secure products and services
will not lower their prices because consumers’ associate high price with high quality and
sellers of secured products are unable to attract customers desiring such products because of
the lack of price differential. Overall, sellers of better security earn a loss while providers of
less security earn a profit. Nevertheless, the market as a whole, and not providers of
insecure products and services, suffer losses from identity theft. This is because consumers
associate losses with the whole market and may migrate to less efficient payment systems as
well as because sellers of better security have less incentive to continue to provide such
security. This situation precipitates more data breaches, more identity theft and
consequently market inefficiency or total collapse.109
This discussion can be placed in context by reference to earlier observations about the state
of the Nigerian financial market. It was mentioned that issues of fraud are generally
shrouded in secrecy.110 However, this lack of transparency is characteristic of virtually all
aspects of banking and financial transactions. These include information about the
conditions of the use of financial products, transaction costs and so on. According to the
Central Bank of Nigeria;
An important component of the review exercise was the development of a
minimum disclosure requirement that stipulates the information banks are
required to disclose to all customers prior to the consummation of every credit
transaction. …The overreaching goal … is to produce a Guide that… will
108 ibid (Schreft) 23.
109 ibid.
110 See notes in 3.2 The Challenges of Fraud Reporting p 50.
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accommodate the freedom of operators to charge competitive prices, while
protecting consumers from arbitrary and excess charges.111
These observations imply that service charges in the financial industry are seldom reflective
of value and may be arbitrary regardless of quality. Banking applications and
implementation standards for EMV and PCIDSS exemplify how asymmetric information
work in e-payment systems. According to Murdoch and Anderson, not only does the
security of banking apps vary across platforms and suppliers, but because most apps are
proprietary, the vulnerabilities are known only to the service providers. Also, while
acknowledging the security of the EMV protocol, the authors argue that the protocol has
numerous vulnerabilities which are the inevitable result of implementation choices. Banks
can choose for example to issue inexpensive cards that use public key cryptography in the
card authentication step or opt for cheaper ones that merely present a certificate signed by
the issuing bank. These cheaper cards, which do not use PKI, are easier to clone. 112
It can therefore be argued, following previous analysis in this chapter and chapter three that
since the financial industry in Nigeria barely meets the PCIDSS requirements, and the CBN
security requirements under the e-banking guidelines is to be solely implemented and
monitored by the banks themselves,113 consumers may be unaware of banks and other
payment service providers with lax security systems. Conversely, products, services and
charges could not be comparatively and competitively priced. The CBN itself recognises the
effects of asymmetric information on the financial market and has concluded that it leads
invariably to distrust and market collapse. According to the CBN, ‘…customers do not
perceive fraud as an issue with a specific bank, but with electronic payments overall, which
eventually affects the entire industry and not just the institutions that have been impacted by
fraud.’114
111 Letter from Central Bank of Nigeria to all deposit Money Banks Reference No
CFP/DIR/GDL/01/018 dated 6th July 2012.
112 Steven J Mudorch and Ross Anderson, ‘Security Protocols and Evidence: Where Many
Payment Systems Fail’ (Financial Cryptography and Data Security Barbados March 3-7
2014 Pre-proceedings Draft) <http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/papers/fc14evidence.pdf
>accessed 22/06/2014.
113 For example, banks have different obligations to implement but not to report on their
security protocols and they are required to ensure that ISPs implement appropriate security
where services are outsourced, see notes in 3.5.1 Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)
Regulations on Privacy and Security p 73.
114Central Bank of Nigeria, ‘About the Nigeria Electronic Fraud Forum’
<http://www.cenbank.org/neff/about.asp> accessed 09/04/2015.
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It is however to be noted that as information asymmetry is invariably part of traditional
markets, this position is unlikely to change. Organisations expect to protect their brands and
withhold adverse information from customers unless they are compelled by law. To correct
transactional imbalances therefore, it is the role of government to impose transparency rules.
Consistent with this view for example, the UK Payment Services Regulations requires
payment services providers to provide their users with information relating to cost, charges,
exchange rates, security, and limits on transactions. They must also provide information on
liability for fraudulent use of payment instruments, and responsibility to block payment
instruments as well as complaint procedure.115
6.4.2.2 Market Systems and Negative Externalities
Externalities operate to confer costs or benefits on entities other than those who should bear
them. Externalities can be positive or negative. Positive externalities confer benefits on
those who cannot be charged for the benefits while negative externalities confer costs on
those who should not bear the cost. In markets where the externalities are negative, entities
engage more in activities that impose costs on others and less in activities that benefit
others. 116 To translate this to the context of e-payments, if risks of insecurities, data
breaches and identity thefts and frauds are borne not by payment service provider but by
individuals, the society or other organisations, there is less incentive for organisations to
provide better security and therefore prevent the operation of negative externalities.117 Two
activities in the Nigerian payment industry show how externalities operate to displace the
cost of fraud. Firstly, the liability allocation regime already places the burden of fraud on
the consumer or user. Secondly, society through law enforcement appears to have assumed
the cost of preventing fraud on e-payment platforms, thus providing further disincentive to
industry.
(a) How Unclear Rules about Liability Allocation Promote the Operation
of Externalities
It was pointed out earlier in this chapter that organisations engage in liability shifting by
arguing that users are to blame for personal data compromise and identity fraud. Invariably,
in many cases where conflicts arise as to whether a user had authorised particular
transactions, service providers avoid liability either by alleging that users colluded to
commit the fraud and subsequently sought to repudiate the transaction, or that they were
115 See generally Part 5 of the Payment Services Regulations 2009 SI 2009/209.
116 See Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and
Club Goods (CUP 1986).
117 Schreft, (n 107) 5.
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negligent in safeguarding their payment information or instruments. 118 Arguably, even
practices put in place by industry to curb fraud inadvertently aid this denial and shifting of
liability. A good example is transaction alert system. Under the system, card or account
holders receive alerts or notifications immediately a transaction occurs on their accounts or
payment cards. The effect is to instantly alert the card or account holder to fraudulent
transactions and forestall further fraud. Customers who receive notifications of unauthorised
transactions are expected to immediately notify the service provider, which then ‘blocks’ the
account or card to prevent further use by the fraudster.
While seemingly devised to combat fraud and protect customers, the system is also arguably
ineffective because it amounts simply to ‘bolting the barn after the horse has escaped’. To
illustrate, based on already established assumption of negligence or collusion, customers are
presumed to be liable for pre-transaction alert losses. The transaction alerts do not therefore
significantly affect this existing liability structure. In effect, it does not follow that even if a
transaction is fraudulent, the customer would be reimbursed or indemnified for the loss.
The problem described above is particularly aided by lack of specific liability rules
applicable to fraudulent and unauthorised payments. As an example, under the E-banking
guidelines, determination of liability is subject to the contract between the parties. The
Guidelines provide that ‘Agreements reached between providers and users of e-banking
products and services should clearly state the responsibilities and liabilities of all parties
involved in the transactions’.119 This provision fails to provide any meaningful guidance on
the allocation of liabilities and offers little, if any protection to users of electronic banking
and payments. It is arguable for instance that while contracts constitute important evidence
of the agreement between parties, contracts envisaged by the guidelines will usually be
standard form contracts containing extensive exemption of liability clauses. Even if
otherwise, users will still generally be incapable of engaging in meaningful negotiation. As
discussion on information asymmetry above implies, respective bargaining powers of the
parties are likely to be unequal because of service providers’ superior knowledge about
products functionalities and security defects.
Perhaps in recognition of the inefficiency (and even unfairness) of the present liability
allocation structure, the Central Bank of Nigeria proposed a Card arbitration framework
called the E-payment Dispute Arbitration Framework. The objectives of the framework
include the provision of speedy redress for e-payment dispute complaints without involving
118 See example given above at p 192.
119 Item 3.0(g) CBN Guidelines on Electronic Banking 2003.
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the courts. It is also intended to facilitate the identification of the entity at fault in disputed
claims, and to shift the liability towards that entity.120 Again, however, apart from the fact
that the framework is yet to become operative, some of its provisions already suggest that it
would be equally problematic and is unlikely to have much effect on the status quo. For
example, Item 5(d) of the framework provides as follows:
Where a Cardholder uses an EMV Payment Card on an EMV Terminal and
fraud occurs, liability is on the Cardholder. However, it is the responsibility of
the issuer to prove to the arbitration panel that the Payment Card issued was the
Payment Card used and the Payment Card was not reported stolen.
Upon literal construction, the provisions emphasised above already carry a presumption that
the cardholder is liable without requiring that evidence be produced on the state of the
security of the service provider’s systems. Contrary to arguments above demonstrating that
EMV cards can be compromised especially when issuers influence the security designs,121
the provision appears to suggest that the cards are completely impregnable. As it merely re-
asserts the presumption of negligence or collusion on the part of the cardholder, decisions of
arbitral panels under the proposed dispute resolution framework will produce results such as
Job and Rahman cited earlier.122 As Mason rightly contends, the resulting decisions would
be ‘incorrect decisions based on a misunderstanding of the burden of proof, a failure to
properly test the evidence, and an acceptance of unwarranted assumptions.’123
The Payment Services Regulations (UK) provides an example of how law defines the
respective liabilities of parties to a payment transaction. The law places the burden of
proving a disputed payment on the service provider and negates presumptions of negligence
and fraud on the part of users. 124 Section 60(3) provides as follows:
Where a payment service user denies having authorised an executed payment
transaction, the use of a payment instrument recorded by the payment service provider
is not in itself necessarily sufficient to prove either that—
(a) the payment transaction was authorised by the payer; or
120 See item 3 Central Bank of Nigeria (Proposed) E-payment Dispute Arbitration
Framework 2013.
121 See notes above at p 204.
122 See notes above at p 191.
123 Stephen Mason, ‘Electronic Banking and How Courts Approach the Evidence’ 29(2)
(2013) Computer Law and Security Review 144.
124 Payment Services Regulation 2009 SI 2009/209, regs 60(1)-(3).
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(b) the payer acted fraudulently or failed with intent or gross negligence to comply
with regulation 57.
Regulation 57 deals with the obligations of the payer/user to give notification to the service
provider of theft or misappropriation or unauthorised use of the payment instrument in the
agreed manner without undue delay upon becoming aware of the fact. 125 Therefore the
cumulative effect of regulations 57(2) and 60(3) is to displace the presumption of
negligence and collusion which often follow a user’s allegation of unauthorised use of
payment instrument. The payment service provider is put to strict proof even where it
appears that the actual payment instrument issued had been used to authorise a disputed
transaction.
Furthermore, under section 62 of the Regulations, the law addresses the allocation of
liability in instances where the users have been negligent. It provides that the payer
(payment service user) is liable up to a maximum of £50 for any losses incurred in respect
of unauthorised payment transactions arising from the use of a lost or stolen payment
instrument. The liability is the same for losses arising from users’ failure to keep the
personalised security features of the payment instrument safe from the misappropriation.126
The user however bears the full liability for the all losses incurred in respect of an
unauthorised payment transaction if he has acted fraudulently, or with intent or gross
negligence failed to give notification to the service provider upon becoming aware of theft
or misappropriation of the payment instrument.127 The law further provides that the user is
not liable for any losses incurred in respect of an unauthorised payment transaction arising
after notification has been given to the provider.128 The user is also not liable where the
payment service provider has failed at any time to provide appropriate means for
notification in accordance with the provisions of the regulations.129 The notable omission
with respect to the provisions here is failure to define what qualifies as appropriate means
of notification under Regulations 58(1) (c). However, one may presume that such means of
notification will be a medium of communication accessible to the user 24 hours of the day.
The foregoing argument further underline the need for laws to aid the allocation of liabilities
when payment is contested and fraud occurs. Significantly, it also demonstrates that laws
125 ibid regs 60(3), 57(2).
126 ibid reg 62(1)(a)-(b).
127 ibid reg 62(2) (a)-(b); see also regs 57(1)-(b).
128 ibid regs 62(3)(a), 57(1)(b).
129 ibid regs 62(3)(b), (58(1)(c).
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could address the fears of service providers that they would be made unjustly to bear the
cost consequences of users’ negligent or fraudulent behaviour.130
(b) Society’s Assumption of the Cost of Fraud as Externality
An example of how the society bears the cost of fraud in Nigeria is demonstrated by efforts
of law enforcement agents aimed at combatting cybercrimes. Although there are no laws to
try the criminals, law enforcement agents appeared to have developed a typology of
cybercriminals with the objective perhaps of ultimately preventing the crime through a
campaign of scare-mongering. This ‘criminal profiling’ characterises cybercriminals as
male, between the ages of 18 and 33, typically well-educated, (which in the Nigerian
context means the person has up to university level education) unemployed and technology
savvy.131 To justify their classification in any of the categories, suspected cybercriminals
will also usually be in possession of laptop computers or smart phones with ability to initiate
connectivity to the internet almost 24 hours of the day.132 Such ‘suspects’ may be classified
as ‘Yahoo! Yahoo! Boys’ (named after the search engine Yahoo), or ‘419ners’ (named after
the section of the Nigeria criminal code criminalising impersonation). They may also be
classified as engaged in a new form of electronic payment fraud called ‘cashless Lagos’ in
mimicry of the cashless policy of the Central Bank of Nigeria. A successful classification of
a person as a cybercriminal is often accompanied by indiscriminate searches of the person,
or properties or premises of such persons.
The above practice clearly infringes on certain fundamental human rights. 133 However, the
main focus here is how it operates to externalise the cost of fraud. To make this point, it is
possible to argue that whereas industry is better positioned to prevent e-payment fraud
through deployment of strong technical security, taxpayers appear to pay this cost. For
example, while the exercise is arguably wasteful and often futile (because of lack of
130 See eg notes in (a) Personal information is all Information - Why not the Expansionist
Approach? p 153 at 154.
131 This prototype was given by Law Enforcement 1&2; see also UNODC research
suggesting that 45 per cent of all global internet users are below the age of 25 and that this
majority represents ‘…a demographic that also broadly corresponds with an age group often




132 As the cost of internet connection is still high in Nigeria, the ability to connect to the
internet at all hours of the day is deemed a luxury which an unemployed person cannot
afford.
133 For example rights to privacy and freedom from discrimination, harassment and
intimidation are guaranteed under s 28(1) (a)-(h) Ch IV CFRN 1999.
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cybercrime legislation), government pays for the law enforcement time and resources
incurred in the course of indiscriminate searches and arrests. Also, while it is open to
industry to contend that law enforcement agents are simply executing their mandate to
protect the society, the exercise may also raise speculations that criminals are being arrested
and prosecuted. This may in turn prompt suggestions, particularly from service providers,
that there is less fraud and therefore less need to invest in fraud prevention.
A correct assessment of the role of regulation in consumer payment systems is therefore that
while excessive government intervention in the market could stifle innovation, unfettered
markets would fail to produce the right mix of efficiency, safety and access. This is
particularly true when payments participants fail to consider all the costs and benefits of
their actions to other parties.134
6.4.2.3 Inability of Industry to meet the Index for Good Regulation
It is useful to conclude the discussion here by measuring industry attempts to regulate e-
payment systems against criteria which may be applied to assess the legitimacy and
efficiency of good regulatory regimes. It was noted at the beginning of this chapter that an
effective regulatory regime is backed by the cohesive force of law. By necessary inference,
regulation which excludes law is inefficient and ineffective. The five criteria outlined by
Balwin, Cave and Lodge were also highlighted as collectively constituting benchmarks for
assessing good regulation. For ease of reference, these are legislative mandate,
accountability, due process, expertise and efficiency.
As the preceding discussions in this chapter and chapters three and five have indicated, the
present approach to the regulation of e-payment services cannot satisfy the legislative
mandate requirement. This is because the PCIDSS and data protection standards, as
regulatory frameworks, are mandated by industry and not statute. Industry also fails to meet
the criteria of accountability, and due process or even efficiency in regulation. The general
problems of compliance and uniformity of the PCIDSS have been discussed above.135 In the
particular context of Nigeria however, a security expert noted that in spite of the fact that the
PCIDSS is a rigorous and on-going process, there are no fully functional monitoring
processes in place in Nigeria.136 Therefore, in spite of the provision of regulatory guidelines
that “there will be a continuous review and recertification on compliance with these
134 Barbara S. Pacheco, ‘Summary to Conference on Consumer Payment Innovation in the
Connected Age’ (International Conference on Payment Policy Kansas City March 29-30
2012).
135 See previous notes at p 189.
136 IT Security expert 1.
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[PCIDSS] and other global industry standards from time to time”, 137 organisations are
actually accredited on a one-time compliance assessment basis. In other words, after an
initial threshold of compliance (for which they receive certificates) there is no framework
for periodic examinations to ensure that organisational practices are upgraded. It is trite that
the threat landscape for the e-payment industry is volatile, therefore, updating and
monitoring compliance is an effective means of ensuring the industry keeps abreast of the
risks. Furthermore, as previous discussion in this chapter indicates, although non-
compliance with the standards is rife, the process of punishment is not transparent as the
industry itself attempts to avoid the stigma or other consequences of non-compliance. As a
result, it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of the PCIDSS as a private ordering system.
Finally the establishment of the Nigerian Electronic Fraud Forum (NeFF) serves as a good
illustration for the inefficiency of legislative mandate. The NEFF is an all-stakeholder fraud
forum established to monitor electronic fraud and encourage fraud reporting, information
dissemination and information sharing among stakeholders. As stated in the NEFF annual
returns, the forum was borne out of the need for ‘a holistic approach to combat the menace
of fraud and restore confidence in all e-payments mechanisms in the country.’ 138 The
rationale for setting up the body include the recognition that electronic fraud attempts will
increase significantly as Nigeria migrates to electronic payments, and the fact that e-fraud
incidences impact negatively on the financial industry as a whole. The NEFF has as its
mandate, the formulation of cohesive and effective fraud risk management practices through
information and knowledge sharing with key industry stakeholders. The objective behind
the NEFF is to tackle electronic fraud by eliminating the culture of secrecy which makes
service providers susceptible to the same types of fraud by the same fraud cartel. The
establishment of the Neff is therefore based on the overall assumption that crime control
would be more effective if payment institutions share fraud information and articulate a
common requirement to law enforcement agents.139 It is notable that it was the NEFF that
provided the statistics indicating that 70% of e-fraud occurrences are attributable to phishing
attacks. The NEFF in conjunction with the Central bank of Nigeria and the Nigeria
137 Item 3.1 CBN POS Guidelines 2011.
138 Nigeria Electronic Fraud Forum (NeFF) Annual Report 2012.
139 See generally Central Bank of Nigeria, ‘About the Nigeria Electronic Fraud Forum’
<http://www.cenbank.org/neff/about.asp> accessed 09/04/2015.
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Interbank Settlement Systems (NIBSS) also developed a dedicated portal for fraud reporting
in the e-payment industry.140
However, while the NEFF is innovative in terms of promoting collaboration, some of its
objectives underline the inefficiency and hence failure on the part of financial regulators.
Firstly, because the NEFF is projected as an alternative forum of fraud reporting, it is
indicative of the failure of primary fraud reporting systems. It therefore impairs the
regulators’ execution of their regulatory mandate and amounts to re-inventing the wheel.
Secondly, and owing to the first reason, its effectiveness is questionable because it is likely
to be perceived merely as a regulatory watchdog. One may pose the question for instance
that if organisations will not report fraud to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) as a
regulator, why would they exchange fraud information at the Neff which is itself an
initiative of the CBN and a forum for convergence of competitors, regulators and law
enforcement? In other words, it is reasonable to expect that fraud information disclosed at
the forum will eventually be passed on to regulators with possible consequences of
regulatory reprisals. This would inhibit the free dissemination of fraud information which is
the primary objective of the NEFF.
Considered from these perspectives, the NEFF may invariably represent a classic example
of the failure of legislative mandate. That is, the NEFF is indicative of the failure of the
CBN’s legislative mandate to protect the e-payment systems. It therefore appears that
industry expertise will be the only strength of e-payment regulation in Nigeria if we apply
the index of measuring good regulation. However, it has been argued above that industry
can manipulate its expertise to serve its own purposes particularly when using technology.
In order to avoid replication therefore, the only point worthy of mention here is that industry
may need to be regulated even in how it applies this expertise.141
6.4.3 The Law and Regulation of Users
Users’ ability to regulate their own behaviour is perhaps the most problematic aspect of
controlling frauds and identity related crimes in e-payment systems. From the perspectives
of service providers highlighted in chapter five and earlier in this chapter, security is seen
more as ‘people problem’ rather than a legal or technical problem.142 Generally therefore,
140 See Central Bank of Nigeria, ‘Submission of Fraud Report on E-channels using A
Common Portal for the Payment Industry’ (CBN circular BPS/DIR/CIR/GEN/02/103 of 02
July 2013).
141 See further notes below on Accountability and the Law.
142 See example given at p 193; see also notes on (a) Personal information is all Information
- Why not the Expansionist Approach? p 153 particularly at 154.
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users are considered the weakest link in the security chain. Conceptualising the user
problem, it was noted as follows:
The biggest challenges in information security frequently involve
humans…Humans, perhaps unlike technology can demonstrate extreme levels
of variation in skill and do not always follow logical rules in conduct. They can
be emotional actors, driven by perception and emotion as much as by objective
reality.143
According to Verizon data breach report, humans are the “the carbon layer” of
information assets. They are therefore notoriously susceptible to social tactics including
deception, manipulation, and intimidation. The report notes further that while humans are
the most complex creatures on earth, savvy threat agents or criminals have consistently
outwitted them or otherwise leveraged them to steal data.144
A number of reasons account for scepticisms about users’ abilities to protect themselves
from identity theft and fraud. Firstly, user choices of technical security measures are
inhibited by the complex nature of technology and cost. For example, while one may not
expect users to implement security at the level of organisations, end-user security measures
may be equally problematic in terms of both technicality and cost. In Nigeria particularly, it
may be correct to argue that even when available, end-user security measures may be
unreliable and defective. As the BSA piracy study shows, PC software piracy in Nigeria at
82% is almost double the global piracy rate which is 42%.145 It is therefore safe to assume
that the Nigerian market is saturated with pirated end-user products including anti-virus
programs.
Secondly, and based on the first reason above, users’ susceptibilities to crimes increases.
This argument holds even when service provider organisations engage in user enlightenment
or education. As an example, organisations providing e-payment services particularly banks
in Nigeria, have adopted the practice of sending e-mails to their customers periodically
informing them of fraud trends and how to avoid victimisation. The following are examples
of such e-mails:
143 Andrea M. Matwyshyn (ed.), Harbouring Data: Information Security, Law, and the
Corporation, (Stanford University Press 2009) 229.
144 Verizon, Data Breach Investigation Report 2012, 33.
145 See BSA 2011 Global Piracy Study <http://globalstudy.bsa.org/> accessed 20/09/2013;





Some of our customers have been receiving Internet Banking Login
alerts for logins which they did not initiate. In the alert, they are asked to
click on a link for security measures to protect their accounts.
If you receive such a login alert, please be informed that it is fraudulent,
and it is an attempt to obtain your banking details.
We reiterate that XXX bank will never require you to click on any link in
any communication we send to you. The genuine Login Alert, like all our
communication to you, contains no links.
If you do receive a Login Alert asking you to click a link, please
disregard and delete it immediately.
Your online security is our priority.
XXX Bank Plc.
Table 6.1- Sample spam login alert
Table 6.2 - Sample fraudulent transaction alert
Dear Valued Customer,
We have received enquiries from some customers about transaction alerts purportedly sent by us.
These alerts for strange transactions invite the customer to click on a link to view the details of the
transaction. However, the link leads to a 'phishing' site which attempts to get personal banking
information such as Internet banking code, password, email address, email password, Phone number,
ATM Card PIN, etc.
The following tips will help you identify these fraudulent transaction notifications:
1 The 'Description' contains a link. Do not trust links in an email and DO NOT CLICK on them!
2 The Account Number is masked (e.g. 200 *******) because they do not have that information.
3 The Account Balances are not provided as they are not privy to that information and a wrong
figure would prompt you to call your Relationship Officer.
Following these tips will protect you from unintentionally compromising your account.
We reiterate that XXX bank will NEVER request your personal banking details via email and these
emails should ALWAYS BE DISREGARDED.
Your online security is our priority.
Thank you for your continued patronage.
XXX Bank Plc.’
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The challenges here include inability to measure the impact of these messages on users and
the fact that education cannot keep up with the evolving criminal methods of stealing
personal information. For example, increasing use of mobile devices for banking and
payments suggests that criminals would migrate to these platforms to leverage attacks.
Furthermore, there is disagreement among stakeholders on the utility of this approach to
user education. Service providers tend to argue that information about fraud (called fraud
alerts) aids education of users on criminal methods used to obtain personal information and
represents a means of preventing identity theft and fraud. 146 Other stakeholders take a
contrary view and contend that the approach has the capacity to generate negative responses
or to “backfire” and has only nuisance value. According to a security expert, it is not only
somewhat of a paradox that service providers deny the pervasiveness of fraud, it is also
paradoxical that their numerous fraud warnings constitute a form of “user spamming”. As
he noted;
…you need to understand ... I’m not saying it is bad to warn your [the banks’
customers], but anyone [accountholders in Nigeria] knows these warnings have
become so everyday that they are nonsensical or scary. I mean, banks are
virtually spamming us [the customers], … and the ‘spammers’ are spamming us
too… As a reasonable person, wouldn’t you just stop using the systems [e-
payments, e-banking etc.] altogether?147
Even if this assessment of user education is incorrect, the invariable inference here is that
organisations’ attempts to educate users may rebound and result in consumers’ either
withdrawing from or refraining from using e-payment systems at all.
As previous observations above also underline the fact that users are likely to always be
susceptible to manipulations by malicious actors, one can argue that end users cannot be
independent regulators because they are volatile and unpredictable actors. Furthermore,
because technology generally undermines the capacity for consent online, even attempts to
give users substantive control over their personal information through the notion of consent
or meaningful choice are replete with pitfalls. Austin argues for example that consent online
is really a trade-off between privacy and utility. 148 In Shapiro’s view, leaving privacy
protection to individuals is inefficient, time-wasting and has the disadvantage of raising
146 all payment service providers interviewed made this point.
147 IT security expert 2.
148 Lisa M. Austin, ‘Is consent the Foundation of Fair Information Practices? Canada’s
Experience under PIPEDA’ (2006) 56(2) University of Toronto Law Journal 181.
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transaction costs.149 Nevertheless, given that users can be ignorant, or negligent, it would
still be quite arbitrary for the law to impose limitations on how consumers’ transfer their
personal information. The CBN Biometric Verification Number (BVN) better illustrates
industry recognition of this problem. The BVN system discussed in chapter five appears to
have followed the part of technologies that pre-determine users’ behaviour by locking them
into certain choices.
Lock-in technologies modify or alter the behaviour of actors in ways which ensure
compliance with law or regulation. Built-in security processes embedded in privacy by
design (PbD) and privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) serve as good examples. PbD
embed privacy features into the design specifications, implementation, and networked
infrastructures right from the outset. It entails building-in privacy requirements from the
onset of a systems’ development and throughout its life cycle. 150 Consistent with this
approach, and the notion that technology is self-executing when it comes to constraining
human behaviour, the BVN employs biometric technology to bypass certain user behaviour.
For example, enrolment on the BVN would ensure that users are unable to access their
accounts unless they are physically present at ATMs or points of sale. Therefore, the
biometric technology undermines the authentication value of PINs and passwords and
nullifies the effects of sharing such information with family or friends. 151 However,
precisely because of their capacity to compel obedience, self-executing technologies are
considered controversial. They therefore raise further questions about legitimacy and choice
as well as legal regulation.
6.4.3.1 Are “Lock-in” Technologies Legitimate?
Lock-in technologies are referred to as ‘techno-regulation’ by Brownsword,152 and described
as the deliberate employment of technology to regulate human behaviour by Lennes.153 Jaap
koops defines them more aptly as ‘technology with intentionally built-in mechanisms to
149 Andrew L Shapiro, The Control revolution How the Internet is putting Inndividuals in
charge and Changing the World we Know (Century Foundation 1999) 161.
150 See Ann Cavoukian, ‘Privacy by Design: The 7 Foundational Principles’ (2011) 3
<https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2011/03/fred_carter.pdf.>accessed
09/10/2014.
151 See (n 142).
152 Roger Brownsword, ‘Code, Control, and Choice: Why East is East and West is West’
(2005) 25(1) Legal Studies The Journal of Society of Legal Scholars 1, 3.
153 R.E Lennes, Harde Lessen: Apologie Van Technologie als Regulerings Instrument
(Universiteit van Tilburg, Tilburg 2010) 21 cited in Ronald Leenes, ‘Framing Techno-
Regulation: An Exploration of State and Non-state Regulation by Technology’ (2010)
Tilburg Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 10/2012, 149.
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influence people’s behaviour’.154 In his analysis of techno-regulation, Brownsword argues
that there are moral and ethical implications of design-based technologies aimed at
controlling harm-generating behaviour. Such technologies, he argues, function in ways
which override human choice, freewill, and dignity. According to Brownsword, human
dignity implies that people should be able to choose not only the right actions but also the
wrong ones. Accordingly, because design-based technologies impose behavioural
constraints on the subjects, they deprive such subjects of the opportunity to choose between
right and wrong. 155
As Yeung also argues, although a distinction may be made between design-based
approaches which operate directly on the individuals decision-making process and those
which seek to restrict opportunities for the exercise of individual judgement without
overriding their judgements altogether, concerns that the technologies may generally
jeopardise constitutional values are legitimate. As she argues, it may lead to a loss of
opportunity to appeal to the discretion and judgement of enforcement officials against the
inappropriateness or unfair application of regulatory standards.156 Following the same line
of argument, Koops opines that design-based technologies nevertheless raise these concerns
even where they are incorporated to enforce legal norms. As he observes;
…but also if technology is used ‘only’ to enforce existing legal norms, its
acceptability can be questioned since the reduction of ‘ought’ or ‘ought not’ to
‘can’ or ‘cannot’ threatens the flexibility of human interpretation of norms that
are fundamental elements of law in practice.157
The above arguments would be correct to the extent that they identify the corrosive effects
of design-based technologies on legitimacy and accountability. However, if the arguments
were intended to suggest that lock-in technologies reduce users to robotic recipients of
industry’s inventions, they would be incorrect. To support this point, it is important to note
that it is progressive technological modifications that have been used to respond to user
154 Bert Jaap-koops, ‘Criteria for Normative Technology: The acceptability of ‘Code as
Law’ in the Light of Democratic and Constitutional Values’ in Roger Brownsword and
Karen Yeung (eds) Regulating Technologies, Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames and
Technological Fixes (Hart Publishing 2008) 158.
155 Brownsword, ‘Code, Control, and Choice: Why East is East and West is West’ (n 152)
15-17.
156 Karen Yeung, ‘Towards an Understanding of Regulation by Design’ in Brownsword and
Yeung, Regulating Technologies, Legal Futures, Regulatory Frames and Technological
Fixes (n 154) 95.
157 Jaap-koops, (n 154) 158-159.
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problems in payment systems. As examples, by design, mere possession authenticates the
use of credit cards, but this creates incentive to steal the card as any holder may use it. To
correct this, subsequent ATM cards were designed with an additional requirement for PINs.
This means that the user must not only have the card but must know the PIN. There is less
incentive to steal this card unless the thief also has access to the PIN. However, the
technology also proved susceptible because users wrote PINs on or kept it with the card. To
further increase the confidence that the holder of the card is the authorised user, biometric
technologies such as fingerprints, iris scan and so on were introduced.158 Technology is also
now being advanced to integrate behavioural biometrics, including typing speed, touch pad
dwell time, key selection, and angle of mouse movements, into mobile devices and web
applications to build further confidence into authentication processes.159
The point made above is that application of behaviour-modifying technology is neither new
nor novel. Such technologies have progressively evolved particularly in response to criminal
exploitation of payment instruments and processes. This position is correct even if
regulatory motivations are unclear or when regulatory intentions are not clearly spelt out. As
Murray persuasively argues, the nature of complex regulatory environments often mean
regulation may be transparent or opaque. Whether noticeable or not, regulation is justified
by the need to protect the regulated entity and others.160 Also commenting on the notion that
user consent creates artificial control, Cate and Mayer-Schonberger rightly contend that
consent is not the optimal mechanism to ensure that either information privacy or the free
flow of information is being protected because individuals cannot fully grasp the complexity
of the situation they are asked to assess.161 In Koops view, the tendency to ground data
protection in informational self-determination leads to consequential focus on user
empowerment which is a fundamental fallacy.162 At best, the requirement for consent gives
158 This example was cited by Lessig, see Lawrence Lessig, Code Version 2.0 (Basic Books
2006) 41-42.
159 See eg MasterCard, ‘Security Matters Insights on Advancing Security and Fraud
Management for Payments Spotlight on Biometrics’ (2014) Issue 22;
<http://www.mastercard.com/us/wce/PDF/SecurityMatters_2014.pdf>accessed 01/07/2014.
160 Andrew D Murray, The Regulation of Cyberspace Control in the Online Environment
(Routledge Cavendish 2007) 23.
161 Fred H Cate and Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, ‘Tomorrow’s Privacy Notice and Consent
in a world of Big Data’ (2013) 3(2) International Data Privacy Law 67, 68.
162 Bert-Japp Koops, ‘The Trouble with European Data Protection Law’ (2014) 4(4)
International Data Privacy Law 250, 253.
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the users a false sense of self-determination and creates what Schwarz refers to as the
“autonomy trap”.163
Therefore, one may view technologies that lock in or restrict user choices and preferences as
a means of protecting the users even from themselves, while at the same time achieving the
interests of government and industry in regulating behaviour. In effect, enrolling user
biometrics for account authentication or embedding payment cards with fingerprint
biometrics as in the proposed BVN will not in itself be illegitimate. The outstanding
question is whether there is need for legal control of such activity and how it should be
implemented.
6.4.3.2 Accountability and the Law
The examples above demonstrate how technology can be used to bypass certain user
behaviour. Although, it was argued that laws cannot directly regulate behaviour, laws play a
role by setting the standards of behaviour sought to be locked-in in the first place. In the
case of data protection for example, laws have to define what constitutes personal
information in order to establish information qualifying for protection. Additionally, legal
requirements that the most effective or up-to–date technical safeguard be used may form the
basis of integrating biometric technologies into payment instruments and processes. Where
laws do not form the basis of such integration as in the case of the BVN in Nigeria,164 laws
would still be required to set the standards of protection for personal information stored in
biometric databases. Without such regulation, it is arguable that the risk of fraud arising
from data breaches corresponds to the benefits provided by the lock-in technologies. In
other words, consumers of the services could be locked-in into a false sense of security if
criminals can gain access to identity databases. Arguably, in such circumstances, criminals
would have less need of the information which technology protects in the hands of users.
Therefore, in order to address questions of accountability, laws are required to set out
evidential requirements to establish that correct security protocols have been implemented
into payment instruments or processes that have lock-in effects. A good example here is the
Nigerian e-identity card. It was argued in chapter five that because the card is embedded
with payment functionalities, it may serve as an access point to payment information by
163 Paul M. Schwatz, ‘Privacy and Democacy in Cyberspace’ (1999) 52 Verderbilt Law
Review 1609, 1659-1662.
164 The requirement to use biometrics in payments is not backed by any law but is simply an
initiative by the CBN to curb e-payment fraud.
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multiple organisations which have no need for such information.165 Conversely, one of the
proposed security features of the card is the deployment of firewall technology to separate
and protect the financial information on the card.166 It is therefore possible to argue that
unless the protocols used to implement such separation are ascertainable and verifiable,
allegations of unauthorised access may be difficult to resolve.
Based on the analysis above and earlier explication of Lessig’s theory, cybersecurity for e-
payments in Nigeria can be depicted as a process (figure 6.1) in which each regulatory
modality affects the others within the regulatory schema.
Figure 6.1 Cybersecurity process based on the theory of modalities of control
As shown in figure 6.1, law has no direct impact on user behaviour but technology does.
Although, technology standards may be translated into legal rules, laws cannot directly
regulate technology because technology is evolving and the volatility of technology means
security mechanisms become elementary and outdated fairly quickly. However, since
industry can readily modify technology, direct regulation of industry by the law would
promote the development of high technical standards for data security. To cite few of many
possible examples, data protection law may provide that organisations use the most up to
date, if not the state of the art in technology to protect personal information. Also, laws
regulating electronic payment services may impose liability on providers in certain
circumstances where authentication or authorisation is contested. Digital signature laws may
allocate higher evidential value to digital against simple electronic signatures. Together, the
laws would ensure that the payment industry keeps abreast of developments in criminal
skills. It would also ensure that to avoid liability, service providers deploy updated and
165 See notes in 5.1.1 NIMC’s Electronic National Identity Card p137.
166 See eg NIMC, Facts About the National e-ID Card <https://www.nimc.gov.ng/?q=facts-
about-national-e-id-card>accessed 12/04/2015.
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industry recommended technologies including those that may lock-in users in order to
comply with legislation.
Conclusion
The analysis in this chapter used Lessig’s theory of modalities of regulation to examine the
limits of existing legal and regulatory frameworks in the Nigerian e-payment industry. The
core of the argument is that law is central to the setting of standards for privacy and security
for electronic transactions. Through an examination of the different modalities for
controlling e-payment frauds, the arguments demonstrate that the current attempts to curtail
cybercrime threats to e-payment systems in Nigeria are inadequate. For example, as the
most significant regulatory mechanism in cyberspace, “code as law” may not go far enough
because organisations fail to implement it as such. Code may also go further than law and
may require legal regulation. While conceding that technology plays a fundamental role in
regulation of e-payment frauds therefore, an understanding that technology is malleable and
prone to manipulation and abuses underscores the need to regulate industry to regulate
technology.
The arguments in the chapter also underline the market economy constraints that undermine
any claim of viable industry self-regulation. It was argued that because externalities and
information asymmetry affect market efficiency, which is a public good, they also threaten
the economy as a whole. By impugning the integrity of payment systems, they heighten the
fear of victimisation. The consequences are that users may migrate from arguably more
efficient e-payments to less efficient ones such as cash or other paper payments. Invariably,
inefficiency precipitates a ‘dive to the bottom’ and eventual collapse of the payment system
and even the economy.
Conversely, laws can foreclose on inefficient self-regulatory schemes and promote user
confidence in electronic transactions generally. More significantly, laws can prevent lacunae
in the administration of justice by setting clear evidential standards and rules in cases of
identity-theft or fraudulent transactions. Overall, a conclusion that self-regulation as an
alternative to legal control leaves users mostly unprotected and prone to exploitation is
inescapable. Legal regulation is then justified not only on the grounds that law is the most
obvious self-conscious agent of regulation, but also on grounds that alternative proposition




A Proposal for Cybersecurity for E- payment Systems in
Nigeria
Introduction
In chapter six of the thesis, arguments were made that self-regulation by the payment
industry is inadequate and law is central to achieving effective control of identity-related
cybercrimes. It is further argued in this chapter that it is by understanding the functions and
limits of different laws that we can better achieve cybersecurity. It is therefore proposed that
in formulating cybersecurity for e-payments and indeed cybersecurity generally, policy must
take account of the socio- legal factors and the regulatory and enforcement realities of the
Nigerian system.
This chapter starts by re-examining the main arguments and findings in the thesis that
underpin the proposal. It then evaluates the potentials and limits of criminal and non-
criminal laws in the area of controlling identity-related cybercrimes. It is argued in the
chapter that because of inherent limitations of criminal legislation and the peculiar
challenges of enforcement in Nigeria, policy should promote non-criminal legislation as a
means of controlling identity-related cybercrimes. The chapter concludes with specific
recommendations for achieving comprehensive cybersecurity in Nigeria. This chapter
therefore serves three purposes. One, it highlights the proposal for cybersecurity in e-
payments in Nigeria. Two, it advances justifications for the proposal and three, it analyses
the factors which make the proposal particularly workable in the Nigerian context.
7.1 Statement of the Proposal
The effectiveness of laws often depends on jurisdictional context. It is therefore important
not only to concede to legal regulation but also to identify laws that regulate effectively. In
other words, the social context and legal and enforcement regimes in Nigeria require that
proposals and implementation for cybersecurity laws be moderated by an understanding of
laws that work more effectively. In the context of identity-related cybercrimes in e-payment
systems, these are non-criminal legislation aimed at regulating providers of e-payment
services. Presently, these laws are being overlooked in favour of criminal legislation. As a
result, policy initiatives with respect non-criminal laws on cybersecurity have been
comparatively marginal.
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The above proposal is underpinned by the empirical data and the theoretical frameworks
analysed in this thesis. Three central points can be inferred from the analysis. The first is
that because identity-related cybercrimes are pervasive, legal regulation is required to
enable industry adequately address the crimes. The second derives from arguments that the
social and political challenges of enacting and enforcing a cybercrime law in Nigeria makes
it imperative to develop alternative cybersecurity laws. The third point derives from the
effectiveness of non-criminal legislation in preventing identity-related cybercrime in the
first place. The following sections summarise the main arguments and principal findings in
the thesis in order to demonstrate how they lead to the conclusions.
7.2 The Scale of the Problem - Identity-related Cybercrimes are
Pervasive
In chapter three, the thesis assessed the pervasiveness of identity-related cybercrimes. The
empirical data indicated that it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the rate of the
crime because there are no reliable and evidence based statistics. It was argued that based on
the literature and the antecedent of cybercrimes in Nigeria, the lack of statistics cannot be
taken as evidence that identity-related cybercrimes are not pervasive.1 I therefore concluded
that it is more logical to attribute the lack of statistics to the “culture of denial” or “culture
of secrecy” which implicates unwillingness on the part of organisations to admit the crimes
due to reputational concerns.2
Further analyses in chapters three, five and six support this point. The arguments
demonstrated that in spite of denials of the pervasiveness of the crime, initiatives taken by
the Nigerian payment industry suggest a drive towards combatting identity-related
cybercrime. For example, concurrent with its denial, industry has also intensified technical
responses and education of users on fraudulent activities.3 The Central Bank of Nigeria’s
(CBN) biometric verification number (BVN) exercise is an outstanding example in this
regard. Therefore, while the culture of denial or culture of secrecy understates the threats,
industry’s resourcefulness in addressing the threats suggests that the crimes are more
widespread than stakeholders are willing to admit. Although, the conclusion (that identity-
related cybercrimes are pervasive) appears to be against the weight of the evidence provided
by the empirical data, it is also supported by the empirical data and the literature which
established that the crimes are indeed pervasive but merely not reported or recorded.
1 See notes in notes in 3.2 The Challenges of Fraud Reporting p 50.
2 ibid.
3 See notes in 3.5 Industry Responses to cybercrime Threats –Private Ordering and
Technical Security Standards p 73.
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7.3 The Challenges of Criminal Legislation
Analyses in chapters two, three, four and five of this thesis established that industry
guidelines constitute the principal regulatory instruments for e-payment systems. The theory
of modalities of regulation examined in chapter six however demonstrates the standard
setting role of the law. When applied to regulation of the Nigerian e-payment system, the
theory underlines why it is essential to legislate to regulate e-payment services and
institutions. The thesis established that with respect to laws which may control identity-
related cybercrimes, progress has been made only at the level of criminal legislation.4
The data and documentary evidence, which includes legislative proposals and policy
documents, suggest that a criminal law solution drives the debates on cybersecurity in
Nigeria. To illustrate this, a total of 18 out of 19 respondents interviewed during the
fieldwork proposed criminal legislation as the main solution to cybercrime threats to e-
payment systems. This is in contrast to six respondents who specifically mentioned non-
criminal regulation such as a data protection law. Furthermore, records of legislative
proposals and bill progression indicate that successive cybersecurity bills presented to the
Nigerian National Assembly have been lopsided in favour of criminal legislation. More than
15 bills for a cybercrime law have been presented to the two legislative houses at different
times. As noted in chapter four, reports suggest that the cybercrime Bill 2014 was signed
into law before the expiration of the tenure of the last legislative houses.5 Comparatively,
only one comprehensive proposal for a data protection law was located and even this
proposal was not presented to the National Assembly and was never debated. A payment
services regulation law proposed in 2009 had lapsed and the records did not indicate that the
bill was resuscitated or that a new bill was presented or debated by subsequent legislative
houses. No specific proposal for a digital signature law could be located.
It is crucial to restate, as mentioned in chapter four, that in spite of their frequency and
consistency, even the proposals for cybercrime law spanned over a period of ten years with
some of the bills not even getting a mention by either of the legislative houses. This trend
prompted further enquiries into why there were so many bills but none was passed into law.6
A review of legislative debates failed to give indications of the reasons why the bills were
not passed. However, data from the empirical research and further scrutiny of individual
bills provided a number of possible explanations. The first explanation is the possibility that
4 See notes in 4.2.3 Hacking Offences under the Cybercrime Bill 2014 p 96.
5 See (n 47) at p 97.
6 ibid.
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social perceptions of cybercrimes may have contributed to lack of criminal legislation. The
second explanation suggests that lack of legislation was due mainly to legislative inaction.
The third explanation points to the fact that the passage of a cybercrime law was due to the
political “fight for turf” among law enforcement agencies.
7.3.1 Social Perceptions of Cybercrime
The arguments in chapter four may suggest that because of social perceptions of cybercrime,
agitation for criminal legislation was not sustained. It was argued for example that society
views the crimes as less serious because of the pervasiveness of corruption within the
political class. In other words, society tolerates cybercrimes because of perceptions that it
leads to lesser financial losses relative to funds embezzled by politicians and other economic
criminals. It was also argued that this tolerance of cybercriminals has been documented in
the literature and may even be inferred from the popularity of music which extols the
exploits of cyber-fraudsters. 7 Although, this research did not undertake a quantitative
sampling of the Nigerian population to establish their views of cybercriminals, existing
empirical research, and the views of law enforcement agents, lawmakers and policy makers
collected during the research demonstrates that such perceptions exist.8 The explanations of
service providers for avoiding liability for fraudulent transactions also demonstrate another
crucial perspective on cybercrime. For example, the tendency to argue that hackers are
motivated by ideological rather than financial considerations or that users are negligent or
collusive suggests that victims of cybercrimes, rather than the criminals are being
stigmatised.9
It is arguable that the social perceptions of cybercrime are even reflected in law and policy.
In chapter four, it was mentioned that rather than establish an enforcement agency for the
cybercrime law, the cybercrime bill 2014 proposed a Cybercrime Advisory Council
coordinated by the National Security Adviser (NSA). The notable aspect of the provision is
that the Council is expected to meet four times a year. 10 It is argued here that the
establishment of the council and the prescribed number of meetings suggest a lack of
appreciation for the evolving nature of cyber-threats and crimes. What one may ask, could a
cybersecurity agency meeting four times a year achieve in the context of fast evolving
cyber-threats and cybercrimes? It is therefore possible to conclude that this approach only
reinforces society’s perceptions that cybercrimes are relatively less serious crimes.
7 See notes in 4.2.3.1 Access without Authority (Basic Hacking Offence) p 97 at 98.
8 ibid 100.
9 See eg notes in 6.4.1.3 Security is never “Absolute” p 192.
10 See generally notes in 4.6.2 The Politics of the “Fight for Turf” p 132.
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In view of the many proposals for cybercrime law, and reports that a Cybercrime Act 2015
was eventually passed,11 the above observations may appear hypothetical. In other words, it
is possible to argue that the social perceptions could not inhibit the passage of a cybercrime
law. This assessment would be correct. As the arguments in the thesis itself suggest, social
perceptions of cybercrimes are more likely to affect the enforcement of the law. It was
argued in chapter four that societal perceptions may undermine the prescribed punishment
for the basic hacking offence.12 I argued that as a result of the perceptions, the society, law
enforcement and judicial authorities may be inclined to query the jurisprudence and
punishment for the basic hacking offence. This is particularly true in view of the fact that
the criminal law prescribes arguably less severe punishment for more serious or violent
offences. Although, it was noted that the arguments were not intended to exculpate hackers
from punishment, I concluded that punishment for the basic hacking offence should be
evaluated in the light of the retribution and utilitarian theories of punishment.13
In addition to the above, social perceptions may affect reporting systems and therefore the
effectiveness of the law. In this regard, the following questions must be raised. One, if
cybercrimes are considered as resulting in insignificant financial losses, and victims are
adjudged ignorant, negligent, greedy or even collusive in the crime, will they (the victims)
bother to report the crimes at all?14 Two, if cybercrimes reflects on organisations’ reputation,
will organisations report the crimes? Three, if law enforcement agents view cybercrimes as
non-violent and therefore less serious, will they deploy time and resources to reported
cases?15 Finally and more fundamentally, if there are no statistics to show the scale of the
crime, will government allocate adequate resources to developing computer forensic
capacity for investigation and prosecution of cybercrimes?16 Negative answers to these
questions further underline the argument that criminal legislation on cybercrime would be
ineffective.
7.3.2 Legislative Delays
Another explanation for lack of cybercrime legislation is that it is due to inaction on the part
of the legislative houses. Although, because of the paucity of debates on the various
11 There is still some uncertainty about the law because of the haste with which the law was
purportedly passed; see eg (n 47) at p 97.
12 See 4.2.3.1 Access without Authority (Basic Hacking Offence) p 97 at 103.
13 ibid 101.
14 See notes in 3.4.1 Account Takeover Fraud p 70; see also 6.4.1.3 Security is never
“Absolute” p 192.
15 See particularly (n 62) at p 100.
16 See 4.6.1 Lack of Computer Forensics Capacity in Law Enforcement p 130.
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cybercrime bills sent to the Nigerian National Assembly, this explanation is persuasive, it is
not conclusive. It was noted above and earlier in chapter four that numerous proposals have
been put forward during the tenure of different legislative sessions. The proposals emanated
from different sources including privately sponsored and executive bills. Therefore
lawmakers often have to deal with similar proposals from different sponsors almost
simultaneously. While this may not justify inaction, it demonstrates that multiple proposals
may generate confusion which could delay debates on bills by the legislative houses. It is
therefore possible to argue that the sheer volume of legislative proposals on cybercrimes
may have considerably slowed down the legislative process.17
7.3.3 The “Fight for Turf” Among Law Enforcement Agencies in Nigeria
Perhaps the most persuasive explanation, supported in particular by the data, is that delay in
passing the cybercrime law is driven by the battle or fight for turf. It was stated in chapter
four that battle or fight for turf represents in-fighting among law enforcement agencies
seeking powers to administer or enforce the cybercrime law. As a result, agencies engaged
in the turf lobby law and policy makers to abandon proposals which fail to designate them
the implementing agency for the cybercrime law.18 This explanation also finds support in
the wordings and provisions of different cybercrime bills. While the bills for cybercrime
laws are generally comparable in terms of their scope, they differ on the provisions on
enforcement. Subsequent bills either include or expunge provisions relating to the
establishment of a cybersecurity agency. To illustrate, a bill proposed to establish a
cybersecurity agency which would liaise with relevant law enforcement agencies to enforce
cybercrime laws was proposed in 2008. The bill died at the Committee stage.19 Also, in
2009, a bill titled an ‘Act for the establishment of the Nigerian Computer Security and
Protection Agency and its Governing Board along the lines of the 2008 bill was proposed.20
It was unclear whether this bill progressed beyond the first reading.
By 2010, the language of the proposals changed. A bill presented in 2010 to amend the
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act 2007 sought to confer powers on
17 See particularly (n 46) at p 97.
18 See notes in 4.6.2 The Politics of the “Fight for Turf” p 132.
19 See The report of the Joint Committee on Drugs, Narcotics and Financial Crimes, Science
and Technology and Justice on A Bill for an Act to provide for the establishment of the
Cybersecurity and Information Protection agency charged with the Responsibility to secure
Computer Systems and Networks and Liaison with relevant Law enforcement Agency for
the enforcement of Cybercrime Laws and Related Matters 2008 [HB 154] Establishment
Bill 2008.
20 See Computer Security and Protection Bill 2009 (HB 321) C 3681.
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the EFCC to investigate cybercrimes and e-payment related crimes. By the proposal, the
EFCC, which already has the mandate to investigate economic and financial crimes, sought
to extend its powers to cybercrimes and e-payment matters.21 A proposal made in 2011again
resuscitated the notion of establishing a cyber-security and information protection agency.
The agency is to be charged with the responsibility of securing computer systems network
and liaising with the relevant law enforcement agency for the enforcement of cybercrime
laws, and for related matters.22 The bill did not pass legislative approval. The Cybercrime
Bill 2014 neither establishes a central cybersecurity nor grants specific powers to any law
enforcement agency. As noted in chapter four, this was interpreted to mean there would be
no implementing agency for the law. The intent of the law is that all law enforcement
agencies in Nigeria develop capacity to investigate and undertake prosecution of
cybercrimes.23
In addition to the evidence provided by the data therefore, the consistency in the alteration
of the provisions relating to the cybersecurity agency suggests that the “fight for turf”
among law enforcement agents is the most outstanding factor which delayed criminal
legislation on cybercrimes in Nigeria. As the Cybercrime Bill 2014 resolves the problem by
refraining from naming any lead or central agency for administration and enforcement of the
law, the inference can be drawn that the bill represents a compromise between those in
favour of the establishment of an agency and those against it. However, it was argued earlier
in chapter four and in the recommendations made later in this chapter that this approach to
enforcement is both ineffective and counter-productive.24
7.4 Understanding the Limits of Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
I have argued previously that the effectiveness of cybercrime laws would be impeded by
social perceptions of the crime. I argue further here that when considered against the factors
that inhibit the effectiveness of other forms of cybersecurity laws, the implementation and
enforcement challenges of a cybercrime law are almost intractable. The arguments here
draw on earlier analysis of relevant provisions of the cybercrime and data protection bills in
chapters four and five. The conclusions drawn are summarised below.
21 See Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) (Amendment) Bill
2010 (HB 351) C 349.
22 See Cybersecurity Bill 2011 (HB 154) C4443.
23 See notes in 4.6.1 Lack of Computer Forensics Capacity in Law Enforcement p 130.
24 ibid; see also further notes on Creation of Specialised Agency for Cybersecurity below.
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7.4.1 Cybercrime Bill 2014- Intractable Challenges of Enforcement and
Effectiveness
The analysis of the draft legislation on cybercrime indicated that although the law contains
relevant provisions that could aid the control of cybercrimes, the language and scope of the
law are generally narrow. Provisions of the bill particularly relevant to identity-related
cybercrimes include those on hacking, phishing and identity theft. It was argued that the
express criminalisation of unauthorised access in excess of authority addresses the artificial
distinctions made between insider and outsider fraud and cybercrime and computer crime by
policy and practice in Nigeria.25 However, an examination of different hacking offences
demonstrates that that even when the law is passed, the provisions may produce difficult
challenges in terms of enforcement. For example, the arguments suggest that the hacking
offences would be more effective if the basic hacking offence is defined in terms of access
to data or programs rather than as a strict liability offence. It was also suggested that
offenders may escape liability under section 6(2) of the proposed law unless the law is
amended to remove the technicality which may arise from the enumeration of further
offences. 26 The analysis of the law also led to conclusions that provisions relating to
computer fraud and identity theft are still inadequate. The law failed to address questions of
ownership of personal information and the crucial question of whether identity information
being intangible property is capable of being stolen. 27
The analysis of the law also identified problems with the enforcement provisions. In this
respect, the research data provided the information needed to understand the underlying
reasons for decentralising enforcement of the cybercrime law. As already stated above, an
important conclusion drawn from the data is that lack of provision for a specialised agency
to enforce the law represents a compromise to appease law enforcement agencies engaged in
the battle for turf. It was also argued in chapter four that even the proposal to constitute all
law enforcement agencies in Nigeria into implementing agencies for the cybercrime law
would aggravate the dearth of computer forensic capacity within the Nigerian law
enforcement agencies and lead to rivalry which perpetuates the fight for turf.28 This means
in effect that the law recreates the very problem which it was intended to address.
25 See notes in 3.2 The Challenges of Fraud Reporting p 50 at 51; see also notes in 4.2.3.2
Unauthorised Access in Excess of Authority p104 at 105.
26 See notes in 4.2.3.3 Unauthorised Access with Intent to Obtain Computer Content p 106
at 107.
27 See 4.5 Identity Theft and Identity Fraud under the Criminal Code Act and the
Cybercrime Bill p 123.
28 See 4.6.2 The Politics of the “Fight for Turf” p 132.
223
Besides the systemic challenges of enforcement highlighted above, the effectiveness of the
criminal law in the area of controlling cybercrimes is generally in doubt. It is trite that the
nature of the cyberspace itself interferes with enforcement of the criminal law. Cybercrimes
can be transient and are evolving, and offences may be committed across several ‘invisible’
national borders. These factors make investigation, arrest and prosecution difficult.
Correspondingly, since states have different levels of technological development and
different enforcement capacities as well as different social and political ethos,
harmonisation of laws is both impractical and undesirable. As a consequence, and in spite of
agreements and treaties on international cooperation in the area of cybercrime, criminal laws
have yielded only marginal results in terms of prosecutions and convictions. The
McKinnon’s case cited earlier in chapter three provides some support for this position.29 It
has therefore been rightly observed that the threat of punishment has had no significant
impact on the prevention of cybercrime. 30 Instructively, Gragido et al capture the near
impotence of the criminal law in context of cybercrimes when they observed as follows:
If you commit a cybercrime, there’s almost no chance you’re going to be caught.
If you are caught, there’s almost no chance you’re going to be prosecuted. If you
are prosecuted, there’s almost no chance you’re going to be convicted. If you
are convicted, there’s almost no chance you’ll serve the full sentence.31
The foregoing observation suggests that in practical terms, cybercrime law has inherent
challenges of effectiveness. In other words, absent the peculiar political and enforcement
challenges within the Nigerian system, criminal legislation is still unlikely to significantly
reduce cybercrimes. Therefore, a cybercrime law could easily become a cosmetic or
symbolic law aimed at improving Nigeria’s national image before the committee of nations
rather than one geared towards effectively fighting the crime.
7.4.2 Regulation of Data Processing- The Privacy and Data Protection Bill 2013
With the aid of the research data, the arguments in chapter three demonstrate that for the
same reasons that organisations do not report fraud, they would also not report breaches of
data. The main reason already stated above is the culture of denial or secrecy driven by
reputational concerns. Therefore, the lack of data breach reports cannot be taken as lack of
data breaches in the Nigerian e-payment industry. The analyses in chapter five underline the
29 See 4.2.3.1 Access without Authority (Basic Hacking Offence) p 97 at 98.
30 See eg Stefan Fafinski, Computer Misuse Response, Regulation and the Law (Willan
Publishing 2009) 45-95.
31 Will Gragido et al, Blackhatonomics an Inside Look at the Economics of Cybercrime
(Elsevier 2012) 4.
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relevance of data protection to e-payment systems. It was argued that although individuals
could be targets of cybercriminals, organisations’ databases are more susceptible and
attractive targets because of the volume of identity information they hold. The analysis
concluded that industry guidelines on data protection in the telecom and banking industry
are incomprehensive and inadequate to protect consumers’ personal information.
The examination of relevant provisions of the draft data protection law 2013 suggests
possible lacunae and interpretation problems in the law. It was argued in particular that to
ensure legal clarity, regulatory certainty and general effectiveness of a data protection law,
the law should adopt a risk of harm based approach to defining personal information. This
approach contrasts with the expansionist approach taken by the Canadian Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) and the EU law. The
arguments therefore underlined the relativeness of laws, and the danger of transposing laws
from one jurisdiction to another without due considerations for local or jurisdictional
context. As noted in chapter five, the draft law is modelled on the PIPEDA 2000. The
PIPEDA itself was modelled on the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) Model Code for
Protection of Personal Information developed by business and consumer groups.
Consequently, the PIPEDA has been described as a voluntary industry standard which found
its way, unusually into the text of legislation.32
Data from the research provided further understanding of the challenges associated with
regulatory laws such as data protection. Analysis of the data suggests that the payment
industry has certain incorrect perceptions of the objective of a data protection law and the
obligations of organisations under such a law. As I argued in chapter five, the position of
service providers appears to be that users’ privacy behaviour could undermine any legal
obligation to protect personal information.33 It was implied that a data protection law has not
formed part of active proposals for cybersecurity because certain interests lobby against it.
The data also suggested that industry stakeholders particularly regulators and service
providers regard a data protection law as ‘over-regulation’ and as such may form part of this
lobby interest. Consequently, I concluded that lack of administrative and enforcement
powers under the draft law are attributable to a need to appease the lobby interests.
Although, this was not clearly established, it is also possible to infer that industry lobby may
32 see Bill C-12: An Act to Amend the Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act 19 October 2011; see also Englander v Telus (2004) 247 D.L.R (4th) 275,
[46] where the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal referred to the ‘non-legal drafting’ of the
law.
33 See notes in (a) Personal information is all Information - Why not the Expansionist
Approach? p 153 particularly at 154.
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largely account for lack of legislative proposals on digital signatures and regulation of
payment services.
The data suggested further that pervasive culture of non-compliance and problems of
identity management constitute major challenges to an effective data protection regime in
Nigeria. For example, policy objective to develop central systems for unique identification
have been unrealisable because of the proliferation of identity management in the private
sector and parallel identity programs in the public sector.34Although, the challenges posed
by systemic non-compliance were not underplayed, it was noted that because the draft law
proposes to exclude data processing by the public sector, it promotes inequity and invariably
non-compliance.35
7.4.3 Laws that Regulate (effectively) Criminal (Reactive) Law vs Non-
Criminal Legislation
In order to justify the proposal made at the start of this chapter, it is necessary to restate that
in spite of the challenges of cybercrime law, policy in Nigeria appeared to have focused
almost exclusively on criminal legislation. However, a number of inferences drawn from
juxtaposing the challenges of a data protection regime against those of criminal legislation
shows that this approach is inefficient.
Considered from the perspective of passing a law, it is arguable that a data protection law
could pass legislative debate quicker. As the research data suggests, similar to the
cybercrime law, enforcement provisions in the draft data protection law may have been
influenced by lobby or vested interests.36 However, in contrast to the political fight for turf,
“lobbying” against regulation should be considered a legitimate industry reaction. In other
words, regulation ordinarily implies burden and no one likes to be burdened, therefore, the
overriding consideration for government should be that its duty to protect its citizens
outweighs industry interests to avoid regulation.
Also, if viewed from the perspectives of effectiveness and efficiency of the law, regulatory
laws such as a data protection law would be more effective because they are preventive.
While criminal laws are essentially reactive, and may therefore signify the failure of
regulation in the first place, preventive legislation is anticipatory, and has distinctive
advantages in the area of crime prevention. Arguably, legislation that regulates to prevent
crimes means that Nigeria ends up with smaller percentage of cybercrimes. Consequently,
34 See notes in 5.4.3 Challenges of Identity Management p 169.
35 See 5.4.2 Non-compliance with Regulation- ‘The Culture of Impunity’ p 167.
36 ibid 168.
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less use will be made of the criminal law and less burden placed on the penal system. There
would also be less demand for the unavailable forensic expertise in law enforcement as is
presently the case in Nigeria. Also, following the regulatory scheme in chapter six,37 the
cumulative effect of regulatory laws will raise the stakes for service providers. If they must
comply with the laws, they have to develop technologies which make hacking, theft and
privacy compromise difficult, if not impossible. In this way, the law invariably aids the
development of technology and boosts confidence in e-payments and e-commerce which are
the goals of policy in Nigeria.
In addition to encouraging technological innovation and development, laws that prevent
criminal access to information systems can also lead to cost savings for the government and
users. For example, the regulatory schema in chapter six places the burden of regulation on
industry. This is a rational approach however it is viewed. Firstly, industry is better
positioned to bear such burden in terms of cost and expertise. Secondly, industry introduced
e-payment systems, presumably for users’ convenience, but arguably also to save cost and
increase business profitability. It is therefore correspondingly reasonable to make industry
bear the legal, technical and other incidental costs of securing the payment systems. Since
imposing regulatory burdens on industry also implicate the development and
implementation of appropriate technologies by industry, this translates into cost savings in
the areas of crime control and losses to fraud for government and users respectively. One
could argue further that by implementing regulation on data protection and similar laws,
government could generate income through fees and regulatory fines imposed for non-
compliance. Therefore, because similar to other policy objectives, cybersecurity must
compete for the allocation of resources, a shift to proactive legal measures that prevent
cybercrimes ensure the achievement of cybersecurity at optimal cost. 38
With respect to the challenges of non-compliance with regulation, it would be correct to say
that whether or not there is a culture of non-compliance, non-compliance must be
considered a real risk of any legislative framework. Depending on the system and the
subject of regulation, the risks may be marginal or significant. Therefore, the correct
approach is for policy to access the risks and then determine whether realistic thresholds for
compliance and non-compliance could be set and are acceptable.39 Without undertaking this
37 See Figure 6.1 p 213.
38 For example in addition to cybercrimes, policy must also prioritise resource allocation to
terrorism and general insecurity which Nigeria presently contends with.
39 See notes on Regulatory Impact Assessment below.
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assessment, it could be deemed irresponsive of government to refrain from regulating
activities clearly in need of regulation simply because it anticipates non-compliance.
Furthermore, arguments in chapter six demonstrate that apart from preventing the crimes, if
identity theft and fraud do occur, non-criminal laws provide certainty on the allocation of
liability to further imbue trust in e-transactions. Infact, it was noted in chapter four that
some offences under the proposed cybercrime law such as access in excess of authority
would be effective only if supplemented by statutory provisions to report breaches under a
data protection regime.40 Therefore, whether they are meant to deal with acceptance and
trust issues,41 or with security threats or crimes, or with consequential liability problems,
non-criminal laws provide the needed scope for regulation.
Finally, it is arguable that unlike cybercrime laws, data protection laws could be more easily
enforced nationally and even internationally. For example, organisations which would be
target of regulation can be identified by national regulators. Also, drafted correctly, the data
protection law could be made to have extra-territorial effect. The EU Data Protection law is
a good example in this respect. The law requires that third countries have adequate levels of
data protection as a condition for transfer of European origin data to such countries.
Therefore, without direct enforcement, the law imposes its own standard of data protection
on third countries.42
It is important to state however that the intention here is not to argue that criminal
legislation is completely irrelevant. Invariably, crimes would be committed and the criminal
law would be needed to punish offenders. Indeed as Lord Colville aptly observed;
The analogy must be with the household and the burglar. We do not wish to
suggest to the householder that he must take precautions to make his house
absolutely impregnable to a burglar, because we all know that that is
impossible.43
The objective here is to demonstrate that criminal legislation is not a standalone solution
even to cybercrime problems. Therefore, rather than focus on the cybercrime law in a way
which suggests that it synonymous with cybersecurity, policy in Nigeria must consider it
only as part of a composite framework for cybersecurity. In this thesis, I have argued that
40 See notes in 4.2.3.2 Unauthorised Access in Excess of Authority p 104 at 106.
41 See notes in 2.4.4 Developing E-commerce p 43 at 45.
42 See Directive 95/46/EC art 25.
43 Viscount Colville, ‘Computer Misuse Bill [HL] (1989/90) 230, 233.
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the effectiveness of data security or technical based security measures is inherently limited.
In addition to misuse by industry, data security measures also have the propensity to fail. I
have also argued that industry is incapable of effecting composite cybersecurity because
industry private ordering systems such as the PCIDSS are not uniformly applied and
enforced. More significantly, I conceded to arguments that private ordering systems pre-
empt legal regulation and may represent an attempt to exclude such regulation. 44 I
concluded that following Lessig’s modalities of control, only a mix of the regulatory
modalities backed by the force of law would ensure composite cybersecurity. The approach
to cybersecurity proposed above would therefore be consistent with the definitions and
mechanisms expected to be deployed to achieve cybersecurity.45
7.5 Recommendations for Achieving Cybersecurity in E-payment
Systems in Nigeria
In this section, I propose, in more specific terms, the solutions required to effect
cybersecurity in e-payment systems in Nigeria. The recommendations made here are based
on the evaluation of gaps in law, policy and enforcement in the area of cybersecurity in
Nigeria. I demonstrate through the analysis that the arguments above can be streamlined
into clear and practical recommendations which are also applicable to cybersecurity in its
broader scope.
The recommendations are highlighted as follows:
(1) Passing cybersecurity laws that impact on payment service regulation and
prevention of identity-related cybercrimes
(2) Setting up specialised and regulatory agencies to implement cybersecurity laws
(3) Developing capacity in the area of cybersecurity
(4) Harmonising identity management programs to make identity management more
effective
(5) Incorporating regulatory impact assessment into decision making processes of
government.
(6) Ensuring the effective Implementation of National Cybersecurity Strategy through
understanding Private/ Public Partnership as an advantage with a Caveat
(7) Engaging in education and public awareness programs on a larger and more
extensive scale
44 See notes in 6.4.1.1 Technology is Expensive p 189 at 190.
45 See notes in (d)Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) p 82 at 85.
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7.5.1 Enactment of Cybersecurity Laws for Electronic Transactions
It is trite that legislation is generally imperfect. However as demonstrated in chapters five
and six of this thesis, laws are fundamental for setting and enforcing security standard for e-
transactions. This is borne out by the fact that when used appropriately, laws as command-
and-control regulation can provide clarity, certainty, and predictability. It allows both the
general public and the regulated institutions to know what is required and determine
whether it is being achieved.46Furthermore, laws contain provisions for sanctions. Since
punishment is expensive and has implications for the cost of doing business, businesses are
more likely to comply with laws. Laws can therefore establish clear penalty regimes unlike
standards such as the PCIDSS where this is unclear. The analyses in chapters two, three and
five inidicate that legislation is required to regulate data processing, digital signature and
payment systems.
7.5.1.1 Regulating Data Processing
Chapter five of this thesis considered the relevance of data protection law to the prevention
of identity related cybercrimes. It is important to summarise here the specific reasons which
make the law imperative in Nigeria. Data protection is about social and legal responsibility
of the government. This encapsulates protection from crime and exploitation. As an
example, the analyses of the cybercrime threats in chapter three demonstrate that if
criminals gain access to proprietary systems operated by banks or other payment or even
non-payment service providers, the resulting data breach could lead to large scale identity
fraud which puts more citizens at risk. Government’s role in this aspect is to minimise the
possibilities of such large scale compromise through regulation of data processing which
would include principles for security and safeguard of personal information.
Apart from fraud prevention, government also needs to protect fundamental rights of
privacy and dignity which are undermined by information systems. To illustrate, due to the
imperatives of the digital economy, and perhaps on account of cultural perceptions on
privacy,47 Nigerians have not opposed large scale processing of personal data such as the
NIMC’s national electronic identity card.48 It is arguable that without mandating legal
standards for data protection, these activities would also amount to exploitation. In other
46
OECD, ‘Reducing the Risk of Policy Failure: Challenges for Regulatory Compliance’
(OECD 2000) 21 <http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/46466287.pdf>accessed
10/04/2015.
47 See notes in (a)Personal information is all Information - Why not the Expansionist
Approach? p 153 at 154.
48 Compare in this respect the fact that the UK abonded its identity card project over privacy
concerns. See eg Identity Documents Act 2010 which repealed Identity Cards Act 2006.
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words, if conventional notions of privacy, such as those contained in the Nigerian
constitution are effectively dead,49 then lack of legal protection for personal information
must be taken as indicating that the government, its agencies and private institutions have
capitalised on a people’s willingness to trade their personal information for the necessity of
transactions. 50 Conversely, a data protection law would represent government’s
corresponding obligation to ensure that processing agencies do not misuse the information
they collect from citizens and that they protect users’ privacy and dignity.
Additionally, as analysis in chapter two of the thesis indicate, new payment systems,
institutions and services have developed in Nigeria since policy introduced and mandated
the use of e-payment systems. In the case of data protection, this translates into a lack of
uniform standard for protection of personal information in respective sectors engaged in or
connected with the provision of e-payments. For example, different sets of incomprehensive
industry guidelines regulate providers of telecom and banking/financial services and it is
still unclear what data protection laws would regulate emerging online payment service
providers. The appropriate approach therefore is to pass a general or omnibus data
protection law which has the potential to foster uniformity and standardisation. Notably, a
general law does not exclude respective sectors from formulating additional guidelines on
data processing, provided such guidelines conform to the standards in the law or set higher
standards.51
Moreover, it is arguable that due to increasing population online and the mobility facilitated
by technological development, a data protection law is imperative for Nigeria. According to
Greenleaf for example, apart from its global influence, a country’s population is also a basis
for enacting a data protection law. 52 Statistics have shown that Nigeria has the highest
population of internet users in Africa.53 Therefore, even if statistics also fail to indicate the
level of threats to online transactions, a data protection law is fundamental to gaining users’
confidence and further integrating Nigeria into the digital economy. As Gillen rightly points
out, ‘Now instead of debating the nature of the space … [governments] are concerned with
49 See eg Micheal Froomkin, ‘The Death of Privacy?’ (2000) Stanford Law Review 1461;
see also notes in 5.2.1.1 Distinguishing Data protection from Privacy p 141 at 143.
50 ibid (notes 5.2.1.1)
51 Graham Greenleaf, ‘The Influence of European Data Privacy Standards outside Europe:
Implications for Globalisation of convention 108’ (2012) 2(2) International Data Privacy
Law 68.
52 ibid.
53See Internet world Stats, Internet Users in Africa 2014-
Q2<http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm> accessed 22/02/2015.
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controlling access to data and potential for interactions it provides.54 As a further example,
although it was criticised for being anticipatory and pre-emptive,55 the EU Directive on data
protection is now one of the most comprehensive and influential data protection instruments
in the world. This demonstrates that even if the perceptions of the risks are low, a data
protection law is still a legitimate regulatory instrument in the Nigerian context.
Finally, it is important to restate here that expanding the powers of the regulator and
providing for data breach reporting are particularly essential to the effectiveness of a data
protection law. For example, by providing regulators with powers to issue large and
extensive fines, the law would underline the rationality that the cost of disobedience needs
to be set above any possible benefit of non-compliance. With respect to data breach and data
notification, I argued in chapter three that organisations fail to report breaches because law
and regulation have not distinguished data breaches from general security breaches. I also
argued that although the distinction may be highly technical, since there is lack of reporting
requirement for data breaches, organisations may justifiably treat data breach as a threat
which could be dealt with by organisations’ internal security mechanisms.56 In order to
eliminate the technicality therefore, a data protection law must provide that organisations
report data breaches regardless of whether they expect consequential fraud to follow such
breaches. It is notable in this regard that the US, which has no general legislation on data
protection, is proposing to introduce a federal data breach disclosure law.57 It is also notable
that the reform of the European Data Protection Directive includes provisions for mandatory
data breach reports.58
7.5.1.2 Payment Services Regulation
It was noted in chapter two that to address regulatory challenges in e-payment systems, the
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) relies on banking legislation and a number of ad hoc
54 Martina Gillen, ‘Lawyers and Cyberspace: Seeing the Elephant?’ (2012) 9(2) Scripted
131,142.
55 See eg Paul M Schwartz & Joel R Reidenberg, ‘Data Privacy Law: A Study of United
States Data Protection (1996) cited in Julia Fromholz, ‘The European Union Data Privacy
Directive’ (2014) 15(1) Berkeley Technology Law Journal 461.
56 See notes in 3.3.2.1 Hacking (Unauthorised/Illegal Access to computer Systems) p 56 at
58.
57 See Michael Daniels, ‘What You Need to Know about President Obama’s New Steps on
Cybersecurity’ (The White House Blog Jan 14 2015).
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/01/14/what-you-need-know-about-president-
obama-s-new-steps-cybersecurity> accessed 28/04/2015.
58 See General Data Protection Regulation, art 31.
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guidelines which could potentially create regulatory overlap and conflicts.59 Therefore, not
only is the CBN literally ‘biting more than it can chew’ in terms of regulation, it is also
inhibited by lack of legislation to effectively pursue its regulatory mandate.60 In terms of
regulating the e-payment systems and services and preventing crimes on users and
consumers, new laws regulating payment services would create new and more competent
regulatory regimes, as well as clear liability rules. The UK Payment Services Regulation
(PSR) is a specific example cited in the thesis. The PSR regulates most payment services
including electronic fund transfers, banking, market structures, card schemes, software
vendors and other ancillary providers. The PSR also appointed the Financial Services
Authority (FSA) as the competent authority for its supervision and enforcement. 61
(it is important to note that while the UK has the laws above, initiatives are now being
developed towards a private/public partnership and co-ooperation in the UK. This initiative
is not being recommended here because it has not worked in the UK itself. More laws are
now being developed progressively to counter threats even when these erode privacy. In
Nigeria where compliance is a serious problem and where mechanisms for reporting are
unlikely to be used effectively even if they exist and where there is no enforcement capacity,
a public/private initiative is unlikely to work)
7.5.1.3 Digital Signature Laws
The arguments in chapter three demonstrated that through the use of certification systems,
PKI provides additional security protocol which aids mutual identification and
authentication of contracting parties. As the arguments further demonstrate, implementing
technical security is a complicated process often beyond the technical skill or knowledge of
the average user. Encryption for example may take place independently of a user’s
knowledge or input as communication is usually between the browser and the web server.
As a result, the obligation to encrypt data often falls on organisations handling the data. It
was therefore argued that legislation is needed to standardise technical security processes in
order to enhance their operations and reliability. Also, applying the arguments relating to the
legitimacy and accountability of lock-in technologies in chapter six, the invariable
conclusion is that legislation on digital signature translates to law setting standards rather
than law qualifying technologies.
59 See notes in 2.3.4.4 Payment Institutions – Institutional Framework for E-Payment
Systems in Nigeria p 37.
60 ibid.
61 See Payment Services Regulation 2009 SI 2009/209 reg 2.
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As I argued further in chapter six, a PKI regime enabled by digital signature laws has far
reaching implications for evidence and allocation of liability in cases involving fraudulent
or contested e-payments. 62 For example, although the Nigerian Evidence Act admits
electronic evidence, the law omits the definitions of different forms of electronic signatures.
It also failed to prescribe the weight courts would attach to different forms of electronic
signatures or the means by which the correctness of procedures used to generate the
signatures may be established. 63 To further illustrate this point, in the case of handwritten
signatures, the Evidence Act provides that evidence that a signature is that of a person may
be inferred from the fact that a person having the same name, address, business or
occupation as the maker of the document is admissible as proof that the document was
signed by that person. 64 Correspondingly, the law ought to set out the evidential
requirements for e-signatures. This may include how to verify that the correct procedure
was used in creating the signature and the means of identifying the signer. This is
particularly true with respect to digital signatures which are generated by means of
cryptographic algorithms. Presumably, since they are also be supported by certification
authorities, the reliability of digital signatures depend largely on the credibility of
certification authorities recognised by law.
Therefore, while non-mandatory use of digital signature is consistent with the notion that
laws need to be technology neutral, a digital signature law could bridge the gaps identified
above. For example, by logical assumption, courts would tend to attach strong evidential
value to digital signatures which use a combination of mathematical algorithm and public
key cryptosystem to create unique digital fingerprint associated with a person or entity.65
7.5.2 Creation of Specialised Agency for Cybersecurity
It was noted previously in chapter four and earlier in this chapter that the cybercrime bill
failed to create a central enforcement agency in order to resolve the fight for turf among law
enforcement agencies. I argued that this approach to enforcement is ineffective and
counterproductive. For the purpose of this recommendation, it is important to demonstrate
how this approach would fail to yield the expected results and why it is imperative to create
a central agency for cybersecurity.
62 See notes in 6.4.1.2 Technology as Industry Regulation – Misuse in Evidential Matters
p190 at 191.
63 ibid.
64 See Evidence Act 2011 s 94(1).
65 See notes in (c) Digital signatures p 81.
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In chapter four, it was observed that lack of provision for an implementing agency for the
proposed cybercrime law is indicative of expectations that forensic capacity would be
developed across all law enforcement authorities in Nigeria. However, it was also argued
that an underlying assumption that a blanket power of enforcement to all law enforcement
agencies would result in capacity development may also be displaced. As further argued in
the chapter, such an approach would lead to a “Jack of all trades” situation, where capacity
would exist at mediocre or superficial levels. It was stated that perhaps for similar reasons,
the National Assembly contested the proposal to constitute the Office of the National
Security Adviser (ONSA) into a “coordinating council” for the implementation of the
cybercrime law.66
Apart from inhibiting capacity development, a more critical problem with the (decentralised)
approach to enforcement is its propensity towards perpetuating the fight for turf. I argued in
chapter four that vesting blanket powers on all law enforcement agencies in the area of
implementing the cybercrime law could create rivalry which inhibits the sharing of
information and intelligence.67 For example, the rivalry could lead to different agencies
carving out ‘turf’ in respective areas of cybersecurity in a way which further compounds
problems of access to and reliability of statistics on cyber-threats and cybercrimes. As
specific examples, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) could claim
electronic fraud as its core cybersecurity turf. The National Drug Law Enforcement Agency
(NDLEA) may assert authority to investigate online money laundering and terrorist
financing. The National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP)
may stake its claim on offences related to online child abuse and so on.68
Conversely, if a central agency on cybersecurity exists, all other agencies would be obliged
to share information with the central agency. The Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission (EFCC) is a good example in this respect. The EFCC was set up mainly to
combat economic crimes. This approach makes the EFCC a credible resource on economic
crimes in Nigeria. Therefore, if as argued in chapter three, lack of reliable fraud statistics
contributes to misunderstandings about the nature and extent of cyber-threats in e-payment
systems,69 then the establishment of a central agency would considerably boost reporting
and collation of statistics on cyber-threats and cybercrimes.
66 See 4.6.1 Lack of Computer Forensics Capacity in Law Enforcement p130 at 132.
67 See 4.6.2 The Politics of the “Fight for Turf” p132 at 133.
68 See (n 209) at p 131.
69 See 3.2 The Challenges of Fraud Reporting p 50 at 51.
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It is important to state that in setting up a central cybersecurity agency, a more dynamic
approach is to create the agency through an establishment Act.70 This ensures that the
agency is not dependent on the passage or otherwise of a cybercrime law.71 The approach
would also separate the narrow notion of cybercrime from the broader concept of
cybersecurity. It would side-track ambitious agencies fighting for turf and enable cyber-
threats to be accounted for regardless of whether they have been defined as cybercrimes.72
Consistent with the notion that cybersecurity is not only about cybercrimes and to further
de-emphasise ‘turf’, the agency would be made up of experts in different areas of computer
forensics rather than only of personnel drawn from law enforcement. Therefore, a central
agency would ensure that Nigeria could coordinate her response to cybersecurity, and
develop reliable statistics on cyber-threats to inform policy decisions in the area of
cybersecurity. It will also ensure that Nigeria could effectively collaborate with other
national and international cybersecurity agencies through the sharing of intelligence on
cyber-threats and cybercrimes.
7.5.3 Capacity Development in Computer Forensics
In chapter four, it was noted that stakeholders’ have argued that capacity building without
cybercrime legislation amounts to wasteful dissipation of resources. The converse position
to the effect that laws cannot be effective unless capacity already exists to enforce them was
also noted. The arguments in this area therefore tend to oscillate between claims that laws
cannot exist in isolation of capacity on the one hand and that there can be no capacity
building without legislation on the other hand.73
A correct approach here would entail an understanding of the limits that technology places
on the law itself. It is trite that on account of the evolving nature of technology and volatility
of cyber threats, it would be difficult to achieve a perfect mix of law and expertise at any
given time. This is more so given that law generally lags behind developments in
technology. If this position is correct, then it is realistic to expect some gaps between laws
and achieving the capacity to implement them. In other words, whether laws pre-date or
post-date capacity developments, there is likely to always be a gap. This gap would widen in
countries like Nigeria where the law has so far not responded. For example, it was
mentioned in chapter four that departments already created to ensure control of cybercrimes
70 An example in this respect is the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)
Establishment Act 2004 which set up the EFCC.
71 See further notes on Capacity Development in Computer Forensics below.
72 See notes in 4.1.1 (Not) Defining Cybercrime p 88.
73 See notes in 4.6.1 Lack of Computer Forensics Capacity in Law Enforcement p 130.
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lack the manpower to carry out meaningful investigations and prosecution of suspected
criminals.74 As there are also no specialised courts for cybercrimes, and no training for
judges on the technical aspects of cybercrimes, many cases either do not get to the courts or
are tried without reference to the ‘cyber’ aspect of the crimes.75
Based on the above observations, one could contend that arguments as to whether law
should precede capacity development or not, have become largely irrelevant. This is not
only because capacity is already unwieldy against the crimes, but also because the
arguments lay undue emphasis on the implementation of criminal legislation. In other words,
the arguments are narrow and incomplete because they fail to take cognisance of the broad
scope of cybersecurity and the need to train personnel other than law enforcement agents. It
was mentioned previously in this chapter that cybersecurity is not solely about the
investigation and prosecution of cybercriminals. Cybersecurity is also about preventing
cybercrimes, making information systems resilient, and setting security standards and
ensuring conformity with those standards.
Conversely, capacity development on cybersecurity is not limited to law enforcement. For
example as with cybercrime investigators, technical expertise will be required for data
protection officers. The office of data protection needs to develop expertise to validate
protocols put in place by service providers, investigate security breach notifications and
discover vulnerabilities as well as to review forensic procedures used by organisations to
investigate disputed claims. 76 Consistent with the justifications for data protection and
digital signature laws above, capacity development here would strengthen the prevention of
identity-related cybercrimes. It would also ensure that well-trained data protection officers
could identify threats and vulnerabilities even when organisations fail to detect or report
them.
7.5.4 Centralising Identity Management Program
Chapter five identified centralised identity management as crucial to the effective
implementation of a data protection regime in Nigeria. The critical argument made in the
chapter is to the effect that providers of e-payment and associated services pose substantial
risks to users because they collect personal information without legal regulation. It was
74 ibid 131, an example was given of the Computer Crime Prosecution Unit which has not
prosecuted any cybercriminal since its creation in 2010.
75 See eg Amadi v FRN discussed at p 113.
76 See Steven J Murdoch and Ross Anderson, ‘Security Protocols and Evidence: Where
Many Payment Systems Fail’ <http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/papers/fc14evidence.pdf>
accessed 19/05/2014.
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pointed out that the converse is also true as unreliable identification systems undermine the
data protection regime. In other words, there must be an effective means of establishing
identities for organisations to be confident that they are protecting authentic identity
information. The analysis in chapter five also established that although the law vests the
management of identities on the Nigeria Identity Management Corporation (NIMC), its
objective of developing unique individual identification is undermined by parallel identity
management schemes by both public and private organisations. In practice therefore, what
exists is a patchwork of identity management systems which compound security problems.77
As was further argued in chapter five, apart from concerns about security, multiple identity
programs also have implications for cost. Specific examples include the CBN’s biometric
verification number (BVN) system and the SIM registration exercise by mobile network
providers (MNOs). To further illustrate therefore, since the NIMC already collects personal
information including the biometrics of all Nigerians, its National identity database should
serve as a repository for all public and private organisations for identity verification
purposes. It would also appear logical for the CBN and the NCC to simply revert to this
database for their respective identification needs rather than commence parallel identity
programs. This is more so because the CBN and the NCC are also government institutions
and the simultaneous programs must be funded concurrently by the government. Against
this background, parallel identity programs not only undermine the mandate and core
objective of the NIMC to develop unique identifiers for use offline and online, they are also
needless and wasteful. In view of this position, it is crucial to streamline identity
management system to free up resources to address security which would be a major
concern for the operation of the national identity database.78
The process would entail Government revisiting the expected or desired outcomes of
identity management and the principles, procedures, laws and policies needed to achieve
these outcomes. Specifically, the NIMC Act needs to be amended to map a definitive role
for the government in the creation and assurance of unique identities. This would promote
confidence in the national e-identity card as an identification system validated by public
authority. For organisations, public authority backed unique identifiers gives the assurance
that they are protecting genuine and not fictitious or forged or stolen identities. For users,
unique identifiers provide assurance that they can be correctly identified and authenticated.
For law enforcement, a unique identifier enhances the possibility of correctly identifying
77 See notes in 5.4.3 Challenges of Identity Management p 169.
78 ibid.
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criminals. Unique identification also helps the government to link individuals to identifiers
for access to e-government services.
Conversely, the NIMC itself must be subject to data processing regulations to ensure
responsibility and accountability. Accordingly, as argued in chapter five, a situation in
which the NIMC could be excluded from regulation under the draft data protection law is
unacceptable on legal and ethical grounds.79 Government also needs to imbue trust in the
NIMC identity program and address concerns that it might be another of government’s
many “white elephant projects”.80 This is particularly true in view of the fact that past
identity management programs in Nigeria have failed. For example, the first attempt at
identity management commenced in 1979 with the establishment of the Department of
National Civil Registration (DNCR) which was assigned the responsibility. Until 2007
when its assets were taken over by the NIMC, the DNCR failed to achieve its objectives. It
is therefore concerning that statistics from the NIMC itself indicate that since it commenced
enrolment in 2009, it has failed to make the expected progress in terms of the number of
people it registers per day. This perhaps account for why government issued a definite,
albeit unrealistic, deadline for the completion of enrolment by the end of 2014.81 However,
as suggested below, the proper approach is for government to initiate and sustain awareness
mechanisms which imbue trust in the program.82
7.5.5 Integration of Regulatory Impact Assessment into Decision Making
Process of Government
Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) is a decision process aimed at informing political
decision makers on whether and how to regulate to achieve public policy goals. It entails the
broad analysis of all cost and benefits of a proposed regulatory initiative or of existing
regulation.83 As a systematic evaluation of the potential impacts of government action, RIA
asks questions about cost and benefits, the effectiveness of the regulation in achieving
policy goals and whether there are superior alternative approaches available to government.
The advantages of RIA therefore include cost saving, the ex-ante and ex post evaluation of
79 See 5.4.2 Non-compliance with Regulation- ‘The Culture of Impunity’ p 167 at 168.
80 This is used to describe projects which fail to achieve their objectives after considerable
investment by government.
81 Ben Agande, ‘Jonathan orders NIMC to Register all Nigerians by Dec, 2014’ Vanguard
Newspaper (Lagos, October 12 2003) <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/10/jonathan-
orders-nimc-register-nigerians-dec-2014/> accessed 26/02/2014.
82 See notes on Public Awareness and Education below.
83 OECD, Regulatory Cost Assessment Guidance (OECD Publishing 2014) 9.
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regulatory proposals, and the consideration of diverse interests in policy making through
wide stakeholders’ consultation.84
RIA is an important instrument that should be used by the Nigerian government to ensure
that legislation meets and continues to be relevant in the context of policy objectives. It is
relevant both in the general area of regulation and specific area of regulating technologies.
Applied across the broad spectrum of regulation, RIA can be used to address compliance
problems in Nigeria. For example, because non-compliance is a systemic problem, RIA can
aid the realistic assessment of thresholds for compliance or non-compliance in a specific
industry which is to be the target of regulation. This would enable government to determine
what initiatives, if any, are required to boost compliance and whether rationales exists for
reviewing the cost of disobedience.
In the sphere of digital economy laws, RIA is particularly useful for a number of reasons.
Firstly, because of the relative newness of e-payment systems, an evidence based policy
instrument like the RIA would aid the collection of evidence such as fraud statistics. This
serves to validate the need for regulation and legitimise government action. Secondly, by
encouraging consultation among stakeholders, government would identify possible areas of
misunderstandings and conflicts. This imbues transparency into decision making process for
regulation and has the effect of improving confidence in regulation and promoting voluntary
compliance. Thirdly and more importantly, because technology becomes outdated very
quickly, RIA would aid the assessment of the effectiveness of laws. This is particularly true
because when laws operate in a technology context, they need to be routinely updated in
line with the assessment of the threats. This could inform decisions on whether and how to
update or amend existing legislation. Therefore, although RIA does not become a substitute
for political decision making, its empirical approach makes it a useful tool in the
development, review and revision of significant legislation.85
7.5.6 Effective Implementation of National Cybersecurity Strategy-
Understanding Private/ Public Partnership as an advantage with a Caveat
Policy initiatives to underline the significance of cybersecurity have included the
development and implementation of national cybersecurity strategies. 86 A national
84 For a more comprehensive explanation on RIA, see OECD, Reviews of Regulatory
Reform Regulatory Impact Analysis a tool for Policy Coherence (OECD Publishing 2009).
85 ibid 12.
86 See e.g. International Strategy for Cyberspace 2011(USA), Australian Government,
Cybersecurity Strategy (2009); Canada’s Cybersecurity Strategy 2010 and The UK
Cybersecurity Strategy: Protecting and Promoting the UK in a Digital World (Nov. 2011).
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cybersecurity strategy is often a policy document outlining the modalities for achieving
cybersecurity. Following this trend, the Office of National Security Adviser (ONSA) in
Nigeria produced two policy documents referred to as the National Cybersecurity Policy
and the National Cybersecurity Strategy.87 Fundamental aspects of the cybersecurity policy
and strategy include recognition of the need to designate certain information infrastructures
as critical national infrastructure (CNI) and the procedures for such designation. Other
aspects of cybersecurity dealt with include recognising the need for legal frameworks and
capacity development in the area of cybersecurity. The strategy further articulated three
clear approaches as conditions for successful implementation. These are private/public
sector partnership, stakeholders’ collaboration and international cooperation.88
While the strategy is a positive development in the respects highlighted above, it is arguable
that it is still largely a policy document containing vague political statements. To illustrate,
it is trite that cybersecurity requires significant resource input on the part of government.
However, the strategy omits to demonstrate government’s commitment in terms of the cost
of implementing or achieving the objectives of the strategy. The commitment of £860
million to the National Cybersecurity Strategy programme over a period of five years in the
UK is an example here. 89 A similar approach in Nigeria would enable government to set
realistic goals on the means of achieving cybersecurity and on the cost of such achievement.
Further aspects of the cybersecurity strategy which suggest lack of commitment to
implementation include provisions for review after a period of five years. It is arguable that
this provision shows lack of appreciation for the evolving nature of cyber-threats and the
urgency of cybersecurity measures. For example, since Nigeria does not currently have
regulatory framework on cybersecurity, it would have been reasonable for the policy to set
review for a shorter period such as two years. This would enable the ONSA to review the
cybersecurity policy and strategy in the light of developments (or lack of developments) in
regulatory frameworks. More importantly, as the success of the cybersecurity strategy is
87 It is not clear why there is a separate policy and strategy document as both appear to have
similar objectives and scope. See National Cybersecurity Policy December 2014
<https://cert.gov.ng/images/uploads/NATIONAL_CYBESECURITY_POLICY.pdf>; see
also National Cybersecurity Strategy December 2014 <http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
D/Cybersecurity/Documents/National_Strategies_Repository/Nigeria_2014_NATIONAL_
CYBESECURITY_STRATEGY.pdf> accessed 12/11/2015.
88 ibid National Cybersecurity Strategy [para 1.1 – 1.6]
89 This sum appears to have been reviewed upwards to 1.9 billion, see Chancellor’s Speech




hinged on stakeholders’ cooperation and information sharing through private/public
partnerships (or PPP), it is essential to highlight the problematic aspects of these solutions.
It was noted earlier in this thesis that lack of information sharing among stakeholders on
cybercrime and cyber-threats is a major hindrance to understanding the challenges posed by
cybercrime and the responses which may be developed. Therefore, cooperation among
stakeholders is an essential aspect of cybersecurity. However, while seemingly positive and
even simplistic, achieving stakeholders’ cooperation poses significant challenges. The
problem of international cooperation in the area of cybersecurity particularly as it relates to
the legal and social contexts of cybercrimes have been highlighted earlier in this chapter.
The arguments will not be repeated here save to reiterate that while international
cooperation appear attractive in theory, it is difficult to implement in practice.90 In fact, it
has been noted that to achieve international cooperation in cybersecurity, a nation must
agree on international norms of behaviour with like-minded nations.91
Private/public partnership (PPP) is another major area which might present a problem. PPP
is particularly important because of its increasing relevance in cybersecurity discourse. In
the UK, for example, government launched a private/public partnership initiative tagged the
Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership (CISP) in 2013. The CISP delivers a key
component of the UK cybersecurity strategy by facilitating the sharing of information on
cyber threats in order to make UK businesses more secure in cyberspace.92 As in the UK,
the rationale behind cybersecurity PPP in Nigeria includes the need for wider stakeholders’
engagement and information sharing. Specifically, the cybersecurity strategy recognised the
position of the private sector as builders, owners and operators of much of the critical
information infrastructures (CII) upon which government itself leverage to provide some of
its services.93PPP is therefore justifiable on the grounds that the private sector itself is
potentially the largest economic victim of cybercrime and has much to benefit from
information sharing. Furthermore, it is arguable that however expansive its resources, none
90 See previous notes in 7.4.1 Cybercrime Bill 2014- Intractable Challenges of Enforcement
and Effectiveness at 222.
91 See e.g Chancellor Speech to GCHQ (n 89).
92 See Press Release, ‘Government Launches Information Sharing on Cyber Security’
available <www.gov.uk> accessed 09/11/2015.
93 See National Cybersecurity Strategy 2014 [para 10.2] (n 87)
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of the respective stakeholders, whether the private or public sector, could have complete
vicinity of the problem of cyber threats if they acted alone.94
In spite of its advantages, the problematic aspects of PPP include how to foster trust
between the partnering private and public sectors to facilitate information sharing in the first
place. It also includes possible conflicts of interests. For example, under an ideal PPP,
partners would be required to share information on security breaches and cyber threats and
even vulnerabilities. However, it may be impossible to achieve this ideal because private
sector organisations are likely to continue to put reputational concerns before their
partnership obligations to share information. Also, in practice, organisations are likely to
anticipate regulatory reprisals which may lead to adverse publicity and reputational damage
even when they share information with the government. It was argued earlier in the thesis
that this is the basis on which information sharing among service providers, regulators and
law enforcement under the Nigeria Electronic Fraud Forum (NEFF) initiative is bound to
fail.95 On its part, government may refrain from sharing intelligence with the private sector
based on considerations of national security, or on grounds that certain information is
classified or sensitive. Generally therefore, PPP in the area of cybersecurity would operate
under a regime of mutual distrust and suspicion.
Closely related to the issue of trust is how the partnering sectors can avoid conflicts of
interests. For example, government’s role as a regulator may conflict with its role as a
partner. To underline the tendency of PPP to create this conflict, a commentary noted as
follows;
What is the proper way to reconcile –or at least balance- the desire to assure
companies that cooperation is beneficial and not an undue risk, while also
holding them accountable for deficient security measures or for failing to
provide timely and adequate disclosures of cyber vulnerabilities and attacks?
The public and private sectors are struggling with that question and legislative
efforts have thus far fallen short of providing an adequate answer.96
94 See e.g. Press Release, ‘Government Launches Information Sharing on Cyber Security’ (n
92).
95 See previous notes in 6.4.2.3 Inability of Industry to meet the Index for Good Regulation
203 particularly at 204.
96 Judith H Germano, ‘Cybersecurity Partnerships: A New Era of Public-Private
Collaboration’ (2014) Centre on Law and Security New York University Law School, 6
available
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Further issues which may give rise to conflicts include claims by private sector
organisations that their obligations to protect their users’ privacy and other interests conflict
with their partnership obligation to share information. More crucially, it can be argued that
private sectors may view PPPs as mere political rhetoric or even as patronising since
governments can and do implement parallel laws and policies capable of giving them (the
governments) mandatory access into private or proprietary information systems. Examples
in this respect include the recently passed Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA)
which in the US will serve as the legal basis for mandatory information sharing between the
private and public sectors.97 Also, although limited to data breaches, EU law now proposes
to introduce mandatory reporting of security breaches.98
It is important to state that the intention here is not to argue that PPP is without merit, or that
it should not be used. On the contrary, the foregoing observations are intended to
demonstrate that there are significant barriers to overcome if cybersecurity PPP would work
effectively in Nigeria. It is therefore recommended here that the proposed PPP should
incorporate a number of further elements for effectiveness. Firstly, the PPP must develop
modalities for information sharing built on clear guidelines. This may include the
development of a code of conduct for information sharing which outlines the rights and
obligations of the partners and addresses the privacy interests of users and consumers of
private and public sector organisations. Secondly, the PPP must incorporate modalities for
developing a high level of trust and incentives for information sharing. For example, the
code of conduct may also provide for circumstances where organisations may be exempted
from prosecution by customers or users in consequence of information sharing. Thirdly, to
ensure accuracy and reliability of information, the partners must develop infrastructure for a
virtual collaborative environment so that information can be shared in real time. Finally,
while the government and the private sector in Nigeria continue to work on developing trust,
the focus of policy should also shift to areas where PPP are more likely to achieve farther-
reaching successes. This would include government investment and collaboration in
innovation and research which may indirectly facilitate information exchange without the
attendant distrust between the partners.
<http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/Documents/Cybersecurity.Partnerships.pdf>
accessed 03/11/2015.
97 See Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act 2015 (US) s 754.
98 See General Data Protection Regulation, art 31.
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7.5.7 Public Awareness and Education
According to the ITU;
Nigeria does not have any officially recognized national or sector-specific
educational and professional training programs for raising awareness with the
general public, promoting cybersecurity courses in higher education and
promoting certification of professionals in either the public or the private
sectors.99
Against the background of the above observation, one must argue that creating public
awareness on the nature of the threats online is an important aspect of preventing
cybercrimes and promoting cybersecurity. Although service providers already take this
approach, the scope of education is narrow relative to the threats. 100 For example, most
providers focus on creating awareness information only on in relation to e-mail based
phishing scams. However, the growing use of mobile banking and mobile payments also
suggests that criminals would migrate to mobile payment platforms. Therefore, in addition
to creating awareness about well-known scams, providers should also provide awareness on
evolving threats. With respect to mobile payments for example, this would include
educating users on how to differentiate between official mobile banking applications and
rouge applications, as well as how to check and update payment and banking applications.
On the part of government, broader awareness programs are also required. For example, in
addition to the computer emergency response team (CERT) launched in May 2015,101
government must also sponsor public awareness programs which would further educate
users particularly on the significance of registering with the NIMC for identification and
verification purposes. Government must also take the lead in creating awareness among
service providers on the need for data protection and other regulatory regimes and the legal
and social responsibility implicit in the passage of cybersecurity laws.
Conclusion
In this chapter, the clear issues that justify legal interference in cybersecurity initiatives
were highlighted and re-examined. The issues include misunderstandings of the nature and
extent of cyber-threats as shown by the culture of denial and social and policy perceptions
99 ITU, ‘Cyberwellness Profile Nigeria’ <http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
D/Cybersecurity/Documents/Country_Profiles/Nigeria.pdf>, 2
100 See notes in 6.4.3 The Law and Regulation of Users p 205 at 208 .
101 See https://www.cert.gov.ng/ accessed 28/06/2015.
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of cybercrime. They also include politics or political considerations as evidenced by the
battle for turf and lack of political will to establish reliable identity management systems.
As a basis for the proposal on cybersecurity in Nigeria, the chapter further summarised the
main findings and arguments throughout the thesis. The arguments restate the central role of
legislation in ensuring the security for e-payment systems. They also demonstrate that while
cybercrime and cybersecurity are global concerns, the imperatives of legislation need to be
moderated by an understanding of the limits of respective legal frameworks in the context of
different legal systems, societies and cultures. It was argued that on account of the
limitations created by the Nigerian social, political and enforcement environment, policy
should focus on non-criminal regulation and promote legislation in this area.
While this proposal appears to be against the weight of the evidence which centres on a
criminal law based resolution, the arguments made in the chapter provide justifications for
the approach. The analysis juxtaposed the peculiar and problematic contexts of both reactive
and preventive laws to arrive at the conclusion that proactive laws aid technological
developments which prevent identity-related cybercrimes in the first place. The chapter
concluded with a list of recommendations needed to achieve the security of e-payments. On




Conclusion of Central Thesis
8.1 Revisiting the Research Question
As a basis for understanding the challenges of implementing cybersecurity in Nigeria, this
thesis set out to examine the legal and regulatory responses to identity-related cybercrimes
in e-payment systems. Specifically, the thesis investigated the nature of cybercrime threats
to identity information and the reasons underpinning the legal and regulatory responses (or
lack of responses) to the threats. The objectives of the research were encapsulated in seven
research questions. The central research question formulated by the thesis is, to what extent
has the Nigerian law evolved to meet the challenges of cybersecurity in electronic
transactions?
In order to place the analysis within the context of e-payment systems, the thesis also
formulated ancillary questions as follows; what are e-payment systems and what role do
they play in development and governance in Nigeria? How do cybercrimes threaten e-
payment systems and how has industry and policy responded to the threats? To what extent
has the criminal law responded to the threats of cybercrimes and what reasons account for
the response(s) or lack of it? How does the understanding of data protection regimes aid the
prevention of identity related cybercrimes and to what extent has the Nigerian law
integrated data protection standards? How do theories of cyberspace regulation aid the
understanding of the limits of private ordering systems and self-regulation in the context of
controlling identity-related crimes in e-payment systems? To aid the development of the
electronic economy and considering the context of the Nigerian society and nature of
cybercrimes, how should the law best address the challenges of identity related cybercrimes
in e-payment systems?
In the following discussion, I summarise the main answers provided in the respective
chapters of the thesis.
To set the background for the investigation, chapter one of the thesis highlights the
problems and sets the hypothesis. The chapter also identifies the questions sought to be
answered and the methodologies used in the research.
In addressing the main research question, the thesis surmised that there are presently no
legal measures in place to address the specific problems of cybersecurity. It then examined
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this claim by perusal and analysis of policies, laws and regulatory frameworks throughout
the thesis. Overall, the research established that although the industry is in denial, and the
scale of cybercrime is unascertainable, there is policy awareness of the threats posed by
cybercrimes to electronic transactions and to the consumers. However, as analyses in
chapters four, five and six demonstrate, Nigerian laws in the areas of cybersecurity have
remained largely under-developed. For example, there are no laws regulating providers of
electronic services, or laws setting out the liability structure in electronic fraud cases. There
are also no data protection laws to protect personal information of consumers and no
legislation on cybercrime. The research further revealed that even where proposals for laws
have been made, they are mired in political considerations and fraught with interpretational
and implementation problems which could render resulting legislation ineffective.
In answer to the central research question, the thesis demonstrated that while policy
promotes e-payments and e-transactions, it has failed to develop corresponding legislation
to promote trust and confidence in the transactions. Therefore, the laws in Nigeria have not
evolved in any significant way to address the challenges of cybersecurity in electronic
transactions.
In chapter two, the legal status of e-payments and e-moneys in Nigeria was discussed. It was
argued that although they are not currency, e-money and e-payments have analogous
functions to currency because they facilitate trade, and function in discharge of monetary
obligations once acceptable to the parties involved. It was further argued that to the extent
that they perform these functions, e-payments and e-moneys have the same legal effect as
currency. Therefore, losses and fraud in e-payment systems are tantamount to loss of money
or monetary value. However, it was also argued that because they are not legal tender
money, acceptance of e-payments and e-money systems depends largely on the existence of
enforceable legal rules and standards which promote users trust and confidence.
The arguments also highlight the fact that increasing internet access and innovations in the
payment industry as well as mobility and convenience drives growth of e-payments schemes.
Consequently, in addition to traditional payment service providers such as banks, new
players have evolved in the payment service industry. However, as the arguments further
suggest, because of antecedents of bank failures and consumer confidence problems,
acceptance of e-payment in Nigeria have be driven by policy initiatives mandating its use
rather by recognition and acceptance by users. The analysis concluded that this development
calls for a re-evaluation of laws and regulations relating to financial services.
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In order to highlight the significance of e-payment systems to economic and social
developments, further analysis in chapter two identified the social and economic advantages
of new innovations in payment systems. It was noted that e-payment systems will enhance
policy objectives to boost financial inclusion, reduce the cost of cash, improve consumer
convenience and develop e-commerce. Although, it was also argued that e-payment systems
could lead to reduction in crimes, chapter two concluded that the attendant threats of
cybercrime corresponded to the expected benefits of the new e-payment systems.
Chapter three examined the cybercrimes that threaten e-payment systems. The analysis of
the concept of identity demonstrated the overlap between real and digital identities and why
both forms of identities are relevant to the discourse on cybersecurity. The chapter further
analysed hacking, phishing, and malware propagation as the main cyber-threats to e-
payment systems. It was noted that hacking considerably threatens proprietary network
systems and criminals employ phishing and spamming tactics to exploit both providers and
users of e-payment services. However, because of lack of credible and reliable statistics on
the scale of the crime, it was argued that the extent of the crime cannot be fully known. The
analysis therefore highlights lack of crime statistics as a possible factor contributing to the
failure of law and policy to respond to the threats of cybercrimes in Nigeria.
The concluding part of chapter three examined the nature of responses provided by the
financial industry to control identity-related crimes. The analysis established that
authentication protocols and encryption technology as well as the PCIDSS standards
developed by the payment card industry represent the main industry responses to combat the
threats of cybercrimes and protect users’ personal information. The analysis further
established that while these technical measures are admittedly indispensable to the security
of the payment systems, their effectiveness is impaired by the growing technical
sophistication of criminal attacks and lack of legal frameworks such as those regulating
digital signatures.
Chapter four evaluated the criminal law response to the specific cybercrimes identified in
chapter three. In order to set the background for the analysis of the law, the chapter
examined the state of the Nigerian law on cybercrime. It was noted that there are presently
no specific laws which criminalises cybercrime. In order to demonstrate the limits of extant
criminal legislation in the area of cybercrimes, the provisions of the Nigerian Criminal laws
including the Criminal Code Act and the Advance Fee Fraud Act were examined. It was
argued that provisions in the laws relating to trespass and damage to property, as well as to
theft, impersonation and fraud were either inapplicable or inadequate to deal with
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cybercrimes such as hacking and phishing. The chapter also examined the proposed
cybercrime law, the Cybercrime Bill 2014. Possible interpretation challenges of the
proposed law were examined with reference to the UK Computer Misuse Act (CMA) 1990.
It was argued in particular that the cybercrime bill failed to strike the appropriate balance
between certain types of cybercrimes, such as hacking, and the punishment for the crime.
The bill also failed to criminalise identity theft. More crucially, the bill failed to make
significant improvements in the area of developing the concept of computer-related fraud.
Therefore, it still remains a grey area whether a person is criminally liable if he steals
personal information by misrepresenting himself to a computer system.
Chapter four concluded with the examination of the enforcement challenges of the proposed
cybercrime law. The chapter draws on evidence from the research data to conclude that
politics and lobby interests, as well as enforcement challenges contribute significantly to the
slow response of criminal legislation on cybercrime in Nigeria.
Chapter five of the thesis examined the regulation of data processing in Nigeria. It was
argued that data protection law is a viable legislative instrument for preventing identity
related crimes in the multi-stakeholder industry of e-payment services. Chapter five
therefore evaluates the concept of data protection. To clarify the nature and functions of data
protection relative to privacy, the chapter examined the distinctions between the concepts of
privacy and data protection. It was argued that in contrast to privacy, data protection
protects specific privacy rights involved when personal data is processed.
Also, in chapter five the guidelines and regulations on data protection in the banking and
telecommunications sectors in Nigeria were examined. It was argued that regulation of data
processing in the respective sectors is incomprehensive and cannot accommodate the new
threats to data processing activities. The examination of the NIMC’s e-identity card and
NCC’s SIM registration as well as the CBN’s BVN exercise suggested that there is a need
for a more comprehensive and uniform approach to data protection.
Chapter five concluded the analysis on data protection by drawing on the empirical work
and the literature. It identified non-compliance and identity management as the main
barriers to an effective data protection regime in Nigeria. Therefore, the chapter established
that as far as data protection is concerned, the law has not developed sufficiently to address
potential threats to personal or identifying information.
In order to demonstrate how the theories of regulation aid an understanding of the limits of
self-regulation currently operative in the Nigerian e-payment industry, chapter six evaluates
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different theories of regulation of cyberspace. The chapter considered the self-regulatory
approach promoted by the cyberlibertarians and concluded that the approach generally falls
short of what true regulation entails. After examining the alternative position proposed by
the cyberpaternalists, the chapter finds that Lessig’s theory of modalities of control built
around law, code, market, and norms provides a useful explanation of how regulatory
mechanisms which work in real space also apply to the cyberspace. Although, because of
the difficulties of formulating widely acceptable normative preferences, it was argued that
Lessig’s notion of norms be substituted for ‘users’, the chapter generally concede to the
correctness of Lessig’s proposal to the effect that regulation by law is central to the
effectiveness of other modalities of regulation in cyberspace.
Accordingly, and to justify the position advocated by the theory, the chapter considered the
respective limitations of industry, technology and users in controlling crimes in e-payment
systems in Nigeria. It was established that technical standards are not wholly efficient
because of the volatility of technology, its associated costs and the propensity of industry to
manipulate and misuse technical security measures. It was also established that market
considerations such as asymmetric information and the operation of negative externalities
demonstrate that industry is often motivated by self-interest and is incapable of self-
regulation. It was further argued that ability of users is limited by the complexity and cost of
technology and even attempts to educate users on the threats online may yield conflicting
and unanticipated results. To this end, the chapter concluded that although controlling
identity-related cybercrimes entails the broad spectrum of the mechanisms for cybersecurity,
law is central and promotes, rather than marginalise non-legal mechanisms of regulation.
In chapter seven, it was argued further that cybersecurity laws need to be carefully and
selectively deployed in order to be effective in the context of the Nigerian society. It was
proposed that laws which prevent rather than those that react to cybercrimes are likely to be
effective in controlling identity-related crimes in e-payment systems. In making the
argument, the chapter summarised the main findings in the thesis which underpin the
proposal. These include the effects of the social and policy perceptions of cybercrimes on
the effectiveness of criminal legislation, and the attendant problems of enforcement due to
the battle for turf, as well as lack of capacity for enforcement and the general ineffectiveness
of criminal legislation in the area of cybercrime. The arguments demonstrate that a proposal
to promote non-criminal legislation is supported by the imperatives of the digital economy,
encouraging technological development and achieving policy objectives at minimal cost.
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Chapter seven made specific recommendation for achieving cybersecurity in Nigeria. The
recommendations suggest that although no legislation is perfect in the sense of achieving all
its expected objectives, non-criminal laws minimise the problems and make cybersecurity
more achievable. The recommendations also suggest that to achieve cybersecurity, an
amalgam of laws rather than one specific law or the other is needed. The chapter therefore
concludes by demonstrating how cybersecurity would best be achieved considering the
Nigerian social, political and legal contexts.
8.2 Broader Application of Research
It was noted in the introductory chapter to this thesis that a solution to identity-related
cybercrimes in e-payment systems has wider implications for the development of
appropriate responses to different types of cybercrimes and cyber-threats. These may
include the use of the internet for money laundering and terrorist financing. Therefore, since
the overall objective of the thesis is to understand the challenges of implementing
cybersecurity in Nigeria, the arguments and data generated by the research, as well as the
conclusions are transposable to the general area of cybersecurity.
As examples, the data suggests that government should expect denials of the pervasiveness
of cybercrime particularly where there are industry and service provider interests at stake.
Lobbying from vested interests is also to be expected when regulation is proposed or
imminent. Furthermore, because of the technical nature of cybercrime and cybersecurity,
government should expect misunderstandings of cyber-threats and their effects. Arguments
in this thesis also demonstrate that regardless of the nature of cyber threats and crime, the
challenges of enforcement, investigations and prosecution are likely to be the same. The
analyses further suggest that because of the interconnection and interdependence enabled by
the internet, extant legislation which deals with core services or activities are no longer
adequate. Hence, data processing in different sectors including telecommunications,
financial services and all e-commerce may be regulated by a common legislation such a data
protection law.
Overall, the analyses in the thesis demonstrate that for developing the digital economy, the
same regulatory modalities used for real world transactions are applicable and useable.
Therefore, a ‘wait and see’ policy approach to regulating emerging technologies is neither
necessary nor conventional wisdom. This is particularly true when fundamental interests
such as protection of human rights, prevention of crimes and the financial welfare of the
nation or even of individuals is at stake.
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